- PTAB · Dec 27, 2022 · IPR2022-01147 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over the asserted reference combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at least a bachelor of science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, with at least two years of relevant experience in a field related to acoustics, speech recognition, speech detection, or signal processing.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education or industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above.” Id. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. To determine whether to institute, we also apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim Construction We need only construe terms that are in controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“The closest that Petitioner comes to addressing the recited VAD with Weinstein is by stating that “[a] POSITA would have understood that ‘there is no coupling of the desired signal into the reference sensor, i.e., when the actual coupling system H21 is zero,’ occurs when the desired signal, e.g., speech, is absent.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 92). Notably, the only support for this conclusion is the Kenny Declaration, which simply repeats this statement verbatim without any citation to the evidence of record. Compare id., with Ex. 1003 ¶ 92. We agree with Patent Owner that the “conclusion is wholly unsupported by evidence.” PO Resp. 12. And “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). But, even assuming Petitioner’s conclusion is correct and crediting Dr. Kenny’s testimony, the Petition does not explain sufficiently how a VAD signal in the Hietanen-Burnett combination is related to the period in which speech is alleged to be absent in Weinstein. See Pet. 25.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,019,091 - Apple Inc. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 16, 2022 · IPR2022-01084 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 14–42 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)); see id. at 7, 9. The Interim Procedure also explains that such a stipulation (a Sotera stipulation) “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB.” Id. at 7. In this proceeding, Petitioner “stipulates that, unless the Board denies or later vacates institution,” Petitioner “will not seek resolution in the litigation of invalidity based on the specific grounds asserted in” the Petition. Pet. 98–99. Petitioner asserts that its “stipulation prevents overlap because it requires the grounds addressed in each forum to be mutually exclusive, thereby obviating the possibility of inconsistent results.” Prelim. Reply 4.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“purposes of institution that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reasons to combine Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings in the way Petitioner proposes. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–125, 145–147, 163–164. As Dr. Kenny explains, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have (1) “applied Visser’s cross filter w12 to Avendano’s second signal x2 to further increase speech content in the first virtual microphone Cf” and (2) “applied Visser’s cross filter w21 to Avendano’s first signal x1 to further decrease speech content in the second virtual microphone Cb.” Id. ¶¶ 120, 145, 164. As Dr. Kenny also explains, these modifications would have improved Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhanc[ing] the separation between speech and noise.” Id. ¶¶ 119, 163. Any “need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining” references. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. At this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that improving Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system” suffices as a reason for combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164. The “desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal . . . .” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Because Dr. Kenny explains that combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings would have improved Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhanc[ing] the separation between speech and noise,” we disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner provides “no reason” why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have configured “the modified Avendano system in the specific way” Petitioner proposes. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119, 163; Prelim. Resp. 10. Patent Owner’s assertion that Avendano differs from Visser because (1) Avendano subtracts the signals supplied by delay nodes 402 and 404 and (2) Visser sums the signals supplied by cross filters w12 and w21 disregards the principle that “[c]ombining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” See In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973); Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Obviousness does not depend on “whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). That Avendano already accounts for “changing acoustic signals” with a “Weiner filter and filter smoothing module,” as Patent Owner asserts, does not undermine modifying Avendano’s system to incorporate Visser’s cross filters w12 and w21 to “further enhance the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhance the separation between speech and noise.” See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164; Prelim. Resp. 12. Visser’s cross filters w12 and w21 would have improved Avendano’s system regardless whether the cross filters adapted during operation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164. We are persuaded that Visser’s disclosure about filters adapting during operation and learning to separate speech “according to the specific acoustic environment,” such that the system can accurately separate speech “even in a changing acoustic environment,” provides an independent reason for combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104, 111–112, 147; Ex. 1006, 7:1–5, 9:8–12, 16:8–19, 16:62–17:4, code (57). (j)” slip op. at 55
