• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00371 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Takagi, Cornette, Suehiro, GMW14400, Laurent, and Vaissiere.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’227 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer The only independent claim at issue, claim 1, recites a “Superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:6. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’227 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, experts)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the extrinsic sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions). Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’227 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. Claim 1 indicates that the intermetallic layer has a “mean composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:1–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry—consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1001, 2:47–50. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’227 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Rabbe’s testimony. Dr. Rabbe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’227 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:60–64 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating … which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076 ¶ 166; Ex ¶ 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s construction of “intermetallic” for this proceeding does not fully account for the ’227 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently mean compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Because IHS was a company that created an online database with the purpose of providing (selling) standards including General Motors standards to the public, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to look to this database and would have been able to find GMW14400. Patent Owner presents no evidence to the contrary. Because a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner, we determine Petitioner establishes GMW14400 is qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,326,227 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,326,227
• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00370 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–16). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’602 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer All independent claims at issue, claims 1, 21, and 24, recite a “superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:11, 16:60, 17:21. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’602 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions) Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’602 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. The claims indicate that the intermetallic layer has a “mean iron composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:6–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that the iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry— consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Id. at 2:50–54. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’602 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Raabe’s testimony. Dr. Raabe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’602 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:57–61 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating . . . which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076, 166; Ex. 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s definition of “intermetallic” does not fully account for the ’602 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently defined mean iron compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “have had reason to combine teachings of Takagi and Cornette with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 11–20 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28– 42; Ex. 1016 ¶ 35; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1025, 5:17–20; Ex. 1026, 7; Ex. 1034 ¶ 13). In particular, Petitioner argues that Takagi discloses a pre-coating thickness of 10–20 µm but does not explicitly disclose a post hot-stamping coating thickness corresponding to the pre-coating thickness. Pet. 11. Cornette teaches that the hot-stamping thickness causes coating expansion from 25 µm to about 40 µm, an increase of 60%. Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner and Dr. Miles reason that, when hot stamping Takagi’s product, the thickness would be 32 µm. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32); see also Pet. Reply 20–21. Thus, Patent Owner argues that Cornette evidences Takagi’s finally coating thickness without requiring modification of Takagi. Petitioner further argues that Takagi and Cornette teach that post hot- stamping thickness could be varied and optimized as a result effective variable. Id. at 12–13; see also Pet. Reply 17–18. Cornette teaches, for example, that “[t]he average [pre-coating] layer thickness showing the best compromise between corrosion protection and weldability is 25 µm” and links this pre-coating thickness to a final thickness of “about 40 µm at the steel surface.” Ex. 1014, 9. Petitioner also argues that it would have been obvious to fill in other details of Takagi including, for example, selecting USIBOR 1500 steel, based on the teachings of Cornette. Pet. 14. Patent Owner argues that there is no reason to combine Takagi with the teachings of Cornette. PO Resp. 26. Patent Owner makes seven related arguments. Patent Owner first argues that the Petitioner’s position is speculative and lacks basis. Id. at 26–27. We disagree. Cornette evidences a final coating thickness for Takagi, and the references also suggest that final coating thickness is result effective. Second, Patent Owner argues that there would have been no incentive to seek a motivation to seek a thicker coating post-hot stamping. Id. at 28– 35. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s position that Takagi, by itself, would have reached a thicker coating after stamping as evidenced by Cornette. Pet. 11–12. Petitioner takes the position, with evidence, that practice of Takagi alone would reach the recited thickness. No motivation to modify Takagi is required under this position.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,961,602 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,961,602
• Google LLC v. Escapex IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00337 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103: claims 1–3, 5–6, 13–15, 17–18 over Fuloria and Andler; the remaining claims over combinations adding WO ’100, Bartholomew, Kirk, or Cheung.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar field and three years of professional computer programming experience, including experience with networked media and databases, where additional education can substitute for experience or vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–31). In the Decision on Institution, Inst. 7–8. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed definition “because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’687 [p]atent as well as the asserted prior art.” PO Resp. 4; Tr. 36:4–18. Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’687 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’687 patent and cited prior art, we maintain the previously adopted definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that the term “engagement” in independent claims 1, 11–13, 23, and 24 is defined in the Specification of the ’687 patent and should be interpreted to mean “an indication that a user should be distinguished with respect to the content over another user.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 53–55; Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). Patent Owner agrees that the Specification “defines” the term in that manner. PO Resp. 13. The Board did not interpret any terms in the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 9. We agree with the parties’ proposed interpretation of “engagement” and apply it for purposes of this Decision, based on the Specification’s disclosure that “[a] user engagement with content refers to an indication that a user should be distinguished with” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “No other terms require express interpretation to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 10,474,687 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,474,687
