• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00108 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations lacked adequate motivation to combine and did not teach capturing images at different distances.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues Petitioner’s proffered level of skill is too broad with respect to work experience. PO Resp. 27–28. Patent Owner counters that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and two years’ work experience related to biometric security, facial authentication, and three-dimensional computer vision such that they would have had significant academic and/or work experience in both facial biometrics and computer vision. Id. at 28–29. Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 13–14. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’938 patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’938 patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “images are three dimensional—let alone a technique that captures two images at different distances, compares the images for certain differences, and verifies three dimensionality based on those differences, as recited by the claim. Instead, Tanii describes a system that “corrects warp in which the perspective is exaggerated when an image is captured with the user’s face at close range.” Ex. 1007, code (57). In particular, Tanii recognizes the physical phenomenon of perspective distortion (fish-eye distortion) where “[i]f the image of the face of a person or the like is captured from a point that is relatively nearby, an image is obtained in which the perspective appears exaggerated,” i.e., the user image is warped or distorted. Id. ¶ 6; see id. ¶ 48, Fig. 4B. Tanii corrects such warped images by enlarging peripheral areas of the user image. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches: (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 12 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Derakhshani, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, instead, focused specifically on the use of the word “slid” in Derakhshani as indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Derakhshani, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,693,938 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,693,938
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01094 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Ma; claims 3 and 4 were not shown unpatentable over Werner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’223 patent would have had a university degree in chemistry and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of electrical engineering, particularly optoelectronics, or alternatively a university degree in electrical engineering and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of chemistry. The person of ordinary skill in the art has spent several years studying the structure and function of organic optoelectronic components, in particular OLEDs, and has detailed knowledge of the chemical structure of light-emitting organic layers and the transport of charge carriers to these layers. In this respect, the person of ordinary skill in the art works at the interface between electrical engineering/physics (charge carrier transport and light emission processes in optoelectronic components) and chemistry, in particular organic chemistry (materials and layer stack combinations suitable). Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–47). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention. See generally Resp. Neither party indicates that the result would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references. See Ex. 1005, (code 57); Ex. 1007, 8107 (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention and within the context of the entire patent disclosure. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party indicates that an express construction for any claim term is necessary to resolve the disputes at hand. Pet. 15; see generally Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. In our analysis of the challenges, however, we discuss the meaning of the terms “metal complex” and “central metal atom,” which appear in claim 1 (Ex. 1001, 19:19–20) to the extent necessary to resolve Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to establish that Ma invalidates claim 1. See Resp. 53, 56–58.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Whether Ma qualifies as a “printed publication” involves an inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is considered “publicly accessible” upon a satisfactory showing that the document has been “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence[] can locate it.” Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29, 10– 11 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on the information presented, we find Petitioner has the better position. Patent Owner admits that joint vaporization means “two materials vaporize together.” Reply 21 (quoting Resp. 54). As Petitioner argues, “This is what Ma discloses.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Ma describes a “two-component” electron transport layer having a “thickness with one value.” Id.; see Ex. 1007, 811 (reporting a “co-deposited” application of “BPhen:LiQ” that is “50 nm thick”). Ma’s disclosure, thereby, strongly “indicates that the two components were vaporized together––as opposed to creating a ‘macroscopically homogenous form’” prepared by sequentially vaporizing the individual components as Patent Owner “hypothesizes.