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have at least a bachelor of science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, mechanical engineering, or a related discipline, with at least two years of relevant experience in a field related to acoustics, speech recognition, speech detection, or signal processing.” Pet. 6–7. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education or industry experience may compensate for a deficit in the other.” Id. at 7. Dr. Kenny’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23. For purposes of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (quoting Pet. 6–7). Based on the current record and for purposes of analysis, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’213 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,321,213 - Hanwha Solutions Corporation / Hanwha Q Cells USA, Inc. v. Rec Solar Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2022 · IPR2021-00989 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 11, and 13 were not shown unpatentable under either obviousness ground because Petitioner did not establish a motivation to combine Yagiura and Shimasaki.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s position is persuasive. We agree that documents from the Japanese Patent Office are self-authenticating official government documents. The technical issues regarding missing pages in the originally filed version of the document do not cause us to question authenticity. We also agree that Petitioner uses the documents to establish what the documents teach rather than establishing the truth of what the documents teach. In Reply, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner relies on the date printed on the document to prove up the truth of when the document was published. Mot. Excl. Reply 1–2. To the extent this is the case, an exception to hearsay applies because the document is a record of a public office. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B) (a record of public office is an exception to the hearsay rule if the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances “indicate a lack of trustworthiness”). Here, Patent Owner does not persuasively demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness; Patent Owner does not identify any substantively meaningful distinction in the missing pages of the originally filed document and does not identify any evidence to suggest that the missing pages were anything more than a harmless clerical error. For the reasons above, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude is denied with respect to these documents. B.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Petitioner’s proposal is too broad. PO Resp. 8. For example, a person who merely installs solar panels for three years (satisfying “professional experience in solar energy”) while having some familiarity with module manufacturing would not be of ordinary skill in the design aspects of the ’060 patent as, for example, reflected by the claims at issue and the ’060 patent’s text and figures. See, e.g., Ex. 1101, Figs. 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 3:22–7:44. On the other hand, we also determine that Patent Owner’s proposal is too narrow. A person could, for example, have ordinary skill in the art of the ’060 patent by virtue of non-professional experience (for example, academic experience). When assessing relevant experience, research work done for a university (beyond mere classroom study) would have been just as valuable as research work done for a corporation. Also, ordinary skill in the art could be demonstrated by work that requires understanding of the ’060 patent’s field even if not “designing, developing, and/or researching” in the field itself We, thus, determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’060 patent would have been someone with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or the like, and at least two years of (a) experience designing, developing, and/or researching in the field or (b) experience in solar energy that required an understanding of the ’060 patent’s field. Alternatively, that person would have had an advanced degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or the like and at least one year of” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“qualifies as evidence in this matter. The Federal Circuit has held that expert testimony about the perspective of person of ordinary skill in the art (as Dr. Kimball provides here) must come from a person having at least ordinary skill in the art. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools, Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (holding that ITC Administrative Law Judge abused discretion by admitting expert testimony of witness who lacked the experience of a person having ordinary skill in the art); see Mot. Excl. 6–7 (arguing this point). Patent Owner, however, cites no authority that expert testimony on such matters come from a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Cf. Scentair Tech., LLC v. Prolitiec Inc., IPR2021-00012, Paper 22 at 61 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2022) (similarly noting a party’s lack of authority on this point). Beyond needing to come from a person of ordinary skill in the art, expert testimony is admissible if the expert has the “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Furthermore, “[t]here is … no requirement of a perfect match between the expert’s experience and the relevant field.” USPTO, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 34 (Nov. 2019). Here, Petitioner adequately establishes that Dr. Kimball qualifies as a” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Petition argues that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not dispute this. PO Resp. 13. We determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms that are in controversy, and only to the” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,749,060 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,749,060 - Hanwha Solutions Corporation / Hanwha Q Cells USA, Inc. v. Rec Solar Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2022 · IPR2021-00988 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 11, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Huang and Wu; claims 1, 2, and 4 are also anticipated by Zhang.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s position is persuasive. We agree that documents from the Japanese Patent Office are self-authenticating official government documents. The technical issues regarding missing pages in the originally filed version of the document do not cause us to question authenticity. We also agree that Petitioner uses the documents to establish what the documents teach rather than establishing the truth of what the documents teach. In Reply, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner relies on the date printed on the document to prove up the truth of when the document was published. Mot. Excl. Reply 1–2. To the extent this is the case, an exception to hearsay applies because the document is a record of a public office. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B) (a record of public office is an exception to the hearsay rule if the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances “indicate a lack of trustworthiness”). Here, Patent Owner does not persuasively demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness; Patent Owner does not identify any substantively meaningful distinction in the missing pages of the originally filed document and does not identify any evidence to suggest that the missing pages were anything more than a harmless technical error. For the reasons above, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude is denied with respect to these documents. B.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Petitioner’s proposal is too broad. PO Resp. 8. For example, a person who merely installs solar panels for three years (satisfying “professional experience in solar energy”) while having some familiarity with module manufacturing would not be of ordinary skill in the design aspects of the ’060 patent as, for example, reflected by the claims at issue and the ’060 patent’s text and figures. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 3:22–7:44. On the other hand, we also determine that Patent Owner’s proposal is too narrow. A person could, for example, have ordinary skill in the art of the ’060 patent by virtue of non-professional experience (for example, academic experience). When assessing relevant experience, research work done for a university (beyond mere classroom study) would have been just as valuable as research work done for a corporation. Also, ordinary skill in the art could be demonstrated by work that requires understanding of the ’060 patent’s field even if not “designing, developing, and/or researching” in the field itself. We, thus, determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’060 patent would have been someone with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or the like, and at least two years of (a) experience designing, developing, and/or researching in the field or (b) experience in solar energy that required an understanding of the ’060 patent’s field. Alternatively, that person would have had an advanced degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or the like and at least one year of (a) experience designing, developing, and/or researching in the field or 7 Our analysis is constrained to the extent neither party addresses the Best Medical factors with particularity. For example, the briefing does not address the educational level of the inventor. patent’s field.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We next assess whether or not Dr. Kimball’s testimony properly qualifies as evidence in this matter. The Federal Circuit has held that expert testimony about the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art (as Dr. Kimball provides here) must come from a person having at least ordinary skill in the art. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools, Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (holding that ITC Administrative Law Judge abused discretion by admitting expert testimony of witness who lacked the experience of a person having ordinary skill in the art); see Mot. Excl. 6–7 (arguing this point). Patent Owner, however, cites no authority that expert testimony on such matters come from a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Cf. Scentair Tech., LLC v. Prolitiec Inc., IPR2021-00012, Paper 22 at 61 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2022) (similarly noting a party’s lack of authority on this point). Beyond needing to come from a person of ordinary skill in the art, expert testimony is admissible if the expert has the “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Furthermore, “[t]here is … no requirement of a perfect match between the expert’s experience and the relevant field.” USPTO, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 34 (Nov. 2019). Here, Petitioner adequately establishes that Dr. Kimball qualifies as a” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues, however, that where claim 4 recites “the first and second solar cell series are coupled with the bypass diode of the first solar cell unit via a first cross-connector, and the third and fourth solar series are coupled with the bypass diode of the second solar cell unit via a second cross-connector,” the word “a” means “one.” PO Resp. 13–14. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art via one or more cross-connectors” and that “a” meaning “one” in claim 4 is necessary for claim 4 to further limit claim 1. Id. Petitioner argues that “a” means “one or more.” Pet. Reply 2–4. We agree with Petitioner. The ’040 patent explicitly defines “a” consistently with Petitioner’s position by stating that “it should be noted that the term ‘comprising’ does not exclude other elements or steps and the ‘a’ or ‘an’ does not exclude a plurality.” Ex. 1001, 7:62–63. The ’040 patent’s explicit definition is consistent with typical usage of “a” in this patent law context. See, e.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that “a” in patent parlance means “one or more” for open-ended claims reciting the transitional phrase “comprising”). Patent Owner’s argument regarding claim construction is unpersuasive because Claim 4 further limits claim 1 by explicitly requiring first and second crossconnectors; claim 1 does not recite a “cross-connector.” Ex. 1001, 8:2–22. Thus, we construe “a” in this context as meaning “one or more.”” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,749,060 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,749,060 - Sani-Tech West, Inc. v. Meissner Filtration Products, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 8, 2022 · IPR2022-01123 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious, principally for failing to explain why a skilled artisan would add hose barbs.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Obviousness requires more than a mere showing that each limitation in a challenged claim was independently known in the prior art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). Rather, a patent challenger must articulate a reason why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified the prior art. Id. at 418. Because Petitioner has failed to articulate a reason to modify Goebel to include the claimed hose barbs, there is no reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing claim 1 and its dependent claims 2–8 would have been obvious over Goebel.