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01192 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of the Lorex Manual or Lorex Video with the identified references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute any of Petitioner’s contentions as to the effective filing date, stating in agreement with Petitioner’s asserted Effective Filing Date of the Challenged Claims that “[t]he ’916 Patent claims a priority of a provisional application 61/924,240 filed on January 7, 2014.” PO Resp. 8. Given that the parties are in agreement on the January 7, 2014, effective filing date, we similarly use January 7, 2014, as the effective filing date of the challenged claims for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Vlad Kardashov, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’916 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two 7 US 2012/0198040 A1, published August 2, 2012 (Ex. 1011, “Kuo”). 8 The subject ’916 patent claims priority to Kuo as a continuation-in-part of that earlier filed application. Ex. 1001, code (63). 9 Lorex Technology Inc., “How to set up remote access for DVR using - Lorex Stratus Connectivity” (June 18, 2013), available at https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fMPRi9WFuTM (Ex. 1012, the “Lorex Video”). 10 US 2012/0113265 A1, published May 10, 2012 (Ex. 1013, “Galvin”). years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’916 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner

    “that Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that the Lorex Manual was based on a disclosure made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. The Lorex Manual is relied on under Ground 1A, exclusively or in the alternative to or in combination with Kim, for all claim elements. Pet. 9– 31. Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that this subject matter was disclosed to Lorex by ThroughTek, much less by one of the inventors of the ’916 Patent.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 9,774,916 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,774,916
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. And Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed

    “construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,602,448
• Ericsson Inc. / Nokia Of America Corporation v. XR Communications LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00868 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–11, 13–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Trigui; claims 4–6, 13–15, and 18 are also unpatentable over Trigui and Rudrapatna.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art, or provide an alternative level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 9. In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which was also undisputed by Patent Owner at that stage of the proceeding. Inst. Dec. 11–12. Because nothing in the record establishes that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because there is no dispute, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Petitioner contends “[n]o specific construction of any term is required,” and Petitioner has applied the “ordinary and customary meaning” of the claim terms. Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner agrees that no formal claim construction is necessary.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner provides the Board with the district court’s constructions in the related litigation. Id. (citing 2007, 39).4 4 The Petition in this case was filed on May 8, 2024. In the related litigation, Patent Owner’s opening brief on claim construction was filed on July 15, 2024, defendants’ responsive brief on claim construction was filed on this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, to the extent necessary, we apply the district court’s constructions and the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Figures 6 and 10 show multiples of the system of Figure 2A. Id.; see also id. ¶ 81 (describing Figure 6) ¶ 85 (describing Figure 10). We find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments that Trigui’s arrays may consist of “subarrays.” See Pet. 24; Reply 9. For example, Trigui describes that “[t]he antenna arrays 256 may consist of sub-arrays where the antenna elements of each sub-array are combined passively to achieve a predefined pattern.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 50. To that end, Figure 6 shows one antenna array that consists of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements), and Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each consist of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements). See Pet. 28–32; Reply 9–11. Given this disclosure in Trigui, we do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that Figure 6 does not show a single antenna array, or that Figure 10 does not show two antenna arrays. PO Resp. 17–18. Patent Owner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Trigui’s sub-arrays are not intended to be combined. PO Resp. 18. This argument contradicts Trigui’s disclosure, which shows multiples of the hardware of Figure 2A in Figures 6 and 10, and encourages multiple operator sharing of passive antenna arrays and transceivers. See, e.g., Reply 4 (describing Trigui as “providing building blocks that should be combined to understand Trigui’s full teachings”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 48, 68. Trigui even states as much: Although FIG 2A illustrates only a single MIMO branch DIAA, the present invention contemplates the use of multiple MIMO branches (as will be illustrated below with reference to FIGS. 6–11) . . . Similarly, I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems, as well as the beamforming weights 214, can be sent to other MIMO branches. Patent Owner’s argument that “Trigui does not teach any relationship between the number of beams and the number of MIMO transceivers” is not well developed and is unpersuasive in light of Petitioner’s showing. Petitioner has demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 6 depicts one antenna array with two bi-directional beams. Pet. 27–28. Petitioner has further demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 10 depicts two antenna arrays, i.e., where m=2, where each array comprises a beamformer configured to produce n different bi-directional beams, i.e., where n=2. Id. at 28–29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 is reproduced below: Id. at 29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 shows two copies of the arrangement shown in Figure 6, where Petitioner has identified in red the two antenna arrays, and identified in blue the beams. That is, Trigui’s Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each produce two beams. Figures 3 and 4 of Trigui (PO Resp. 16–17) do not address Petitioner’s contentions. See Reply 6–7. Petitioner relies on Figures 4A and 4B to support that “[e]ach of Trigui’s arrays can produce multiple beams.” Pet. 26; Reply 7. Dr. Cooklev agrees. PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 91). However, as described above, Petitioner relies on Figure 6 to show “n” different bidirectional beams where n=2. Pet. 27. Petitioner does not rely on Figures 3 and 4 to teach the “n” number of beams. See Reply 7. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition provides no evidence for the “n different bidirectional beams.” See Sur-reply 11–12; see Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 9, 14, 74, 77, 81; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 192, 193).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Trigui explicitly discloses that its system may have multiple modems. See Pet. 38; Reply 15. For example, Figure 2A shows Modem A, Modem B, and Modem C for a single MIMO branch. Ex. 1004 Fig. 2A; see also id. ¶37 (“one or more modems 204, such as, for example, baseband modules of cellular base stations”) ¶ 41 (“I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems . . . can be sent to other MIMO branches”); see Pet. 34. We find persuasive Petitioner’s explanation, supported by testimony from Dr. Negus, that “Trigui teaches use cases in which two separate wireless network operators would share certain tower [equipment,] such as the antenna arrays, but each wireless network operator would have its own baseband unit (i.e., modems A for the first operator and B for the second operator).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 226–232); e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶ 48 (stating that “the present invention . . . enable[s] multiple operator sharing of a passive antenna array, transceivers, and the total available power of the DIAA”); id. (“[S]plitting resources between the multiple operators is flexible and should be done on the basis of the individual operator needs”); ¶ 2 (“enabling a versatile solution for sharing antenna elements and active electronics between multiple operators servicing the same geographic area”); see also Pet. 38–41 (providing further explanation that one modem would be implemented for each operator); Reply 18–21. Patent Owner agrees that the second modem would be for a different operator. PO Resp. 20 (stating that “[E]ven if a second modem is added, it would be for a different operator”).5 Therefore, we are persuaded 5 In the Sur-reply, Patent Owner argues the opposite; that the operators would not have separate modems. Sur-reply 4. We rely on Patent Owner’s modems that share the two DIAA arrays in Figure 10. Pet. 42; Reply 18; In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A reference must be considered for everything that it teaches, not simply the described invention or a preferred embodiment.”). Thus, we find that Petitioner’s proposed modification for Figure 10 is derived from Trigui’s disclosures, not through hindsight. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.3d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (“Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper”).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,737,511 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,737,511
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00983 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 10, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over Alexander and Cosper; the alternative Gregorio-based grounds did not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “112(f). Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But if the term does not use the word “means,” then it is presumed not to be subject to Section 112(f). Id. “That presumption can be overcome, but only if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “The correct inquiry, when ‘means’ is absent from a limitation, is whether the limitation, read in light of the remaining claim language, specification, prosecution history, and relevant extrinsic evidence, has sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “both parties have asserted in the Apple Litigation that the “control component” requirement is a means-plus-function limitation subject to 35 U.S.C. §112(f), despite the fact that the control component limitation does not recite “means for.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1012, 3–8; Ex. 1013, 13); PO Resp. 6–7. Indeed, the court in the Apple Litigation has concluded that the control component requirement is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and has construed that requirement accordingly: Function: receiving control signals input to the oscillating resonant module; receiving outputs from the one or more sensors; controlling oscillation of the mass to produce a vibration response according to the received control signals by generating, using one or more of the received sensor outputs, control outputs to an actuator that drives the mass to oscillate. Structure: a microcontroller, a processor, a microprocessor, or a CPU that performs the algorithm shown in Figure 45 or the algorithm described in the corresponding text. See, e.g., 31:19–32:13, and equivalents thereof. Ex. 2001, 10; Ex. 2002, 40. Because of the Apple Litigation record, Petitioner presents its challenges in the alternative, first applying a plain meaning approach to the control component requirement, and also analyzing the requirement under the construction adopted in the Apple Litigation. Pet. 3–5. We adopt the court’s construction in the Apple Litigation. 35 U.S.C.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of vibration-generating systems; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 2. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’882 patent specification.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “(1) Analogous Art Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,152,882 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,152,882
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00698 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 based on the asserted combinations of Izumi, Cosper, Rossi, Ibuki, and Aldrich.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi’s module to include multiple sensors in accordance with Cosper’s teachings. Pet. 15. Petitioner argues that the sensors would monitor the moving element and generate a control signal in accordance with Izumi. Id. at 15–16. Petitioner further argues that Izumi’s controller would have been implemented using a microprocessor and memory as Cosper suggests. Id. at 16. Petitioner argues three reasons why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi with Cosper’s teachings. Id. at 16–19. First, Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Cosper as a way to further Izumi’s objective of having a sensor that detects the and controls the movement of the moving element. Id. at 16–17. Second, Petitioner argues that the combination of Izumi and Cosper would have enhanced reliability of the feedback sensors by capturing “data specific to different operating parameters.” Id. at 17–18. Third, combining the references’ teachings would “facilitat[e] implementation of software instructions” by using a microprocessor and memory. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale to combine the references’ teachings. Based on our review and consideration of the record, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Izumi and Cosper in the manner Petitioner argues (“the Izumi-Cosper combination”).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,093,767
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00697 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable under § 103 based on the combinations of prior art listed in the decision.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention and states that “Patent Owner does not believe that any of the arguments herein would change if the Board were to adopt Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill rather than Patent Owner’s.” Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,093,767

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.