- Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 8, 2015 · CBM2015-00015 · APJ Rama G Elluru · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request and request to seek termination, but granted its request for an oral hearing in both proceedings.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. We deny Smartflash’s request for rehearing of our Order and its” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for patent owner
“In our Order, we determined that 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,118,221 (“the ’221 patent”) in CBM2015-00015 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00102, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 1 of the ’221 patent. Dec. 3. We likewise determined that § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317 (“the ’317 patent”) in CBM2015-00018 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00112, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 18 of the ’317 patent. Id. at 7. Because we determined that Apple “reasonably could have raised” a 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenge to these claims in its CBM2014-00102 and CBM2014-00112 petitions and because claims 1 and 18 were the only claims challenged in CBM2015-00015 and CBM2015- 00018, respectively, we dismissed Apple as a Petitioner from CBM2015- 00015 and CBM2015-00018. Id. at 4–5, 7. We further stated that because Apple is the only Petitioner in these cases, we would not hear any argument” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Smartflash’s request for leave to file a Motion to Terminate is denied for the reasons previously set forth in our Estoppel Order. See Paper 37, 5– 6.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 8,118,221 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 8, 2015 · CBM2015-00018 · APJ Rama G Elluru · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request and authorization to seek termination, but granted an oral hearing in CBM2015-00015 and CBM2015-00018.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. We deny Smartflash’s request for rehearing of our Order and its request for authorization to file a motion to terminate these cases. However, we grant Smartflash’s request for a hearing in CBM2015- 00015 and CBM2015-00018, as discussed below.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelDecided for patent owner
“In our Order, we determined that 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,118,221 (“the ’221 patent”) in CBM2015-00015 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00102, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 1 of the ’221 patent. Dec. 3. We likewise determined that § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317 (“the ’317 patent”) in CBM2015-00018 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00112, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 18 of the ’317 patent. Id. at 7. Because we determined that Apple “reasonably could have raised” a 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenge to these claims in its CBM2014-00102 and CBM2014-00112 petitions and because claims 1 and 18 were the only claims challenged in CBM2015-00015 and CBM2015- 00018, respectively, we dismissed Apple as a Petitioner from CBM2015- 00015 and CBM2015-00018. Id. at 4–5, 7. We further stated that because Apple is the only Petitioner in these cases, we would not hear any argument” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Smartflash’s request for leave to file a Motion to Terminate is denied for the reasons previously set forth in our Estoppel Order. See Paper 37, 5– 6.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 7,942,317 - Square, Inc. v. Unwired Planet LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · IPR2014-01164 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–7 and 11–17 as anticipated by DeLorme, and claims 7–10 or 1–6 and 11–16 as obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“its combinations of teachings of the applied references. See, e.g., PO Resp. 34–39. As the Federal Circuit has explained, While it is always preferable for the factfinder below to specify the level of skill it has found to apply to the invention at issue, the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the Board was not required to set forth express findings as to level of skill in art and quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Circ. 1985)). Here, we are persuaded that the prior art adequately reflects an appropriate level of skill. Additionally, Mr. Proctor proposes a definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art—a person with an engineering degree, either computer science or electrical engineering, and around two years of experience working in the wireless communications industry. Ex. 2003, 55:14–56:3. Patent Owner does not dispute Mr. Proctor’s proposed definition. Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 21–23. We agree that this definition is reasonable.” slip op. at 30
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Regarding Dr. Chatterjee’s testimony, Dr. Chatterjee acknowledges that some amount of TRIPS functionality would be available via mobile devices. Ex. 2002 ¶ 48. Dr. Chatterjee, however, is vague with respect to his opinion of which functionalities would be too difficult to implement. See e.g., id. ¶¶ 48, 52, 53, 58. Dr. Chatterjee testifies regarding significant challenges, but does not tie these challenges persuasively to his opinion that DeLorme’s disclosure is inadequate. For example, Dr. Chatterjee testifies that “although distributed computing was known at the relevant time, distributed computing technologies at that time, e.g., the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) and Microsoft’s Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), were difficult to deploy.” Id. ¶¶ 50, 51 (citing Ex. 2014, 14; Ex. 2016, 10). Dr. Chatterjee, however, does not testify persuasively regarding (1) how CORBA and DCOM relate to the elements recited in claim 1 of the ’433 Patent, or (2) how the challenges with implementing CORBA and DCOM undermine the explicit disclosure in DeLorme of TRIPS using stored preferences to narrow search results.