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  • PTAB · Sep 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00122 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted the petitioner's request to withdraw its rehearing request and granted the joint motion to terminate the proceeding.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “agreement to jointly seek termination of this proceeding, and “[b]ased on the settlement, Petitioner hereby requests withdrawal of its Request for Rehearing.” Joint Motion 1. We “may enter non-final orders to administer the proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.5. Here, the Board has not decided the merits of Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. Additionally, we stated in our Decision Denying Institution that “the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” Paper 7, 22. Under these circumstances, therefore, we determine that it is appropriate to grant the request to withdraw Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and terminate this proceeding as to the Parties. III. ORDER Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, it is: ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for withdrawal of its Request for Rehearing (Paper 8) is granted; and” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “agreement to jointly seek termination of this proceeding, and “[b]ased on the settlement, Petitioner hereby requests withdrawal of its Request for Rehearing.” Joint Motion 1. We “may enter non-final orders to administer the proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.5. Here, the Board has not decided the merits of Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. Additionally, we stated in our Decision Denying Institution that “the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” Paper 7, 22. Under these circumstances, therefore, we determine that it is appropriate to grant the request to withdraw Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and terminate this proceeding as to the Parties.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,061,190
  • PTAB · Apr 3, 2024 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing

    On rehearing, the Board held claim 3 unpatentable as obvious over Eray-WO799, revising the final written decision’s outcome for that claim.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “As stated in our Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art and found that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have possessed “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1–2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” Dec. 6–7 (citing Pet. 8; PO Resp. 18). Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Daniel van der Weide, supported Petitioner’s definition, which was adopted for this proceeding. Ex. 1003 ¶ 25. Dr. van der Weide defined himself as “a person of more than ordinary skill in the art during the relevant timeframe” because “[b]y 2010, [he] held a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, and [he] had at least” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,165,240
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2018 · IPR2017-01395 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board partly granted Intel’s rehearing request to recognize the Stansbury Declaration as a compliant sworn affidavit, but otherwise denied rehearing and left institution denied.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

      “When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments. See id. An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In the Decision, the Board determined that the record before it was insufficient to show that Stevens21 is a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 311(b) with respect to the ’948 patent. Stevens2 is one of the references relied upon in the sole asserted ground of unpatentability in the Petition. Accordingly, the Board concluded that Petitioner did not slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

      “Stevens2 was published no later than April 7, 1995 and is prior art under 102(b).” Pet. 45 n.9 (citing Ex. 1063 in support thereof (the “Stansbury Declaration”)). The Petition, per se, provides no other evidence or argument to establish a threshold showing that Stevens2 is a printed publication— publicly accessible by an interested person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date. slip op. at 3

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “attested that Stevens2 was ‘standard reference book on TCP/IP’ that was ‘widely cited and relied upon,’ ‘well known resources to a [person of ordinary skill in the art]’ (Petition at 15 (citing Ex.1003 at ¶¶21-88, including ¶¶27, 60, and FN3), 45 (citing Ex.1003 at ¶1212), FN9).” Req. 12. Initially we observe the Petition cites these paragraphs of Dr. Horst’s Declaration as part of the “Background Of Technology” discussion rather than as support for public accessibility of Stevens2. See Pet. 15–24. Furthermore, incorporating by reference such a substantial portion of Dr. Horst’s Declaration (paragraphs 21–88) is improper under our rules. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). Regardless, even if we consider Dr. Horst’s description of well-known background material (including Stevens2) as support for public accessibility of Stevens2, his testimony does not indicate” slip op. at 5

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 8,805,948
  • PTAB · May 2, 2016 · IPR2015-01340 · APJ Rama G Elluru · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Mylan’s rehearing request and instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, 4, 6-22, 25-30, 32-37, and 39-42.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “II. ANALYSIS When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The applicable standard for a request for rehearing is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. We grant Petitioner’s request for rehearing and institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–22, 25–30, 32–37, and 39–42 of the ’186 patent for the reasons provided in the concurrently issued Decision on Institution. Paper 16.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “References Basis Claims challenged Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag and, 1, 2, 4, 6–11, 25–28, § 103(a) Hanessian 32–35, 39, and 40 Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag, 12–16, 29, 30, 36, 37, Hanessian, Bachovchin, and § 103(a) 41, and 42 GLUCOPHAGE Label Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag, Hanessian, Bachovchin and, § 103(a) 12, 17, 18, and 22 XENICAL Label Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag, Hanessian, Bachovchin, and § 103(a) 12, 19, 20, and 21” slip op. at 2

    None
  • PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner limited additional discovery about Ward Dietrich’s involvement in preparing or controlling the Petition and denied discovery of other requested materials.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

      “We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments in the Request but, with the exception noted below, find them unpersuasive to demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any points. For example, we disagree with Patent Owner that “[t]he Motion certainly met this standard [of showing beyond speculation that something useful would be uncovered as to RPI issues]” for at least the reasons previously detailed in the Decision. See Decision 1–5. However, Patent Owner argues that “Ward Dietrich is Chief Operating Officer of the Mangrove Partners Master Fund” and “has no public role in petitioner” (Motion 3 (citing Ex. 2002 at 2)) and that “Ward Dietrich held himself out as an ‘authorized person’ to sign the Power of Attorney on behalf of Petitioner” (Req. Reh’g 6 (quoting Motion 3)). Petitioner does not appear to refute this contention. Patent Owner further requests “[c]ommunications and documents or things . . . including assistance with identification of prior art, filing, funding, compensation, and/or preparation of any papers related to the Mangrove IPRs” and the identification of “persons and entities . . . involved in the preparation and filing of the petitions” and “persons and entities . . . who controlled or had the ability to control the preparation and filing of the petitions in the Mangrove IPRs.” Ex. 2034, 3; Ex. 2035, 3. In view of Ward Dietrich’s alleged role as an officer of Mangrove Partners and the named Petitioner, we grant Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery for the limited purpose of providing communications and/or agreements pertaining to Ward Dietrich’s involvement in the preparation and filing of the Petition and/or control or ability to control the preparation and filing of the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedAdditional discovery, deniedGranted in part

