- Microsoft Corporation v. Litl, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · IPR2021-01011 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims 1–36, and the Board’s rules bar institution on disclaimed claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“November 22, 2021, after Petitioner filed its Petition, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer, disclaiming claims 1–36 of the ’957 patent. Ex. 2008. Under our rules, “[n]o inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e); see Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (explaining how Rule 42.107(e) operates in the case of a pre-institution disclaimer of all claims) (precedential). Because we cannot institute trial on disclaimed claims and Patent Owner has disclaimed all of the challenged claims, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–36. III. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to the challenged claims of the ʼ957 patent; and FURTHER ORDERED that no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,577,957 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 4, 2021 · IPR2021-00821 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As discussed below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“reasonable likelihood of showing any of challenged claims 1–9, 15–22, and 24–27 would have been obvious over the asserted prior art. Independent claims 1, 26 and 27 recite “wherein the graphical user interface comprises at least a plurality of views of digital media content.” Ex. 1001, 47:58–59, 50:66–67, 51:41–52:1. The independent claims further require transitioning “between the plurality of views.” Id. at 47:60, 51:1, 52:4–5. For all of its asserted grounds, Petitioner asserts that the prior art teaches a plurality of views because “[t]he Shimura-Tsuji Computer can orient the displayed content in either a normal view in the laptop mode or an inverted view in the easel mode based on the outputs of the rotation angle and gravity sensors.” Pet. 50; see id. at 82, 84. Petitioner further asserts that in its proffered combination, “image files . . . would be displayed in either a normal view in the laptop mode or an inverted view in the easel mode, thereby disclosing ‘the graphical user interface comprising at least a plurality of views of digital media content.’” Id. at 50–51; see id. at 82, 84. Similarly, Petitioner explains that its asserted prior-art combination teaches transitioning between views because “[w]hen a user configures the Shimura-Tsuji-Aldrich Computing System between the laptop and easel modes, the displayed content . . . would ‘transition between the plurality of views [normal and inverted views] in response.” Id. at 51. In short, Petitioner relies only on different orientations of the same displayed content to meet the claimed plurality of views. Thus, on the current record, Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the asserted combination of Shimura, Tsuji and Aldrich teach or suggest the claimed plurality of views of digital media content and transitioning between those views, as required in all independent challenged claims.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“As Patent Owner explains, the ’888 patent discusses views extensively. See Prelim. Resp. 38–39 (providing numerous citations to the ’888 patent). In particular, the ’888 patent describes many examples of views that each organize content in a different way. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 5 (album view), 7A (single album view), 8 (time view), 16 (a view including cards); see also id. at 21:35–23:58 (describing the ’888 patent’s figures). We agree with Patent Owner that, when discussing views, the ’888 patent consistently refers to different ways of organizing content. See Prelim. Resp. 35–44; see also, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:14–15 (explaining that “[e]ach view may offer the user particular interaction options, features and benefits”), 21:16–19 (time view organizing content chronologically), 21:19-22 (album view organizing content by album), 22:59-64 (single album view showing previews of photographs). But, as Patent Owner notes, “[t]he specification never describes two orientations of the same organization of displayed content as different ‘views.’” Prelim. Resp. 37. Instead, the ’888 patent separately addresses the display’s “orientation,” which, according to the specification, is achieved simply by rotating the display. Ex. 1001, 10:27–30 (“the plurality of orientations comprises a first orientation relative to the longitudinal axis and a second orientation relative to the longitudinal axis,”), 10:46–49 “(the second orientation is 90 degrees relative to the first orientation, and . . . the third orientation is 180 degrees relative to the first orientation”), 10:57–11:8 (characterizing the display’s “orientation” as a “degree of rotation”). The ’888 patent also expressly distinguishes between displayed content and its orientation in describing that “display content and/or display orientation of the portable computer may vary when the portable computer is configured from the laptop mode into the easel mode.” Id. at 37:6–9. The ’888 patent, however, does not refer to merely changing the visual display’s orientation as changing views. “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Consistent with the ’888 patent’s specification, for purposes of this Decision, we construe “a plurality of views of digital media content” as referring to a plurality of ways of organizing visual representations of computer content. The recitation is distinct from merely changing the display’s orientation.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,612,888 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 2, 2021 · IPR2021-00800 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because the Petition’s deficient, unclear arguments did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“intended to cite and to wade through the Petition to separate the teachings of the references, the Ward testimony, Petitioner’s characterizations of the evidence, and Petitioner’s arguments, that is not our role. Rather, Petitioner is required to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” and to both “identify[] specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explain “the relevance of [that] evidence to the challenge raised.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5); see also id. § 42.22(a)(2) (petitions “must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). Petitioner has not complied with our rules. To hold otherwise would require us to “play archaeologist with the record,” which we decline to do. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999). Based on all these deficiencies, the Petition fails to specify sufficiently where the limitations of the challenged claims of the ’154 patent are taught or suggested by any of the asserted references. It also fails to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of the significance of the citations to the asserted references and the Ward Declaration. These failures violate the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5). Because these requirements must be met to show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determine that Petitioner has not made such a showing.” slip op. at 18