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“combine DeLorme and Trask. PO Resp. 51. Petitioner, in reliance on the testimony of Mr. Proctor, asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to combine DeLorme’s system of taxi service providers and Trask, because Trask enhances DeLorme’s system to maximize available taxis and minimize delays by accounting for the location of the taxi. Pet. 56–57 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 181–184). In the Decision to Institute, we credited Mr. Proctor’s statements, as they are consistent with the teachings of DeLorme and Trask. Inst. Dec. 21. For example, Trask teaches tracking the present position of taxis (Ex. 1007, 2:25–30) and comparing the locations of vehicles with customer requests to determine the most appropriate vehicle to dispatch (id. at 2:31–42).” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner further asserts that Mr. Proctor’s deposition testimony establishes that he improperly relied on hindsight bias and his declaration is not sufficient to establish obviousness. PO Resp. 41–47. Mr. Proctor testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Baker and Hall in various ways depending on their objectives. Ex. 2003, 161:10– 162:13. Patent Owner points to a question posed by its counsel asking “[a]nd this example that you just gave me—is how you would combine their teachings if your objective were to create something like the ’433 patent; is that right?” PO Resp. 43–44 (citing Ex. 164:4–12). We disagree that Mr. Proctor’s testimony in the affirmative to this question is an admission that he used hindsight bias, because Patent Owner’s contentions rely on incorrect characterizations of Mr. Proctor’s testimony. Patent Owner additionally alleges that Mr. Proctor belatedly identified the level of skill in the art (PO Resp. 47), which is not persuasive for the same reasons discussed with respect to DeLorme and Trask. We credit the testimony of Mr. Proctor regarding the combination of Baker and Hall as consistent with the teachings of these references.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 7,376,433 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,376,433 - Google Inc. v. Smartflash LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 18, 2015 · CBM2015-00143 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, 18, 19, 21, and 24 under § 325(d) because the same § 101 ground was considered in the Apple CBM.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“We determine that the present petition raises the “same or substantially the same prior art or arguments” previously presented in the Apple CBM. We exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and decline to institute a covered business method patent review of claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, 18, 19, 21, and 24 in this case under the same ground as asserted in the Apple CBM. In making our determination we are cognizant that Google supports its Petition with the Tygar Declaration, a different witness than relied on in the Apple CBM. That Google cites to different factual support is an insufficient difference to cause us to institute a new trial. We have reviewed the Tygar Declaration and find that, as relevant here, it is directed to the same grounds as presented in the Apple CBM, i.e., patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51–62. As such, the Tygar Declaration is cumulative of arguments already made in the Apple CBM. Specifically, the Tygar Declaration contends the claims of the ’516 patent “are directed to the abstract idea of controlling access to something based on one or more conditions (such as payment).” Id. at ¶ 53. The Tygar Declaration also analyzes whether or not the ’516 patent includes an inventive concept that is significantly more than an abstract idea. Id. at ¶¶ 56–61. In making the analysis, the Tygar Declaration includes testimony that “claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, 18, 19, 21, and 24 recite the use of a general purpose computer to perform routine, conventional, well-known computer functions.” Id. at ¶ 61. Dr. Tygar concludes claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 12, 18, 19, 21, and 24 are “not directed to patent eligible subject matter and are thus invalid.” Id. at ¶ 62. In our Apple CBM Decision on Institution, we considered these issues in our analysis of Alice Corp. Pty, Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). See Apple CBM Decision on Institution, slip. op. at 10–20.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialcites AlicePatents in suitUS 8,794,516 - Compass Bank / Commerce Bancshares, Inc. et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 5, 2015 · IPR2014-00724 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 18–31 are unpatentable: claims 18–21 and 23–31 as anticipated by Kapidzic; claims 18–22 as obvious over PKI Report and RFC 1424; and claims 23–30 as anticipated by PKI Report.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We find that “process,” or more specifically, “computer process,” as recited in each of the challenged claims, should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. To the extent that there might have been ambiguity as to the plain and ordinary meaning, the references in the ’574 patent to computer processes support the idea that a skilled artisan would have understood what was meant by the recitation of the term. In particular, the ’574 patent discloses that “[e]ach user or certification authority of the infrastructure has access to a computer process which comprises appropriate certification software and storage areas for storing data structures.” Ex. 1002, 5:55–57. The ’574 patent explains that the invention is directed to a certification system, which: includes computer processes implementing certification servers, certification clients and certification protocols, in which one or more first computer processes are associated with at least one initial (root) registration authority, one or more second computer processes are associated with policy certification authorities, one or more third computer processes are associated with certification authorities, and one or more end-user computer processes or application computer processes are associated with respective end-users or user applications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Because we use the broadest reasonable interpretation for construing claims, we decline to limit the construction of common certificate repository to require storage of public key certificates for all CAs, or even all CAs within a hierarchy or infrastructure. Other than declining to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed narrowing of the plain and ordinary meaning of a common certificate repository, we do not find it necessary to provide an explicit construction of the term.