• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Jumio Corporation v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00109 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine the references and failed to show the claimed different-distance image capture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 11–12. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’910 Patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’910 Patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that these reasons would not have adequately motivated a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine and modify the references in Petitioner’s asserted manner to reach the claimed features. Petitioner’s motivations — “substitution,” “obvious alternative . . . approaches,” “use of a known technique,” and “complimentary” techniques — are all similarly based on swapping or adding techniques for verifying three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17; Pet. Reply 16–17. Those motivations might have been suitable had Tanii described techniques to verify three dimensionality, but Petitioner has not shown that Tanii describes any technique to verify three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17, 25–28. Instead, as discussed above, Tanii describes the existence of the perspective distortion phenomenon and a technique for correcting it. As such, substituting the knowledge that perspective distortion exists and techniques to correct it does not correspond adequately motivate Petitioner’s combination. Put another way, because Tanii does not teach an approach for verifying three-dimensionality, Tanii’s techniques cannot be used as a substitute for approaches that do verify three dimensionality simply because Tanii discloses the concept of perspective distortion.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 13 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Ex. 1005, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Ex. 1005, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject. Zhang also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Petitioner acknowledges as much stating “[a]lthough Zhang does not expressly say that the second image is captured at a second distance different from the distance of the first image, this would have been obvious to a POSITA.” Pet. 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 1046). Because Zhang does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance, Petitioner once again relies on expert testimony to argue that the multiple images disclosed in Zhang would have been taken at different perspectives resulting from rotating or translating the position of the camera and that taking images at different distances would have enhanced Zhang’s homography-transformation procedure. Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 1046). From here Petitioner repeats many of the same arguments it made regarding the parallax approach from Derakhshani, except that these arguments are on even weaker footing because Zhang does not mention taking images by translating the position of the camera, nor even that the multiple images taken should be from different perspectives. Each of these assertions are made solely on the basis of Petitioner’s expert testimony, and as such are not persuasive. Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1046). Petitioner’s argument that Zhang teaches capturing a second image at a second distance simply lacks sufficient support from Zhang’s disclosure.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,874,910 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,874,910
• Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00108 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations lacked adequate motivation to combine and did not teach capturing images at different distances.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues Petitioner’s proffered level of skill is too broad with respect to work experience. PO Resp. 27–28. Patent Owner counters that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and two years’ work experience related to biometric security, facial authentication, and three-dimensional computer vision such that they would have had significant academic and/or work experience in both facial biometrics and computer vision. Id. at 28–29. Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 13–14. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’938 patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’938 patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “images are three dimensional—let alone a technique that captures two images at different distances, compares the images for certain differences, and verifies three dimensionality based on those differences, as recited by the claim. Instead, Tanii describes a system that “corrects warp in which the perspective is exaggerated when an image is captured with the user’s face at close range.” Ex. 1007, code (57). In particular, Tanii recognizes the physical phenomenon of perspective distortion (fish-eye distortion) where “[i]f the image of the face of a person or the like is captured from a point that is relatively nearby, an image is obtained in which the perspective appears exaggerated,” i.e., the user image is warped or distorted. Id. ¶ 6; see id. ¶ 48, Fig. 4B. Tanii corrects such warped images by enlarging peripheral areas of the user image. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches: (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 12 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Derakhshani, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, instead, focused specifically on the use of the word “slid” in Derakhshani as indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Derakhshani, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,693,938 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,693,938
• Jumio Corporation v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00107 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not determined unpatentable because the petition did not establish motivation to combine the references or that they taught capturing images at different distances.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues Petitioner’s proffered level of skill is too broad with respect to work experience. PO Resp. 27–28. Patent Owner counters that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and two years’ work experience related to biometric security, facial authentication, and three-dimensional computer vision such that they would have had significant academic and/or work experience in both facial biometrics and computer vision. Id. at 28–29. Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 8. