- Genband US LLC / Genband Management Services Corp. v. Metaswitch Networks Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01457 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–5, 8, 9, 15–18, and 22–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Ejzak and Cisco or Intel; claim 10 was not shown unpatentable over either combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“First, the above-reproduced figure does not appear in the Specification of the ’640 patent. Rather, it is a creation of the Patent Owner. The figure creates the impression that a “part” necessarily is a “device.” Patent Owner, however, does not provide adequate support for such a narrow reading of 14 “part.” Although a “device” is a “part” of a telecommunications network, that does not mean a “part” has to be a “device.” Even Dr. Akl, Patent Owner’s expert, testified only that a “device” is a “part” of a telecommunications network and not that a “part” of a telecommunications network has to be a “device.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 56. Second, the figure also creates the impression that neither a domain nor a region would identify a device. But Patent Owner does not provide adequate support for such a narrow reading of “domain” and “region.” In that regard, Dr. Akl, Patent Owner’s expert, testifies only that a “device” is neither a “domain” nor a “region,” not that a “domain” or a “region” would not or could not identify a “device.” Id. By assuming that a “part” of a telecommunications system has to be a “device,” and by assuming that neither “domain” nor “region” would identify one or more devices, Patent Owner sees an alleged contradiction in allowing media connectivity setting to be as we have construed it, and the phrase that immediately follows the claim term—“identifying one or more other devices.” Because of that alleged contradiction, Patent Owner contends that “at least one media connectivity setting identifying one or more other devices” should be construed as “information identifying one or more parts of a telecommunication network, distinct from either a domain or a region of the telecommunication network.”” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Claim 10 recites, among other limitations, an additional requirement of determining from said bypass mode data that said media gateway “must” be bypassed in said media path. That is in contrast with the language of claim 9, which also depends from claim 8, and which recites, among other limitations, the additional requirement of determining from said bypass mode data that said media gateway “may” be bypassed in said media path. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction for the word “must.” In the circumstances here, the plain and ordinary meaning of “must” in the English language applies. There is no indication that one with ordinary skill in the art would understand the word as conveying something different. The Specification of the ’640 patent does not set forth a special definition of “must.” Also, consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of “must,” the Specification of the ’640 patent distinguishes between “must” and “may”: It may be determined from the retrieved bypass mode data that the media gateway may be bypassed in the media path, in which case preceding device connectivity data is included in the outbound communication setup request message. It may be determined from the retrieved bypass mode data that the media gateway must be bypassed in the media path, in which case preceding device connectivity data is included in the outbound communication session setup request message. Ex. 1101, 12:35–42 (emphasis added). 34 We determine that “must,” when applied to an action, such as bypassing a media gateway as recited in claim 10, eliminates not taking that action as a possibility and precludes the not taking of that action. In that regard, the different language used between claims 9 and 10 further supports the distinction between the absolute nature of “must” as used in claim 10 and the permissive nature of “may” as used in claim 9. In that regard, as is noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Bress, agrees that the permissive nature of “may” does not meet the absolute requirement of “must.” PO Resp. 43 (citing Ex. 2004, 123:7–124:5).” slip op. at 34
- Skill levelDecided for patent owner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts: As of the priority date of the ’640 Patent of March 22, 2011, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have been someone with a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related scientific field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the telecommunications industry, which could include telecommunications device design, telecommunications software development, or related areas. Alternatively, a POSITA in the relevant timeframe would have been someone with an advanced degree, such as a Master’s Degree, in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related scientific field, focusing on telecommunications technology. Alternatively, a POSITA in the relevant timeframe could have been someone lacking formal technical education but having experience in the 18 telecommunications industry that would be equivalent to such education. See Ex. 1004 at ¶ 128. Pet. 19–20. Patent Owner does not explicitly take a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level of technical education and experience is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). C.