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 42–44; Ex. 2041 ¶¶ 155–157); see Resp. 54– 55; see also Ex. 1007, 811 (Ma’s description of its device fabrication, appearing in the third paragraph of the experiments section). Petitioner further advances evidence that “[p]reparing a layer that is ‘macroscopically homogeneous’ but potentially microscopically heterogeneous,” as Patent Owner postulates, “would introduce excessive variability and render the data noncomparable and unreliable, thus undermining the experiment’s purpose.” Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 44); see Resp. 54–55. Patent Owner presents no counterargument or evidence that is persuasive to undercut Petitioner’s reasoning or evidence on that point. See Sur-reply 19–22. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized “that vaporizing materials together would best achieve Ma’s objective of assessing the current density using different Liq doping percentages.” Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1007, 811; Ex. 1020 ¶ 51). Here again, Petitioner’s evidence on point stands uncontested. See Sur-reply 19–22 (declining to contest that point). On this record, therefore, we agree with Petitioner that, as to the relevant disclosure in Ma, “the most natural interpretation of ‘co-deposition’ for forming a layer, particularly when there is nothing to indicate that the materials” are “vaporized sequentially,” is that the materials are co-deposited by joint vaporization. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 46–51). We further agree that, “[u]nder a preponderance standard, Ma’s disclosures are sufficient to render joint vaporization at least obvious.” Id. For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Ma discloses joint vaporization as required by the challenged claims.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 8,558,223 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,558,223
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable: claims 1–13 and 15–16 on anticipation and obviousness grounds, and claim 14 on obviousness over Choulis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’164 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa. Pet. 12. Patent Owner repeatedly refers to “a POSITA” without addressing the definition of that term or contesting Petitioner’s proposed definition. See Resp. 1, 2 n.1, 3, 8, 9, 15–21, 23, 26, 29, 32–33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44–49, 51–57, 61, 62 (bare references to “a POSITA”). Neither party indicates that the ultimate result on patentability would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition, which is not contested, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See Ex. 1004, (code 57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1008, code (57); Ex. 1009, code (57) (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “because no information raised during the trial phase of this review changes the calculus: First and foremost, the plain terms of claim 1 include no language from which we reasonably can impose limits on the phrase “matrix material” as urged by Patent Owner. In addition, the specification includes no special definition of that phrase that supports importing Patent Owner’s proposed narrowing limitation into the claim. Furthermore, we are directed to no disclaimer of claim scope during patent prosecution that would support Patent Owner’s twice-rejected argument that the phrase “matrix material” in claim 1 excludes embedded dopants and dispersed agglomerations. And the extrinsic evidence advanced by Patent Owner during this review is ineffective to override the clear interpretation of “matrix material” that is established by the intrinsic evidence. Reply 1–7.10” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We find that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. We agree with Petitioner, in that regard, that Choulis explicitly teaches “using spin-coating as a method for depositing materials, which involves a simultaneous application process” as required by claim 13. Reply 16 (citing Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1044 ¶ 45).16 We 15 Petitioner raises Djobo as a background reference supporting that Choulis anticipates deposition of PVK by evaporation. Pet. 41. Patent Owner counters that Djobo, to the contrary, shows that Choulis does not teach deposition of PVK by evaporation. Resp. 48. In other words, both parties cite Djobo in connection with the ground based on anticipation by Choulis. Against that backdrop, we determine that Patent Owner waives any argument that Petitioner improperly cites Djobo as a background reference in support of the anticipation challenge, which is based on Choulis alone. Resp. 48 (nowhere asserting that the challenge is deficient on that basis). That waiver arises because no argument, in that regard, is raised in Patent Owner’s Response see Inst. Dec. 34 (“The Board shall deemed waived any issue not raised by Patent Owner in a timely response to the Petition . . . .”). 16 Patent Owner’s statement that “spin coating tends to cause phase separation” is not developed adequately on this record and, therefore, is further agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “has not contested this point.” Resp. 48. “Therefore, there is no genuine dispute regarding the unpatentability of claim 13,” although Patent Owner raises “arguments concerning evaporation, which is a distinct process from spin-coating” relevant to the additional limitations of claim 14. Reply 16. We determine that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. Patent Owner, however, has the better position on whether Choulis anticipates claim 14, which “includes the requirement of applying matrix materials via evaporation coating.” Reply 16. Petitioner seems to abandon that challenge in the Reply by raising arguments that appear, on this record, to bear exclusively on whether the subject matter of claim 14 would have been obvious over Choulis.17 Id. at 16–17. Those arguments are insufficient to counter Patent Owner’s reasons why Choulis does not anticipate the “evaporation coating” limitation of claim 14. Compare id., with Resp. 48. On this record, therefore, we determine that Petitioner does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 14. unpersuasive to persuade us “that Choulis does not have three matrix materials.” Sur-reply 15. That argument runs counter to Choulis’s explicit, intrinsic disclosures, which illustrate (Ex. 1004, Fig. 4) and describe (id. ¶ 30) an organic light emitting layer composed of three matrix materials. See Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 4, ¶ 30); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–88 (persuasive declaration testimony of Dr. Holmes, cited at Pet. 24–25). 