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’606 Patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’606 Patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that these reasons would not have adequately motivated a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine and modify the references in Petitioner’s asserted manner to reach the claimed features. Petitioner’s motivations—“substitution,” “obvious alternative . . . approaches,” “use of a known technique,” and “complimentary” techniques—are all similarly based on swapping or adding techniques for verifying three dimensionality. See Pet. 12–16; Pet. Reply 6–7. These motivations might have been suitable had Tanii described techniques for verifying three dimensionality, but Petitioner has not shown that Tanii describes any technique to verify three dimensionality. See Pet. 12–16, 19–23. Instead, as discussed above, Tanii describes the existence of the perspective distortion phenomenon and a technique for correcting it. As such, substituting the knowledge that perspective distortion exists and techniques to correct it does not correspond with approaches for verifying three-dimensionality, and so does not adequately motivate Petitioner’s combination. Put another way, because Tanii does not teach an approach for verifying three-dimensionality, Tanii’s techniques cannot be used as a substitute for approaches that do verify three dimensionality simply because Tanii discloses the concept of perspective distortion.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia with nexusObjective indicia outweighedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner has demonstrated a nexus by showing that certain objective indicia, discussed below, are the direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention. As discussed above in our summary of the ’606 Patent and reflected in our discussion of Petitioner’s obviousness challenges (see §§ I.F, II.E.1, II.E.2, II.E.3), the unique characteristics of the claim relate to verification of three dimensionality by comparing two images taken at different distances for perspective distortion. Indeed, those features are what distinguish over the prior art. See id. Furthermore, Patent Owner, supported by testimony from its Chief Technology Officer, Mr. Rose, asserts the unique characteristics claimed are reflected in the “3D liveness checks” its ZoOm software product provides because ZoOm “confirms that a user is 3D by comparing images taken at different distances for expected differences in biometric data, such as the presence of appropriate perspective distortion and differences.” PO Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2059 ¶ 49). Patent Owner’s assertion is further supported by a “FaceTec Software Explanation” stating that its software uses “near & far image data . . . to determine if the expected differences in perspective distortion are present in the image data” and, from that, “decides if there is sufficient evidence in the image data to conclude with a high degree [of] confidence that the image data contains first-generation biometric data captured in real-time from a live, physically present user.” Ex. 2067; see PO Resp. 25–26. As such, the 3D liveness checks provided by Patent Owner’s software are indicative of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention and, as we discuss below, certain objective indicia of nonobviousness have a direct nexus to the 3D liveness checks of its software.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,157,606 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,157,606
• Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00106 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board determined claims 1–20 were not unpatentable because Jumio did not show sufficient motivation to combine the references or that they taught capturing images at different distances.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues Petitioner’s proffered level of skill is too broad with respect to work experience. PO Resp. 28. Patent Owner counters that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and two years’ work experience related to biometric security, facial authentication, and three-dimensional computer vision such that they would have had significant academic and/or work experience in both facial biometrics and computer vision. Id. at 28–29. Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 11–12. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’471 patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’471 patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that these reasons would not have adequately motivated a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine and modify the references in Petitioner’s asserted manner to reach the claimed features. Petitioner’s motivations—“substitution,” “obvious alternative . . . approaches,” “use of a known technique,” and “complimentary” techniques—are all similarly based on swapping or adding techniques for verifying three dimensionality. See Pet. 12–16; Pet. Reply 6–7. These motivations might have been suitable had Tanii described techniques for verifying three dimensionality, but Petitioner has not shown that Tanii describes any technique to verify three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17, 25–28. Instead, as discussed above, Tanii describes the existence of the perspective distortion phenomenon and a technique for correcting it. As such, substituting the knowledge that perspective distortion exists and techniques to correct it does not correspond with approaches for verifying three-dimensionality, and so does not adequately motivate Petitioner’s combination. Put another way, because Tanii does not teach an approach for verifying three-dimensionality, Tanii’s techniques cannot be used as a substitute for approaches that do verify three dimensionality simply because Tanii discloses the concept of perspective distortion.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “none of the relied upon references teach capturing two images at two different distances, as required by limitations 1[d3] and 1[d4]. These limitations recite “moving the camera from a first location to a second location, the second location being a second distance from the user” and “capturing at least one second image of the user taken with the camera of the computing device at the second distance from the user, the second distance being different than the first distance.” Derakhshani does not teach capturing a second image at a second distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches: (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 13 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Ex. 1005, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, instead, focused specifically on the use of the word “slid” in Derakhshani as indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Derakhshani, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,776,471 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,776,471
• Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCAdverse judgment
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2025-00618 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Adverse judgment

  After Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims, the Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2).

