- Banilla Games, Inc. v. Savvy Dog Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2020 · CBM2020-00014 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because the remaining claims did not establish that the patent claims a financial product or service, as required for CBM review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). For reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that the challenged patent qualifies as a covered business method patent. Accordingly, we decline to institute a covered business method patent review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the limitations “determining a winning combination” and “testing the game field . . . to ensure that a winning combination more valuable . . .” are not financial in nature. Beginning with “winning combination,” we agree with Patent Owner that “winning,” by itself, is not necessarily monetary in nature. Prelim. Resp. 28. Indeed, other games include the step of determining whether a combination is a “winning combination” or not without necessarily involving any kind of prize or payout. See id. at 29–30. Instead, as is shown in the ’223 patent, some additional step after the determination of who won is necessarily if there is going to be some monetary payout corresponding to the win. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 6 (showing Step 630 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), Fig. 8 (showing Step 820 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), 6:34–40 (explaining a player “may” redeem points earned in the game for cash). Petitioner identifies nothing in the specification requiring that money be paid for just winning. Moreover, the ’223 patent makes clear that the games are intended broadly for “entertainment” and “amusement” and not just for gambling. See id. at 1:13–15 (explaining patent is related to “amusement and entertainment electronic gaming”). As Patent Owner explains, the ’223 patent expressly discusses the use of the games in Ohio, which prohibits gambling, but permits the use of games of skill for entertainment purposes. See Prelim. Resp. 52–58 (discussing Ohio’s laws in detail); Ex. 1001, 1:18–33 (describing Ohio’s laws prohibiting gambling, but allowing “games of skill”). Thus, at best, “winning combination” relates only to the possibility that a monetary payout could be received, not that a player necessarily will receive anything of monetary value for playing the game. This possibility is insufficient to meet the financial product or service requirement. See Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382 (noting “it cannot be the case that a patent covering a method and corresponding apparatuses becomes a CBM patent because its practice could involve a potential sale of a good or service” and “[i]t is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the specification speculates such a potential sale might occur”).” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,736,223 - Workspot, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2020 · IPR2019-01002 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, 7–9, 12, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 29, and 30 were not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because the references did not teach the required distinct content and web server limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We credit the testimony of Dr. Hernandez on step (a), as it explains in detail the deficiencies in Petitioner’s position and is consistent with the references’ disclosures discussed above. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 90–92, 95. Based on the full record developed during trial and for the reasons explained above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Craft and Duursma teach step (a) of claim 1. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Craft and Duursma under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 30
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Reply is improper because it was not raised adequately in the Petition. See Sur-Reply 9–11. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” “‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Practice Guide at 74; see also Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Board did not err in refusing to consider portions of a reply declaration “rais[ing] a new obviousness argument for [a claim] limitation that could have been made in the petition” but was not); Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369–70 (concluding that the Board did not err in refusing to consider reply brief arguments advocating a “new theory” of unpatentability under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). Petitioner in its Petition never referenced any specific “software” executed by web server 49a or “portion” of web server 49a, instead referring to the device throughout as a singular entity. See Pet. 50–63. The word “software” appears only four times in the Petition, and never in reference to web server 49a of Zoller. See id. at 52, 61, 66, 77. Mr. Zoller in his declaration likewise does not refer to any particular software or portion of web server 49a. See Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 119–163, pp. 106–123. Mr. Zoller’s” slip op. at 45
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We credit the testimony of Dr. Hernandez on step (a), as it explains in detail the deficiencies in Petitioner’s position and is consistent with the references’ disclosures discussed above. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 90–92, 95. Based on the full record developed during trial and for the reasons explained above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Craft and Duursma teach step (a) of claim 1. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Craft and Duursma under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 30