      “However, Patent Owner argues that “Ward Dietrich is Chief Operating Officer of the Mangrove Partners Master Fund” and “has no public role in petitioner” (Motion 3 (citing Ex. 2002 at 2)) and that “Ward Dietrich held himself out as an ‘authorized person’ to sign the Power of Attorney on behalf of Petitioner” (Req. Reh’g 6 (quoting Motion 3)). Petitioner does not appear to refute this contention. Patent Owner further requests “[c]ommunications and documents or things . . . including assistance with identification of prior art, filing, funding, compensation, and/or preparation of any papers related to the Mangrove IPRs” and the identification of “persons and entities . . . involved in the preparation and filing of the petitions” and “persons and entities . . . who controlled or had the ability to control the preparation and filing of the petitions in the Mangrove IPRs.” Ex. 2034, 3; Ex. 2035, 3. In view of Ward Dietrich’s alleged role as an officer of Mangrove Partners and the named Petitioner, we grant Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery for the limited purpose of providing communications and/or agreements pertaining to Ward Dietrich’s involvement in the preparation and filing of the Petition and/or control or ability to control the preparation and filing of the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied

      “Patent Owner requests an “expanded panel that includes the Chief Judge” because, according to Patent Owner, an expanded panel “is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity” and to “clarify the standard for additional discovery.” Req. Reh’g 1–2, 8–9. Discretion to expand a panel rests with the Chief Judge, who, on behalf of the Director, may act to expand a panel on a suggestion from a judge or panel. AOL Inc. v. Coho Sicensing LLC, Case IPR2014-00771, slip op. at 2 (PTAB Mar. 24, 2015)(Paper 12)(informative). Patent Owner’s suggestion was considered by the Acting Chief Administrative Patent Judge, who declined to expand the panel.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,490,151
  • PTAB · Jan 13, 2016 · IPR2015-00710 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing in part and instituted review of claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 20 on anticipation and obviousness grounds; it denied rehearing on the remaining claims.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

      “When the Petition and Dr. Irazoqui’s testimony are considered in view of the Request for Rehearing, we agree that we overlooked Petitioner’s argument that the “gas flow passage” of Figure 2 extends from the upper surface of insulator 122 to the upper exterior of feedthrough 100, i.e., traverses the space between insulator 122 and washer 124. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:18–21, 7:27–29). Given this evidence associating the “minute” gaps with the space between insulator 122 and washer 124, and in light of our current construction of “laminar delamination gap” requiring no specific dimensions for a “very thin gap,” we are persuaded that the evidence of record sufficiently supports Dr. Irazoqui’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Fraley discloses a “laminar delamination gap,” under a construction requiring a “very thin space.” 3 Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 52 (p. 45). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, we grant-in-part and deny-in-part Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth below.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “7. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 20 of the ’553 patent are anticipated by Fraley; we are not persuaded that claims 3, 4, 8, 9, 12–15, 18, and 19 of the ’553 patent are anticipated by Fraley.” slip op. at 12

    • BurdenMixed

      “of the Request for Rehearing, we agree that we overlooked Petitioner’s argument that the “gas flow passage” of Figure 2 extends from the upper surface of insulator 122 to the upper exterior of feedthrough 100, i.e., traverses the space between insulator 122 and washer 124. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:18–21, 7:27–29). Given this evidence associating the “minute” gaps with the space between insulator 122 and washer 124, and in light of our current construction of “laminar delamination gap” requiring no specific dimensions for a “very thin gap,” we are persuaded that the evidence of record sufficiently supports Dr. Irazoqui’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Fraley discloses a “laminar delamination gap,” under a construction requiring a “very thin space.” 3 Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 52 (p. 45).” slip op. at 6

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument because Exhibit 2008, relied upon by Patent Owner to support its argument, instructs that “[a] braze fillet should ideally be very small.” Ex. 2008, 1; see also id. at 2 (“Keep the fillet small. Remember, all the good things about a braze joint are happening INSIDE the joint, not in the outside fillets.”). Thus, on this record, regardless of any variation in the size of the braze-fillet, Patent Owner’s evidence and attorney argument do not demonstrate that the space between insulator 122 and washer 124 would be “substantial.” Based on the foregoing, and upon review of Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s arguments, the evidence of record, and the supporting testimony of Dr. Irazoqui, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 16 of the ’553 patent are anticipated by Fraley.” slip op. at 8

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,327,553
  • PTAB · Feb 12, 2015 · IPR2014-00509 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Target’s request for rehearing of the denial of institution, for the reasons given in the related IPR2014-00508 decision.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “our Decision Denying Joinder of the instant proceeding with IPR2013-00533 (Paper 18), as well as our Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review (Paper 19). Paper 20 (“Request for Rehearing”). Patent Owner, Destination Maternity Corporation, was authorized to file an Opposition (Paper 22), to which Petitioner was authorized to file a Reply (Paper 23). For the reasons discussed in the Decision Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing in related IPR2014-00508 (Paper 28), we grant the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2

    None

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