• Apple Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2018 · IPR2017-00219 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8, 11–17, 19–22, and 24–33 were not shown unpatentable because the obviousness combinations lacked a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “one” as recited in claims 1 and 3 is “within 50% of one.” Pet. 24–25. Petitioner argues that this is consistent with the ’710 patent specification, which states that the inner code 210 of Figure 1, “can have a rate that is close to one, e.g., within 50%, more preferably 10% and perhaps even more preferably within 1% of 1.” Pet. 24–25 (quoting Ex. 1201, 2:62–64 and citing Ex. 1206 ¶¶ 102–103) (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not provide an express claim construction in this proceeding. In related proceeding IPR2017-00210, Patent Owner argues that the term “close to one” does not require construction and that the ’710 patent explains that the rate of a coder is the number of input bits divided by the number of output bits. IPR2017-00210, Paper 35, 18. We determine that “close to one” as recited in the challenged claims is construed as “within 50% of one.”” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that Petitioner’s proposed definition comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’710 patent and the prior art of record. Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “As part of our obviousness analysis, we consider “the scope and content of the prior art.” See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). In this regard, we credit Patent Owner’s testimony and evidence that an important aspect of the art in this case is the relative unpredictability of developing error-correction codes. See PO Resp. 5–6, 45–46 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 116–117; Ex. 2033, 256:21–257:12) (“The field of error correction coding has historically been characterized by significant experimentation and unpredictable results . . . . Even when well-performing codes are identified, the reasons for the improved performance are often not understood.”)); Ex. 2004 ¶ 47. We do not agree with Petitioner that the need to run experiments in an unpredictable field, such as error-correction coding, indicates anything about whether such experiments ultimately would have been successful at the time of the invention. Importantly, “[u]npredictability of results equates more with nonobviousness rather than obviousness, whereas that which is predictable is more likely to be obvious.” Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanco Holding S.A., 865 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In the absence of any evidence rooted in the Petition that substantiates a reasonable expectation of success, Petitioner’s reliance on a known need for experimentation is not sufficient to support its obviousness rationale.9 See Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]here a party argues a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine references, it must show the artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success from doing so.” (internal quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “with Patent Owner that “[i]t is completely irrelevant what Dr. Frey claims he could do in the year 2018 when armed with Caltech’s patent disclosures and publications, [the inventor’s] original coding work, contemporary resources, (e.g., Dr. Frey (¶51) used Matlab, a software program that received over 35 version updates since May 2000), and 18 years of post-filing date knowledge” PO Sur-Reply 7. Because this evidence is not tied to the state of the art at the time of the invention, it is not probative of anticipated success. See Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (“Those charged with determining compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 103 are required to place themselves in the minds of those of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time the invention was made, to determine whether that which is now plainly at hand would have been obvious at such earlier time.” (emphasis added)). As part of our obviousness analysis, we consider “the scope and content of the prior art.” See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). In this regard, we credit Patent Owner’s testimony and evidence that an important aspect of the art in this case is the relative unpredictability of developing error-correction codes. See PO Resp. 5–6, 45–46 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 116–117; Ex. 2033, 256:21–257:12) (“The field of error correction coding has historically been characterized by significant experimentation and unpredictable results . . . . Even when well-performing codes are identified, the reasons for the improved performance are often not understood.”)); Ex. 2004 ¶ 47.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,116,710 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,116,710