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“a concern that inventors testifying in patent infringement cases would be tempted to remember facts favorable to their case by the lure of protecting their patent or defeating another’s patent.” Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Looking to Dr. Kapidzic’s doctoral thesis, the “Publications Overview” section of Dr. Kapidzic’s thesis indicates that she “was the main designer of the overall CMS system, as well as of the CMS Client [and t]he functionality of CMS servers (CAs) was designed by the author in co-operation with Alan Davidson.” Ex. 2011, 3–4. That section further indicates that Kapidzic, referred to in the thesis as “KAP2,” was “published as the result of the author’s work,” “presents the overall design of CMS (done by the author), as well as its functions and protocols (done by the author in co-operation with Alan Davidson),” and “represents the bases for Chapter 3 of this thesis.” Id. at 4 (emphases added). Although we agree that authorship of articles is not necessarily determinative of whose ideas are present in a paper, we do not find Patent Owner has sufficiently corroborated Dr. Muftic’s testimony to establish that the entirety of Kapidzic can be attributed solely to Dr. Muftic. Our reviewing court has stated that “sufficient circumstantial evidence of an independent nature can satisfy the corroboration requirement.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). We find Patent Owner has not submitted sufficient independent circumstantial evidence corroborating Dr. Muftic’s testimony that the entirety of the ideas in Kapidzic originated with Dr. Muftic. Other than Dr. Muftic’s own testimony, there is no evidence on record regarding which aspects of either of the two co-authored articles were his. See Reply 3. Even looking to Dr. Muftic’s testimony, Patent Owner has not established sufficiently which aspects of Kapidzic it alleges originated with Dr. Muftic. See Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 13, 17, 24–26, 33. In fact, Dr. Kapidzic’s doctoral thesis, as discussed above, directly contradicts Dr. Muftic’s testimony, and states that the ideas in Kapidzic were those of only Dr. Kapidzic and Mr. Davidson. Ex. 2011, 3. Dr. Kapidzic’s thesis was submitted approximately two years after Kapidzic was published, whereas Dr. Muftic’s testimony is nearly two decades later. Id. at page B. Moreover, Dr. Muftic was Dr. Kapidzic’s advisor and, presumably, had an opportunity to review the thesis. Weighing the submitted evidence, we find Patent Owner has not established that Kapidzic is entirely the work of Dr. Muftic. Therefore, Patent Owner has not established that Kapidzic should be disqualified as prior art.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Nevertheless, we evaluate Petitioner’s arguments as applied to the properly construed claims to ascertain whether Kapidzic discloses performing the recited step as claimed. The steps that claim 18 recites as being performed “at a computer process” are “generating a data structure,” “sending the signed data structure,” “verifying the authenticity of said [certificate signature] request,” and “certifying and returning the data structure.” In the context of Kapidzic, it is clear that generating a data structure, which includes generating RSA keys and which is subsequently sent via email, sending the signed data structure, which is done via email, and returning the data structure, which is also done via email, are all steps that involve computer processes. See Ex. 1004, 12–13. Thus, our focus is on whether Kapidzic discloses verifying the authenticity and certifying the data structure “at a computer process.” With respect to the certifying step, Kapidzic explains that “[i]f all the checks verify successfully, the parent CA signs the certificate and . . . creates a Certificate Signature Reply that contains the signed certificate.” Ex. 1004, 13. This description indicates that the certification done by the parent CA includes “signing” the electronic data structure and, thus, involves a computer process. The verifying the authenticity step also requires a computer process. For example, even if verifying an identity is required and such verification is done manually, the issuing CA at least needs to be able to read the data structure it received by email as part of the process of verifying an identity. Thus, we find that Kapidzic discloses “at said computer process . . . verifying the authenticity of said request.” Moreover, Kapidzic discloses in Section 8 that the integration of signing and storage/retrieval protocols “opens the opportunity for the CMS to fully automate the process of certificate retrieval and verification, independently of any other system,” and that “CMS UAs provide APIs [7], which enable different security enhanced applications to be easily interfaced with the CMS, supplying them with verified certificates.” Ex. 1004, 16 (emphasis added). That disclosure appears to indicate that Kapidzic contemplates an entirely automated certificate management system, such that every process disclosed by Kapidzic, not just the processes relied upon by Petitioner for disclosing the subject matter recited in the challenged claims, could be done at a computer process.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 5,745,574 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 5,745,574 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 21, 2015 · IPR2014-00682 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 26, 28, and 30–33 are unpatentable as obvious over Porras and Cheswick; the Board did not find claims 26 and 30–32 anticipated by NetRanger.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. “anomaly” In the Decision to Institute, we construed the term “anomaly” as “a departure from the usual or expected; an abnormality or irregularity.” Dec. 6. Specifically, we agreed with Patent Owner’s assertion that this is the plain meaning of the term and is consistent with the specification of the ’084 patent. Id. at 7. For example, the ’084 patent states that “[a]nomaly detection systems look for statistically anomalous behavior . . . [s]tatistical scenarios can be implemented for user, dataset, and program usage to detect ‘exceptional’ use of the system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 3:54–57). Neither party contests this construction. We see no reason to deviate from this construction of “anomaly.”” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“As explained above, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “data” or the data limitations excludes “anomaly reports” or “analysis results” sent to a central collection and processing center. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the claimed data collection and processing center must monitor and analyze data “firsthand” as Patent Owner contends. PO Resp. 1–3, 7. In its Response, Patent Owner bases its narrow reading of the scope of claim 26 on the description in the ’084 patent that “all communications sent to each host 220, 230, 240, 250 are forwarded to, or otherwise captured by, the data collection and processing center” and “[t]hus, the data collection and processing center receives all communications (i.e., the data) originating from a user on the computer network 204 and flowing to . . . all . . . hosts (and vice versa).” Id. at 2–3 (quoting Ex. 1004, 7:37–44). Nothing in this language, however, limits the data collection and processing center to receiving communications that directly originate from a user. In other words, nothing in this language prevents a device from intercepting the communications, doing some data manipulation or analysis, and then forwarding the resulting product on to the data collection and processing center. In fact, the language itself seems to contemplate that scenario—“all communications . . . are forwarded to, or otherwise captured by, the data collection and processing center.” Ex. 1004, 7:36–37 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded to the contrary by Dr. Goldschlag’s testimony, which simply recites the claim language and concludes that “[m]onitoring and analyzing reports based on such data does not satisfy the claim language.” Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 21–23. Moreover, Patent Owner does not address, in its brief, the very next sentence of the ’084 patent, which describes a situation similar to that described by Porras, where the data collection and processing center does not monitor the data “firsthand.” Ex. 1004, 7:45–47 (“It should be noted that certain devices can be used as sensors to sense data traffic and pass their findings on to the data collection and processing center.”) (emphasis added). During oral argument, Patent Owner suggested that this language reflects an embodiment with functionality not encompassed by claim 26.7 Tr. 34 (“The specification contemplates additional embodiments that are not claimed here, and this claim does not prevent taking additional information, such as reports from the sensors, and using that information further.”). We are persuaded, however, that the correct reading of this language, in context, is that the ’084 patent contemplates network devices that may implement various amounts of processing of incoming data prior to forwarding that data on to the central data collection and processing center. At the very least, the ’084 patent does not clearly restrict that amount of data manipulation and processing. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Porras discloses an enterprise-layer monitor that “analyz[es] 7 Petitioner objects to this argument as improper new argument. Tr. 49.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“computer with a firewall coupled to a computer network.” Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1007, 041; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 233–34). Specifically, Petitioner asserts that NetRanger’s Director teaches the claimed data collection and processing center. Id. There is no dispute that NetRanger discloses the Director comprising a computer. To support the firewall portion of this limitation, Petitioner relies solely on the following language from NetRanger in a section titled “How Existing Firewalls Affect NetRanger Installation”: The NetRanger NSX can work in conjunction with existing firewalls as long as they are appropriately placed within your network. Ideally, the NetRanger NSX should be located in front of the existing firewall. If the NetRanger NSX packet filter is placed behind a firewall, intrusion detection will be limited to traffic that has been allowed through the firewall, and it will not generate alarms on reconnaissance or failed malicious activity. In cases where there is no need for address translation or other proxy services, NetRanger can replace firewalls. If there is no need for address translation or other proxy services, NetRanger works best without a firewall and has less impact on network performance. Id. (quoting Ex. 1007, 041) (emphases added); Reply 13. According to Dr. Bellovin, “[o]ne having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that, since NetRanger could ‘replace firewalls,’ NetRanger was a firewall itself.” Ex. 1001 ¶ 233. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner doesn’t identify a single disclosed embodiment where NetRanger’s Director comprises a computer with a firewall coupled to a network as required by the claims. PO Resp. 22. Instead, Petitioner states that the NetRanger system, generically, may replace a firewall, or can work in conjunction with a firewall. Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1007, 041; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 233–34). In its reply, Petitioner states that it “provided a block quote in support of the fact that NetRanger teaches that the Director was a computer with a firewall” referring to a portion of the paragraph reproduced above. Reply 13 (citing Pet. 48; Ex. 1007, 041). Nonetheless, Petitioner does not explain, and it is not clear on its face, how the cited language supports a teaching that the Director can replace a firewall, as opposed to, for example, the entire NetRanger system or NetRanger’s NSX component replacing the firewall. Thus, Petitioner has not shown persuasively that NetRanger discloses this limitation. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has not met its burden to show,” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 6,715,084 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,715,084 - Commerce Bancshares, Inc. / Compass Bank et al. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 21, 2015 · IPR2014-00801 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 26, 28, and 30–32 are unpatentable as anticipated by Aucsmith; claim 33 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“National Bank of Omaha, filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–33 of U.S. Patent No. 6,715,084 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’084 patent”). On December 1, 2014, we instituted a review (Paper 7, “Decision to Institute” or “Dec.”) based upon Petitioner’s assertion that claims 26, 28, and 30–33 are unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), as anticipated by Aucsmith.1 Dec. 18. Petitioner provides a Declaration from Dr. George Kesidis (Ex. 1003), and Patent Owner provides a Declaration from Dr. David Goldschlag (Ex. 2011). This is a Final Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Based on the record presented, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 26, 28, and 30–32 are unpatentable. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 33 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“1. “anomaly” In the Decision to Institute, we construed the term “anomaly” as “a departure from the usual or expected; an abnormality or irregularity.” Dec. 7–8. Specifically, we agreed with Patent Owner’s assertion that this is the plain meaning of the term and is consistent with the specification of the ’084 patent. Id. at 7. For example, the ’084 patent states that “[a]nomaly detection systems look for statistically anomalous behavior . . . [s]tatistical scenarios can be implemented for user, dataset, and program usage to detect ‘exceptional’ use of the system.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:54–57). Neither party contests this construction. We discern no reason to deviate from this construction of “anomaly.”” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“evidence that Aucsmith discloses the detecting limitation as required. First, we are persuaded that the indirect detecting method of Aucsmith satisfies the detecting limitation. Aucsmith discloses that “server 104 can also use the possible security problems reported by all of the agents 106(1)–106(N) to help detect intrusion patterns, new intrusion techniques, and other security problems.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 13. As discussed, although we agree that server 104, using this method, is analyzing reports of “possible security problems” created by distributed agents, we are persuaded that this is within the scope of the claim because the reports include data entering the network. For example, Aucsmith discloses that “server 104 receives notice of the anomaly and can examine the anomaly,” and “[i]n individually examining the anomaly [reported by agent 106], the server 104, may, for example, search for particular information in the anomaly such as a network address previously noted as a security problem . . . .” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 43, 45; see also id. ¶ 44 (“[S]erver 104 may examine the anomaly in conjunction with other information accessible by the server 104, e.g., information included in the collection of security data 118, information sent to the server 104 from other sources, information accessible to the server 104 through the network 108 and/or the corporate server 116, and other similar types of information.”). We are persuaded that Aucsmith discloses server 104 analyzing data entering the network, although this data may also have been analyzed previously by the distributed agents.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence that Aucsmith discloses “adjusting anomaly detection sensitivity and alarm thresholds” sufficient to show anticipation. Dr. Kesidis’s testimony just repeats the language from Aucsmith quoted above and concludes that “Aucsmith discloses each and every limitation of claim 33.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–81. Dr. Kesidis, however, does not explain why a person of ordinary skill would understand “modifying security procedures” to disclose “adjusts anomaly detection sensitivity and alarm thresholds.” Id. Dr. Goldschlag, on the other hand, states that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood this term to disclose adjusting either anomaly detection sensitivity or alarm thresholds.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 62 (emphasis added). Thus, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 33 is anticipated by Aucsmith.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 6,715,084 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,715,084 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 19, 2015 · IPR2014-00660 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 18–31 are unpatentable: anticipated by Kapidzic, variously anticipated or obvious over PKI Report, and variously anticipated or obvious over RFC 1422 and RFC 1424.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Although we agree that authorship of articles is not necessarily determinative of whose ideas are present in a paper, we do not find Patent Owner has sufficiently corroborated Dr. Muftic’s testimony to establish that the entirety of Kapidzic can be attributed solely to Dr. Muftic. Patent Owner asserts that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cooper stands for the proposition that every point of Dr. Muftic’s testimony does not need to be corroborated. Tr. 37:7–12. Cooper specifically states, however, that “sufficient circumstantial evidence of an independent nature can satisfy the corroboration requirement.” Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330 (emphasis added). We agree with Patent Owner that it has sufficiently established that Dr. Kapidzic and Mr. Davidson were students advised by Dr. Muftic at the time Kapidzic was written. We also agree that Patent Owner has sufficient circumstantial evidence to corroborate that Dr. Muftic was at least working in the same field at around the same time. The circumstantial evidence also appears to corroborate that Dr. Muftic may have contributed to Kapidzic, at least in an advisory role. What we find lacking, however, is sufficient independent circumstantial evidence corroborating Dr. Muftic’s testimony that the entirety of the ideas in Kapidzic originated with Dr. Muftic. Other than Dr. Muftic’s own testimony, there is no evidence on record regarding which aspects of either of the two co-authored articles were his. See Reply 6. Even looking to Dr. Muftic’s testimony, Patent Owner has not established sufficiently which aspects of Kapidzic it alleges originated with Dr. Muftic. See Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 13, 17, 24–26, 33. In fact, Dr. Kapidzic’s doctoral thesis, as discussed above, directly contradicts Dr. Muftic’s testimony, and states that the ideas in Kapidzic were those of only Dr. Kapidzic and Mr. Davidson. Ex. 2006, 3. Dr. Kapidzic’s thesis was submitted approximately two years after Kapidzic was published, whereas Dr. Muftic’s testimony is nearly two decades later. Id. at page B. Moreover, Dr. Muftic was Dr. Kapidzic’s advisor and, presumably, had an opportunity to review the thesis. Weighing the submitted evidence, we find Patent Owner has not established that Kapidzic is entirely the work of Dr. Muftic. Therefore, Patent Owner has not established that Kapidzic should be disqualified as prior art.” slip op. at 21