17 There is some confusion on this point, given that both parties sometimes collapse, into a single argument, whether Choulis anticipates or renders obvious claim 1. Compare Resp. 48, with Reply 16–17.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “On this record, therefore, we determine that Choulis, at minimum, suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized PMMA as a suitable alternative to PVK in Choulis’s Figure 4 embodiment, notwithstanding any differences raised by Patent Owner. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. Patent Owner’s argument that no disclosure in Choulis suggests that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have found it desirable to use PMMA in place of PVK in Choulis’s devices” misses the mark, where Choulis includes both PMMA and PVK in lists of materials suitable for use as host or matrix materials. Resp. 38; Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. “Our caselaw is clear. It’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it is a suitable option.’” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Even if Choulis does not expressly disclose substituting PMMA for PVK in the Figure 4 embodiment, “an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to make that substitution.” Reply 10 (citing Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 100; Ex. 1044 ¶ 23)). The suggestion for that substitution is set forth unambiguously in Choulis’s listing of both “PVK” and “PMMA” as materials suitable for use as a first “host” material in Choulis’s organic functional layer; that is, “the light emitting layer” that is “described above” in Figure 4. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. ii. Alternative Reasoning for Replacing PVK with PMMA Patent Owner counterargues that using PPMA in place of PVK would have been understood to “upset the hole and electron balance,” as well as “affect hole-charge recombination,” and “degrade the performance of the resulting OLED system.” Resp. 37. Petitioner responds with evidence that “it would have been a routine task for” an ordinarily skilled artisan “to optimize the composition of each component within the light-emitting layer to achieve the desired charge balance.” Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 24). Petitioner’s response brings to light a second reason why an ordinarily” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 8,723,164 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,723,164
• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Kwatra does not teach or suggest minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration as required by the claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing 6 Patent Owner asserts objective evidence of nonobviousness. Prelim. Resp. 19–27. or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction to resolve any current dispute between the parties.” PO Resp. 15. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Kwatra teaches, at Equation 7, minimizing velocity and acceleration of a function representing camera path (P). FF ¶¶ 6, 8–9. Kwatra does not state that this camera path function considers rotation. Rather, the words “camera path” suggest x, y, z movement of the camera rather than rotation of the camera. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony that Kwatra’s minimization of a smoothed camera path does not result in minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration is credible because this testimony is consistent with Kwatra as a whole and consistent with the other evidence of record. Id. ¶ 10. Kwatra recognizes that image rotation angle (“θ”) may not remain smooth. Id. ¶ 12. But rather than attempting to minimize velocity and acceleration of rotation of the camera housing, Kwatra states that applying a smoothness constraint on rotation angle “may be non-linear.” Id. ¶ 13. Consistent with Kwatra, Dr. Foroosh credibly explains the difficulty of applying linear techniques to rotation. Id. Thus, Kwatra proposes instead constraining the sine and cosine of theta. Id. ¶ 14. The Kwatra provisional application is part of the Kwatra reference (id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “(id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,574,894 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,574,894
• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00984 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Meulen and Chao; claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Meulen does not disclose transforming an image captured by its camera.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras,” or alternatively “would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras.” Pet. 6. Petitioner further argues that an “advanced graduate degree” may “make up for the work experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 33–34). “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 19–20). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’413 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “From the outset we note that the words of the claim recite “non- uniformly shift[ing] the pixels” and do not recite a “non-linear” transformation. This favors Petitioner’s position, which is based directly off the definition of “non-uniform,” over Patent Owner’s position, which substitutes “non-linear” for “non-uniform.” Generally, then, we would determine the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term in the context of the entire Specification. Here, however, the ʼ413 patent does not mention “uniform” or “non-uniform” shifting of pixels anywhere except in the claims. The Specification, therefore, provides limited guidance, by itself, as to the ordinary and customary meaning of the term. Nonetheless, even reviewing the portions of the Specification cited by the parties, we see no clear or unambiguous effort to limit the challenged claims to require only non-linear transformations in which the pixels to which a transformation is applied do not have the same amount of shift. is not non-linear. Pet. Reply 1. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the center circle of Figure 2B maintains the original circular shape after the transformation is applied to the image which contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that no two pixels will have the same amount of shift. Pet. Reply 1–2. We agree. In Figure 2B of the ʼ413 patent, the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest. Ex. 1001, 4:19–21. After the input image goes through linear scaling (step 204) and then non-linear warping (step 206) the circles become more vertically compressed as they approach the top and bottom edges and more horizontally stretched as they approach the left and right edges. Id. at 4:22–30. But “the center circle is fully corrected so that it maintains the original circular shape of the corresponding circle in the input image 212.” Id. at 4:23–25. This means that at least some pixels, such as those of the center circle, undergo the same amount of shift after being transformed.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “readable instructions” of claims 1 and 2 must occur in a particular order. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that the step of “determine a portion within the input image” must occur after “obtain[ing] an image” and before “apply[ing] a transformation to the input image.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the specification does not require such an order and, in fact, describes an embodiment where such an order is not followed. Pet. 3. We determine that the “determine a portion within the input image” step does not need to occur after the “obtain an image” step and before the “apply a transformation to the input image” step. As Patent Owner itself points out, claims 1 and 2 are apparatus and system claims respectively, and an ordering of the limitations of such claims is not necessary. PO Resp. 17. Even if we were to treat the apparatus and system claims as reciting the steps of a method, “as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We see nothing in the claims that would cause us to break this general rule. Patent Owner argues that the claims imply a “specific order because the ‘determine a portion’ requirement operates on ‘the [obtained] input image’ and defines the ‘portion’ that is necessary for the 23; Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Although the steps are recited in a specific order in the claim, as they necessarily must be, the claim does not expressly specify that the certain steps must occur before or after other instructions, nor does logic imply such a requirement. For example, if certain characteristics of the image are known before the image is obtained (e.g. the size, dimensions, resolution, aspect ratio, or content etc.) the determination of the portion of the image could be made before the image is obtained. These characteristics may be based on the specific device taking the image or the subject matter of the image, both of which may be known before the image is captured or obtained. It is, therefore, not necessary that the image be obtained in order for a portion of the image to be determined. Similarly, we do not find the written description to expressly or implicitly specify an order the claimed step of “determine a portion of the input image.” For example, the written description of the ʼ413 patent states that in Figure 2B “the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction as the frame boundary is approached.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–22. Patent Owner emphasizes that this disclosure implies that an input image is obtained before the center portion is chosen. PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:63–64, 4:19–22). But the description of this embodiment does not expressly recite an order. For example, the description of Figure 2A explains that “an input image is obtained” in step 202, “the image is then scaled” in step 204, and a “non-linear warping is then applied” in step 206. Ex. 1001, 3:63–4:3. This description does not mention “determin[ing] of a portion of the image” as a separate step or as part of the listed steps, and therefore, does not specify an order in which this step must occur. is configured so that some areas of the image are fully corrected geometrically, while some other areas are distorted. . . . [T]he center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction.” Id. at 4:17–19. This excerpt from the ʼ413 patent, which the Patent Owner specifically relies on (PO Resp. 19), also does not specify an order in which the determination step (choosing of the region of interest) takes place. Moreover, because the ʼ413 patent states that the warp module is configured so that some areas are fully corrected while others are not, the determination step could take place at the time the warp module was configured, presumably before the image was obtained. Finally, the ʼ413 patent states that “in the case, of video, the area may dynamically change between images (e.g. to follow a moving object).” Ex. 1001, 4:34–36. Patent Owner argues that this description “requires first obtaining the image in order to locate the object that is being followed.” PO Resp. 19–20. This embodiment is related to the case of video or a moving object, which the challenged claims do not mention. We, therefore, decline to limit the scope of the claim based on this embodiment. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and cited evidence we determine Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Meulen and Chao. For example, Petitioner argues that “[i]t would have been obvious that when performing image scaling, pixels from the input to output positions are shifted based on a scaling factor.” Pet. 91. Meulen teaches scaling but does not provide the details regarding scaling. E.g., Ex. 1007, 1:55–56, 4:37–49. We agree that in light of Meulen’s disclosure of scaling, a POSITA would have looked to other references, such as Chao, for further details on how to perform scaling. Dr. Katsaggelos provides credible support, testifying that “Meulen mentions ‘compression and/or scaling,’ and provides details on how to perform compression. But Meulen does not disclose the details of how to perform scaling. A POSITA when faced with Meulen and having the knowledge about scaling would have been motivated to turn to a prior art reference that discloses the details of scaling.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 262. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner provides no motivation to combine other than asserting that it involves combining prior art elements. PO Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 92). As explained above, however, Petitioner does more than just assert that the motivation involves combining prior art elements. Instead, Petitioner explains that Meulen discusses both compression and scaling, and provides details regarding compression but does not provide details on how to scale. Pet. 91–92; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–262. Thus, Meulen teaches that scaling was a known technique. See Hybritech, (“a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”). Dr. Katsaggelos testifies that, in this situation, a POSITA would have looked to Chao for details regarding scaling. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–263. We determine this establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have had reason to combine Meulen’s teachings with Chao. Patent Owner draws a distinction between Meulen and Chao, arguing that “Meulen is concerned with modifying content from a media source to be displayed on a device’s screen while Chao, by contrast, is directed to changing the aspect ratio of a document intended for printing.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 89–90). Patent Owner’s argument is contradicted, however, by Chao’s disclosure which states that “after all the background and foreground elements in the image have been resized . . . [t]he image may be output by displaying the image on or as part of: a display screen such as a computer monitor, camera screen, printer screen, printed page, projected image, or the like.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 32. Patent Owner argues that Meulen’s system avoids distortion near the middle where the user’s focus is more likely to be, while Chao, on the other hand, is directed to avoiding distortion of stylized borders on differently sized pages. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:26–29; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 25; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 91–92). This argument reads the prior art too narrowly and does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner does not rely on Chao for its teaching of avoiding distortion near the borders of the image, but rather on its teaching of scaling the image while maintaining the design intent of the original image. Ex. 1008 ¶ 22; Ex. 1014 ¶ 67. Thus, Petitioner is applying Chao’s techniques of scaling (regardless of where the area of 92. Finally, Patent Owner argues that Chao’s approach of stretching/shrinking only the background and uniformly scaling entire foreground objects is suitable for graphic design but incompatible with Meulen which is concerned with adapting externally derived media source content for display on a fixed size screen. PO Resp. 37–38 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 93). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner relies on Chao’s teaching of stretching/shrinking of background elements and applies that stretching/shrinking to Meulen’s images displayed on its screen. Pet. 91–92 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 28, 63; Ex. 1002 ¶ 263). The fact that Chao applies its teaching to graphic design does not prevent a POSITA from applying those teachings to Meulen’s media content displayed on its screen.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,015,413 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,015,413
