- US Conec Ltd. v. Senko Advanced Components, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00122 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted the petitioner's request to withdraw its rehearing request and granted the joint motion to terminate the proceeding.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“agreement to jointly seek termination of this proceeding, and “[b]ased on the settlement, Petitioner hereby requests withdrawal of its Request for Rehearing.” Joint Motion 1. We “may enter non-final orders to administer the proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.5. Here, the Board has not decided the merits of Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. Additionally, we stated in our Decision Denying Institution that “the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” Paper 7, 22. Under these circumstances, therefore, we determine that it is appropriate to grant the request to withdraw Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and terminate this proceeding as to the Parties. III. ORDER Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, it is: ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for withdrawal of its Request for Rehearing (Paper 8) is granted; and” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“agreement to jointly seek termination of this proceeding, and “[b]ased on the settlement, Petitioner hereby requests withdrawal of its Request for Rehearing.” Joint Motion 1. We “may enter non-final orders to administer the proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.5. Here, the Board has not decided the merits of Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. Additionally, we stated in our Decision Denying Institution that “the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” Paper 7, 22. Under these circumstances, therefore, we determine that it is appropriate to grant the request to withdraw Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and terminate this proceeding as to the Parties.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,061,190 - Infineon Technologies AG v. Amatech Group LimitedRehearing grantedPTAB · Apr 3, 2024 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing
On rehearing, the Board held claim 3 unpatentable as obvious over Eray-WO799, revising the final written decision’s outcome for that claim.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“As stated in our Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art and found that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have possessed “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1–2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” Dec. 6–7 (citing Pet. 8; PO Resp. 18). Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Daniel van der Weide, supported Petitioner’s definition, which was adopted for this proceeding. Ex. 1003 ¶ 25. Dr. van der Weide defined himself as “a person of more than ordinary skill in the art during the relevant timeframe” because “[b]y 2010, [he] held a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, and [he] had at least” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,165,240 - Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Neonode Smartphone LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Dec 3, 2021 · IPR2021-00144 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Rehearing
Granted rehearing and instituted IPR of claims 1–6 and 12–17 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Petitioner, as the party challenging the Decision, has the burden of showing that we should modify the Decision. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision.” Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“that we misapprehended Hirayama307’s distinction between icon 41 and window 43 and, as a result, misapprehended the Petition’s arguments related to icon 41. Specifically, Hirayama307 discloses that window 43 appears “after having touched the desired icon 41 with the point of the pen 3,” and that window 43 is “the processing display form” of icon 41. Ex. 1006, 5:64–66. Thus, contrary to our determination in the Decision that “Hirayama307 appears to duplicate or relocate the representation of the function, i.e., icon, during gliding,” a closer reading of Hirayama307 indicates that icon 41 and window 43 are different, though Hirayama307 at times uses the term “large icon” or “enlarged icon” to describe window 43. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 6:7–14, 6:22–23, 6:30. We acknowledge that Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner, but we find that the parties’ disagreement raises an issue of fact that is best resolved on a full trial record. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently at this stage of the proceeding that Hirayama307 discloses the limitation “wherein the representation of the function is not relocated or duplicated during the gliding.” In light of this determination, we need not address Petitioner’s additional arguments related to whether Hirayama307 discloses the limitation at issue.10” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“2:48–51. Hirayama307 explains that, after the user moves the pen point from icon 41 to display portion 3, “an icon (hereinafter . . . referred to as a window) enlarged in the form of the processing display mode of the desired icon 41 is automatically displayed on the display portion 1 as shown in FIG. 3B.” Id. at 5:3–12.” slip op. at 6
- Other 314aInstituted
“§ 314(a). See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . .”); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“First of all, the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(a))). When deciding whether to exercise our discretion, we may consider the number of claims and grounds that meet the reasonable likelihood standard and whether, in the interests of efficient petition should be denied. Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 at 42 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative); SAS Q&A’s, Part D, Effect of SAS on Future Challenges that Could Be Denied for Statutory Reasons, D2 (June 5, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/sas_qas_20180605.pdf. Here, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges involving Hirayama307, which address all challenged claims. On this record, and based on the particular facts of this proceeding, we find that instituting a trial is an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources.” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,095,879
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.