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  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,835,421
  • PTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01280 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial despite declining to deny under § 325(d).

    RulingsRemand decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

      “Other than initials on a lengthy IDS, nothing in the record indicates that the Examiner substantively considered Takeuchi, Kim, Pienemann, or among over 1,000 other references listed on the IDS, which, as noted in the Director Review Decision, “is over 40 times the size of a typical IDS.” Pet. Remand Br. 5–6; DR Dec. 7 n.3 (citing Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees During Fiscal Year 2025, 89 FR 91898 at 91924 (Nov. 20, 2024)); Ex. 1002, 228–284. Petitioner also shows that the applicant did not respond to the Examiner’s request that the applicant specifically point out “any particular reference or portion of a reference in the [IDS] which the examiner should take [sic] pay particular attention to.” Ex. 1002, 174, 295– 302.” slip op. at 13

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “Patent Owner is likely correct that the ITC would not have been inclined to grant a stay if one had been requested at the time the Institution Decision issued. Moreover, the ITC conducted a full evidentiary hearing a month after the Institution Decision issued, and the target date for the ITC’s final determination is several months before the projected statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision. PO Remand Br. 7. Accordingly, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. See also Klein Tools, Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., IPR2024-01400, Paper 22 at 2 (PTAB June 9, 2025) (Acting Director Stewart determining that Fintiv factor 1 weighs in favor of discretionary denial when the ITC investigation is unlikely to be stayed, the ITC already conducted a full evidentiary hearing, and the ITC final determination is expected to issue six months before the statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision).” slip op. at 19

    Discretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,925,202
  • PTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01406 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board denied institution of review of claims 1, 3, 4, 8–13, and 15 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. A stay of litigation pending resolution of an inter partes review allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts, and strongly weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. The Guidance Memo states that “the Board will apply the Fintiv factors when there is a parallel proceedings at the International Trade Commission.” Guidance Memo 2. Patent Owner asserts that a stay of the ITC Investigation had not been requested at the time of the Institution Decision,7 and argues that “the ITC does not stay investigations pending IPR.” PO Supp. Br. 4. Patent Owner also notes that the Institution Decision issued “just days before the ITC evidentiary hearing.” Id. Accordingly, Patent Owner argues that this factor favors denial. Id. Patent Owner is likely correct that the ITC would not have been inclined to grant a stay if one had been requested at the time the Institution Decision issued. Moreover, the ITC conducted a full evidentiary hearing less than three weeks after the Institution Decision issued, and the target date for the ITC’s final determination is four months before the statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision. PO Supp. Br. 5. Accordingly, we” slip op. at 9

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,925,202
  • PTAB · Jun 30, 2022 · IPR2021-00361 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 14, and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Dukach and obvious over Dukach, alone or with Dunsmuir.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “of the invention of the ’613 patent, “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and two years of work experience in operating systems, file systems, networks, and/or client-server applications, though additional education or work experience can make up for more or less formal education.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Patent Owner does not present an alternative definition of the skilled artisan, and does not dispute Petitioner’s definition thereof. See generally PO Resp.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “skilled artisan to have its “ordinary and customary meaning[],” allegedly “a stream of data bytes that can be read and written (among other common operations).” PO Resp. 3. But as noted by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 3–4), the only intrinsic evidence cited by Patent Owner does not support its proposed construction in the context of the ’613 patent; rather, such evidence favors Petitioner. See PO Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:35–45 (a “‘file is accessed via the file descriptor’”), 2:46–3:7 (“‘the system calls that access files via file descriptors do not distinguish between a file on media and a communication channel’”)); see also PO Resp. 7 (“It is undisputed that file descriptors were conventionally ‘associated with’ files stored on media, communication channels, and even hardware devices.” (emphasis added)). Patent Owner also cites extrinsic evidence, namely, Dunsmuir (Ex. 1007), to support its proposed construction: “Conceptually, a file consists of a stream of data bytes followed by a logical end-of-file. … Because UNIX file I/O is performed through a uniform file interface, a program that can read and write files can read and write anything.” PO Resp. 4 (quoting Ex. 1007, 22). But as noted by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 4–6), Patent Owner does not explain why this “conceptual” meaning set forth in the generic context of programming interfaces in a UNIX operating system would apply in the specific context of the ’613 patent. See Pet. Reply 4 (“[Patent Owner’s] proposed construction is problematic because it is inconsistent with the specification of the ’613 patent.”). Patent Owner also does not explain what “among other common operations” means in the context of its own proposed construction. For the foregoing reasons, and those discussed below, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed construction of “file.” First, the claims of the ’613 patent support Petitioner’s proposed construction. For example, claim 1 recites that a “file” is accessed via a file descriptor. Ex. 1001, 14:55. Claim 5 recites a file descriptor being associated with “a communication channel” and determining with what file type the file descriptor is associated. Ex. 1001, 15:44–57. Together, these limitations show that a “file” is an entity assessed via a file descriptor, and such an entity includes, for example, a communication channel (i.e., per these claims, a communication channel is a type of file associated with a file descriptor). We find nothing in the claims, and Patent Owner does not direct us to anything in the claims, that supports limiting the term “file” only to a “stream of data bytes that can be read and written.”” slip op. at 20