• Apple Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2018 · IPR2017-00210 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–8, 11–17, 19–22, and 24–33 not unpatentable because Apple did not prove anticipation by Frey or obviousness over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “given reference qualifies as a prior art “printed publication” involves a caseby-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding its disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The key inquiry is whether the reference was made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Petitioner has put forth date stamp evidence that a copy of the conference proceedings including Frey was at least received in the Cornell University Library by March 20, 2000. Ex. 1015, 16. Petitioner also put forth a declaration of Pamela Stansbury, an employee in the Original Cataloging Unit of the Cornell University Library, who testifies that, based upon her review of library records and her knowledge of standard operating procedures, Frey was “publicly available at the Cornell University Library as of March 20, 2000.” Ex. 1031 ¶ 4; see also Paper 22, 5 (Petitioner’s motion to submit supplemental information, which includes a description of Exhibit 1031); Paper 32 (granting Petitioner’s motion to submit supplemental information). Patent Owner does not dispute that Frey was publicly available as of March 20, 2000. See PO Resp. 15. Based on Petitioner’s evidence, we determine that Frey qualifies as a prior art printed publication as of March 20, 2000.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

    “It is well established that when a party seeks to prove conception via the oral testimony of a putative inventor, the party must proffer evidence corroborating that testimony. . . . There is no particular formula that an inventor must follow in providing corroboration of his testimony of conception. Rather, whether a putative inventor's testimony has been sufficiently corroborated is determined by a ‘rule of reason’ analysis, in which ‘an evaluation of all pertinent evidence must be made so that a sound determination of the credibility of the inventor's story may be reached.’ However, that ‘rule of reason’ analysis does not alter the requirement of corroboration of an inventor's testimony. Evidence of the inventive facts must not rest alone on the testimony of the inventor himself. Singh, 317 F.3d 1240–41 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). With respect to priority and antedating a reference, the Federal Circuit has stated the following regarding burdens and required documentary support: When the issue of priority concerns the antedating of a reference, the applicant is required to demonstrate, with sufficient documentation, that the applicant was in possession of the later-claimed invention before the effective date of the reference. Demonstration of such priority requires documentary support, from which factual findings and inferences are drawn, in application of the rules and law of conception, reduction to practice, and diligence. The purpose is not to determine priority of invention—the province of the interference practice—but to ascertain whether the applicant was in possession of the claimed invention sufficiently to overcome the teachings and effect of an earlier publication of otherwise invalidating weight. In re Steed, 802 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphases added); see also Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus America, Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Steed). “The principles are legal, but the conclusions of law focus on the evidence, for which the Board’s factual findings are reviewed for support by substantial evidence.” Steed, 802 F.3d at 1316; see also NFC Tech., LLC v. Matal, 871 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “2. Analysis To anticipate a patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “a reference must describe, either expressly or inherently, each and every claim limitation and enable one of skill in the art to practice an embodiment of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.” Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). When evaluating a prior art reference in the context of anticipation, the reference must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)). “[A] reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 49 CCPA 993, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (1962)). We analyze the instant ground with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable expectation of success for the proposed modifications to Frey and Divsalar. Petitioner’s argument in response acknowledges the missing expectation of success evidence by relying on the experimental nature of the field. Pet. Reply 9. Petitioner states that [a]s [Patent Owner] concedes, rigorous mathematical analysis of codes is difficult, and, as a result, POSAs routinely developed codes by experimentation. POR, 4. Encouraged by Frey’s results, POSAs would have been motivated to use Frey’s irregularity in Divsalar. Indeed, this is exactly what Dr. Frey suggested to Dr. Divsalar in an email dated December 8, 1999. Ex. 1035, App. A; Ex. 1064, 185:5–8. The Petition showed that POSAs would have had a reasonable expectation of success because it was trivial to modify Divsalar to make it irregular by repeating some of the information bits more than others, which meets the limitations of the claimed invention. Pet., 44–47. . . . Dr. Mitzenmacher agreed that simply repeating the first two bits in Divsalar “q+10” times and the rest “q” times would make the code irregular. Ex. 1062, 153:11-154:8. Pet. Reply 9 (emphasis added). To buttress the argument that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in the proposed modifications, Petitioner introduces new testimony and simulations from a new declarant, Dr. Frey, to confirm that using Frey’s irregularity in Divsalar would not have been difficult and would have yielded a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1068). Yet, even if we were to deem the testimony and simulation to be within the proper scope of a reply brief,6 they do not support a reasonable expectation of success at the time of the invention. We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]t is completely irrelevant what Dr. Frey claims he could do in the year 2018 when armed with Caltech’s patent disclosures and publications, [the inventor’s] original coding work, contemporary resources, and some 18 years of post-filing date knowledge.” PO Sur-Reply 6. Because this evidence is not tied to the state of the art at the time of the invention, it is not probative of anticipated success. See Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (“Those charged with determining compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 103 are required to place themselves in the minds of those of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time the invention was made, to determine whether that which is now plainly at hand would have been obvious at such earlier time.” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,116,710 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,116,710
