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  • PTAB · May 14, 2021 · IPR2020-00712 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner leave to file Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination testimony as an exhibit, finding it could not have been obtained earlier and that the interests of justice supported admission.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “To the extent Patent Owner’s request for leave did not specifically encompass relief pursuant to Rule 42.123(b) and, therefore, lies outside of a proper request for rehearing, we find in the interests of efficiency in the proceedings that we may consider whether Patent Owner’s Request satisfies Rule 42.123(b), in light of the arguments advanced by both parties, rather than, for example, require Patent Owner to refile its request for leave pursuant to Rule 42.123(b). We further find that Patent Owner’s arguments sufficiently show that the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran could not have been obtained earlier (by virtue of it being cross-examination testimony). Petitioner’s contention that Patent Owner had “unfettered access” to Dr. Mihran does not suggest that the cross-examination testimony to be filed as an exhibit, based on questioning by Petitioner, could have been obtained earlier. See Resp. 9. Further, we are persuaded that the interests-of-justice support allowing the cross-examination testimony to be entered in the record as an exhibit, including the interests of allowing each party to rely on evidence developed during trial to support or attack the credibility of a declarant. See Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable fact finder would refuse to consider evidence of inconsistent sworn testimony. Moreover, any such inconsistencies would likely bear on the overall credibility of the expert.”). We considered Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner seeks to use improperly the cross-examination testimony to support its sur-reply, because “Dr. Mihran developed new arguments and opinions that Patent Owner would like to advance.” Id. at 7–8. To be clear, we make no finding on whether any testimony in the transcript of Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination may be properly relied on by Patent Owner in support of the sur-reply in each case and do not limit Petitioner’s ability to contest Patent Owner’s use of the cross-examination testimony. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the cross-examination testimony in support of its sur-replies, Petitioner may dispute whether such reliance is proper. Petitioner may also choose to request leave to file additional briefing to respond to arguments advanced by Patent Owner citing the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran. We, therefore, conclude that the interests-of-justice favor allowing Patent Owner to file the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran as an exhibit.” slip op. at 7

    • Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedGranted

      “encompass relief pursuant to Rule 42.123(b) and, therefore, lies outside of a proper request for rehearing, we find in the interests of efficiency in the proceedings that we may consider whether Patent Owner’s Request satisfies Rule 42.123(b), in light of the arguments advanced by both parties, rather than, for example, require Patent Owner to refile its request for leave pursuant to Rule 42.123(b). We further find that Patent Owner’s arguments sufficiently show that the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran could not have been obtained earlier (by virtue of it being cross-examination testimony). Petitioner’s contention that Patent Owner had “unfettered access” to Dr. Mihran does not suggest that the cross-examination testimony to be filed as an exhibit, based on questioning by Petitioner, could have been obtained earlier. See Resp. 9. Further, we are persuaded that the interests-of-justice support allowing the cross-examination testimony to be entered in the record as an exhibit, including the interests of allowing each party to rely on evidence developed during trial to support or attack the credibility of a declarant. See Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable fact finder would refuse to consider evidence of inconsistent sworn testimony. Moreover, any such inconsistencies would likely bear on the overall credibility of the expert.”). We considered Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner seeks to use improperly the cross-examination testimony to support its sur-reply, because “Dr. Mihran developed new arguments and opinions that Patent Owner would like to advance.” Id. at 7–8. To be clear, we make no finding on whether any testimony in the transcript of Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination may be properly relied on by Patent Owner in support of the sur-reply in each case and do not limit Petitioner’s ability to contest Patent Owner’s use of the cross-examination testimony. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the cross-examination testimony in support of its sur-replies, Petitioner may dispute whether such reliance is proper. Petitioner may also choose to request leave to file additional briefing to respond to arguments advanced by Patent Owner citing the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran. We, therefore, conclude that the interests-of-justice favor allowing Patent Owner to file the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran as an exhibit.” slip op. at 7