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“as Patent Owner argues, that Petitioner has not explained sufficiently why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have attached hose barbs to the ends of Goebel’s pipe coupling 14. See Prelim. Resp. 15, 17. Indeed, other than asserting that hose barbs were well-known, Petitioner only refers to Goebel for “indicat[ing] that the hose to which it is connected at each end may be secured using a clamp.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:60–2:3, claim 3). Without any explanation of its relevance to hose barbs by either Petitioner or Mr. Clem, however, we decline to speculate the significance of this teaching. Obviousness requires more than a mere showing that each limitation in a challenged claim was independently known in the prior art. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). Rather, a patent challenger must articulate a reason why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified the prior art. Id. at 418. Because Petitioner has failed to articulate a reason to modify Goebel to include the claimed hose barbs, there is no” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away foundDecided for patent owner
“In fact, Petitioner’s argument appears to support the opposite conclusion. According to Petitioner, “barb fittings are known by POSAs to be particularly poorly suited to sterile and aseptic processing because they incorporate pockets where bacteria and contaminants may reside.” Id. at 46–47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 96). This statement appears consistent with Maurer’s teaching. Indeed, Maurer teaches “it is advantageous if the design avoids the creation of cavities or pockets in which contaminated material can collect.” Ex. 1005, 14:16–18. This is especially important because, as Petitioner points out, Maurer envisions using its device “in pressure measurement in kidney dialysis machines.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, 14:6–20). Given Maurer’s goal to avoid contamination (see Ex. 1005, 1:24–31, 8:33–36, 9:50–56), and Petitioner’s acknowledgement that barb fittings are “particularly poorly suited to sterile and aseptic processing because they incorporate pockets where bacteria and contaminants may reside” (Pet. 46–47), we find Petitioner has not explained sufficiently why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have incorporated hose barbs into Maurer’s device. Thus, there is no reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing claim 1 would have been obvious over Maurer and Milton.” slip op. at 13
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,373,825 - Globalfoundries Inc. / Globalfoundries U.S. Inc. et al. v. Katana Silicon Technologies LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 6, 2022 · IPR2022-01083 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claims on any ground asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“it is used consistently throughout. First, in describing related prior art, the ’903 patent states that “[t]he through plug is constituted of an insulating material covering a sidewall of a through hole and a low electrical resistance metal material . . . in a columnar shape that is positioned so as to be surrounded by the insulating material and that serves as a conductive member.” Ex. 1001, 1:35–40. In describing its own drawings, reference numeral 15 consistently is used to refer to the “through plug.” Id. at 2:37– 52. Figures 1A and 1B “are views schematically showing the structure of a semiconductor device (semiconductor chip) according to an embodiment of the present invention.” Id. at 5:46–48, Figs. 1A, 1B. In these figures, reference numeral 15 refers to “[a] through plug.” Id. at 6:16. This through plug “is constituted of a columnar electric conductor 15a . . . and an insulation layer 15b . . . surrounding the electric conductor 15a.” Id. at 6:21–25. Similarly, reference numeral 15 refers to the “through plug” in Figures 1C, 2A, 2B, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7A, and 7B. Id. at 6:35–40, 7:10–38, 8:10– 17, 8:32–38, 8:65–9:43. Where it is referred to in these same parts of the ’903 patent, the conductive core is discussed as merely a portion of the through plug and is referred to by the reference numeral 15a. Id. Thus, the ’903 patent consistently defines the through plug as having two portions: both a conductive core and a surrounding insulation layer. This is true whether the patent is referring to either of its disclosed embodiments or the prior art. Based on this unambiguous usage, we determine that the ’903 patent defines the term “through plug” as including both a conductive core and a surrounding insulating layer. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320–21 (“the specification ‘acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication’” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded that the Petition adequately identifies how Christensen teaches or suggests a through plug as that term is used in the ’903 patent. As noted above, the ’903 patent requires a through plug to have both a conductive core and a surrounding insulating layer. It is clear on the current record that Christensen’s “conductive stud” could correspond to the conductive portion of such a through plug. Ex. 1033, 4:66–5:1 (“the stud 34 may comprise any number of conductive materials”). But Petitioner does not show sufficiently that Christensen teaches or suggests the surrounding insulating layer necessary to turn the conductive core into a through plug. First, Petitioner does not allege that Christensen teaches or suggests such a layer. Pet. 33–34. Second, Christensen discloses the use of “conductive materials” and “material[s] which promote[] adhesion to the surrounding oxide such as titanium or titanium nitride.” Ex. 1033, 4:66–5:1, 5:15–20. None of these materials are identified by Christensen as insulators. Id. Accordingly, we are not persuaded on the current record that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Christensen alone teaches or suggests the through plug of the challenged claims. b. Christensen and Lin Petitioner also argues that the combination of Christensen and