- Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 7, 2019 · IPR2019-00838 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1, 13–18, 22, and 33–38 under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same prior art had been presented to the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In evaluating whether to deny institution on the basis of § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, the Board considers the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (2) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (3) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (4) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (5) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (6) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the” slip op. at 13
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00736 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted combinations taught the claimed conversational protocol.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’128 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“event types” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 12–13. Petitioner also does not explain persuasively or sufficiently why or how Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” qualify as the “events” recited in the claim. Although “the [prior art] reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required to teach a claim limitation, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009), neither Petitioner nor its declarant, Dr. Olsen, explains persuasively or adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” as teaching or suggesting the “events” recited in the independent claim. Petitioner’s evidence and argument fails to persuasively and adequately explain how the speech acts or performatives as described in Nodine are the events recited in the challenged claims. Although both Finin and Bayardo define and disclose performatives (Ex. 1016, 297; Ex. 1017, 197), Petitioner does not discuss these disclosures or explain sufficiently how the speech acts/performatives in Nodine, Finin, and Bayardo alone or combination teach the “layer of conversational protocol defined by event types and parameter lists associated with one or more events, and wherein the parameter lists further refine the one or more events” limitation of claim 22 and 45. Petitioner asserts that “Nodine in combination with Steiner and Finin discloses or suggests this limitation” of claim 45 (Pet. 49), but Petitioner does not identify adequately any reliance on Steiner for this limitation (id. at 28–33, 49). slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“in the art at the time of the invention of the ’128 patent would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar discipline, and one to two years of work experience in networked computer systems or a related area. Ex. 1002 ¶ 14; Pet. 4. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Olsen’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“The parties do not propose a construction for any claim term. Petitioner avers that no express constructions are required. Pet. 12–13. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s failure to set forth its construction of any term is reason to deny the Petition, and Patent Owner does not propose a construction for any term. Prelim. Resp. 6. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00735 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted combinations rendered claim 1 and its dependent claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“event types” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 13–14. Petitioner also does not explain persuasively or sufficiently why or how Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” qualify as the “events” recited in the claim. Although “the [prior art] reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required to teach a claim limitation, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009), neither Petitioner nor its declarant, Dr. Olsen, explains persuasively or adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” as teaching or suggesting the “events” recited in the independent claim. slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because (1) it relies on similar art that applicant overcame during prosecution of the parent ’115 patent, and (2) it is duplicative of the co-pending petition in IPR2019-00733. Prelim. Resp. 48– 61. Because, for reasons discussed below, we deny the Petition on other grounds, we need not determine whether it also would be appropriate to deny the Petition pursuant to our discretion under § 325(d).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties do not propose a construction for any claim term. Petitioner avers that no express constructions are required. Pet. 14. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s failure to set forth its construction of any term is reason to deny the Petition, and Patent Owner does not propose a construction for any term. Prelim. Resp. 6. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Pet. 25. Petitioner’s arguments offer conclusory statements that equate Nodine’s speech act/performative types to “event types” recited in the challenged claims, and the parameters associated with Nodine’s speech act/performatives with “one or more of the events” recited in the challenged claims. See id. Petitioner argues that Nodine thus discloses the conversational protocols defined by events. Id.; see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 106–107. In sum, Petitioner maps Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” to the “events” recited in claim 1. We note that Petitioner does not offer a construction for “event” or “event types” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 13–14. Petitioner also does not explain persuasively or sufficiently why or how Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” qualify as the “events” recited in the claim. Although “the [prior art] reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required to teach a claim limitation, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009), neither Petitioner nor its declarant, Dr. Olsen, explains persuasively or adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” as teaching or suggesting the “events” recited in the independent claim.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Illumina, Inc. v. The Trustees Of Columbia University In The City Of New YorkAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 9, 2019 · IPR2018-00797 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable as obvious over the instituted grounds; the Board also denied Petitioner’s motion to exclude and found no estoppel against Patent Owner.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“II. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE In support of its briefing, Patent Owner provided a declaration of” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner
“proceedings or would otherwise have a collateral estoppel effect on the current proceedings. See Paper 59, 4–5. For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the claims of the ’985 patent have material differences from the claims at issue in the previous proceedings, and that there is no inconsistency between Patent Owner’s positions in the current proceeding and in the previous proceedings. Accordingly, we determine that there is no estoppel attaching to Patent Owner with respect to the present inter partes reviews. Below, we provide a brief history of the previous proceedings and then address Petitioner’s contentions.” slip op. at 61