• Fanduel, Inc. / Draftkings, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2017-01333 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Carter and Barton; claim 6 is unpatentable as obvious over Carter, Barton, and Walker. Claims 1–3 and 6 were not shown unpatentable over Carter and Martin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “It “remains true in construing patent claims before the PTO” that “the prosecution history . . . serves as intrinsic evidence for purposes of claim construction.” Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “The PTO should also consult the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the agency for a second review,” such as the present inter partes review. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Upon our review of the entire record, we agree with the construction of “selectable betting parameter” previously provided by the Board, during ex parte prosecution of the ’952 patent, as set forth above. Therefore, for the reasons provided in that previous Board decision, none of which are disputed here, we apply that construction here. 2.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner

    “However, the Federal Circuit has “cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We find no such clear disclaimer in the ’952 patent specification that would require Patent Owner’s narrow interpretation of the “corresponding” claim term. In particular, while any given location in the cited example from the ’952 patent corresponds to one value of the parameter so the location “determines the bet input” (Ex. 1001, 2:20–22), there is no clear disclosure that other locations may not correspond to that same parameter. It is only in one “example” that each different location “corresponds to a different roulette number.” Id. at 2:22–24 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’952 patent disclosure does not clearly disclaim multiple different locations each corresponding to the same bet input (number or color). See id. at 2:12–31.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “After full consideration of the foregoing arguments, we conclude Patent Owner’s analysis of the scope of the claim limitation at issue is vague and confusing. That claim limitation is: the first and second selectable betting parameters are different such that selecting one would cause a different result for the bet than selecting the other. Ex. 1001, 35:23–28. Such language, on its own, presents a straight-forward claim requirement. Patent Owner’s overlying varnish suggesting that the claim requires a relationship between the first and second parameters, making them “comparable variables,” is not supported by the claim language at issue, and confuses Patent Owner’s analysis of the prior art at issue. We reject Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction of this claim limitation and determine no explicit claim construction of this limitation is needed to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record. 4. Remaining Claim Terms The parties do not offer any further explicit claim constructions. We determine no further explicit claim constructions are needed to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s reference to video game experience, as opposed to some other computer gaming experience, is not required to achieve ordinary skill in the art pertinent to the ’952 patent. The ’952 patent is concerned principally with implementing different gaming rules via computer hardware and software as a mobile gaming device moves between jurisdictions; the specific technical implementation of presenting the game on a computer screen is only a secondary consideration. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract. However, even if we were to accept Petitioner’s position on this point, it would not affect the bases for our decision set forth below. We agree with Petitioner that ordinary skill here requires gaming experience, and does not encompass telecommunications experience without gaming experience. While wireless communication and location tracking are components of the ’952 patent’s claimed invention, the specifics of how such communication and tracking occur is only a secondary consideration. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract, 1:51–2:11, 7:48–8:12. However, even if we were to accept Patent Owner’s position on this point, it would not affect the bases for our decision set forth below. We determine a person of ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’952 patent would have a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a similar field. Such a person, further, would have at least about two years of experience designing and developing computer hardware and software to be used for playing games.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,306,952 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,306,952
