- Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00042 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Medivis’s rehearing request, leaving in place the decision that claims 1–6 and 11–20 were not shown unpatentable because the cited references’ public accessibility was not established.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a sur-reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented in turn.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“accessibility, except the references Chen, 3D Visualization, and 3D Slicer themselves. This is insufficient and tantamount to submitting no proof of public accessibility. To find public accessibility, we must determine that a “document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art[,] exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008), quoted in Dec. 26–27. Petitioner has insufficiently explained, by a preponderance of the evidence, how Chen, 3D Visualization, and 3D Slicer themselves answer the question of whether they have been disseminated or otherwise made available to those of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we did not overlook or misapprehend any evidence of public accessibility on pages 29–30 of the Petition.” slip op. at 4
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“declaration by reference, we exercised our discretion to address a portion of it in our Decision. Dec. 30–31. We did so because we noted that his testimony was “particularly deficient for [the 3D Slicer] reference.” Id. at 30. Petitioner now asserts that in doing so, we “misapprehended or overlooked the logic that application documentation” like 3D Slicer’s “must be accessible to potential application users because it serves to help users use the application.” Req. 7. But Petitioner’s assertion that “application documentation must be accessible to potential application users because it serves to help users use the application” is a new argument, not raised in the Petition or Reply. Even if Petitioner’s assertion were correct, it falls far short of the evidence required to prove that 3D Slicer was actually disseminated to interested members of the public. See, e.g., Weber, 92 F.4th at 1068. Thus, Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us that we overlooked or misapprehended anything.” slip op. at 11
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 11,004,271 - LG Electronics, Inc. v. Constellation Designs, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 15, 2023 · IPR2022-01549 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied LG Electronics’ rehearing request, leaving in place its decision denying institution because the Petition did not explain how De Gaudenzi teaches maximizing parallel decode capacity.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented in turn.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“In our Decision, we faulted the Petition for “not sufficiently identify[ing] how De Gaudenzi1 teaches the ‘maximize’ limitation in the independent claims.” Dec. 17. For example, the Petition asserts that De Gaudenzi1 teaches constellation optimization by assignment of labels, but then when explaining how, only states that De Gaudenzi1 “discloses a labelling rule,” that “can be ‘Gray labelling’/‘Gray mapping,’ or ‘the pseudo-Gray labellings.’” Pet. 61; see also Dec. 13–14 (summarizing and quoting the positions in the Petition). As a result, we determined that the Petition “does not sufficiently explain why the existence of a labeling rule maximizes parallel decode capacity,” and that “the record lacks evidence of, and it is Petitioner’s burden to explain, how predetermined constellation point labels are assigned to maximize parallel decode capacity as required by the claim.” Dec. 16, 17.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“attempts to improperly supplement the Petition by advancing two new arguments in the Request: 1) that Gray mapping is “the only specific example labeling scheme disclosed by the ’980 Patent as ‘maximize[ing] the PD capacity’ used in ‘[a]ll the PD optimized PAM constellations.’ EX1001, 10:18-20;” and 2) that “Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Caire, in his own work (EX1013 cited by De Gaudenzi1 and Petition) states that ‘we conjecture that Gray labeling maximizes BICM capacity.’ EX1013, 6.” Req. 12. Neither of these arguments are in the Petition. The Request does not cite to the Petition in making these arguments. The Request does later cite to pages 14 and 63 of the Petition, implying support for these arguments. However, neither page makes these arguments, or even cites to the portions of the references cited in the Request. Thus, we do not consider these new arguments, as Petitioner has not shown they were previously presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,567,980 - Impinj, Inc. v. NXP B.V.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 2, 2021 · IPR2020-01422 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Impinj’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied on all challenged claims because the Petition did not sufficiently explain how MacLellan or Gallagher teaches “specific useful data.”