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,738,148
  • PTAB · May 14, 2021 · IPR2020-00680 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner leave to file Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination testimony as an exhibit, finding it could not have been obtained earlier and admission served the interests of justice.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “encompass relief pursuant to Rule 42.123(b) and, therefore, lies outside of a proper request for rehearing, we find in the interests of efficiency in the proceedings that we may consider whether Patent Owner’s Request satisfies Rule 42.123(b), in light of the arguments advanced by both parties, rather than, for example, require Patent Owner to refile its request for leave pursuant to Rule 42.123(b). We further find that Patent Owner’s arguments sufficiently show that the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran could not have been obtained earlier (by virtue of it being cross-examination testimony). Petitioner’s contention that Patent Owner had “unfettered access” to Dr. Mihran does not suggest that the cross-examination testimony to be filed as an exhibit, based on questioning by Petitioner, could have been obtained earlier. See Resp. 9. Further, we are persuaded that the interests-of-justice support allowing the cross-examination testimony to be entered in the record as an exhibit, including the interests of allowing each party to rely on evidence developed during trial to support or attack the credibility of a declarant. See Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable fact finder would refuse to consider evidence of inconsistent sworn testimony. Moreover, any such inconsistencies would likely bear on the overall credibility of the expert.”). We considered Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner seeks to use improperly the cross-examination testimony to support its sur-reply, because “Dr. Mihran developed new arguments and opinions that Patent Owner would like to advance.” Id. at 7–8. To be clear, we make no finding on whether any testimony in the transcript of Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination may be properly relied on by Patent Owner in support of the sur-reply in each case and do not limit Petitioner’s ability to contest Patent Owner’s use of the cross-examination testimony. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the cross-examination testimony in support of its sur-replies, Petitioner may dispute whether such reliance is proper. Petitioner may also choose to request leave to file additional briefing to respond to arguments advanced by Patent Owner citing the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran. We, therefore, conclude that the interests-of-justice favor allowing Patent Owner to file the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran as an exhibit.” slip op. at 7

    • Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedGranted

      “encompass relief pursuant to Rule 42.123(b) and, therefore, lies outside of a proper request for rehearing, we find in the interests of efficiency in the proceedings that we may consider whether Patent Owner’s Request satisfies Rule 42.123(b), in light of the arguments advanced by both parties, rather than, for example, require Patent Owner to refile its request for leave pursuant to Rule 42.123(b). We further find that Patent Owner’s arguments sufficiently show that the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran could not have been obtained earlier (by virtue of it being cross-examination testimony). Petitioner’s contention that Patent Owner had “unfettered access” to Dr. Mihran does not suggest that the cross-examination testimony to be filed as an exhibit, based on questioning by Petitioner, could have been obtained earlier. See Resp. 9. Further, we are persuaded that the interests-of-justice support allowing the cross-examination testimony to be entered in the record as an exhibit, including the interests of allowing each party to rely on evidence developed during trial to support or attack the credibility of a declarant. See Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable fact finder would refuse to consider evidence of inconsistent sworn testimony. Moreover, any such inconsistencies would likely bear on the overall credibility of the expert.”). We considered Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner seeks to use improperly the cross-examination testimony to support its sur-reply, because “Dr. Mihran developed new arguments and opinions that Patent Owner would like to advance.” Id. at 7–8. To be clear, we make no finding on whether any testimony in the transcript of Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination may be properly relied on by Patent Owner in support of the sur-reply in each case and do not limit Petitioner’s ability to contest Patent Owner’s use of the cross-examination testimony. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the cross-examination testimony in support of its sur-replies, Petitioner may dispute whether such reliance is proper. Petitioner may also choose to request leave to file additional briefing to respond to arguments advanced by Patent Owner citing the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran. We, therefore, conclude that the interests-of-justice favor allowing Patent Owner to file the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran as an exhibit.” slip op. at 7

    • Strike new argumentNot reached

      “allowing the cross-examination testimony to be entered in the record as an exhibit, including the interests of allowing each party to rely on evidence developed during trial to support or attack the credibility of a declarant. See Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable fact finder would refuse to consider evidence of inconsistent sworn testimony. Moreover, any such inconsistencies would likely bear on the overall credibility of the expert.”). We considered Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner seeks to use improperly the cross-examination testimony to support its sur-reply, because “Dr. Mihran developed new arguments and opinions that Patent Owner would like to advance.” Id. at 7–8. To be clear, we make no finding on whether any testimony in the transcript of Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination may be properly relied on by Patent Owner in support of the sur-reply in each case and do not limit Petitioner’s ability to contest Patent Owner’s use of the cross-examination testimony. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the cross-examination testimony in support of its sur-replies, Petitioner may dispute whether such reliance is proper. Petitioner may also choose to request leave to file additional briefing to respond to arguments advanced by Patent Owner citing the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran. We, therefore, conclude that the interests-of-justice favor allowing Patent Owner to file the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran as an exhibit.” slip op. at 7