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“We are capable of discerning whether Petitioner’s arguments in its Reply, and the evidence submitted in support thereof, were necessitated by Patent Owner’s arguments, or whether such arguments constitute new evidence. We are further able to determine whether Petitioner’s reference to additional documents improperly changes the scope of its anticipation or obviousness arguments, and are capable of giving Petitioner’s arguments and evidence appropriate weight. Therefore, there is no danger of unfair prejudice or confusing the issues. Moreover, in this case, we agree with Petitioner that its submitted declaration and supporting evidence merely respond to Patent Owner’s arguments regarding how a skilled artisan would have understood certain disclosures in the references submitted in support of the unpatentability arguments in the Petition. We have not considered the content of these exhibits or declaration testimony to the extent that evidence may go beyond merely providing context regarding how a skilled artisan would have understood references in the previously-submitted evidence to terms relating to X.509 standards. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied.” slip op. at 54
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Although we agree that authorship of articles is not necessarily determinative of whose ideas are present in a paper, we do not find Patent Owner has sufficiently corroborated Dr. Muftic’s testimony to establish that the entirety of Kapidzic can be attributed solely to Dr. Muftic. Patent Owner asserts that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cooper stands for the proposition that every point of Dr. Muftic’s testimony does not need to be corroborated. Tr. 37:7–12. Cooper specifically states, however, that “sufficient circumstantial evidence of an independent nature can satisfy the corroboration requirement.” Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330 (emphasis added). We agree with Patent Owner that it has sufficiently established that Dr. Kapidzic and Mr. Davidson were students advised by Dr. Muftic at the time Kapidzic was written. We also agree that Patent Owner has sufficient circumstantial evidence to corroborate that Dr. Muftic was at least working in the same field at around the same time. The circumstantial evidence also appears to corroborate that Dr. Muftic may have contributed to Kapidzic, at least in an advisory role. What we find lacking, however, is sufficient independent circumstantial evidence corroborating Dr. Muftic’s testimony that the entirety of the ideas in Kapidzic originated with Dr. Muftic. Other than Dr. Muftic’s own testimony, there is no evidence on record regarding which aspects of either of the two co-authored articles were his. See Reply 6. Even looking to Dr. Muftic’s testimony, Patent Owner has not established sufficiently which aspects of Kapidzic it alleges originated with Dr. Muftic. See Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 13, 17, 24–26, 33. In fact, Dr. Kapidzic’s doctoral thesis, as discussed above, directly contradicts Dr. Muftic’s testimony, and states that the ideas in Kapidzic were those of only Dr. Kapidzic and Mr. Davidson. Ex. 2006, 3. Dr. Kapidzic’s thesis was submitted approximately two years after Kapidzic was published, whereas Dr. Muftic’s testimony is nearly two decades later. Id. at page B. Moreover, Dr. Muftic was Dr. Kapidzic’s advisor and, presumably, had an opportunity to review the thesis. Weighing the submitted evidence, we find Patent Owner has not established that Kapidzic is entirely the work of Dr. Muftic. Therefore, Patent Owner has not established that Kapidzic should be disqualified as prior art.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“construction argument that all manual intervention is excluded by the claim. Nevertheless, we evaluate Petitioner’s arguments as applied to the properly construed claims to ascertain whether Kapidzic discloses performing the recited step as claimed. The steps that claim 18 recites as being performed “at a computer process” are “generating a data structure,” “sending the signed data structure,” “verifying the authenticity of said [certificate signature] request,” and “certifying and returning the data structure.” In the context of Kapidzic, it is clear that generating a data structure, which includes generating RSA keys and which is subsequently sent via email, sending the signed data structure, which is done via email, and returning the data structure, which is also done via email, are all steps that involve computer processes. See Ex. 1007, 7–8. Thus, our focus is on whether Kapidzic discloses verifying the authenticity and certifying the data structure “at a computer process.” With respect to the certifying step, Kapidzic explains that “[i]f all the checks verify successfully, the parent CA signs the certificate and . . . creates a Certificate Signature Reply that contains the signed certificate.” Ex. 1007, 8. This description indicates that the certification done by the parent CA includes “signing” the electronic data structure and, thus, involves a computer process. The verifying the authenticity step also requires a computer process. For example, even if verifying an identity is required and such verification is done manually, the issuing CA at least needs to be able to read the data structure it received by email as part of the process of verifying an identity. Thus, we find that Kapidzic discloses “at said computer process . . . verifying the authenticity of said request.” We also find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that, at least some of the time, manual intervention would not be required. We find this argument particularly persuasive in light of Kapidzic’s disclosure in Section 8 that the integration of signing and storage/retrieval protocols “opens the opportunity for the CMS to fully automate the process of certificate retrieval and verification, independent of any other system,” and that “CMS UAs provide APIs [7], which enable different security enhanced applications to be easily interfaced with the CMS, supplying them with verified certificates.” Ex. 1007, 11 (emphasis added). In fact, that disclosure in Kapidzic appears to indicate that Kapidzic contemplates an entirely automated certificate management system, such that every process disclosed by Kapidzic, not just the processes relied upon by Petitioner for disclosing the subject matter recited in the challenged claims, could be done at a computer process.