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’843 patent and the types of problems and prior art solutions described in the ’843 patent, we adopt the preliminary definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, with one clarification. The definition includes both an education and a work experience component. The education component is satisfied by a bachelor’s degree in computer science or equivalent education. We see no reason why such an education must have been acquired in a “formal” setting as Patent Owner suggests—as opposed to, for example, via on-the-job training or work experiences that would be the equivalent of the education one would receive by obtaining a bachelor’s degree in computer science. We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science (or equivalent education) and 3–4 years of experience working with remote-accessed skill for purposes of this Decision.5” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 8,135,843 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,135,843 - Amazon.Com, Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic InstituteRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01069 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Amazon’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 9–21 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (emphasis added). When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision. Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).” slip op. at 3
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“system, e.g. how the system interprets words or phrases.” Apple IPR 6. Thus, the Apple IPR Board adopted Patent Owner’s argument that as applied to the prior art, the term “case” in “case information” requires “uses of the system contemplated by the invention, not uses of any other natural language processing system.” Apple IPR 6. The Board rejected that such prior use was found in rules regarding how the system interprets current word or phrase input. Id. We find that the Apple IPR discussed a user’s selection among possible choices, but also addressed that the “case” required use of the system of the ’798 invention. Id. at 5–6. Thus, we do not agree we misapprehended the meaning of the claim language. Req. Reh’g 2.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, in showing that claims 9– 21 would have been obvious over Livowsky;1 claims 10–12 and 14–16 would have been obvious over Livowsky and Shwartz;2 claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Shwartz and Livowsky; claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Shwartz and Weber;3 and claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Meng4 and Zhang.5 Dec. 17–18, 21–22, 23–24. For the reasons below, the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,177,798 - Amazon.Com, Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic InstituteRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01068 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Amazon’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–8 because Petitioner did not show the Board misapprehended the construction or prior-art evidence.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (emphasis added). When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision. Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).” slip op. at 3
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“interpretation of the claim construction in the Apple IPR. See Req. Reh’g 3. The Apple IPR cites the embodiment from the ’798 patent specification (Ex. 1001, 5:36–38, 16:52–17:5). Apple IPR 5–6. The Board in the Apple IPR expressly clarified that in the case information construction “‘instances of use’ of the system [did not] mean indications cover instances of use of the system, e.g. how the system interprets words or phrases.” Apple IPR 6. Thus, the Apple IPR Board adopted Patent Owner’s argument that as applied to the prior art, the term “case” in “case information” requires “uses of the system contemplated by the invention, not uses of any other natural language processing system.” Apple IPR 6. The Board rejected that such prior use was found in rules regarding how the system interprets current word or phrase input. Id. We find that the Apple IPR discussed a user’s selection among possible choices, but also addressed that the “case” required use of the system of the ’798 invention. Id. at 5–6. Thus, we do not agree we misapprehended the meaning of the claim language. Req. Reh’g 2.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information” to exclude clarifications from users. Id. at 5–6, 7–11. Petitioner argues that our Institution Decision adopts Patent Owner’s narrow construction and finds that “clarifying prompts” in grounds including Weber are not “case information.” Id. at 7–8. Our Institution Decision found that Petitioner did not persuasively and sufficiently assert how the prior art disclosed the “case information.” Dec 19–20. Our determination was based on the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence and argument in the regarding whether Weber’s prompting the user for information, which was contested by Patent Owner, teaches or suggests “information about prior instances of use of the natural language processing method.” Dec. 19–20 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s arguments does not identify any evidence we overlooked or misapprehended. Req. Reh’g 7–8. Instead, Petitioner characterizes our Institution Decision as broadly excluding user prompts. Our determination was based on the full claim construction, which is supported by the Apple IPR’s emphasis of “prior instances of use of the natural language processing method.” Apple IPR 5–6; Dec. 19–20.” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,177,798 - Facebook, Inc. / Instagram, LLC et al. v. Blackberry LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2020 · IPR2019-00925 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4–7, 10–13, and 16–18 are unpatentable, principally as obvious over Ording, Abiko, and Dvorak, with McPherson added for claims 6, 12, and 18.