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“49 media gateways. In that connection, we credit the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Bress, over the testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Akl, in part because Mr. Bress discusses and explains more of the disclosure of Ejzak. Patent Owner’s argument that it is possible to obtain the media connectivity setting of the ensuing device by requesting the ensuing device for such information (PO Resp. 38) is ineffective with respect to claim 4, which does not specify from where the information is retrieved. Retrieving information from the ensuing device nonetheless still is retrieving. With respect to claim 5 which requires retrieving the information from within the given media gateway, not the ensuing device, we have determined that Petitioner has not stablished that Ejzak necessarily discloses retrieving such information from within the storage of the given gateway. Patent Owner’s argument that the claim limitation of “retrieving ensuing device connectivity data for an ensuing device” would not have been regard by one with ordinary skill in the art as an obvious variant of Ejzak’s determining the IP realm for the next segment of the media path is not supported by sufficient reasoning and explanation directed to Ejzak’s disclosure of provisioning IP realms of media gateways as identified and explained by Petitioner. Between the testimony of respective expert witnesses of Petitioner and Patent Owner, we credit the testimony of Mr. Bress, Petitioner’s witness, over that of Mr. Akl, Patent Owner’s witness. Mr. Bress’s testimony, in our view, is more thorough, whereas Mr. Aky’s testimony, in our view, focuses more on what a prior art 50 disclosure literally states without enough explanation as to the understanding by one with ordinary skill in the art of the teachings associated with that language.” slip op. at 49
Patent outcomesUS 8,687,640 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,687,640 - Genband US LLC / Genband Management Services Corp. v. Metaswitch Networks Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01456 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 6, 7, 11–12, 19–21, and 25–31 are unpatentable as obvious over Ejzak and Cisco and over Ejzak and Intel.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“discussed below, Patent Owner is unpersuasive in arguing (PO Resp. 18–19) that “at least one media connectivity setting identifying one or more other devices” should be construed as “information identifying one or more parts of a telecommunication network, distinct from either a domain or a region of the telecommunications network.” (Emphasis added). Specifically, we determine that the requirement of “identifying one or more other devices” does not exclude information describing domains or regions of a telecommunications network from satisfying the claimed “at least one media connectivity setting identifying one or more other devices.” Patent Owner presents its argument as follows: A “device” is a “part” of a telecommunications network, such as an endpoint or media gateway. Ex. 1001 [’640 Patent] at 11:46 (“a device (endpoint device or media gateway)”); see also Ex. 2006 [Akl Declaration] at ¶ 56. A “device” is neither a “domain” nor a “region” of a telecommunications network. Ex. 2006 [Akl Declaration] at ¶ 56; see also Ex. 2004 [Bress Transcript 1] at 137:15–18 [footnote omitted] and 142:7–11 [footnote omitted]. The following figure demonstrates the relationships between parts, domain, and regions and their associated media connectivity settings:” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“As of the priority date of the ’640 Patent of March 22, 2011, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have been someone with a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related scientific field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the telecommunications industry, which could include telecommunications device design, telecommunications software development, or related areas. Alternatively, a POSITA in the relevant timeframe would have been someone with an advanced degree, such as a Master’s Degree, in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related scientific field, focusing on telecommunications technology. Alternatively, a POSITA in the relevant timeframe could have been someone lacking formal technical education but having experience in the telecommunications industry that would be equivalent to such education. See Ex. 1004 at ¶ 128. Pet. 19–20. Patent Owner does not explicitly take a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level of technical education and experience is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“37), and based on our discussion of media gateway above, we find that each pair of ALG and associated BG in Ejzak constitutes a media gateway.6 This was a determination first made in the initial decision (Dec. Inst. 21), and Patent Owner put forth no contrary position in the Patent Owner Response. Tr. 48:7–18. Petitioner additionally argues that it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill to combine each pair of ALG and associated BG in a single physical device, in view of Ejzak alone, because it was well-known in the art that the signaling and media functions of the ALG and BG could be implemented in a single physical device. Pet. 20–21.7 That contingent argument is unnecessary, because none of the claims requires the media gateway to be in the form of a single physical device, such as a unified 6 In particular, each ALG and associated BG pair is a distributed mode SBC (Session Border Controller). 