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 5,745,574 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 5,745,574 - Apple Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 6, 2015 · IPR2015-00445 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple's rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1 and 8 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Rosen and Hartrick obviousness ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“We specifically addressed, in our Decision, the difficulty we had understanding what Petitioner’s proposed modifications were, how they were to be made, and why a person of ordinary skill would have made them. Dec. 12–15. Petitioner’s Request—even while characterizing the modifications as “a single change”—does not persuade us otherwise. Although Petitioner asserts that we misunderstood the changes being proposed, we are not persuaded that the Request clarifies the issue. And while we agree that the need for extensive modification, alone, does not necessarily doom a proposed ground of obviousness (Reh’g Req. 5–6), extensive modification was just one of many problems we had in attempting to understand the ground being asserted in this Petition. We explained in the Decision that combined with the many other deficiencies of the Petition, we were not persuaded that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of the challenged claims. Dec. 4–15 (discussing the Petition’s vague, nested string citations to broad swaths of references; clarity problems created by pervasive use of internal cross-references and nested citations; improper incorporation by reference of the Sherman Declaration to support conclusory statements, thin analysis, and inadequate reasoning; and lack of sufficient information to enable us to do a proper Graham analysis). Similarly, Petitioner asserts that we evaluated this Petition using an impermissibly rigid form of proof and, thus, misunderstood substantial portions of it. Reh’g Req. 6–13. It is true we struggled to understand most of this Petition. As we explained above, however, the combination of problems with the Petition, described in detail in the Decision, made deciphering Petitioner’s contentions extraordinarily difficult. We are not persuaded that denying institution on this basis was an abuse of our discretion.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“problems we encountered with the Petition. First, Petitioner states that the Petition clearly explained only a single limitation is not covered by Rosen—“how [restrictions on usage of the electronic object] are specified or enforced.” Id. at 3. Petitioner goes on to suggest that we misapprehended that there is only a single change required to integrate Hartrick into Rosen to remedy this deficiency. Id. at 3–4 (“The Board also failed to appreciate the Petition actually described a single change to Rosen: integrating Hartrick’s usage rights specification and enforcement features to support Rosen’s ‘Usage’ field.”). However, in the very next sentence, Petitioner explains that making this one change actually requires four separate modifications to Rosen. Id. at 4 (“The Petition explained doing this would cause the skilled person to make four modifications to Rosen.”). We specifically addressed, in our Decision, the difficulty we had understanding what Petitioner’s proposed modifications were, how they were to be made, and why a person of ordinary skill would have made them. Dec. 12–15. Petitioner’s Request—even while characterizing the modifications as “a single change”—does not persuade us otherwise. Although Petitioner asserts that we misunderstood the changes being proposed, we are not persuaded that the Request clarifies the issue. And while we agree that the need for extensive modification, alone, does not necessarily doom a proposed ground of obviousness (Reh’g Req. 5–6), extensive modification was just one of many problems we had in attempting to understand the ground being asserted in this Petition. We explained in the Decision that combined with the many other deficiencies of the Petition, we were not persuaded that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of the challenged claims. Dec. 4–15 (discussing the Petition’s vague, nested string citations to broad swaths of references; clarity problems created by pervasive use of internal cross-references and nested citations; improper incorporation by reference of the Sherman Declaration to support conclusory statements, thin analysis, and inadequate reasoning; and lack of sufficient information to enable us to do a proper Graham analysis).” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,523,072 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 25, 2015 · CBM2014-00102 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 11–14 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the instituted combinations of Stefik ’235 and Stefik ’980, Stefik ’235, Stefik ’980, and Poggio, or Ginter.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Patent Owner has not articulated a persuasive reason for giving Mr. Wechselberger’s declarations, as a whole, little or no weight in our analysis. Patent Owner has not cited any authority requiring an expert to recite or apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in order for the expert opinion to be accorded weight. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d), we apply the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining whether Petitioner has established unpatentability. In doing so, it is within our discretion to determine the appropriate weight to be accorded the evidence presented, including expert opinion, based on the disclosure of the underlying facts or data upon which that opinion is based. Thus, we decline to make a determination about Mr. Wechselberger’s opinion, as a whole. Rather, in our analysis we will consider, as it arises, relevant portions of Mr. Wechselberger’s testimony and determine the appropriate weight to accord that particular testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“definitions of the term—it encompasses data relating to future, current, and past payments. In other words, we are persuaded that the ’221 patent does not incorporate an element of timing into the definition of payment data. First, the plain and ordinary meaning of the two words that make up the term—“payment” and “data”—do not incorporate any notion of time and