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions. In sum, Petitioner argues in its Request for Rehearing that “specific useful data” could be comprised of all the “useful data.” Even if we were persuaded that “specific useful data” could be comprised of all the “useful data,” however, Petitioner did not make this argument in its Petition. As discussed in our Institution Decision, Petitioner instead argued that “MacLellan discloses that a specific set of ‘optional data’ is stored on a tag.” Pet. 23 (emphasis added) (cited by Inst. Dec. 12–13). The wording of this argument suggests that the “specific set” is comprised of a portion of all the optional data. Petitioner, however, relied on the same passage describing optional data 603 in MacLellan to support its contentions that MacLellan teaches both the recited “useful data” and the recited “specific useful data.” For instance, with respect to “useful data,” Petitioner asserted that MacLellan “discloses that optional data sent by the tag can be ‘any data stored on the Tag 102 that is always transmitted to the Interrogator 101 together with the Tag ID 602.’” Id. at 18–19 (quoting Ex. 1003, 8:30–32). As to “specific useful data,” Petitioner asserted that “MacLellan discloses that a specific set of ‘optional data’ is stored on a tag,” and cited again to MacLellan’s teaching that “Optional Data 603 . . . contain[s] any data stored on the Tag 102 that is always transmitted to the Interrogator 101.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:30–31). In our Institution Decision, we stated that Petitioner did not sufficiently explain how MacLellan teaches specific useful data. Inst. Dec. 12–13. In particular, we noted that Petitioner did not sufficiently explain how optional data 603 on a tag is a “specific set” of the same optional data 603. See id. Because Petitioner’s arguments and evidence focused on MacLellan’s optional data as satisfying both “useful data” and “specific useful data” limitations, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to explain its claim scope position regarding these two terms. Alternatively, it was Petitioner’s burden to explain how MacLellan’s optional data would satisfy both limitations despite the claim utilizing different terms. In other words, if Petitioner considers a “specific set” of optional data to be all the optional data, Petitioner needed to state that position in the Petition and provide sufficient explanation with supporting evidence in light of the ’092 patent’s teachings that distinguish useful data from specific useful data.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 7,257,092 - Amazon.Com, Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic InstituteRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01069 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Amazon’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 9–21 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (emphasis added). When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision. Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).” slip op. at 3
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“system, e.g. how the system interprets words or phrases.” Apple IPR 6. Thus, the Apple IPR Board adopted Patent Owner’s argument that as applied to the prior art, the term “case” in “case information” requires “uses of the system contemplated by the invention, not uses of any other natural language processing system.” Apple IPR 6. The Board rejected that such prior use was found in rules regarding how the system interprets current word or phrase input. Id. We find that the Apple IPR discussed a user’s selection among possible choices, but also addressed that the “case” required use of the system of the ’798 invention. Id. at 5–6. Thus, we do not agree we misapprehended the meaning of the claim language. Req. Reh’g 2.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, in showing that claims 9– 21 would have been obvious over Livowsky;1 claims 10–12 and 14–16 would have been obvious over Livowsky and Shwartz;2 claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Shwartz and Livowsky; claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Shwartz and Weber;3 and claims 9–21 would have been obvious over Meng4 and Zhang.5 Dec. 17–18, 21–22, 23–24. For the reasons below, the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,177,798 - Amazon.Com, Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic InstituteRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01068 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Amazon’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–8 because Petitioner did not show the Board misapprehended the construction or prior-art evidence.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (emphasis added). When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision. Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).” slip op. at 3
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“interpretation of the claim construction in the Apple IPR. See Req. Reh’g 3. The Apple IPR cites the embodiment from the ’798 patent specification (Ex. 1001, 5:36–38, 16:52–17:5). Apple IPR 5–6. The Board in the Apple IPR expressly clarified that in the case information construction “‘instances of use’ of the system [did not] mean indications cover instances of use of the system, e.g. how the system interprets words or phrases.” Apple IPR 6. Thus, the Apple IPR Board adopted Patent Owner’s argument that as applied to the prior art, the term “case” in “case information” requires “uses of the system contemplated by the invention, not uses of any other natural language processing system.” Apple IPR 6. The Board rejected that such prior use was found in rules regarding how the system interprets current word or phrase input. Id. We find that the Apple IPR discussed a user’s selection among possible choices, but also addressed that the “case” required use of the system of the ’798 invention. Id. at 5–6. Thus, we do not agree we misapprehended the meaning of the claim language. Req. Reh’g 2.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information” to exclude clarifications from users. Id. at 5–6, 7–11. Petitioner argues that our Institution Decision adopts Patent Owner’s narrow construction and finds that “clarifying prompts” in grounds including Weber are not “case information.” Id. at 7–8. Our Institution Decision found that Petitioner did not persuasively and sufficiently assert how the prior art disclosed the “case information.” Dec 19–20. Our determination was based on the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence and argument in the regarding whether Weber’s prompting the user for information, which was contested by Patent Owner, teaches or suggests “information about prior instances of use of the natural language processing method.” Dec. 19–20 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s arguments does not identify any evidence we overlooked or misapprehended. Req. Reh’g 7–8. Instead, Petitioner characterizes our Institution Decision as broadly excluding user prompts. Our determination was based on the full claim construction, which is supported by the Apple IPR’s emphasis of “prior instances of use of the natural language processing method.” Apple IPR 5–6; Dec. 19–20.” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,177,798 - PTAB · Sep 15, 2020 · IPR2020-00282 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“a party requests rehearing on a decision on whether to institute inter partes review, we “review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). There is an abuse of discretion if we have made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing [our] decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We disagree. Nowhere in the cited passages in the Petition does Samsung argue that we should construe the term “row wrap-around connections” according to the explicit construction that Samsung now suggests for the plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 10–11, 25–30. Rather, Samsung argued that “Petitioners do not believe any term requires explicit construction.” Pet. 10–11. In the Reply, Samsung argued that all of the terms in the challenged claims should be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See Reply 1, 4–5. However, apart from arguing that Samsung had proposed construing limitation 1C in the co-pending district court proceeding according to its plain and ordinary meaning,3 Samsung did not propose any specific construction for the phrase “row wrap-around connection,” or point to any evidence as to what the ordinary and customary meaning of that phrase was to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we decline to adopt Samsung’s new proposed construction on rehearing.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We determined that Samsung had not provided sufficient evidence of its proposed motivation to combine the two references. See Dec. 16 (“[N]either Samsung nor Dr. Wolfe supports this conclusion with any evidence on the preliminary record.” (citing In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3))). In particular, we found that “Dr. Wolfe does not explain how or why the combination of Barkan and Tagg would minimize RC delay or allow for the use of lengthier columns and rows of electrodes, or cite to any facts, data, or authorities to support that opinion.” Dec. 17. We stated that “there is no evidence in the record suggesting that RC delay was a recognized problem . . . or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a connection to both sides of a row of electrodes would be a solution to that problem.” Id. We also stated that Dr. Wolfe does not “provide any detail as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Barkan’s leads 160 to incorporate external connections such as those in Tagg.” Id. (citing Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,821,502 - Blackberry Corp. v. Facebook, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 17, 2020 · IPR2019-01593 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place its discretionary denial of the petition, finding no misapprehension or oversight in its assessment of the claim 23 challenges.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“According to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the “request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” The burden here, therefore, lies with Petitioner to show we misapprehended or overlooked the matters it requests” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Partes Review. Paper 7 (“Dec.”). We exercised our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and denied the Petition based on our determination that Petitioner has only demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to three claim challenges (out of 17).1 Dec. 39−40. Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing challenging several aspects of our Decision. Paper 8 (Req. Reh’g). In particular, Petitioner challenges our determination of the scope of “Global Positioning System data” (hereinafter “GPS Data”) a term recited in independent claim 23. Req. Reh’g 3−6. Petitioner further challenges our determination concerning the term “range of acceptable values,” recited in claim 23. Id. at 10−12. Thus, Petitioner argues, based on the correct interpretation of “GPS data” and “range of acceptable values,” we should have instituted trial because it demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to four or five out of eight challenged claims.2 Req. Reh’g 13.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“types of information that are GPS data, such as idle time. The portions of the Specification that Petitioner now cites, however, do not show that the GPS data is not, at a minimum, location information. As we stated in our Decision, other types of data may be transmitted from the remote unit to the central location, but the GPS data does refer to location information. Dec. 9. Moreover, Petitioner points out that the Specification discusses vehicle speed, idle time, movement, and actual windshield time as examples of calculated values, arguably from GPS location and time information. Req. Reh’g 3. But the Specification actually refers to these values to determine exceptions to be logged and noted (Ex. 1001, 4:41−49, 4:65−67, 6:1−3), which proves only that the system may use non-GPS data, in combination with GPS data, to determine exceptions. We acknowledge that claim 23’s recitation of GPS data could seem, at first blush, to potentially encompass every comparison that the Specification explains. Claim 23, however, must be interpreted in a manner that accounts for the recited two-part structure. In the first part, the claim recites a first comparison that involves the GPS data; and in the second part, the claim recites the second comparison that does not mention GPS data. Our analysis of the term GPS data in our Decision did not assume that the two comparisons involved the same data, e.g., GPS data. This is where Petitioner disagrees with our assessment, because it urges us to construe GPS data as including values and information recited in the second comparison, i.e., the idle time or recited “stationary time.” Petitioner’s position cannot be correct because the claim does not require that the “stationary time” also be GPS data. Further, the comparison that claim 23 recites with respect to GPS data does not mention exceptions at all, so it does not follow that all the Specification’s descriptions of exceptions encompass GPS data. The second comparison recited in claim 23 (comparing the stationary time to a predetermined stationary time), in contrast, is expressly performed for the purpose of noting an exception. Claim 23 (“if the length of time that the remote unit remains in a stationary position is greater than the predetermined stationary time, the system notes an exception.”). Thus, Petitioner, even in arguing for the first time its claim construction position, has not shown that derived data must also be GPS data according to the plain reading of the claim language. Consequently, having reviewed Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that GPS data means data that is derived from and representative of GPS coordinates and time stamps, as argued for the first time in the Request for Rehearing.3” slip op. at 4