• Cisco Systems Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc., And Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 3, 2018 · IPR2017-00198 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing, finding no misapprehension or overlooked evidence supporting its determination that claims 1, 2, 5–10, 8–11, 12, and 18–23 were unpatentable.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “process disclosed by Haims. Req. Reh’g 3.1 Patent Owner’s challenge does not meet the standard set forth for a Request for Rehearing, which requires a party to “identify . . . the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). As Patent Owner did not address this issue in a motion, an opposition, or a reply, the Board could not have misapprehended Patent Owner’s argument.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “disclaimed the selection process disclosed by Haims, we find this contention unpersuasive. “[T]he PTO is under no obligation to accept a claim construction proffered as a prosecution history disclaimer, which generally only binds the patent owner.” Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.3d 973, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Assuming arguendo that the doctrine of prosecution history disclaimer applies to this inter partes review, the purported disavowal of claim scope must be unambiguous, clear, and unmistakable to one of ordinary skill in the art. Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). On the record before us, we conclude that the prosecution history does not evidence such an unambiguous, clear, and unmistakable disavowal. We read the cited portion of the prosecution history as presenting arguments to the Examiner to distinguish the claim from Haims based on the claim’s recited limitations. At most, applicant’s arguments during prosecution merely shed light on the claim limitations that applicant alleged Haims did not teach. We determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood applicant to have made a clear and unmistakable” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Hamberg and Lamb. See Reh’g Req. 3–4. Therefore, Patent Owner’s allegation that Haims teaches the same selection process as Hamberg, even if true, improperly shifts focus from the combination of Hamberg and Lamb. Patent Owner alleges Petitioner does not provide proper reasoning to combine Hamberg and Lamb. Reh’g Req. 3–4 (arguing “Petitioner parsed” and “Petitioner argued”). These allegations fail to address what the FWD overlooks or misapprehends. In any event, the FWD addresses motivation and the combination. See, e.g., FWD 15–23.” slip op. at 4

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Q. And you – do you agree or disagree that Max is participating in the chat session with the conference call requester? Mr. McDole: Objection, leading. A. I think it is – could kind of go either way. I certainly think that it could be considered participating in the sense that he’s receiving messages, not participating in the sense of sending. So I mean I think it is reasonable to say that it is participating, but – it is arguably the other way, too. It is not clear. Ex. 1017, 253 5–16. As an initial matter, Patent Owner, in the Request for Rehearing, does not identify where this purportedly ignored testimony was brought to our attention by Patent Owner. Nonetheless, Dr. DiEuliis, at best, testified that Max “could be considered participating,” but, in the same sentence, Dr. DiEuliis testified that Max is “not participating in the sense of sending.” Dr. DiEuliis continued, “I think it is reasonable to say that it is participating, but -- it is arguably the other way, too.” Although we did not cite to this testimony, such testimony is cumulative, because Dr. DiEuliis testified here, as in the cited testimony, that Max is not participating. Further, in our Decision, we evaluated the testimony of Dr. DiEuliis in light of Hamberg’s teaching that Max is listed as “absent” and noted as “sleep” to determine that Max is not participating. FWD 29.” slip op. at 5

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,853,000
• Apple Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 2, 2018 · IPR2017-00700 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–16 were not shown unpatentable: the proposed Ping, MacKay, and Divsalar combination lacked a persuasive motivation to modify Ping and a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’032 patent would have had a Ph.D. in mathematics, electrical or computer engineering, or computer science with emphasis in signal processing, communications, or coding, or a master’s degree in the above area with at least three years of work experience in this field at the time of the alleged invention. Ex. 1004 ¶ 98; see Pet. 23 (citing the same). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Mitzenmacher, applies the same definition offered by Dr. Davis. Ex. 2004 ¶ 66. We determine that the definition offered by Dr. Davis comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’032 patent and the prior art of record. Accordingly, we apply Dr. Davis’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “for “Tanner graph” set forth in a prior Board decision concerning the ’032 patent and for which Petitioner supports the application of the same construction in the present case. Inst. Dec. 9–10 (quoting IPR2015-00060, Paper 18, 12–14; citing Pet. 264). The prior construction was specifically addressing the Tanner graph of claim 18, but is equally applicable to claim 11, at issue in this case, because the Tanner graph is the same in both claims. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 99 (Dr. Davis); Ex. 2001 ¶ 20 (Dr. Tanner); Tr. 49:18–21, 62:10–13. That construction is as follows: [1] a graph representing an [irregular5 repeat accumulate] IRA code as a set of parity checks where every message bit is 4 Petitioner contends that this construction is the broadest reasonable interpretation, yet is narrower than that adopted by the District Court in Caltech v. Hughes Communications Inc., No. 2:13-cv-07245 (C.D. Cal.) because the court’s construction did not include the constraint regarding parity bit determination (constraint [3]). Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1013). Petitioner contends that the difference has no substantive effect on the issues before us. See Tr. 34:16–35:2. 5 The Board, in the prior decision regarding the ’032 patent, adopted a construction where, “[i]n the context of the ’032 patent specification, . . . ‘irregular’ refers to the notion that different message bits or groups of message bits contribute to different numbers of parity bits.” IPR2015-00060, Paper 18, 12 (Decision denying institution); see also Pet. 24 (advocating the adoption of that construction in this case); PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 69 and asserting: “Caltech does not believe the term needs to be construed, as the plain and ordinary meaning of irregular repetition is clear. That message bits contribute in differing numbers to parity bits is made clear in the claim language.”). repeated, at least two different subsets of message bits are repeated a different number of times, and [2] check nodes, randomly connected to the repeated message bits, enforce constraints that determine the parity bits[, and] . . . [3] a parity bit is determined as a function of both information bits and other parity bits as shown by the configuration of nodes and edges of the Tanner graph. Inst. Dec. 9–10.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. We agree with Patent Owner (see PO Resp. 30–31 & n.7) that, although Petitioner may explain how to modify Ping’s Hd sub-matrix in light of MacKay, it does not address why such an ordinarily skilled artisan would have done this. Nor does Petitioner establish that such an artisan reasonably would have expected success from the modification. Based on the entire trial record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a persuasive rationale for modifying Ping in light of MacKay as asserted by Petitioner. Petitioner’s additional reliance on Divsalar does not remedy this fundamental flaw in the articulated combination. See Pet. 44 (relying on Divsalar for the teaching of repeating information bits if Ping is not understood to teach this aspect).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for patent owner

    “Perhaps sensing this deficiency in the Petition, Petitioner introduces new testimony and a new simulation from Dr. Frey with its Reply in which Dr. Frey allegedly “demonstrate[s] the ease with which a [person of ordinary skill in the art] could have added MacKay’s irregularity to Ping.” Ex. 1065 ¶ 42. According to Petitioner, the results of the simulation “outperform Ping’s original code” and “confirm that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to use MacKay’s uneven column weights in Ping’s Hd matrix, and . . . would have had a reasonable expectation of success when doing so.” Pet. Reply 16–17. Yet, even if we were to deem the testimony and simulation to be within the proper scope of a reply brief,8 they do not support a reasonable expectation of success at the time of the invention. We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]t is irrelevant what Dr. Frey claims he could do in the year 2018 when armed with Caltech’s disclosures, [the named-inventor’s] original coding work, contemporary resources (e.g., Matlab), and some 18 years of post-filing date knowledge.” PO Sur-Reply 7. Because this evidence is not tied to the state of the art at the time of the invention, it is not probative of anticipated success. See Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (“Those charged with determining compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 103 are required to place themselves in the minds of those of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time the invention was made, to determine whether that which is now plainly at hand would have been obvious at such earlier time.” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 7,421,032 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,421,032
• Apple Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 2, 2018 · IPR2017-00701 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1 and 4–10 not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Ping, MacKay, Divsalar, and Luby97 because Petitioner did not establish motivation to combine or reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1104 ¶ 91; see Pet. 21–22 (citing the same). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Mitzenmacher, applies the same definition offered by Dr. Davis. Ex. 2004 ¶ 66. We determine that the definition offered by Dr. Davis comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’032 patent and the prior art of record. Accordingly, we apply Dr. Davis’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no terms require explicit construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. We agree with Patent Owner (see PO Resp. 27–28 & n.7) that, although Petitioner may explain how to modify Ping’s Hd sub-matrix in light of MacKay, it does not address why such an ordinarily skilled artisan would have done this. Nor does Petitioner establish that such an artisan reasonably would have expected success from the modification. Based on the entire trial record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a persuasive rationale for modifying Ping in light of MacKay as asserted by Petitioner. Petitioner’s additional reliance on Divsalar and Luby97 does not remedy this fundamental flaw in the articulated combination. See Pet. 42, 44–45 (relying on Divsalar for the teaching of repeating information bits and Luby97 for the teaching of encoding bits in a stream if Ping is not understood to teach these aspects).” slip op. at 20