nothing about their combination changes that determination. Second, we agree with both parties that language in the ’221 patent supports “payment data” representing data existing prior to, concurrent with, and after payment of the requested content. For example, the ’221 patent states that “payment data for making a payment to the system owner is received from the smart Flash card by the content access terminal and forwarded to an e-payment system.” Ex. 1001, 20:59–62. We agree with Patent Owner that this language indicates that payment data exists prior to the payment being made for the requested content. See PO Resp. 8. Petitioner does not address this language. See Reply 3–5. In addition, we agree with Petitioner that the language in the ’221 patent, “payment data received may either be data relating to an actual payment made to the data supplier, or it may be a record of a payment made to an e-payment system,” (Ex. 1001, 6:60–63) clearly shows that “payment data” includes data for payments that have already been made. See Reply 3–5. Moreover, the plain and ordinary meaning of data does not allow for a change in the character of that data based on when it is used in a transaction. For example, a credit card number may qualify as “data relating to payment” before that credit card number is processed, while the credit card number is being processed, and after the credit card number is processed. Thus, without an express description to the contrary, we presume that “payment data” retains the same meaning before, during, and after the payment operation. Neither party points to persuasive evidence of any such contrary description. In fact, the ’221 patent broadly describes “payment data” in several places as “comprising data relating to payment for the requested data item.” Ex. 1001, 6:51–53, 10:26–30, 10:39–41, 10:44–46. This is consistent with the plain meaning of the term. Thus, we are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “payment data” in light of the specification of the ’221 patent is “data relating to payment for the requested data item.”” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We are not persuaded that Ginter’s disclosure is so restricted. At a minimum, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Ginter to use payment in pre-purchase processing. For example, Ginter teaches processes that include “governing usage of, auditing of, and where appropriate, payment for VDE objects 300 (through the use of prepayments, credits, real-time electronic debits from bank accounts and/or [other deposit accounts]).” Ex.1015, 63:34–41 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that this disclosure relates, not to payments for a particular VDE content object, but rather to payment “for content at some future time when a VDE object has actually been selected and the budget has been used and the metering has occurred.” Tr. 79:13–80:19, 81:19–21 (“it is not an indication, even if it says real-time, that it is real-time for use of the VDE object that is being requested.”). Although we agree with Patent Owner that this is one way of reading the quoted language of Ginter, we are not persuaded that it is the only reading or even the most natural reading of this passage. Nor are we persuaded that it would require a change in the principle of operation of Ginter to allow for prepayment of content. Patent Owner does not explain in their brief what they mean by “principle of operation,” and instead simply cites to In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 812–13 (CCPA 1959). In Ratti, the court held that it would not be obvious to replace a “cylindrical sheet metal reinforcing member” in a seal with “an annular set of outwardly biased spring fingers” because to do so “would require a substantial reconstruction and redesign of the elements shown in” the seal “as well as a change in the basic principles under which the [seal’s] construction was designed to operate.” The timing of payment in a distribution system such as Ginter does not “require a substantial reconstruction and redesign,” but instead is a minor variation in basic payment processing and validation that would be well within the understanding of a person of ordinary skill. See, e.g., Ex. 1014, 29:61–64; Ex. 1031, 16:15–27:9. We are, therefore, persuaded that a skilled artisan would, at a minimum, find prepayment for digital content obvious based on the explicit teachings of Ginter. This is especially true given that, as we explained in the Decision to Institute, Ginter describes significant flexibility of its system stating that “[a]ll participants of VDE 100 have the innate ability to participate in any role” and “[r]oyalty payments for the new works may be accessed by the publisher, distributors, or end-users, and may be tracked and electronically collected at any stage of the chain.” Dec. 21; Ex. 1015, 255:22–43. We found this disclosure supported Petitioner’s assertion that “the known flexibility in such distribution systems, and underscores that one of ordinary skill would have known that combinations between and among disclosures of such distribution systems would have been obvious to one of [ordinary] skill in the art.” Dec. 21 (quoting 103 Pet. 30–31). Patent Owner does not address this contention, which we continue to find persuasive.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundUnpatentableDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded that Ginter’s disclosure of sufficient credit teaches away from using a real-time debit system. According to Ginter, “VDE ensures that certain prerequisites necessary for a given transaction to occur are met,” including that modules and data might “specify that sufficient credit from an authorized source must be confirmed as available.” Ex. 1015, 20:23–29. Directly after this statement, Ginter continues that “[i]t might further require certain . . . modules execute as processes at an appropriate time to ensure that such credit will be used in order to pay for user use of the content.” Id. at 20:29–32. We are persuaded that in light of this disclosure, a skilled artisan would not be discouraged from, but, indeed, would find it obvious to, execute such processes and forward the notification of ensured credit to the data supplier prior to transfer of the requested content. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Ginter teaches away from using a real-time debit system.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,118,221 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,118,221
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.