Lin teaches or suggests the through plug of the challenged claims. Pet. 34–36. Specifically, Petitioner argues that “[t]o the extent [it is determined] that Christensen alone is not sufficient because the conductive stud 34 does not extend all the way through wafer 12, Christensen in view of Lin renders obvious a ‘through plug.’” Id. at 34. According to this argument, “Lin teaches a backside process for forming ‘a conductive plug through a silicon’ wafer and an insulation layer,” and it would have been obvious to form such a plug “from the backside of the wafer 12 below [Christensen’s] conductive stud 34,” such that the combination of the two structures would form a conductive path all the way through the structure of Christensen’s Figures 8B and 9. Id. at 34–35 (emphasis omitted). As with the argument based on Christensen alone, however, this argument does not show sufficiently that the combination of Christensen and Lin teaches or suggests a through plug that has both a conductive core and a surrounding insulating layer. Lin describes its structure as a “conductive plug” and does not describe any insulation surrounding that structure. Ex. 1054, 1:60–64, 3:2– 34, 4:23–32, Fig. 7. “The conductive plugs” of Lin “typically compris[e] metal,” which Lin does not describe as an insulator. Id. at 3:21–25. Nor does Petitioner allege the presence of a conductive core surrounded by insulation either in Lin itself or in the combination of Lin and Christensen. Pet. 34–36. Accordingly, we are not persuaded on the current record that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Christensen and Lin teaches or suggests the through plug of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“An invention is not obvious just ‘because all of the elements that comprise the invention were known in the prior art.’” Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Instead, “a finding of obviousness at the time of invention requires a ‘plausible rational[e] as to why the prior art references would have worked together.’” Id. (quoting Power-One, 599 F.3d at 1352). This rationale requires “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” to combine the known elements in the manner required in the claim at issue. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). “[I]t can be important to” include within this reasoning “a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Id. Here, Petitioner offers two reasons to combine the teachings of Shim and Shirakawa. First, Petitioner argues that “Shim’s diffusion teachings would facilitate the formation of” Shirakawa’s collector layer. Pet. 65–66. On the present record, we do not find this reason sufficiently persuasive. Even though Shim does teach a way to make the n-GaAs that Shirakawa uses, Shirakawa teaches a different way to make the same material, and other prior-art references agree with Shirakawa. Ex. 1022, 1:34–40 (“silicon ions of a silicon layer formed on a GaAs substrate are diffused by means of ion-implantation method using little energy and annealing treatment”); Ex. 1005, 9:36–42 (first embodiment “collector layer” is “laminated on top of a semi-insulating GaAs substrate . . . by epitaxial growth process”), 12:47–48 (fourth embodiment made in same way as first embodiment); Ex. 1016, 8:7–19 (“a highly doped n type GaAs subcollector layer . . . [and other layers] are made to grow above a semiinsulating GaAs substrate . . . by a metal organic vapor phase epitaxial growth method”); Ex. 1025, 4:40–45 (teaching “[f]orming two flat epitaxial layers of gallium arsenide to obtain [a] collector,” including “a layer . . . of the n+ conductivity type and a layer . . . of the n -conductivity type” by “epitaxial growth . . . from the vapour phase or from the liquid phase”). The mere fact that Shim offers an alternative process does not, in the absence of a reason to adopt that alternative process, provide a reason for a person of ordinary skill in the art to make Shirakawa’s n-GaAs via Shim’s method rather than via Shirakawa’s own method. In addition, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Peter Elenius, testifies that the ion implantation involved in Shim’s diffusion process would damage Shirakawa’s gallium arsenide in a way that would dissuade a person of ordinary skill in the art from using that process to produce the HBT of Shirakawa. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 52–57. The other reason that Petitioner provides to combine the teachings of Shim and Shirakawa is that Shim’s diffusion “method us[es] little energy and annealing treatment.” Pet. 66 (quoting Ex. 1022, 1:34–40). Shim’s method is described as “diffus[ion] by means of ion-implantation method using little energy and annealing treatment,” which Shim distinguishes from earlier methods “widely used in the art,” which involved “ion-implantation . . . using high energy.” Ex. 1022, 1:12–40. Shim teaches that its lower-energy ion implantation does not suffer from the “problem” of the earlier method, “damaging of ohmic contacts of metal electrodes” due to the injection of “lots of impurity ions.” Id. at 1:17–22; see id. at 3:37–40 (“the manufacturing method of the present invention can prevent damage to be generated in ohmic contacts of source/drain electrodes due to ion-injecting of high density”). Thus, the lower energy of Shim’s process is a benefit of that process over earlier ion implantation processes, which use higher energy. Shim does not teach that its use of lower-energy ion implantation is an improvement over other processes, such as the epitaxial growth taught by Shirakawa and the other references cited by Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why lower energy would be a benefit of the Shim- Shirakawa combination over Shirakawa alone. Accordingly, we are not persuaded on the current record that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Shirakawa and Shim to arrive at a combination that teaches or suggests the “diffusion layer patterns” of the challenged claims. slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,402,903 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 5, 2022 · IPR2022-00865 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–26 and all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Samsung Petitioners have stipulated that, unless the Board denies or later vacates institution of this petition, Samsung will not seek resolution of invalidity in the Samsung Litigation based on the specific grounds asserted in this petition, or on any other ground that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in an IPR. Pet. 73 (citing Ex. 1079); see Reply 2. This type of stipulation is often called a Sotera-type stipulation. See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (Institution Decision) (precedential). In light of that Sotera-type stipulation, insofar as at least the Samsung case is concerned, we “will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation.” Interim Procedure 3; see also id. at 7–8.