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“teachings accounts for the “numeric character” limitation. First, Ording, as stated above, already teaches that the icon can include a numeric character that is updated to reflect new messages. Pet. 41; Ex. 1103, 13:12−21. Thus, the technical feature of displaying and updating a number on a displayed icon to reflect the status of an e-mail folder is known, as taught by Ording. The remaining issue is whether it would have been obvious for Ording’s number to mean something else. That meaning is provided by Abiko’s e-mail program, which Petitioner contends, and we agree, places a distinct emphasis on organizing e-mail by senders. Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1109 ¶ 11). According to Petitioner, and we agree, Abiko “explains that the menu information, which includes the number of distinct senders (e.g., Fig. 10(b)), could be created ‘when a new message is received.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1109 ¶ 15) (emphasis omitted). Dr. Chatterjee’s testimony, which we credit in this regard, is that Abiko’s sender table and menu essentially count the number of distinct senders, and that this count would have reflected distinct sender’s unread emails because “new messages generally hold more 29 immediate importance to the user because their contents are yet unknown.” Chatterjee Decl. ¶¶ 95−96. In sum, we find that the combination of teachings boils down to Abiko’s e-mail program supplying the count of senders from which unread messages remain in the inbox, and supplies this count for Ording’s icon to display. The reason to combine is twofold. First, Abiko teaches sender-focused e-mail organization, which a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found useful for supplying a count of senders. Ex. 1109 ¶¶ 11, 15. Second, Dr. Chatterjee testifies on the importance of focusing on newly received messages, and that based on that recognition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have implemented Abiko’s sender table to report on the unread messages by sender. Chatterjee Decl. ¶¶ 95−96. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new inventions does.”).” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelOther
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In that regard, Petitioner proffers that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a bachelor’s degree in software engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering with at least two years of experience in software application development, including development of graphical applications on wireless devices, such as development of associated user interface features and functionality (or equivalent degree or experience).” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12−15). Patent Owner, through the Declaration of Dr. Surati, proffers a similar level of education and experience, except for adding that the two years of experience may involve either work or research experience in the fields of “computer hardware, networking, and/or user experience design, or an equivalent subject matter, sufficient to understand fundamental computer 10 networking and hardware architecture and user-interface design.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 7−9). Although we are confronted with very similar proposals from both parties, neither party argues that the obviousness determination hinges on a particular level of ordinary skill. And our decision here is the same regardless of which proposal we adopt as the appropriate level of ordinary skill. Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to define the level of skill with specificity save to note that the level of ordinary skill is evidenced by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededOther
“Patent Owner “does not dispute these three interpretations for purposes of this” proceeding. PO Resp. 12−13. Petitioner does not raise any claim construction disputes. See generally Reply 28. Accordingly, we adopt the above-identified claim construction positions as our final determination and note that no claim terms are in dispute. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we do not expressly construe any other term. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, 9 Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Ording’s userbar icon with the wireless mobile device of Abiko. We credit the testimony of Dr. Chatterjee, summarized above, in this regard. As stated above, Ording touts the usefulness of the userbar, specifically to address a limited screen space environment, which undoubtedly includes a mobile device display. Further, we agree with and credit Dr. Chatterjee’s testimony (Chatterjee Decl. ¶ 74) that as mobile devices were becoming widely available by December 2003, with increasing number of features and applications, including email messaging, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make those features and applications easier to access by providing the Ording user interface (read here, the userbar with the icon representing the features and applications). Such a motivation 19 comports with KSR’s guidance that “[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look to . . . the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace, and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR Int’l Co., v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418−419 (2017). Patent Owner argues that the Petition proffers five layers of modifications to Ording’s computer. PO Resp. 14; see also Sur-Reply 1−4. Patent Owner identifies the combination of Ording’s icon with Abiko’s wireless mobile device as the first “modification to Ording’s computer.” PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner asserts that each modification must be supported by an articulated reasoning, and argues that Petitioner failed to show any. Id. at 15−16; Sur-Reply 1−4. Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, Petitioner is not relying on any modification of Ording. The asserted reasoning for the combination is that Abiko’s wireless mobile device would benefit from the teaching of Ording’s userbar with icons. Second, Petitioner has provided sufficient articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning supporting the motivation to combine as stated above—focusing on a market demand and the recognized benefit of using the userbar with Abiko’s device.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,209,634 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,209,634 - PTAB · Sep 15, 2020 · IPR2020-00282 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“a party requests rehearing on a decision on whether to institute inter partes review, we “review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). There is an abuse of discretion if we have made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing [our] decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We disagree. Nowhere in the cited passages in the Petition does Samsung argue that we should construe the term “row wrap-around connections” according to the explicit construction that Samsung now suggests for the plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 10–11, 25–30. Rather, Samsung argued that “Petitioners do not believe any term requires explicit construction.” Pet. 10–11. In the Reply, Samsung argued that all of the terms in the challenged claims should be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See Reply 1, 4–5. However, apart from arguing that Samsung had proposed construing limitation 1C in the co-pending district court proceeding according to its plain and ordinary meaning,3 Samsung did not propose any specific construction for the phrase “row wrap-around connection,” or point to any evidence as to what the ordinary and customary meaning of that phrase was to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we decline to adopt Samsung’s new proposed construction on rehearing.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We determined that Samsung had not provided sufficient evidence of its proposed motivation to combine the two references. See Dec. 16 (“[N]either Samsung nor Dr. Wolfe supports this conclusion with any evidence on the preliminary record.” (citing In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3))). In particular, we found that “Dr. Wolfe does not explain how or why the combination of Barkan and Tagg would minimize RC delay or allow for the use of lengthier columns and rows of electrodes, or cite to any facts, data, or authorities to support that opinion.” Dec. 17. We stated that “there is no evidence in the record suggesting that RC delay was a recognized problem . . . or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a connection to both sides of a row of electrodes would be a solution to that problem.” Id. We also stated that Dr. Wolfe does not “provide any detail as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Barkan’s leads 160 to incorporate external connections such as those in Tagg.” Id. (citing Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,821,502 - Ericsson Inc. v. Uniloc 2017, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 9, 2020 · IPR2020-00420 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Ericsson’s rehearing request and left in place the discretionary denial of institution for claims 1–5, 7, and 17 under General Plastic.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for patent owner
“considered whether Petitioner knew of prior art which disclosed the same material as what the allegedly recently discovered references disclose. Decision 10–11. The additional consideration was prompted by the Petition’s characterization of Alamouti as merely disclosing an “implementation detail” omitted by the Merakos and Kay. Pet. 28–29. Petitioner argues that the additional consideration of the criticality of the disclosure contained in the allegedly recently discovered prior art applies a new standard that is inconsistent with General Plastic. Reh’g Req. 11. We disagree. First, there is no inconsistency because General Plastic does not prohibit the consideration. Second, the consideration is not a new standard, because, in our view, it already is implicit in General Plastic. Typically, there is nothing to trigger it and an assumption is usually made that absence of the recently discovered reference is what kept Petitioner from filing the petition earlier. Here, the circumstance is different, because Alamouti, and Ling evidently as well, are used by Petitioner only to provide relatively less significant implementation details compared to what Merakos and Kay disclose. Third, Petitioner does not point to anything in General Plastic which approves a hypothetical petitioner’s possibly substituting a reference it has known for a long time with a recently obtained reference that discloses the same, to justify a delay in filing a petition. Thus, it is not” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“every single document in the related litigation. It was incumbent upon Petitioner to submit and identify material to support its assertions. Although we were willing to inspect the Complaint and any Amended Complaint, we were not willing to go further. It matters not whether a plaintiff asserting patent infringement is required to identify all asserted claims in the its assertion, and we need not even have looked in the Complaint.