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“construction issue. Patent Owner explicitly addressed the construction of the term, a fact we acknowledged in our Decision. Dec. 8 (citing Prelim. Resp. 29−30). Petitioner did not address the scope of the term explicitly or implicitly. And it was not apparent from any of the now-cited portions of the Petition that Petitioner contended a scope of the term to include data that is derived from and representative of GPS coordinates and time stamps. Petitioner’s argument attempts to characterize its omission of a contention regarding claim construction as an oversight on our part. The argument is not persuasive as it is Petitioner’s burden to show in the Petition its contentions regarding how the challenged claim is to be construed and how, so construed, the claim is rendered obvious by the asserted references. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)−(4). Therefore, we could not have either overlooked Petitioner’s position on claim construction, since none was provided, or misapprehended a position of claim scope not made explicit.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,356,841 - Facebook, Inc. / Instagram, LLC et al. v. Blackberry LimitedRehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 24, 2020 · IPR2019-00940 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of review of claims 1, 5, 8–10, 13, and 16 on all asserted grounds in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“petition decision is abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (emphasis added). The party seeking rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id. The primary basis for Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing was the district court’s decision finding overlapping claims of the ’929 patent invalid for claiming unpatentable subject matter under § 101. See Exs. 1033, 3001; Req. Reh’g 1–2. Based on Exhibit 1040, that district court’s decision has been “vacated,” and the entire case involving the ’929 patent has been “dismissed with prejudice.” Ex. 1040, 2. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied because the district court’s invalidity decision under § 101 has been “vacated” and the action has been dismissed with prejudice. See Exhibit 1040. With the dismissal of the district court action, Patent Owner’s arguments requesting that we exercise discretion pursuant to § 314(a) are no longer applicable to this IPR proceeding. Further, we cannot abuse our discretion by failing to consider evidence not properly presented to us before we issued our Decision on Institution.” slip op. at 11
- Other 314aOther
“The primary basis for Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing was the district court’s decision finding overlapping claims of the ’929 patent invalid for claiming unpatentable subject matter under § 101. See Exs. 1033, 3001; Req. Reh’g 1–2. Based on Exhibit 1040, that district court’s decision has been “vacated,” and the entire case involving the ’929 patent has been “dismissed with prejudice.” Ex. 1040, 2. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied because the district court’s invalidity decision under § 101 has been “vacated” and the action has been dismissed with prejudice. See Exhibit 1040. With the dismissal of the district court action, Patent Owner’s arguments requesting that we exercise discretion pursuant to § 314(a) are no longer applicable to this IPR proceeding. Further, we cannot abuse our discretion by failing to consider evidence not properly presented to us before we issued our Decision on Institution.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,676,929 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 27, 2020 · IPR2019-01403 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Juniper’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS The applicable standard for granting a request for rehearing of a petition decision is abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party seeking rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDecided for patent owner
“district court and the June 13, 2018 vacatur of that grant, we determined that “service occurred at a time authorized by the district court.” Dec. 6. In its Request, Petitioner contends that, because the district court originally granted leave to serve the complaint in “error,” “Patent Owner’s June 8, 2018 filing was not properly served and cannot start the clock on Petitioner’s one-year deadline.” Req. Reh’g 1. But in advancing this contention, Petitioner misconstrues the meaning of “properly served” in the context of the Board’s precedential decision in GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., IPR2018-01754, Paper 38 (PTAB Aug. 23, 2019) (precedential). In recognizing that a complaint “improperly served” does not trigger the § 315(b) time bar, the Precedential Opinion Panel in GoPro cites IpDatatel, LLC v. ICN Acquisition, LLC, IPR2018-01823, Paper 17 at 10–18 (PTAB Apr. 17, 2019) for the interpretation of “served” in § 315(b) as “requir[ing] compliance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” GoPro at 14. Although we alerted the parties in our Decision that “we discern no evidence on this record that service failed to comply with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Petitioner offers no evidence or argument in its Request that prompts us to reconsider that finding. See Dec. 6.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aOther
“In this case, the Chief Judge has considered Petitioner’s suggestion for an expanded panel, but has determined that an expanded panel is not warranted.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,418,731 - Apple Inc. v. Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 19, 2020 · IPR2018-00395 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked or misapprehended matter affecting its obviousness determinations for claims 1–27.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,622,018
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.