  • ExcludeOther

    “E. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1106, 1118, 1119, 1124, 1129-1149, 1157-1161, 1165, 1167, 1168, 1171, 1172 and portions of Exhibits 2038 and 2039. Paper 52, 1. Patent Owner’s motion is dismissed as moot with respect to these exhibits, as we do not rely on them in a manner adverse to Patent Owner.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,421,032 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,421,032
• Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00621 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  The sole challenged claim was not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to identify a qualifying Rosen reference for its obviousness challenges.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner bears “the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Our rules require a successful petition to include “a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2)). An issue bearing on the challenge is whether and how the claimed channel element impacts the “visual impression created by the patented design as a whole.” Durling, 101 F.3d at 103; see Ex. 1001, Fig. 1 (depicting an elongated region, of relatively darker shading, superimposed over about two thirds of a sipe that bisects the claimed heel region).” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ordinary skill in the art would have had either (1) a degree in Industrial Design combined with some work experience as a designer of footwear designs; or (2) two years of direct experience creating footwear designs. 9 The Petition asserts U.S. Patent No. 6,115,945 (Ex. 1006, “the ’945 patent”) as a background reference. See, e.g., Pet. 5, 34. Dec. 7. That definition is consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition. Pet. 36 (Petitioner’s definition); Reply 2 (Petitioner, reasserting that definition). Patent Owner, for its part, raises no persuasive information tending to establish a different definition. Resp. 2 (Patent Owner, essentially acquiescing to Petitioner’s definition). That definition also is consistent with the disclosures reflected in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “D. Claim Construction The claim of the ’781 patent does not require express construction for the purposes of this decision. On that point, we observe that Figures 1–3 of the ’781 patent (Ex. 1001) reflect the scope of the patented design. To the extent any explanation of that scope is necessary to our decision, we provide it below in our analysis of the asserted challenge. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Conclusions Regarding the First Prong of the Durling Test A preponderance of the evidence supports a conclusion that Petitioner fails to take account adequately of the channel element of the patented design and, therefore, fails also to identify “the correct visual impression created by the patented design as a whole”—a required first step in identifying a Rosen reference. Durling, 101 F.3d at 103. That failure, standing alone, justifies our conclusion that Petitioner fails also to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claim of the ’781 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS D723,781 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
• Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00620 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held the challenged claim not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to identify a Rosen reference creating basically the same overall visual impression.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. The Designer of Ordinary Skill As we did in our institution decision, we find that a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have had either (1) a degree in Industrial Design combined with some work experience as a designer of footwear designs; or (2) two years of direct experience creating footwear designs. 9 The Petition asserts U.S. Patent No. 6,115,945 (Ex. 1006, “the ’945 patent”) as a background reference. See, e.g., Pet. 5, 33. Dec. 7. That definition is consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition. Pet. 35 (Petitioner’s definition); Reply 2 (Petitioner, reasserting that definition). Patent Owner, for its part, raises no persuasive information tending to establish a different definition. Resp. 2 (Patent Owner, essentially acquiescing to Petitioner’s definition). That definition also is consistent with the disclosures reflected in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “D. Claim Construction The claim of the ’783 patent does not require express construction for the purposes of this decision. On that point, we observe that Figures 1–3 of the ’783 patent (Ex. 1001) reflect the scope of the patented design. To the extent any explanation of that scope is necessary to our decision, we provide it below in our analysis of the asserted challenge. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 5