  RulingsAdverse judgment

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Our rules state that “disclaimer of a claim such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial” is “construed to be a request for adverse judgment.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims and no claims remain in this proceeding, adverse judgment is appropriate. We, therefore, enter judgment adverse to the Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 11,695,823
• Google LLC v. Mindbasehq, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2021-01252 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 14–19, 33–40, and 43–46 were held unpatentable as obvious; the Federal Circuit’s affirmed findings leave claims 1–13, 20–32, 41, and 42 unpatentable as well.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “to both cases vacating and remanding in part and affirming in part our Final Written Decisions. Appeal Dec. With respect to Petitioner’s appeals, the Federal Circuit addressed the “dictionary routine” claims (claims 14–19 and 33–40) and the “normalization” claims (claims 43–46). Appeal Dec. 7–14. For the “dictionary routine” claims, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, stating that In sum, as Google contends and we now hold, the “dictionary routine” claims can be practiced by use of an already-created dictionary, and do not also require the automatic creation of a dictionary. The Board needs to consider Google’s evidence and argument by applying this construction of the automatically classifying and storing limitation, and using this understanding to determine whether Conlon may, in fact, render the “dictionary routine” claims obvious (and, relatedly, whether its prior distinctions of Conlon may be immaterial). Appeal Dec. 10–11. For the “normalization” claims, the Federal Circuit also vacated and remanded, stating that our “decision to exclude Google’s rebuttal argument and supplemental declaration is based on a clear factual error,” so on remand we “must include evaluation of the evidence and argument Google provided in reply.” Id. at 13–14. With respect to Patent Owner’s cross-appeals, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Id. at 14–16.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The Federal Circuit concluded that Petitioner’s construction of “automatically classifying and storing” (as recited in limitation [14.3]), is correct. Appeal Dec. 8. That is, “the ‘dictionary routine’ claims can be practiced by [the] use of an already-created dictionary, and do not also require the automatic creation of a dictionary.” Id. at 10; see also Reply 7 (the limitation is “directed to the use of a dictionary function to automatically look up words and their syntax”); Appeal Dec. 8 (“nothing about the term . . . would inform a person of ordinary skill in the art that automatic ‘creation’ of a database, in addition to the ‘use’ of an already-created database, is a requirement of the dictionary routine claims”); id. (“the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language is broad enough to include ‘use’”); id. (agreeing with Petitioner that “the specification describes the ‘dictionary routine’ as the act of looking up words already in the database”); id. at 9 (stating that “[i]t is notable, as well, that the specification nowhere describes automatically creating a dictionary; all instances of creating dictionary entries rely, at least in part, on manual data entry by users”). As directed by the Federal Circuit, we will apply this construction in our analysis.8 Id. 8 Patent Owner argues that the Federal Circuit “cherry-picks” and misinterprets the patents’ specifications, and “ignores the clearly contrary specification language.” PO Remand Br. 4–5, 10; id. at 8 (arguing that that the specification clearly set forth the definition of the claim term, and “the Board must accept term definitions . . . above all external definitions”). We do not consider these arguments on the construction of this limitation, because the Federal Circuit has directed us to proceed under its construction of the limitation. We also agree with Petitioner that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction is “foreclosed from further consideration” under its” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that claim 43 is obvious over the combination of Conlon, Miller, and Fong. The Federal Circuit stated, “[i]n this context, ‘normalization’ generally refers to de-duplicating and simplifying database entries (for instance, combining entries for ‘car’ and ‘automobile’).” Appeal Dec. 4 (cited at Pet. Response Br. 5). This is consistent with the disclosure in the ’433 patent. E.g., Ex. 1001, 16:55– 17:24 (discussing, for example, “recogniz[ing] that the differently named data elements in different structures are actually the same data element . . . is referred to as normalizing the names of the same data elements,” “recogniz[ing] that the same named data elements in different structures are actually different data elements . . . is referred to as normalizing the names of the different data elements,” and “normalizing multiple single data elements”). This is also consistent with how Fong describes “normalization.” Ex. 1029, 76 (The “Function” of “Normaliz[ing] the collection of entities” is to “[r]emove redundancies and detect errors”); see also Ex. 1057 ¶ 226. Patent Owner’s arguments that Fong’s normalization is “different” from the normalization described in the ’433 patent does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s arguments. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not provide a construction for “normalization,” despite claiming that the term is “defined” in the ’433 patent. Pet. Remand Resp. Br. 6; PO Remand Br. 13. Moreover, although Patent Owner purports to identify differences between the ’433 patent and Fong, the “normalization” applied is expressly recited in limitations [43.1.1], [43.1.2], and [43.2], and the subsequent actions taken on those normalized databases (i.e., comparing and recording) are recited in limitations [43.3]–[43.5]. That is, the “normalization” required by the claim is reflected in the claim language itself, and is broader than argued by Patent Owner. See In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for nonobvious distinctions over the prior art”). Patent Owner does not explain how these purported “differences” (e.g., that Fong may require the use of “database keys,” “identifiers,” “entities,” or determining ‘non-key attributes’ from key attributes) impacts the claim language, or Petitioner’s showing. See EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (A prior art reference “must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect”). For the same reasons, as well as those set forth by Petitioner, we are also not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that each DBMS requires a normalization process that is customized for it. Pet. Remand Resp. Br. 6–7. These arguments by Patent Owner also are not commensurate with the scope of the claim language, which does not recite a DBMS, and generally recites “normalizing” or “normalized” without regard to the DBMS. Id. Dr. Jansen provides an example of a database in unnormalized form that is converted into a normalized form, based on Fong’s four conditions, as applied to the claim language. See Reply 31–35; Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 226–261. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner has not explained how the example maps onto the limitations. PO Remand Resp. Br. 6–12. Patent Owner’s complaint that Dr. Jansen created the graphic in the example does not undermine Petitioner’s showing. E.g., Trial Practice Guide,14 I.G., (“Experts may testify about the teachings of the prior art and how they relate to the patentability of the challenged claims.”). We find Dr. Jansen’s testimony credible and persuasive in explaining why the combination of Conlon and Fong teaches the claim limitations. After considering the properly presented evidence and arguments of the complete record, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the combination of Conlon, Miller, and Fong teaches the limitations in claim 43, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Conlon, Miller, and Fong, and that claim 44 would have been obvious over Conlon, Miller, and Fong. 2. Analysis of Dependent Claims 44–46 Claims 44–46 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 41. We, likewise, determine whether the combination renders obvious claims 44–46, taking into account the arguments made in Petitioner’s Reply Briefs and Dr. Jansen’s Supplemental Rebuttal Declarations. Petitioner contends that dependent claims 44–46, would have been obvious over Conlon, Miller, and Fong, and provides explanation as to how the prior art teaches each claim limitation. Pet. 84–86; Reply 35–39; Pet. Remand Br. 13–14. Patent Owner does not provide further briefing on dependent claims 44–46. 14 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trial-practice-guide#step2. Patent Owner did not specifically challenge Petitioner’s contentions as” slip op. at 31

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s arguments do not undermine Petitioner’s showing. Patent Owner did not specifically challenge Petitioner’s contentions as to the sufficiency of Conlon’s disclosure for claim 1410 in the Patent Owner Response. In the Sur-replies, Patent Owner argues that the claim requires that at least some relationships are created “automatically,” and “these automatic embodiments . . . are represented in this group of claims.” Sur-reply 9. Along these lines, in the additional briefing Patent Owner argues that Conlon does not teach “automatic,” but merely teaches “semi-automatic.” PO Remand Br. 9–10. The crux of Patent Owner’s argument, however, is that the Federal Circuit did not properly construe the limitation, and ignored certain disclosures in the ’433 (and ’680) patent. Id. at 10–11; see Pet. Remand Resp. Br. 1–4; PO Remand Resp. Br. 4–5. The Federal Circuit held that “the dictionary routine claims can be satisfied by mere use of a lexical database, and do not also require the automatic creation of additional definitions.” Appeal Dec. 10. Moreover, the statements from Conlon that Patent Owner relies upon relate to creating a database, not using the database. See id. As discussed above, on remand we are directed to apply the Federal Circuit’s construction. Patent Owner does not explain 10 As discussed in the original Final Written Decisions, Patent Owner raised several arguments that generally applied to all the claims, challenging, for example, the level of ordinary skill in the art, whether Conlon, Miller, and Beckwith were analogous art, and