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “in the abstract, discloses the claimed “indicator,” but rather the inclusion (or storage or presence) of that number in a list of monitored file descriptors discloses such a stored “indicator.” See, e.g., Pet. 49 (“[The skilled artisan] would have understood that, before the listen( ) call or the accept( ) call attempts to access a file using a file descriptor, it examines the file descriptor to determine if it is on the list of monitored file descriptors—the ‘indicators’ of a file type associated with the control pipe for services to be performed by the front end server.” (emphasis added)); Pet. 37–38 (“Dukach utilizes the presence or absence of a file descriptor’s number stored in a list of monitored file descriptors to indicate the file type associated with the file descriptor, which is how the ’613 patent describes indicating a file type by the indicator’s presence or absence in an indicator table.”); see also Pet. Reply 13 (“Petitioner contended in the Petition and maintains that it is the presence of a file descriptor’s number on the list of monitored file descriptors, not the file descriptor’s number itself, that teaches the claimed indicator.” (bold omitted)); cf. PO Resp. 9 (“[A]n ‘indicator’ . . . must reflect . . . an indication that such file descriptor is associated with a communication channel.”). Patent Owner also variously argues “Dukach does not disclose or” slip op. at 34

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “In our Institution Decision, we credited the foregoing and related testimony of Dr. Greenspun (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 96–98), and noted that Patent Owner at that stage of the proceeding had not offered any evidence to rebut Dr. Greenspun’s testimony. Dec. 30–31. Despite that, as highlighted by Petitioner, Patent Owner still offers no evidence to rebut Dr. Greenspun’s testimony in this regard. See Pet. Reply 16 (“But in arguing all these [above arguments], [Petitioner] presents no rebuttal evidence—neither a deposition testimony of Dr. Greenspun, nor a rebuttal testimony by its own expert, nor any other evidence.”); see generally PO Resp. Instead, Patent Owner merely declares Dr. Greenspun’s testimony “conclusory” and tainted by “vague leap[s]” (see, e.g., PO Resp. 14), but yet makes such accusations against a technical declarant with nothing but attorney-argument. Regardless, for the same reasons given by Petitioner (see Pet. Reply 16–18), we disagree with Patent Owner and continue to credit Dr. Greenspun’s technical testimony as to the subject limitation. See Pet. Reply 16–18 (Petitioner explaining why “[Patent Owner’s] attorney argument is wrong”.). As noted above, Patent Owner variously argues Dukach does not disclose “storing” of the indicator at issue in this limitation. See generally PO Resp. 7–17. To summarize, we disagree with Patent Owner, and as explained above, are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence, including the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Greenspun, that Dukach discloses storing information that points to a file type associated with a file descriptor. First, we are persuaded that, in Dukach, the presence or absence of a file descriptor’s number in the list of monitored file descriptors constitutes information that points to a file type associated with the file descriptor. See Pet. 37–40 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1005, 11:5–40; Ex. 1002 ¶ 96; Ex. 1001, 11:12–42). Second, we also are persuaded that, in Dukach, the list of monitored file descriptors “needs to be maintained in memory such that it can be used by software to check an at-issue file descriptor’s presence or absence in the list,” which constitutes storing the indicator. Pet. Reply 16– 17 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 97); see Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 97). Finally, even if Patent Owner were correct that Dukach does not disclose a particular embodiment in the ’613 patent (see, e.g., PO Resp. 15 (discussing an embodiment “only applicable for binary file types”)), the issue before us is not whether Dukach indeed discloses such an embodiment, but rather whether Dukach discloses the invention recited, for example, in claim 1, given the breadth (scope) of the limitations defining that invention.” slip op. at 37

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,560,613

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.