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00806 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8, 15–17, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 14 and 19 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed paramagnetic flux paths in Wakuda lacked adequate support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 33. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 3. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’830 patent specification.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that independent claims 1, 19, and 20 include means plus function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.8 Pet. 3–7; PO Resp. 6–14. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. In particular, the parties agree that the “driving component” and “control component” requirements of independent claims 1, 19, and 20 are means plus function limitations. Pet. 3–7; PO Resp. 6–14. Construing a means plus function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 involves two steps: 1) identifying the claimed function and 2) identifying in the specification the corresponding structure that performs the claimed function. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Therefore, the specification clearly links the function of “control[ing] supply of power from the power supply to . . . cause the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency . . . specified by one or more stored values” at least to portions of steps 706 and 708 of the flow diagram algorithm of Figure 7A, as described above. Thus, the control component requires a microprocessor and memory with algorithmic structure including a timing algorithm or similar coding for creating a control output signal that flips to control the direction of current flow through a coil (e.g., coil 514, Fig. 5, coil 626, Fig. 6), where the coil is structure that corresponds to the recited “driving component,” as noted above.11 We adopt the District Court’s conclusion in the Apple litigation that the “control component” structure itself does not require an H-bridge switch, but only requires that the processor generates the “d” inputs to the switch; and further that the structure does not require does not require computing initial default values as specified in step 702 of Figure 7A (i.e., values not specified by a user). Ex. 3001, 30–33, 35. This is in accord with settled law 11 “Rather than using a formal timer mechanism, certain implementations may simply employ counted loops or other simple programming techniques for periodically carrying out tasks.” Ex. 1001, 7:17–20. that limits the structure to that necessary to perform the claimed function. 12 By the same token, we modify the District Court’s construction to the extent it would require, based on such steps as 706, 710, and 716, a specific order of the steps of generating the “p” and “d” values. The claims only require the control component to control the power supply to cause oscillation at a specified frequency and amplitude, but do not require the frequency value to be generated before the amplitude value, or vice versa.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “to include the ability disclosed in Ramsay to allow a user to customize and store parameters associated with haptic effects, such as creating “haptic track files” that specify variations in the amplitude and frequency of the effect over time to achieve a desired effect. Pet. 46–47 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 15, 25– 28, 37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 192–193). Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the desire to expand the functionalities of haptic devices to allow end users to create and customize haptic effects, to provide a fuller haptic experience, and to be able to store haptic effects to save processing power compared to real-time generated effects. Id. at 47–49 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15, 30, 47, 53–57; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 194–196). Petitioner argues that this making combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that both references deal with linear actuators, both disclose storing frequency and amplitude values, and the combination involves routine knowledge of software techniques. Id. at 49–50 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:3–9; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 17, 26–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 197–198). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious to use the H-bridge switch of Rossi as part of the Gregorio actuator drive circuit 16 in the asserted Gregorio-Ramsay combination to periodically switch the polarity of drive signals to electric coil 28 of Gregorio, and thus oscillate magnet 27, under the control of a signal from processor 12 of Gregorio. Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 211). Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated because Gregorio does not disclose implementation details and therefore one of ordinary skill would have looked toward teachings like Rossi to fill in those details, and that an H-bridge switch was a well-known example circuit for implementing a change in “current flow direction/polarity” for “push” and “pull” actions in a system, and was a simple, cost-effective, and reliable circuit design. Id. at 56–58 (citing Ex. 1020, Abstr., Figs. 4, 6, 1:65–3:54; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 212–217). Petitioner argues that making this combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that it involved known techniques through routine circuit design considerations and software instructions for generating the control signal. Id. at 58 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 218). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious to modify the Gregorio-Ramsay-Rossi combination, using the control algorithm disclosed in Aldrich, to replace the monitoring technique of Gregorio with that of Aldrich to maintain a resonance frequency by incrementing or decrementing the drive frequency. Pet. 58–59 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:22–28, 4:42–48; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 219). Petitioner’s expert provides implementation details of Aldrich, including that the Aldrich hill-climb technique would use a Boolean value to indicate whether the frequency was being increased, with local variables set to default values, and use integer values when processing sensor signals. Id. at 59–60 (citing Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 220–222). Petitioner argues that these modifications would have been motivated to improve the Gregorio system using the Aldrich feedback algorithm for targeting a resonant frequency, given that the Gregorio approach had shortcomings that required a monitoring period with reduced haptic feedback, receiving weak EMF signals. Id. at 61–62 (citing Ex. 2004, 3:65–5:55, 5:63–65; Ex. 1021, 1–3; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223–227). Petitioner argues that making this combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that it involved known techniques for improvement to yield predictable results, readily implemented via software executed by the microprocessor. Id. at 62–63 (citing Ex. 2004, 2:44–50; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 229). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s arguments regarding the” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 9,941,830 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,941,830
• Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00680 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2 and 3 are unpatentable under § 103 over Gregorio, Ramsay, Tierling, Rossi, and Aldrich; claim 2 is also unpatentable over Gregorio, Ramsay, Wakuda, Rossi, and Aldrich.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” See PO Resp. 4. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’337 patent specification.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. In particular, the parties agree that the “driving component” and “control component” requirements of independent claim 2 are means-plus-function limitations. Pet. 2–6; PO Resp. 7. Construing a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 involves two steps: 1) identifying the claimed function and 2) identifying in the specification the corresponding structure that performs the claimed function. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner constructionTerm construed board ownMixed

    “supply of power from the power supply to . . . cause the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency . . . specified by one or more stored values” to portions of steps 706 and 708 of the flow diagram algorithm of Figure 7A, as described above. Thus, the control component requires a microprocessor and memory with algorithmic structure including a timing algorithm or similar coding for creating a control output signal that flips to control the direction of current flow through a coil (e.g., coil 514, Fig. 5, coil 626, Fig. 6), where the coil is structure that corresponds to the recited “driving component,” as noted above.10 We adopt the District Court’s conclusion in the Apple litigation that the “control component” structure itself does not require an H-bridge switch, but only requires that the processor generates the “d” inputs configured to operate a switch or other circuit; and further that the structure does not require does not require computing initial default values as specified in step 702 of Figure 7A (i.e., values not specified by a user). Ex. 3001, 30–33, 35. This is in accord with settled law that limits the structure to that necessary to 10 “Rather than using a formal timer mechanism, certain implementations may simply employ counted loops or other simple programming techniques for periodically carrying out tasks.” Ex. 1001, 7:7–10. perform the claimed function. 11 By the same token, we modify the District Court’s construction to the extent it would require, based on such steps as 706, 710, and 716, a specific order of the steps of generating the “p” and “d” values. The claims only require the control component to control the power supply to cause oscillation at a specified frequency and amplitude, but do not require the frequency value to be generated before the amplitude value, or vice versa.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “The record, including testimony by Dr. Hannaford (Ex. 1003; Ex. 1049), supports Petitioner’s rationale, and shows that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Gregorio, Ramsay, and Wakuda in the manner proposed. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s showing for combining these references with any particularity. See generally PO Resp. We discuss below Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s showing as to limitation 2.f based on the combination of Gregorio and Ramsay is conclusory.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 8,860,337 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,860,337
• Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00442 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed all challenged claims, 1–20.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied

    “May 22, 2025, after Petitioner filed its Petition, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer, disclaiming claims 1–20 of the ’154 patent. Ex. 2001. Under our rules, “[n]o inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e); see Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (explaining how Rule 42.107(e) operates in the case of a pre-institution disclaimer of all claims) (precedential). Because we cannot institute trial on disclaimed claims and Patent Owner has disclaimed all of the challenged claims, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20.” slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 11,627,154

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.