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“analogues for SBS, and Metzker reports actually achieving such a molecule. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence supports our determination that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success and reasonable likelihood of success in “meet[ing] the limitations” of claim 1 to the extent the claim requires using such an analogue. Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc., 821 F.3d at 1367.” slip op. at 50
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for patent owner
“analogues for SBS, and Metzker reports actually achieving such a molecule. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence supports our determination that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success and reasonable likelihood of success in “meet[ing] the limitations” of claim 1 to the extent the claim requires using such an analogue. Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc., 821 F.3d at 1367.” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 9,868,985 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,868,985 - Infinera Corp. v. Core Optical Technologies, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 11, 2019 · IPR2018-01259 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Infinera’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the Petition inadequately addressed claim construction, prior-art combinations, and reasons to combine.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“This is not the first time that the ’211 patent has been before a tribunal. It cannot be said that Petitioner is unaware of the important claim construction matters that go to the heart of dispositive patentability issues. Petitioner, on the facts of this case,[] has failed to identify adequately its proposed construction applicable to its patentability challenges. Further, Petitioner cannot avoid its duty to comply with Rule 104(b)(3)[1] by merely inviting us to apply a means-plus-function interpretation rather than affirmatively advocating (in this forum) the application thereof. Petitioner has neither taken a definitive position nor provided complete briefing, and we decline to assume Petitioner’s task of fully analyzing the claim construction for XPIC. Petitioner’s failure in this regard is reason enough to deny the petition. Dec. 13–14 (footnote omitted). We further denied institution because Petitioner’s articulation of a single ground implicated the application of multiple potential constructions. See Dec. 16–17 (explaining—in the context of Petitioner’s challenge to claim 15 over Cusani 1992, Cusani 1997, and Kavehrad—“[t]he number of possible asserted combinations is further multiplied by the overlay of the multiple potential claim constructions discussed above.”).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s analysis in many places is little more than an assertion that each particular element of a larger limitation was individually known in the prior art. Petitioner does not describe adequately a specific proposed combination of references. Because of this and in light of, at least, the massive number of possible proposed combinations, Petitioner has failed to identify adequately how each challenged claim is to be construed and how the construed claim is unpatentable. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), (4). Dec. 18. Petitioner does not identify any portion of the Petition where a specific proposed combination of references is adequately described. See Req. Reh’g 13. Rather, Petitioner impliedly argues that it need not do so. Id. (quoting, but not explaining the relevance to this case, a bodily-incorporation proposition from In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Petitioner makes the conclusory argument that “[i]n providing demonstrative illustrations of a combined system, coupled with a thorough analysis of the teachings of the prior art, Petitioner’s obviousness arguments directly addressed that question” of “what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. (citing In re Mouttett, 686 F.3d at 1333). Petitioner’s argument is, in effect, merely an assertion of disagreement with our determination that the Petition was not persuasive. Petitioner has not identified anything we misunderstood or overlooked.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“combined the references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter” and that “Petitioner’s reasoning is an oversimplification and too conclusory to constitute the necessary articulated reasoning with rational underpinning.” Dec. 20, 21 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). That oversimplification was a reference to Petitioner’s arguments pertaining to the alleged similarity of signal transmission systems, whereas “the key issues involve the specific techniques used to cancel specific types of interference of received signals in optical systems versus radio frequency systems.” Id. at 23. In this regard, we stated: “Demonstrating obviousness in this case requires more than a showing that optical and RF [radio frequency] systems both utilize general techniques related to orthogonally polarized signals and had known interference problems.” Id.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,782,211 - Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2019 · IPR2017-01685 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Uniloc’s rehearing request, leaving unchanged its determination that claims 1–4, 6–8, 18, 21, and 22 are unpatentable because claim 1 lacks the urged negative limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“While the claim language does contain a recitation of a “single request” by the user to generate a conference call request, we fail to discern any explicit claim language that precludes the user’s determination as to availability or the selection of call participants as part of or as a prelude to that recited “single request.” In other words, the language of claim 1 does not contain the negative limitation proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“2 As we indicated in the Decision, Patent Owner’s argument appears to be internally inconsistent because, “if Patent Owner’s proposed negative limitation is set forth explicitly in the claim language, as Patent Owner suggests, there would be no need for Patent Owner to argue that there is a reduction in scope due to a disclaimer.” Dec. 11 (citing Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen the patentee unequivocally and unambiguously disavows a certain meaning to obtain a patent, the doctrine of prosecution history disclaimer narrows the meaning of the claim [relative to the full ordinary and customary meaning] consistent with the scope of the claim surrendered.”)). the prosecution history’s alleged support for the proposed negative limitation. See Dec. 15–20.” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,804,948 - Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 8, 2019 · IPR2017-01683 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Uniloc 2017 LLC’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1–16 unpatentable because it found no overlooked disclaimer, registration evidence, or reply-scope error.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Section 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states the following: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends Petitioner’s argument that the VTE server is not a conference call server is untimely, because Petitioner raised this argument in the Reply. Req. 10. We disagree. Petitioner’s Reply responds to Patent Owner’s argument that the VTE server is a conference call server. See PO Resp. 30–32. Patent Owner “is the party that first raised this issue,” and Petitioner “simply countered, as it was entitled to do.” Idemitsu Kosan Co., LTD. v. SFC Co. LTD., 870 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Patent Owner has not persuasively explained why Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s argument was beyond the scope of a proper reply.