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner bears “the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Our rules require a successful petition to include “a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2)). An issue bearing on the challenge is whether and how the claimed channel element impacts the “visual impression created by the patented design as a whole.” Durling, 101 F.3d at 103; see Ex. 1001, Fig. 1 (solid concentric ovals, which depict a channel element near the center of the claimed grid-like pattern of pads).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As a starting point, to make out a successful obviousness challenge, Petitioner must identify “a reference, a something in existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design in order to support a holding of obviousness. Such a reference is necessary whether the holding is based on the basic reference alone or on the basic reference in view of modifications suggested by secondary references.” Rosen, 673 F.2d at 391. Accordingly, “the first step in an obviousness analysis for a design patent requires a search of the prior art for a primary reference,” which requires the tribunal “to: (1) discern the correct visual impression created by the patented design as a whole; and (2) determine whether there is a single reference that creates ‘basically the same’ visual impression.” Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996). We address the two prongs of the Durling test in turn below.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS D723,783 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
• Digital Check Corp. D/B/A St Imaging v. E-Imagedata Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00177 · APJ Melissa A Haapala · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 44 and 49 are unpatentable as obvious over Fujinawa and Kokubo; claim 49 is also unpatentable as obvious over Fujinawa and Watanabe.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “filing, “would have had at least some experience with microform imaging apparatuses and would have had at least a bachelor of science degree in either electrical engineering or mechanical engineering with at least three years’ experience designing electro-mechanical products, including imaging equipment such copiers, scanners, and/or microform scanners and readers.” Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 39). Patent Owner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have an undergraduate degree in mechanical or optical engineering and 3 years of experience working with or designing scanners, camera systems or printers, which involve opto-mechanical systems similar to that described in the ’279 Patent and the prior art.” PO Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 20). Our decision does not turn on the minor differences between the definitions, particularly as Petitioner asserts that under either definition, its analysis remains the same. See Reply 2. Both Petitioner and Patent Owner advocate a similar level of experience. Accordingly, we accept the level of skill advocated by Patent Owner, with the addition of Petitioner’s identification of working with microform scanners and readers as permissible experience and electrical engineering as a permissible undergraduate degree.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). In our Institution Decision, we did not find it necessary to construe any terms, and accorded them their ordinary and customary meaning. Dec. 6–7. In its Response, Patent Owner asserts the district court in the parallel litigation issued its claim construction order and adopted the parties’ stipulated construction of “first carriage.” PO Resp. 3–4. Patent Owner further asserts the district court concluded the preamble phrase “digital microform imaging apparatus” limits the claims. Id. at 4. Petitioner agrees the district court construction of “first carriage” is the broadest reasonable construction. Pet. 18. Petitioner further asserts the parties’ dispute whether the preamble limits the claims is not germane to this proceeding because each of the prior art references used in this petition discloses a “digital microform imaging apparatus.” Id. at 18–19; Reply 3. Although we have considered the construction of the terms anew in light of the full trial record, we determine that we need not explicitly construe any term to resolve the issues before us. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We have also considered Petitioner’s rationale for why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Fujinawa and Kokubo. Petitioner persuades us that replacing the worm drive mechanism disclosed by Fujinawa with the guide rail and belt configuration disclosed by Kokubo would have been a simple substitution of one known drive mechanism for another that yields predictable results. See Pet. 32–33; Reply 13. We credit the testimony of Mr. Senn that the proposed combination “would have been a simple substitution of the motor shaft mechanism of Fujinawa for the rod and belt configuration of Kokubo to obtain a predictable result, i.e., translation of rotational movement from the motor to linear movement of the carriage to enable the carriage to move along a lead member.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 73. Mr. Senn further testifies that “[t]here are a finite quite short list, means of converting rotary motion to linear motion.” Ex. 2007, 56:15–16. We determine Petitioner articulates sufficient reasoning for the proposed combination to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 398, 417–18. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the components would not be performing the same function. As noted by Petitioner, the claimed functionality is “moving the first carriage,” and not “precision focusing.” See Reply 4. We determine that the functionality of both Fujinawa’s threaded worm and Kokubo’s rail/belt system is the same— namely a drive mechanism for moving the carriage. We are not persuaded that replacing the drive mechanism taught by Fujinawa with the drive mechanism taught by Kokubo would have been more than a simple substitution (as testified by Mr. Senn (Ex. 1002 ¶ 73)) or would otherwise have been challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Kokubo teaches away from the proposed combination. The sections of Kokubo cited in support of Patent Owner’s assertion describe that if the drive pulleys and wire ropes should slip in the conventional reading device shown in Figures 48 and 49, an error occurs in the displacement amount of the wire ropes, which would give rise to distortion in the image. Ex. 1005, 2:48–56. The cited sections of Kokubo further describe that in the device of its fourth embodiment, the lens tube 40 moves along the guide shafts 50, 51 and that the optical parts can be thus moved with high precision and distortion of the image read by the line sensor is consequentially prevented. Id. at 13:55–61. As noted by Petitioner (Reply 9), the prior art system discussed by Kokubo is an unguided wire rope system. See Ex. 1005, Fig. 49, 2:1–6. We disagree with Patent Owner that Kokubo’s description of issues with a prior art unguided wire rope system would have discouraged one of skill in the art from making the combination proposed by Petitioner to replace Fujinawa’s worm with Kokubo’s timing belt and rail system.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,537,279 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,537,279
• Digital Check Corp. D/B/A St Imaging v. E-Imagedata Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00178 · APJ Melissa A Haapala · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 20–25, 27, 28, 31, 41, 43, 44, 53, and 63 are unpatentable over Fujinawa and Kokubo; claim 26 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Our decision does not turn on the minor differences between the definitions, particularly as Petitioner asserts that, under either definition, its 1 The record does not include arguments or evidence regarding objective indicia of non-obviousness. analysis remains the same. See Reply 2. Both Petitioner and Patent Owner advocate a similar level of experience. Accordingly, we accept the level of skill advocated by Patent Owner, with the addition of Petitioner’s identification of working with microform scanners and readers as permissible experience and electrical engineering as a permissible undergraduate degree.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Although we have considered the construction of the terms anew in light of the full trial record, we determine that we need not explicitly construe any term to resolve the issues before us. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed

    “Kokubo. Petitioner persuades us that replacing the worm drive mechanism disclosed by Fujinawa with the guide rail and belt/pulley configuration disclosed by Kokubo would have been a simple substitution of one known drive mechanism for another that yields predictable results. See Pet. 23–25; Reply 12. We credit the testimony of Mr. Senn that the proposed combination “would have been a simple substitution of the motor shaft mechanism of Fujinawa for the rod and belt configuration of Kokubo to obtain a predictable result, i.e., translation of rotational movement from the motor to linear movement of the carriage to enable the carriage to move along a lead member.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 102. Mr. Senn further testifies that “[t]here are a finite quite short list, means of converting rotary motion to linear motion.” Ex. 2007, 56:15–16. We determine Petitioner articulates sufficient reasoning for the proposed combination to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 398, 417–18. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the components would not be performing the same function. As noted by Petitioner, the claimed functionality is to cause the first carriage “to move along the first lead member” and not “precision focusing.” See Reply 3–4. We determine that the functionality of both Fujinawa’s threaded worm and Kokubo’s rail/belt system is the same—namely a drive mechanism to move the carriage. We are not persuaded that replacing the drive mechanism taught by Fujinawa with the drive mechanism taught by Kokubo would have been more than a simple substitution (as testified by Mr. Senn (Ex. 1002 ¶ 102)) or would otherwise have been challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “proposed combination. The sections of Kokubo cited in support of Patent Owner’s assertion describe that if the drive pulleys and wire ropes should slip in the conventional reading device shown in Figures 48 and 49, an error occurs in the displacement amount of the wire ropes, which would give rise to distortion in the image. Ex. 1005, 2:48–56. The cited sections of Kokubo further describe that in the device of its fourth embodiment, the lens tube 40 moves along the guide shafts 50, 51 and that the optical parts can be thus moved with high precision and distortion of the image read by the line sensor is consequentially prevented. Ex. 1005, 13:55–61. As noted by Petitioner (Reply 9), the prior art system discussed by Kokubo is an unguided wire rope system. See Ex. 1005, Fig. 49, 2:1–6. We disagree with Patent Owner that Kokubo’s description of issues with a prior art unguided wire rope system would have discouraged one of skill in the art from making the combination proposed by Petitioner to replace Fujinawa’s worm with Kokubo’s timing belt and rail system. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 would have been obvious over Fujinawa and Kokubo.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,179,019 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,179,019

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.