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,457,758
  • PTAB · May 14, 2021 · IPR2020-00678 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner leave to file Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination testimony as an exhibit in each proceeding, finding that it could not have been obtained earlier and that admission served the interests of justice.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “To the extent Patent Owner’s request for leave did not specifically encompass relief pursuant to Rule 42.123(b) and, therefore, lies outside of a proper request for rehearing, we find in the interests of efficiency in the proceedings that we may consider whether Patent Owner’s Request satisfies Rule 42.123(b), in light of the arguments advanced by both parties, rather than, for example, require Patent Owner to refile its request for leave pursuant to Rule 42.123(b). We further find that Patent Owner’s arguments sufficiently show that the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran could not have been obtained earlier (by virtue of it being cross-examination testimony). Petitioner’s contention that Patent Owner had “unfettered access” to Dr. Mihran does not suggest that the cross-examination testimony to be filed as an exhibit, based on questioning by Petitioner, could have been obtained earlier. See Resp. 9. Further, we are persuaded that the interests-of-justice support allowing the cross-examination testimony to be entered in the record as an exhibit, including the interests of allowing each party to rely on evidence developed during trial to support or attack the credibility of a declarant. See Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable fact finder would refuse to consider evidence of inconsistent sworn testimony. Moreover, any such inconsistencies would likely bear on the overall credibility of the expert.”). We considered Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner seeks to use improperly the cross-examination testimony to support its sur-reply, because “Dr. Mihran developed new arguments and opinions that Patent Owner would like to advance.” Id. at 7–8. To be clear, we make no finding on whether any testimony in the transcript of Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination may be properly relied on by Patent Owner in support of the sur-reply in each case and do not limit Petitioner’s ability to contest Patent Owner’s use of the cross-examination testimony. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the cross-examination testimony in support of its sur-replies, Petitioner may dispute whether such reliance is proper. Petitioner may also choose to request leave to file additional briefing to respond to arguments advanced by Patent Owner citing the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran. We, therefore, conclude that the interests-of-justice favor allowing Patent Owner to file the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran as an exhibit.” slip op. at 7

    • Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedGranted

      “encompass relief pursuant to Rule 42.123(b) and, therefore, lies outside of a proper request for rehearing, we find in the interests of efficiency in the proceedings that we may consider whether Patent Owner’s Request satisfies Rule 42.123(b), in light of the arguments advanced by both parties, rather than, for example, require Patent Owner to refile its request for leave pursuant to Rule 42.123(b). We further find that Patent Owner’s arguments sufficiently show that the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran could not have been obtained earlier (by virtue of it being cross-examination testimony). Petitioner’s contention that Patent Owner had “unfettered access” to Dr. Mihran does not suggest that the cross-examination testimony to be filed as an exhibit, based on questioning by Petitioner, could have been obtained earlier. See Resp. 9. Further, we are persuaded that the interests-of-justice support allowing the cross-examination testimony to be entered in the record as an exhibit, including the interests of allowing each party to rely on evidence developed during trial to support or attack the credibility of a declarant. See Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable fact finder would refuse to consider evidence of inconsistent sworn testimony. Moreover, any such inconsistencies would likely bear on the overall credibility of the expert.”). We considered Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner seeks to use improperly the cross-examination testimony to support its sur-reply, because “Dr. Mihran developed new arguments and opinions that Patent Owner would like to advance.” Id. at 7–8. To be clear, we make no finding on whether any testimony in the transcript of Dr. Mihran’s cross-examination may be properly relied on by Patent Owner in support of the sur-reply in each case and do not limit Petitioner’s ability to contest Patent Owner’s use of the cross-examination testimony. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the cross-examination testimony in support of its sur-replies, Petitioner may dispute whether such reliance is proper. Petitioner may also choose to request leave to file additional briefing to respond to arguments advanced by Patent Owner citing the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran. We, therefore, conclude that the interests-of-justice favor allowing Patent Owner to file the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Mihran as an exhibit.” slip op. at 7