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,571,194 - Hamamatsu Photonics K.K. v. Semicaps Pte Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 18, 2019 · IPR2017-02112 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 3, and 8–20 were not shown unpatentable because Hamada did not disclose the claimed sampling and accumulation, the obviousness theories were insufficient, and Quah was not proven prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“adequately address the pertinent issue—whether Petitioner’s proposed hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would lack the requisite experience and understanding of the art. Patent Owner does not identify adequately a substantive difference between Petitioner’s hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art and Patent Owner’s. See PO Resp. 17–20. For example, Patent Owner does not argue that an electrical engineer or physicist with two years of experience utilizing electronic circuit testing equipment would lack adequate knowledge of the use of lasers in circuit testing. To the contrary, Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Woods, “generally agree[s] with petitioner’s definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art]”—including the type of education and level of experience—and testified that “[t]hese techniques [of OBIRCH and TIVA] were known and widely used around the time of the invention of the ’982 patent to determine the location of defects in a semiconductor device and would have been known to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 30–31. To the extent that Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill is more than merely an elaboration upon Petitioner’s, we find it to be directed to a super-expert in a very narrowly defined field and calculated to undermine Dr. Mercer’s credibility while simultaneously promoting the credentials of its own experts. We do not find this litigation-induced argument persuasive. We determine that the definition offered by Dr. Mercer comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’982 patent and the prior art of record. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Accordingly, we apply Dr. Mercer’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Thus, the parties agree that accumulating encompasses, at least, adding values together. This understanding is consistent with the specification’s discussion of accumulated samples. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 8:20–29. Petitioner initially asserted, in the Petition, that “accumulating” should be construed to include the act of averaging. Pet. 4–5. In the Institution Decision, we declined to construe “accumulating” as necessarily including the act of averaging. Inst. Dec. 7–8. In its Reply, Petitioner no longer advocates this as a matter of claim construction. See Pet. Reply 6. As discussed below, the parties address the issue as a factual matter, and specifically as to whether a prior art reference’s use of the term “average” discloses “accumulating” within the meaning of the claims of the ’982 patent. We again, as we did in the Institution Decision, Inst. Dec. 8, construe the term “accumulating” merely as encompassing the process of addition.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We do not find Petitioner’s dictionary-based “[b]y definition” argument to be persuasive as it is disconnected from the technology at issue. We cannot find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would apply, in this context, a lay dictionary’s general definition and thereby understand Hamada to disclose determining a plurality of samples. We credit the opinion of Dr. Woods, containing persuasive reasoning, and find that Hamada’s use of the word “average” does not disclose “determining a plurality of samples,” as Petitioner contends. We now turn to Petitioner’s arguments that are more closely related to the technology.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“In support of its case, Petitioner reasons that “a POSITA would have considered it obvious to have configured Hamada’s electrical current meter 6 to determine a plurality of samples of the response signal, and to have configured signal processing and display 9 to add up this plurality of samples, in order to optimize Hamada’s averaging process.” Pet. at 23 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 24; Ex. 1014 ¶ 205). Neither Petitioner nor its expert elaborates on the conclusory assertion that performing the claimed determining and accumulating steps would have “optimize[d]” Hamada’s averaging process. Petitioner further reasons that: it would have been obvious for a POSITA at the time of the invention to have configured electrical current meter 6 and signal processing and display unit 9 to respectively measure and add multiple samples of the response signal to allow Hamada’s averaging process, in turn, to be performed on multiple samples. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 206). This reasoning is circular in that it is, effectively, an assertion that it would have been obvious to perform operations on multiple samples in order to perform the process on multiple samples. We also have considered Petitioner’s arguments in the Petition that the “motivation” comes from the “teaching or suggestion” provided by the disclosure of “averaging,” along with Petitioner’s string of reasons from KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See Pet. 24, 43–44 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 206, 306). Petitioner does not develop adequately any of these reasons. An obviousness analysis requires more than “mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In its Reply, Petitioner repackages its “[b]y definition” argument as purportedly an obviousness argument. Pet. Reply 19–20. Petitioner argues that, “to the extent that Hamada does not explicitly disclose this limitation, a POSITA would have considered the act of configuring Hamada to measure and add multiple samples to have been obvious because that is what the definition of ‘averaging’ requires.” Id. (citing Pet. 23–26; Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 204– 208). Although possibly an obviousness theory, this argument reads more like an assertion that the claimed determining and accumulating of a plurality of samples either is inherently or implicitly disclosed in Hamada (offered as an alternative if it is deemed not explicitly disclosed). Thus, Petitioner appears to take the position that the disputed limitation is not absent from Hamada, and Petitioner fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill would have seen a reason to modify Hamada. For the reasons discussed above, we do not find Petitioner’s “[b]y definition” argument persuasive in the anticipation context and, for those same reasons, do not find it persuasive when couched as an obviousness ground. We determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that independent claim 1 would have been obvious over Hamada. Petitioner’s arguments as to dependent claims 2, 3, 8–16, 19, and 20 (Pet. 24–26, 44–45, 47) do not cure the underlying defect in its obviousness theory with regard to independent claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner also has not demonstrated that those dependent claims would have been obvious over Hamada. F. The Remaining Obviousness Grounds Based on Hamada in Combination” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 7,623,982 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,623,982
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.