- BurdenDenied
“Although it might be possible for us to guess at the support Petitioner intended to cite and to wade through the Petition to separate the teachings of the references, the Ward testimony, Petitioner’s characterizations of the evidence, and Petitioner’s arguments, that is not our role. Rather, Petitioner is required to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” and to both “identify[] specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explain “the relevance of [that] evidence to the challenge raised.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5); see also id. § 42.22(a)(2) (petitions “must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). Petitioner has not complied with our rules. To hold otherwise would require us to “play archaeologist with the record,” which we decline to do. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999). Based on all these deficiencies, the Petition fails to specify sufficiently where the limitations of the challenged claims of the ’154 patent are taught or suggested by any of the asserted references. It also fails to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of the significance of the citations to the asserted references and the Ward Declaration. These failures violate the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5). Because these requirements must be met to show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determine that Petitioner has not made such a showing.” slip op. at 18
NonePatents in suitUS 10,289,154 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 21, 2021 · IPR2021-00822 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Shimura and the other references taught or suggested the required frame mode in claims 1–16 and 18–22.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As discussed below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction Petitioner proposes a claim construction for “content mode,” as well as several related terms, i.e., “first content mode,” “second content mode,” and “mode(s) of content.” Pet. 16–18. We determine we need not explicitly construe those terms to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Figure 26 and the accompanying text characterize frame mode as having the keyboard face down on a surface with the screen face up, and the base and display components forming a non-zero angle 134, similar to easel mode’s inverted “V.” See id. at 16:6–13.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“reasonable likelihood of showing the asserted prior art would have rendered obvious the subject matter of challenged claims 1–16 and 18–22. Independent claims 1, 10, and 18 require a “frame mode in which the main display component is oriented towards the operator, the base contacts a substantially horizontal surface, and the keyboard faces the substantially horizontal surface.” Ex. 1001, 17:47–51, 18:66–19:2, 20:27–30, Certificate of Correction. For all of its asserted grounds, Petitioner relies on Shimura’s Figure 4 for teaching the claimed “frame mode.” Pet. 57, 87, 102. We agree with Patent Owner that Shimura’s Figure 4 does not disclose or suggest a frame mode. See Prelim. Resp. 27–32.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,624,844 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 21, 2021 · IPR2021-00786 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Lenovo did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 would be unpatentable over the asserted combinations of Shimura, Tsuji, and Pogue.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As discussed below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“above. As we explain in the summary of the ’715 patent provided in Section II.B, supra, the purpose of the ’715 patent is to better organize “more and more features” provided by “feature packing,” so that the typical computer user can better take advantage of features offered. Id. at 1:40–2:44. The ’715 patent explains that “different views [that] present different organizations of the interface elements and in some example[s] display only certain ones of the modes of content in order to reduce the number of options a user must navigate to accomplish an objective.” Id. at 2:45–58. As Patent Owner explains, the ’715 patent discusses views extensively. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 29–33 (providing numerous citations to the ’715 patent. In particular, the ’715 patent describes many examples of views that each organize content in a different way. See, e.g., id. at Figs. 2 (home view), 3A (web page view), 5 (quick access view), 6 (bookmark view), 20A (channel page view), 21 (channel full view), 23 (channel view); see also id. at 12:48–15:15 (summarizing the ’715 patent’s figures). We agree with Patent Owner that, when discussing views, the ’715 patent consistently refers to different ways of organizing content. Prelim. Resp. 29– 33.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As Patent Owner argues, the Petition relies only on different orientations (such as a “normal view” and an “inverted view”) of a single organization of displayed content, to meet claim 1’s views recitation. Id. at 24–25. For example, Patent Owner points out that the Petition considers Shimura’s display of the word “PATENT” right-side-up (normal view) and upside-down (inverted) as meeting the recited “plurality of views.” Id. at 26– 27 (citing Pet. 49–50, 54–55). As we explain above in our claim construction, however, inverting or re-orienting a single way of organizing displayed content does not create a “plurality of views of a plurality of visual representations of computer content” as claimed and described in the ’715 patent. As such, Petitioner’s implicit “construction of ‘plurality of views’ as reading on different orientations of the same organization of displayed content is wrong because it is inconsistent with every embodiment of a ‘plurality of views’ described in the specification.” Id. at 25, 38–41. Indeed, Patent Owner correctly explains that the ’715 patent addresses reorientation of a display but reorientation does not result in the views recitation. Patent Owner makes this distinction by arguing: [in] the claims and the specification of the ’715 Patent—a “view” is a way of organizing displayed content. Ex. 1001, Abstract, 2:54–58 (“[t]he different views present different organizations of the interface elements”); 3:26–28 (“the plurality of views are configured to organize modes of content into different views”); 7:25–27, 9:55–57 (a “plurality of views” of computer content as recited in claims 1, 17 and 20, is a plurality of ways of organizing displayed content). . . . the specification also describes re-orientating