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s accounting must begin from when it first learned that Patent Owner had filed suit accusing products designed and manufactured by Petitioner of infringing claims of the ’079 patent.” Decision 12. Rather than accounting for the entire 10 month period from March 26, 2019 to January 17, 2020, the Petition only addressed 4 months. Pet. 73. Now, in the Request for Rehearing, Petitioner provides for consideration an explanation that purportedly covers the entire 10 month period. Reh’g Req. 7–10. The discussion and change of focus from 4 months to 10 months arguments after the original arguments are rejected. Accordingly, we decline to consider the new explanation that purportedly accounts for the full 10 month period. C. slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,868,079 - Facebook, Inc. / Instagram, LLC et al. v. Blackberry LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 1, 2020 · IPR2019-00706 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–11, 13–15, 17, 19–22, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious over the instituted combinations of Dallas, Brown, and Kent, with Bott, Mann, or LeBlanc as applicable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a bachelor’s degree in software engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or electrical engineering with at least two years of experience in software application development, including development of applications for messaging (or equivalent degree/experience).” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12–15). Because Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner” (PO Resp. 10), and because we find it generally consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art and the ’120 patent, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation. B.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The fundamental problem with the disputed language is that it causes the meaning of “notification” to turn on the interests, personality, perceptions, or actions of a user, rather than on the operation of the underlying program. As explained above, however, the notification described in the ’120 patent is simply a mechanism in the software that provides some sort of indication that a new message has been received. Unless it is silenced, that mechanism is triggered when a new message appears in the inbox, regardless of what the user of the software may or may not be doing at that time. 7. Conclusion We find no support for inclusion of the disputed language in the claims themselves, elsewhere in the ’120 patent, or in prosecution history; we find no extrinsic support, as Patent Owner’s expert offers only conclusory testimony; and we find that the disputed language would unnecessarily and improperly interject ambiguity into the claim. We thus do not adopt the disputed language and, instead, construe “notification” in the ’120 patent to mean “some form of visual, auditory, or physical cue to draw attention to an incoming message at the time of its receipt.” C.” slip op. at 23
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“4. Extrinsic Evidence Patent Owner also offers testimony of its expert in support of its claim construction. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 49–64. Although Dr. Smith contends that font color, bold text, and italics cannot be “notifications” because “[a person of skill in the art] would not have understood any of these display characteristics as a claimed ‘notification,’” he cites no evidence to support that bare conclusion and does not explain why font color and the like could not be notifications. See id. ¶ 52. We thus give this testimony little weight. Dr. Smith also reiterates Patent Owner’s arguments about “alerts,” the “manner of display,” and “bothering,” which we find unpersuasive for the reasons explained above. See id. ¶¶ 56–60. Dr. Smith further argues that Dallas’ flags, icons, and colors cannot be “notifications” because the user must be looking at their inbox in order to notice them. See id. at ¶¶ 53–55, 61–64. We find the question of whether Dallas’ flags, icons, and colors are “notifications” to be a matter of fact to be resolved in the patentability analysis, not a claim construction issue.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“c. Conclusion on the Independent Claims We find that Petitioner has shown how the combination of Dallas, Kent, and/or LeBlanc teaches all the limitations of independent claims 1, 13, and 24, that the combination is supported with sufficient motivations to combine, and that Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of these claims would have been obvious.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 9,349,120 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 9,349,120 - Snap Inc. v. Blackberry LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 13, 2020 · IPR2020-00392 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on § 314(a) discretionary grounds and denied joinder, citing the concluded district court case, prior petition, and delay in filing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered both the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we exercise our delegated discretion, under 35 U.S.C. § 314, to deny the Petition in this proceeding. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review. Because we deny institution of the Petition, we also deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“The precedential Fintiv Order identifies several factors to be considered in analyzing § 314(a) issues, with the goal of balancing efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. See Fintiv Order, Paper 11 at 5–6. These factors include: 1) whether a stay exists or is likely to be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2) proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline; 3) investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and parties; 4) overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6) other circumstances and considerations that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“As noted above, Petitioner filed IPR2019-00829 on March 25, 2019, which was already near the end of Petitioner’s statutory period. We denied institution on the merits on October 1, 2019. The Challenged Claims were part of this prior petition. Petitioner’s second petition, the current Petition, was filed on January 3, 2020. At that time, Petitioner had already received the Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response in IPR2019-00829 as well as our decision denying institution. Petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the current Petition at least as of April 6, 2019 – the date Facebook filed its petition in IPR2019-00940. Prelim. Resp. 