7 Petitioner cites to Cisco and Intel, respectively, as teaching that signaling and media functions can be performed by a single physical device. Pet. 21. In particular, Cisco discloses that SBCs come in two different models, a distributed model and a unified model, and that in the unified model the signaling and media functions are performed not by separate units but by a single operative unit. Ex. 1010, 2. model SBC. Even if we assume that a single physical device is required by the claims, then for reasons expressed by Petitioner, we determine that it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art, based on the disclosure of Ejzak, to implement Ejzak’s ALG and corresponding BG in a single physical device.8 In that regard, Cisco was cited by Petitioner to show what was well known to one with ordinary skill in the art. In any event, for the reasons indicated by Petitioner on pages 21–25 of the Petition, Cisco would have suggested to one with ordinary skill in the art to implement Ejzak’s ALG and corresponding BG in a single physical device.9” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“In summary, traversed-realm attribute is information about a preceding BG or media gateway including the BG, and that information identifies devices in a traversed IP realm which are accessible from that BG or media gateway. Ejzak discloses limitation [1e]. For limitation [1f], which recites “to enable bypass of said media gateway in said media path if an ensuing device in said outbound signaling path determines that such bypass should be conducted,” Petitioner provides persuasive explanation on pages 16–17, 29–30, and 36–37 of the Petition. For instance, Petitioner explains that in Ejzak, if there is a match between a preceding BG’s IP realm and the next IP realm, one or more BGs may be bypassed. Pet. 16, 30. Petitioner cites to “Case 1,” described in Ejzak, as one example. Pet. 16–17. Ejzak describes: An example of case 1, using FIG. 1 as reference, is that upon receiving an SDP offer from the direction of UA1, ALG3 determines that R4 125 and R1 107 are instances of the same IP realm. ALG3 substitutes the connection and port information from UA1 into the outgoing SDP offer and deletes the traversed-realm instances for R2 113 and R3 119 from the SDP before forwarding. After the end-to-end SDP offer/answer transaction is completed, the media path will bypass BG1 105, BG2 111, and BG3 117. Ex. 1003 ¶ 74. Petitioner also relies on “Case 3,” described in Ejzak, as another example. Pet. 17, 30. Ejzak describes:” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 8,687,640 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,687,640 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2016 · IPR2015-01457 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted, adding claims 8–10 to trial under § 103 grounds over Ejzak and Intel, and Ejzak and Cisco.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“of claim 8 which recites: “said bypass mode data indicating a bypass mode setting for said media gateway.” In the Decision, we stated: “The reference [in Ejzak] merely to ‘policy’ is unreasonably broad and not very meaningful when the limitation pertains to the bypass setting for a particular device.” Dec. 23. We questioned whether “local policy” that may apply generally to all media gateways indicates a specific bypass setting for a particular ALG, BG, or media gateway. Id. at 22. On that basis, we concluded that Petitioner failed to provide adequate explanation on how a “local policy” satisfies the bypass mode data requirement of claim 8. Id. at 23. Petitioner identifies in its rehearing request points we misapprehended in our Decision. The Petition, as filed, adequately explains the “local policy” is specific to the local ALG. Reh. Req. 9–10. Petitioner identifies testimony of Mr. Bress, referred to in the Petition, that explain why one with ordinary skill in the art would understand “local policy” of Ejzak as local and specific to the ALG. Id. at 11 (citing ¶¶ 238–43 of Ex. 1104). We agree that on the record before us, “local policy” appears to be local to the ALG and not generally applicable to all media gateways.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“in our Decision. The Petition, as filed, adequately explains the “local policy” is specific to the local ALG. Reh. Req. 9–10. Petitioner identifies testimony of Mr. Bress, referred to in the Petition, that explain why one with ordinary skill in the art would understand “local policy” of Ejzak as local and specific to the ALG. Id. at 11 (citing ¶¶ 238–43 of Ex. 1104). We agree that on the record before us, “local policy” appears to be local to the ALG and not generally applicable to all media gateways.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,687,640 - Delphix Corp. v. Actifio, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 10, 2016 · IPR2015-01678 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–4 obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered both the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of claims 1–4 of the ’944 patent on any alleged ground. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim on the record before us.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“describes the claimed “hash structure” as a handle. Pet. 7–8, Prelim. Resp. 6. See also Ex. 1001, 27:55–59 (“The data object manager references all content addressable objects with a content addressable handle.”). Petitioner contends that the term “hash structure” should be construed as “a structure for holding a value generated via a hash function.” Pet. 8 (emphasis added). Petitioner relies on the Specification and its explanation that a hash is generated via a hashing algorithm such as SHA-1. Id. (citing Ex. 1001,” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“In support of its contention that marking the hash structure would have been obvious, Petitioner again relies on conclusory testimony from Dr. Shenoy. Pet. 31 (citing Shenoy Decl. ¶ 81). This testimony concludes, without support, that it would have been obvious to include “an indicator as to whether the unique identifier is the encoded data segment itself or a value derived from a hash function of the data segment to specify in the reconstruction process whether or not an additional lookup is required to retrieve the stored data segment.” Shenoy Decl. ¶ 81. Such conclusory testimony is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Petitioner does not cite to any evidence where a hash structure is marked to indicate a field contains encoded content as claimed. Further, Petitioner has not persuasively identified a reason or need in Patterson or Zhu to differentiate a hash structure that stores an encoding as claimed.