the same display organization about the computer’s longitudinal axis to ensure it is right-side-up, but uses different terminology to describe that re-orientation and never refers to two different orientations of the same organization of displayed content as different views. . . . The specification makes clear “views” are particular ways of organizing displayed content—not different orientations of a single organization of displayed content. Prelim. Resp. 27–28; see id. at 29–37, 42–44. We find that Patent Owner’s explanation of this distinction is best supported by the text of the ’715 patent. Thus, on the current record, Petitioner has not made a sufficient” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,880,715 - PTAB · Sep 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00646 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claim 20 based on a reasonable likelihood that Ter-Hovhannisyan anticipates or renders it obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we determine the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect claim 20. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“After the Petition was filed, Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–19 of the ’816 patent. See Prelim. Resp. 3; Ex. 2001. Thus, this decision addresses only claim 20 of the challenged patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“The patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 253(a) . . . disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“’816 patent would have [had] at least a bachelor’s degree in an engineering discipline and approximately three years of experience working on LED lighting technology and designs, including experience with thermal design and heat dissipation.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53). Petitioner further asserts that “[r]elevant work experience could substitute for formal education and post-graduate education could substitute for work experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Ter-Hovhannisyan discloses the annulus limitation, we consider claim 20’s remaining limitations. Petitioner asserts that Ter-Hovhannisyan discloses or would have rendered obvious claim 20’s remaining limitations. Pet. 43–44, 46 (citing Pet. 12, 20–28, 40–42 (Petitioner’s analysis for similar claim limitations recited in claim 1)). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not separately address these limitations. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments (in the context of claim 20) and Dr. Bretschneider’s testimony and find that Petitioner shows sufficiently that Ter-Hovhannisyan anticipates or would have rendered obvious claim 20. Thus, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,985,816 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2021-00681 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not sufficiently identify where the challenged claim limitations were taught or explain the evidence supporting its grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to explain Petitioner’s positions fully. Where the Petition provides some explanation, it does so only through a web of internal cross-references that require the reader to engage in extensive analysis just to decipher what is being argued, much less evaluate the merits of that argument. Although it might be possible for us to wade through this voluminous information and separate the teachings of the references, the Ward testimony, Petitioner’s characterizations of the evidence, and Petitioner’s arguments, that is not our role. Instead, Petitioner is required to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” and to both “identify[] specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explain “the relevance of [that] evidence to the challenge raised.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5); see also id. § 42.22(a)(2) (petitions “must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). Petitioner has not complied with our rules. To hold otherwise would require us to “play archaeologist with the record,” which we decline to do. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999), Based on all these deficiencies, the Petition fails to specify sufficiently where the limitations of the challenged claims of the ’688 patent are taught or suggested by any of the asserted references. It also fails to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of the significance of the citations to the asserted references and the Ward Declaration. These failures violate the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5). Because these requirements must be met to show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determine that Petitioner has not made such a showing.” slip op. at 16
NonePatents in suitUS 8,289,688 - Scentair Technologies, LLC v. Prolitec, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00013 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, finding its new arguments untimely and unpersuasive as to the aerosol outlet limitation for claims 1–19.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in a petition. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked matters or arguments that were not asserted in the Petition. We deny the Rehearing Request because it is based on new arguments that Petitioner did not present in the Petition. B. Petitioner’s Arguments Are Unpersuasive Alternatively, even if we consider the new arguments raised for the first time in the Rehearing Request, we find none persuasive to show reversible error in the Decision. The ’767 patent describes and claims “a cap assembly” that is characterized by three distinct structures, namely, “a cap, a venturi insert, and a base attached together without welds or separate fasteners to define . . . an air outlet chamber” that is “partitioned from the interior of the receptacle by the base.” Ex. 1001, 15:6–13 (claim 1) (emphasis added); see id. at 3:30–43, 9:45–62 (written description).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“The Petition advances three grounds, each of which is based on obviousness and asserts Benalikhoudja1 as a prior art reference. Pet. 5. We found in the Decision, and Petitioner does not dispute in the Rehearing Request, that each ground “depends on Petitioner’s assertion that Benalikhoudja discloses or suggests ‘an aerosol outlet chamber partitioned 1 We refer to US 2006/0237090 A1, published Oct. 26, 2006 (Ex. 1004). from the interior of the receptacle by the base.’” Dec. 5–6. As we did in the Decision, we refer herein to that feature of the claimed invention as “the aerosol outlet limitation.” Id. at 6. Based on the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determined Petitioner did not show sufficiently, for purposes of trial institution, that Benalikhoudja discloses the aerosol outlet limitation. Id. at 9–10. Petitioner argues we erred on that point. Req. Reh’g 1–6.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,480,767
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.