3; Ex. 2001. Thus, Petitioner waited at least nine months after learning of the asserted prior art to bring the second petition. These factors favor exercising our discretion to deny institution. General Plastic Factors 5–7 Petitioner’s explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to nearly the same claims of the same patent consists of the following: Petitioner is also unaware of any basis under § 314(a) for the Board to decline to consider this Petition. As discussed in section I.B., Facebook previously filed an IPR petition challenging the ’929 patent on April 6, 2019. (Ex. 1022). Snap obtained Facebook’s petition, after it was filed and publicly available, from the Patent Office. Snap’s petition is a substantively identical copy of Facebook’s ’929 petition. (See Ex. 1022). Pet. 3. Petitioner does not address why we should institute a petition challenging claims that have already been disclaimed or found unpatentable by a district court. Petitioner also does not address the delay in bringing the current Petition even though Petitioner was aware of the prior art for at least nine months. The facts of this proceeding are unique, and Petitioner has not explained adequately why we should not exercise our discretion to deny this Petition.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“not obligate us to institute in this proceeding without first considering whether to exercise discretion. The statutory provision governing joinder in inter partes review proceedings is 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), which reads: If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. Two clauses within 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) are the source of discretion to deny joinder. The first states “the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party.” Thus, joinder is not required, but remains discretionary. Second, the statute requires an additional step. Acting under delegated authority from the Director, we first determine whether the petition warrants the institution of an inter partes review under § 314. Id. (“the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”). The statute allows for a patent owner preliminary response, and we read 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) as requiring us to consider all of patent owner’s arguments, including those related to discretionary denial under section 314(a).” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,676,929 - Snap Inc. v. Blackberry LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 13, 2020 · IPR2020-00391 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1, 2, 9, 14, 15, and 21 under § 314(a), and denied Snap’s motion for joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Weighing the totality of the record before us, we determine that exercising our discretion, under 35 U.S.C. § 314, to deny the Petition in this proceeding is the proper outcome. As noted above, several factors weigh in favor of institution. We are most persuaded, however, by all the factors favoring exercising our discretion, including the advanced phase of the litigation. Despite knowing of the prior art for some time, Petitioner delayed filing the Petition until after all of the Challenged Claims had either been disclaimed or found to be unpatentable subject matter in a final district court decision.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“The Fintiv factors provide support for exercising discretion not to institute this Petition. See Fintiv Order, Paper 11 at 5–6. The district court case cannot be stayed because it has concluded. We would endeavor to meet our statutory deadline in December 2020, one year after the district court issued final judgment. The parties’ and district court’s investment in the district court case was sufficient to already reach a final adjudication. Now, the parties are involved in a Federal Circuit appeal that may or may not affirm the district court’s determinations. Petitioner and the defendant in the district court case are also the same party. These factors favor exercising discretion. The issues do not necessarily overlap between the petition and the parallel proceeding because the district court reached final judgment based on 35 U.S.C. § 101, which is not before us. We also weigh the potential burdens, and joining Patent Owner to an already existing proceeding would not increase the burden for Patent Owner or for the Board. These factors favor not exercising discretion and instituting review.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“Patent Owner has shown that Petitioner knew of at least the Noble, Hassett, and Johnson prior art references as of October 29, 2018. Prelim. Resp. 3; Ex. 2001. As shown above, Noble serves as the primary reference in each of Petitioner’s four grounds, while Hassett and Johnson are in two grounds each. Pet. 2–3. Thus, Petitioner waited at least fourteen months after learning of the asserted prior art to bring the second petition. These factors favor exercising our discretion to deny institution. General Plastic Factors 5–7” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. Two clauses within 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) are the source of discretion to deny joinder. The first states “the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party.” Thus, joinder is not required, but remains discretionary. Second, the statute requires an additional step. Acting under delegated authority from the Director, we first determine whether the petition warrants the institution of an inter partes review under § 314. Id. (“the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”). The statute allows for a patent owner preliminary response, and we read 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) as requiring us to consider all of patent owner’s arguments, including those related to discretionary denial under section 314(a).” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,296,351
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.