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Dr. Shenoy accounts for the difference between storing a data segment itself in a hash structure and storing a portion of the data in encoded form directly in a hash structure, as required by claim 1. The claimed invention (see step 1F) applies encodings to received portions of the data and determines if the encodings would fit within a hash structure. Yet, Petitioner has not cited in the references any teaching of storing an encoding in a hash structure and Petitioner fails to explain persuasively how the combination of the three references resolves that deficiency. Instead, Petitioner and Dr. Shenoy provide mere conclusory statements to support the assertion that the combination of references teaches determining if received content can be encoded in the hash structure. See Pet. 28, 29. We agree with Patent Owner that “[n]either Petitioner nor its expert explain why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would try to encode data and then store it specifically in a hash structure” as required in step 1F. Prelim. Resp. 39. Petitioner does not adequately explain why or how a person of ordinary skill in the art would arrive at the modifications necessary to meet the requirements of step 1F. Petitioner’s reasons for combining the references – such as reducing the amount of data stored in each field or making the storage system more efficient (Pet. 27–28) – do not adequately address the modifications needed by each reference to reach the determining step (1F). See Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Where, as here, the necessary reasoning is absent, we cannot simply assume that an ordinary artisan would be awakened to modify prior art in such a way as to lead to an obviousness rejection.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,299,944 - NEC Display Solutions Of America / NEC Display Solutions, Ltd. v. Cascades Projection LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 28, 2016 · IPR2015-01841 · APJ Howard B Blankenship · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1, 17, and 61 after their statutory disclaimer, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial” (37 C.F.R § 42.73(b)(2)). No claim remains to be adjudicated in this proceeding. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1, 17, and 61 of the ’347 patent; and FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding is terminated.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,688,347 - Epson America, Inc. v. Cascades Projection LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01206 · APJ Howard B Blankenship · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Cascades Projection LLC’s rehearing request, leaving institution of inter partes review in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Patent Owner in its Request first re-argues a point that we found not” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached
“constructions are erroneous because we misapprehended Patent Owner’s arguments with respect to Figure 65 of the ’347 patent as it relates to Figure 66. Req. Reh’g 4–9 (addressing means plus function limitations). In particular, Patent Owner submits that its argument that the Figure 65 embodiment requires “light beam segment steering” prisms does not rely on the ’347 patent’s description of Figure 66. Id. Patent Owner, however, in its Preliminary Response and in its Request, does not point to any disclosure in the ’347 patent, or to any other evidence, that refers to the prisms of Figure 65 as “light beam segment steering” prisms. Again, Patent Owner is free to provide evidence in support of its position in its Patent Owner Response.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,688,347 - PTAB · Jan 5, 2016 · IPR2015-01522 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Genband did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 7, and 8 unpatentable under its asserted grounds or claims 10, 13, and 14 anticipated by Smith.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Genband will prevail with respect to any one of claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 13, and 14 of the ’018 patent. Accordingly, we do not authorize institution of an inter partes review on the record before us.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Decided for patent owner
“specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Furthermore, “structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“the structure must not only perform the claimed function, but the specification must clearly associate the structure with the performance of the function”).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“description of a technique in the “Background” establishes that Smith, itself, contemplates that particular conversion practice as a part of its disclosed invention. See, e.g., Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (For anticipation, “‘[t]he [prior art] reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.”’ (quoting In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972))). With respect to paragraph 71, Genband does not explain why the act of converting “analog modem tones” into digital packets equates to a conversion step applied to “time-division multiplexed digital signals.” To establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every element in a claim must be found in a single prior art reference. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Here, we are not satisfied that Genband adequately explains where the required conversion of “time-division multiplexed digital signals” is found in Smith. Accordingly, we do not conclude that Genband’s Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the ground that claims 10, 13, and 14 are anticipated by Smith.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,657,018
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.