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,774,069
  • PTAB · Mar 8, 2017 · IPR2016-00647 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Rehearing

    Granted petitioner’s request for reconsideration and added institution of the §102 Cioffi challenge to claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “III. CONCLUSIONS For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that our Decision to Institute overlooked or misapprehended the matters discussed in this Decision, and that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its challenge as to the patentability of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 as being anticipated by Cioffi. The Board has not made a final determination on the patentability of any challenged claims or the construction of any claim terms. Our final decision will be based on the record as fully developed during trial.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 6,430,148
  • PTAB · Mar 31, 2016 · IPR2015-00504 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing only as to addressing the request’s assertions and otherwise denied rehearing, leaving the denial of institution for claims 1, 9, 10, 12, 30, 42, and 45 over Kitamura in place.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

      “II. ANALYSIS When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Dr. Baker goes on to further interpret Kitamura (id. at ¶¶ 75–79), citing additional references (Exs. 1012, 1013), but those additional references do not form part of the obviousness ground, and are not cited in the Petition. We further note Petitioner may rely on expert testimony to interpret patents and printed publications, but may not rely on such testimony as a substitute for a patent or printed publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). We remain persuaded that Dr. Baker does not interpret Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit as requiring the selection of an analog signal, but rather indicates that only as a possible interpretation of Kitamura. As we stated in the Decision, Dr. Baker’s discussion makes clear how the output voltages could be set, but he does not testify that it must employ his discussed methods. Dec. 10.” slip op. at 6

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Ex. 1003 ¶ 74 (citing Exhibit 1004 at 21:27-31). We were not persuaded that Dr. Baker is testifying as to how the circuit must perform, only how it could perform. 5 Dr. Baker goes on to further interpret Kitamura (id. at ¶¶ 75–79), citing additional references (Exs. 1012, 1013), but those additional references do not form part of the obviousness ground, and are not cited in the Petition. We further note Petitioner may rely on expert testimony to interpret patents and printed publications, but may not rely on such testimony as a substitute for a patent or printed publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). We remain persuaded that Dr. Baker does not interpret Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit as requiring the selection of an analog signal, but rather indicates that only as a possible interpretation of Kitamura. As we stated in the Decision, Dr. Baker’s discussion makes clear how the output voltages could be set, but he does not testify that it must employ his discussed methods. Dec. 10. Petitioner also argues that we mischaracterized what aspects Dr. Baker relied upon in making his assessment. Reh’g Req. 8–9. Petitioner continues that Dr. Baker cites to Kitamura’s explicit disclosure, as well as corroborating his explanation with citations to textbook knowledge, but that we failed to credit the same. Id. at 8. We do not agree. We fully reviewed all of Dr. Baker’s testimony and corroborating citations, but we were not persuaded that Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit must function as Dr. Baker suggests it could function. In other words, we do not doubt Dr. Baker’s facts; we are only unpersuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony states sufficiently that Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit must select among specific analog reference voltages.” slip op. at 5

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 5,764,571
  • PTAB · Jun 1, 2015 · IPR2014-01448 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Rehearing

    Rehearing was granted for claims 1 and 7 under § 103 over He and Korodi, and denied for the He and Currie ground.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

      “Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, on rehearing, based on our review of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the combination of He and Korodi. Therefore, we modify our Decision to institute an inter partes review of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Korodi. We determine, however, that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute review on the asserted ground based on He and Currie, and rehearing is denied as to that ground. At this stage in the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims, including the claim construction.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther

      “Based on the record before us, we are persuaded Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we are persuaded the combination of He and Korodi is a proper combination.” slip op. at 10

    • Burden

      “With regard to the asserted ground of unpatentability of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Currie, Petitioner does not explain adequately the relative strengths or weaknesses of this ground and the grounds on which we have instituted. See Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Constellation Tech. LLC, Case IPR2014-01180, slip op. at 29–30 (PTAB Feb. 8, 2015) (Paper 8). The Currie reference has a filing date of September 24, 2004 and an issuance date of October 17, 2006. Thus, the Currie reference would not be prior art if Patent Owner were successful in establishing a conception date “at least as early as April 2004” and diligence from conception to reduction to practice. See Prelim. Resp. 11. Accordingly, the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing do not apply to the combination of He and Currie. Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground.” slip op. at 11

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,671,279

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.