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioners have established a reasonable likelihood that they would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Therefore, in the context of the ’543 patent, and consistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms, a headset is not a handset. Turning to Petitioners’ challenges to dependent claims 8–10, 12, and 13, and independent claim 26, Petitioners’ bare reliance on the cellular phone disclosed in Yang, without any further elaboration, would appear to be insufficient, because the cellular phone disclosed in Yang is a handset, not a headset, as shown, for example, in Figures 1A, 1B, and 1C of Yang reproduced below. Yang describes devices 100a and 100b of Figures 1A and 1B as a “cellular phone” that is “similar to conventional cellular phones,” and then states that the device of Figure 1C “may be” a “handset,” a “personal digital assistant (PDA),” or a “video phone.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 20, 22, 24. Yang further refers to implementations “in various types of device such as cellular telephones, personal digital assistance (PDAs), tape recorders, telephones, and so on.” Id. ¶ 91. However, none of the figures or descriptions in Yang suggest the use of a headset as a communications device. For Ground 1, Petitioners do not argue that one of ordinary skill would have known to use a headset in addition to the devices explicitly disclosed in Yang — rather, Petitioners flatly argue that the handsets of Yang are in fact headsets. Therefore, at this stage, we are not prepared to determine that the” slip op. at 36
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“provided sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the proffered combined teachings of Yang and Burnett. Petitioners have presented ample evidence, including declarant testimony, supporting the combination of Yang and Burnett. Pet. 22–27; Kyriakakis Decl. ¶¶ 87–92. Patent Owner’s attorney arguments are unpersuasive. Prelim. Resp. 5–8. We agree with Petitioners that the substitution of the Burnett GEMS sensor signals for the microphone inputs of Yang would have been a straightforward modification that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to make and would have had a reasonable expectation of successful implementation. We note that the ’543 patent itself indicates that the VAD can process received signals to output a simple “one-bit signal . . . with a zero value representing that no speech has occurred . . . and a unity value indicating that speech has occurred.” Ex. 1001, 4:52–57. Similarly, Yang discloses that the signaling of speech versus non-speech is a simple inversion of a signal. Ex. 1006 ¶ 32. Likewise, Burnett teaches that the GEMS sensor can tell a speech processor when the person is or is not speaking. Ex. 1007, 177. These teachings are consistent with Petitioners’ declarant’s testimony that using Burnett’s GEMS with Yang’s VAD would not have fundamentally changed how Yang’s VAD operates. In addition, we credit Petitioners’ declarant’s reliance on the statement in Yang suggesting the use of other types of signal detectors, as suggesting alternatives to using microphone inputs for speech detection. Patent Owner’s arguments that Yang’s VAD does not use a sensor independent of the microphones, and that Burnett does not disclose how to generate signals for a denoising system, are unpersuasive challenges to the references individually, whereas the relevant issue is whether the combination of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the patentee’s invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,467,543 - PTAB · Dec 2, 2022 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–11 on all asserted §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’240 patent on all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“1 We apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103 because the claims at issue have an effective filing date prior to March 16, 2013, the effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”). See Ex. 1001, code (22). 2 Petitioner does not list claim 1 in its table on page 3, but Petitioner provides argument as to claim 1 in its discussion of the ground. See Pet. 56– 57. 3 Petitioner does not list claims 1and 4 in its table on page 3, but Petitioner provides argument as to claims 1 and 4 in its discussion of the ground. See Pet. 73. 4 Petitioner argues that the Fintiv factors weigh against discretionary denial. Pet. 77–78; see Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5‒6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). Because Patent Owner does not argue for discretionary denial, we see no need to consider the issue further.” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Med. Int'l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., 46 F.4th 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). The parties are in general agreement as to the level of education (undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or equivalent) and the number of years of experience working with RFID devices (1–2 years), but differ as to the exact nature of that experience (developing antennae used in RFID devices versus developing antennae used in RFID devices for inductive coupling). The specification of the ’240 patent describes its technical field as relating to “‘secure documents’ …having RFID (radio frequency identification) chips …operating in contactless mode (ISO 14443) including dual interface (‘DI’, or ‘DIF’) cards which can also operate in contact mode (ISO 7816-2), and more particularly to improving coupling between components within the smart card …and consequent improvements in interacting with external RFID readers.” Ex. 1001, 1:24–34. The specification discusses both inductive and capacitive coupling. See e.g., id. at 6:55–58. Patent Owner submitted into the record a text titled RFID Handbook, which details different frequencies and types of coupling that may be at use by various RFID systems. See Ex. 20035, 22–23. Although this text differentiates between “inductively or capacitively coupled system[s] and microwave system[s] or backscatter system[s]” (id. at 23 (emphasis omitted)), its description of each of these types of RFID devices indicates that an ordinary artisan would have had experience with RFID devices generally. Thus, on the record currently before us, we are not persuaded that the level of 5 Our citations are to the native page numbers in the document and not Patent Owner’s numbering. devices that are used for inductive coupling. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1– 2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” See Pet. 8.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“B. Dr. van der Weide’s Level of Experience Patent Owner argues that we should not give substantial weight to the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. van der Weide, because he “lacks relevant experience to provide opinions through the lens of a [person having ordinary skill in the art].” Prelim. Resp. 27–28 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 71–72. According to Patent Owner, Dr. van der Weide “has experience with RFID that operates at microwave frequencies,” but “identifies no experience with relevant inductive RFID systems at lower frequencies (e.g., frequencies such as 13.56MHz and 8.2MHz).” Id. at 27. This argument is based on Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which we have not adopted. Based on the current record, Dr. van der Weide’s education and experience are sufficient to allow us to grant his testimony our full consideration. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 2–7.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,165,240 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Equo IP LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 28, 2022 · IPR2021-00943 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5–9, 11, 12, 16–20, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over the 300 reference, the 321 reference, and Ericsson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther
“Generally, Patent Owner’s arguments and Dr. Cooklev’s corresponding testimony do not give sufficient weight to the 300 reference. See id. at 49–52. Rather, they are heavily focused on what the 321 reference alone expressly teaches or suggests. See id.; Cooklev Decl. ¶¶ 140–148, 180–181. Because Petitioner relies on the 300 reference together with the 321 reference in its obviousness rationale, we disagree with these arguments (PO Resp. 49–52), and we give little weight to Dr. Cooklev’s corresponding testimony on this issue (Cooklev Decl. ¶¶ 140–148, 180– 181). c) Experts versus a POSITA Patent Owner notes that “both parties agree that the members of the 3GPP Working Groups were experts in the field—with more expertise and understanding than a POSITA.” PO Resp. 49 (emphasis added). Dr. Cooklev testified, “I disagree that a POSITA—who under all accounts would have less expertise than the members of the 3GPP Working Groups—would recognize a problem and believe that the solution was obvious when the Working Group members themselves struggled with the same issue.” Cooklev Decl. ¶ 194, cited in PO Resp. 49. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on the skill level of an expert, not a POSITA. PO Resp. 56. Patent Owner, though, provides insufficient evidence to support the assertion that the Working Group members struggled with this issue. See id. at 49. To the contrary, the background knowledge, reflected in the 300 reference, demonstrates that, in the RAP, the UE must receive a RAR before it transmits Message 3. See, Pet. 33–34 (citing Min Decl. ¶ 102; Ex. 1002, as “correction” (category F), instead of an “addition of feature” (category B) or a “functional modification of feature” (category C). Ex. 1011, 1. The “reason for change” in Qualcomm’s change request also lacks any indication of a struggle: According to the original intention, it is clarified that the transmission of the RACH Msg3 performed only in response to an uplink grant in the Random Access Response. The current specification also allows transmission of Msg3 in response to UL grant on PDCCH.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“PO Resp. 44–45. Patent Owner claims that its definition is better than Petitioner’s because (1) it is not “based on a rigid formula that does not credit significant industry or research experience, which may substitute for formal academic work” and (2) it references additional degrees and coursework. Id. at 45. Patent Owner, though, does not explain how those differences affect the obviousness analysis in this case. See id. Instead, Patent Owner argues that, “even under Samsung’s proposal, the level of ordinary skill in the art does not comport with Samsung’s assertion of obviousness” because the members of the 3GGP working groups were experts, not persons having ordinary skill. PO Resp. 56. That is, Patent Owner’s argument does not depend on the specific differences between the proposed definitions. See id. Rather, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner implicitly applies a level of skill that exceeds the ones proposed by either party. See id. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument for the reasons discussed in Section II.C of this Decision. We see no differences between the parties’ proposed definitions that would affect our analysis. Considering the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’120 patent and the types of problems and solutions described there and in the cited prior art, we apply Petitioner’s definition in this Decision. Pet. 12. But our conclusion would be the same under Patent Owner’s.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner asserts, The Board should construe these two related terms [in claims 1 and 12] such that this “transmitting” feature requires transmitting the Msg3 data only when the three claimed conditions are met: (1) the UL Grant is received on the specific message, (2) the specific message is the random access response message, and (3) there is data stored in a Msg3 buffer of the user equipment. Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 56–57). In Petitioner’s view, the plain language supports the “only when” construction because “the only time after the UL Grant is received on the specific message that the user equipment transmits Msg3 buffer data is only when the specific message is the random access response message and there is data stored in a Msg3 buffer of the user equipment.” Id. at 13. Patent Owner argues for a broader construction. PO Resp. 40; Sur- reply 1–7. In Patent Owner’s view, narrowing the claim by adding the word in other IPRs involving a related patent (U.S. Patent No. 7,881,236),7 the word “only” clarified when the system transmits Message 3 data, but this is not needed here because the claim recites four transmitting limitations that cover all possible scenarios. PO Resp. 40. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s narrow construction is “an effort to introduce a potential non-infringement position” in this IPR. Sur-reply 5. In Patent Owner’s view, “No word or phrase from the challenged claims requires construction for resolution of this IPR.” PO Resp. 36; Sur-reply 4. During the oral hearing, both parties agreed that we need not construe the claims to reach the unpatentability issues. See Tr. 43:14–17 (Patent Owner’s counsel); 64:18–22 (Petitioner’s counsel). We need not resolve the dispute because Petitioner has shown that the” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“properly considers the 300 reference together with the 321 reference because the 300 reference describes a process not clearly documented by the 321 reference. Pet. 6. In particular, the 321 reference, individually, does not clearly describe whether a UE transmits Message 3 when it receives an uplink grant on a message other than an RAR. See id. But together the references show that (1) the Message 3 transmission occurs only if the RAP is ongoing and the Message 3 buffer has a MAC PDU and (2) Message 3 transmission requires a prior UL Grant received in an RAR. See id. at 34–35; Min. Decl. ¶ 104. Specifically, the 321 reference states, “If the UE receives both a grant for its RA-RNTI and a grant for its C-RNTI, the UE may choose to continue with either the grant for its RA-RNTI or the grant for its C-RNTI.” Ex. 1003 § 5.4.1, quoted in Pet. 32. The 321 reference calls the RA-RNTI grant an UL Grant in an RAR and calls the C-RNTI grant the UL Grant in a PDCCH. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.1 (“UE shall monitor the PDCCH after the uplink message containing the C-RNTI MAC”), 4.5.2 (“RA-RNTI for Random Access Response on DL-SCH”), cited in Min Decl. ¶ 99. Dr. Min testifies that, in the 321 reference, the UE chooses either the UL Grant received in an RAR or the UL Grant received in a PDCCH. Min Decl. ¶ 95. But, according to Dr. Min, the 321 reference clearly indicates that UL Grant received in the RAR is the correct one to use during the RAP. Id. ¶ 96. Dr. Min explains that the 321 reference teaches that the UE processes the received UL Grant value after successfully receiving RARs, but the 321 reference is silent about looking for a grant in a PDCCH during the RAP. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 § 5.1.4; Ex. 1045, TS 36.213 v8.3.0, § 6.1). Dr. Min testifies that a UL Grant received in a PDCCH during a RAP “would be highly unreliable” and should be discarded. Id. ¶¶ 96–97. So the 321 reference alone provides strong evidence supporting Petitioner’s assertion that it would have been obvious to transmit Message 3 only when (1) Message 3 data was available to transmit and (2) the UE had received an UL Grant in an RAR. See Pet. 35. To the extent that the language of the 321 reference is ambiguous on” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,517,120 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,517,120 - Google LLC v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 14, 2022 · IPR2022-00889 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Google did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 29–44 obvious, principally because it did not adequately explain why an artisan would add a delay to Elko’s first microphone …
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“microphone channel to the first microphone channel when implementing the dual-filter alternative suggested by Elko.14 Pet. 29–31. However, Petitioner fails to sufficiently explain why an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to implement that dual-filter alternative by relocating the delay to the first microphone channel. Although Petitioner states that its proposed modification “would account for sound propagation from different directions in the dual filter embodiment” (id. at 30–31), this is conclusory and insufficiently explained, particularly given Elko’s disclosure. Petitioner is correct that Elko suggests a dual-filter alternative. Ex. 1002, 11:15–20. Specifically, after describing the Figure 10 embodiment, Elko states that “[i]t might be desirable to filter both input channels to exclude signals that are out of the desired frequency band.” Id. at 11:15–16. Specifically, Elko suggests including “two adaptive filters like filter 1020 shown in FIG. 10, to adjust the two sensing microphones,” as well as a third microphone to serve as the reference. Id. at 11:16–20. But Petitioner fails to sufficiently explain why an ordinary artisan would have relocated delay 1022 when implementing this alternative. Petitioner’s refers to a need to “account for sound propagation from different directions” (Pet. 30–31), but Elko’s adaptive filter already does this. Elko specifically states that filter 1020 accounts for changes in the location of the desired source signal. See Ex. 1002, 11:21–24 (“[U]sing an adaptive filter also allows for the compensation of modal variation in the orientation of the array relative to the desired source.”);15 see also id. at 10:34–55 (noting that” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Finally, although Petitioner relies upon Dr. Vipperman’s declaration, the cited passages simply mirror the language in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 63–66, with Pet. 29–31. As a result, Dr. Vipperman’s testimony does not remedy the Petition’s deficiencies. 37 C.F.R § 42.65(a) (conclusory testimony is entitled to little or no weight); cf. TQ Delta, 942 F.3d at 1358 (“Conclusory expert testimony does not qualify as substantial evidence.”).” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposed definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’611 patent and the asserted prior art. 8 The current record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. This definition is also supported by the testimony of Dr. Vipperman. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 23.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,326,611
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.