several general arguments relating to Conlon and the motivation to combine Conlon with a DBMS. See Final Dec. 14–23, 25–27. We were not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments; the Federal Circuit affirmed, determining that our findings were supported by substantial evidence. Appeal Dec. 14–16. why Petitioner’s contentions are not persuasive in light of the Federal Circuit’s construction of this limitation. In addition, Patent Owner argues in the Sur-replies that “[c]laims 14– 19 are not disclosed by the proffered prior art” and cites to paragraphs 78–83 of the Ranka Rebuttal Declarations. Sur-reply 10. As discussed in the original Final Written Decisions, Patent Owner’s reliance on six paragraphs of Dr. Ranka’s Rebuttal Declarations is an improper incorporation by reference, as Patent Owner did not discuss that testimony or further elaborate on these arguments in the Sur-replies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3); Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 at 9–10 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative); see, e.g., Final Dec. 37–39, 45, 48–50, 52. Therefore, we will not consider arguments that are not made in the Sur-replies, but are instead improperly incorporated by reference to the cited paragraphs in Dr. Ranka’s Rebuttal Declarations. Accordingly, after considering the evidence and arguments of the complete record, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Conlon teaches limitation [14.3], and that claim 14 would have been obvious over Conlon.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,665,680 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,665,680
• Revvo Technologies, Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc.Other
  PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8

  None
  Patents in suitUS 11,835,421
• Orca Security Ltd. v. Wiz, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01084 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR on claims 1–29 over Ross, Agarwal, and Biran because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’896 patent. We institute inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’896 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing computer science (i.e., computer science, computer information systems, computer engineering, etc.) or cybersecurity and (2) at least two years of work experience with cybersecurity and cloud computing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53–54). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. See generally, Prelim. Resp. ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’896 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “1[Pre] A method for generation of unified graph models for network entities, comprising: Petitioner contends that the preamble is not limiting, but to the extent by teaching the remaining limitations of the claim which are the steps in generating unified graph models for network entities, as the preamble recites. Pet. 9–10. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions. At this stage of the proceeding, we agree with Petitioner that the preamble is not limiting because it merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention and because none of the subsequent limitations rely upon the preamble for completeness or antecedent basis. See Catalina Marketing Int’l., Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67 (CCPA 1976).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “sufficiently established a motivation to combine Ross, Agarwal, and Biran in the manner proposed. For example, Petitioner contends for limitation 1[b] that a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Ross’s system to genericize network entities as taught by Agarwal and that Agarwal provides an express motivation to do so, explaining that “[t]he grouping of nodes can be helpful when attempting to understand system properties in a cloud environment, like availability, security and performance, where the system includes a large number of nodes.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:13–26, 13:21–27; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–108). Similarly, for limitation 1[d] Petitioner argues that “Biran provides express motivation to implement Ross to gather information on host-less components . . . to generate an accurate, service-aware view of the system infrastructure.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:59– 61; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 134–136). These disclosures demonstrate that Petitioner’s motivation to combine stems from the prior art references themselves rather than from hindsight. Moreover, Petitioner’s contentions are supported by credible testimony from Dr. Easttom. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–108, 122–123, Addressing a motivation to combine on a limitation-by-limitation basis, as Petitioner has done in its Petition, is not necessarily improper, and may in fact be more suitable in certain situations depending on the proposed combination. Patent Owner does not provide any authority supporting its contention that providing a motivation to combine in the manner asserted in the Petition is contrary to proper obviousness analysis under Graham.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,929,896

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.