- NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 30, 2015 · IPR2014-01026 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11, 14, and 17–21 are unpatentable; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable because Wiklund does not disclose its required sequential contact portions.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1001, 5:9–22 (emphasis added). This passage is consistent with interpreting “first manner and second manner” as meaning “any two different ways.” As described in this quoted passage, if either the forward velocity or the trajectory of the headrest, or both changes, then movement in a first and second manner has occurred. For example, if the headrest were to move forward at one velocity and then merely slow down (or speed up) on the same trajectory, then movement would occur in a first and second manner.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Id. at 8:58–9:5 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion of the quotation establishes that Kage’s headrest moves differently at the beginning and end of its path S2'. Namely, Kage’s headrest moves quickly toward the occupant’s head at the beginning of path S2' and more slowly toward the occupant’s head at the end of path S2'.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“claims 12, 17, 18, and 21 obvious and sets forth the evidence from Wiklund and Humer to support its contentions in detailed claim charts. Pet. 43–46. NHK also proffers Dr. Kent’s testimony to explain the manner in which Wiklund describes the requirements recited in these claims. Ex. 1010¶¶ 60– 69. Claims 12 and 21 depend from claims 10 and 20, respectively, and further recite a “damper connected between the headrest arrangement and the seatback.” Ex. 1001, 13:15–16 (claim 12), 14:26–27 (claim 21). NHK relies upon Humer for its disclosure of a damper as recited in these claims. Pet. 44–46. More specifically, NHK contends that Humer teaches using a damper 118 to improve “energy absorptions” of the Saab SAHR headrest. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1007, 7:27–8:4). NHK also contends that Wiklund is directed to the same Saab SAHR headrest. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶ 60). NHK therefore concludes that an ordinary artisan would have found it obvious to improve Wiklund by adding Humer’s damper between the headrest arrangement and the seatback. Pet. 43–44. NHK contends that an ordinary artisan would have found it obvious to add a damper to Wiklund to “provide ‘some energy absorption to cause more even and controlled contact with the head during impact’ because without the damper 118 ‘the head tends to oscillate after impacting a headrest cushion.’” Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1007, page 8:1–4; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 60, 61, and 63).” slip op. at 34
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“IV. LEAR’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE We have reviewed Lear’s Motion to Exclude, NHK’s Opposition to the Motion, and Lear’s Reply in support of the Motion. Based on our review, we deny the Motion in all respects for one or both of the following reasons: (1) the Motion is moot because it seeks to exclude evidence not considered or relied upon in rendering this Decision or (2) the Motion addresses issues more appropriate to determining the weight ascribed to the evidence rather than the admissibility of evidence. In rendering this Decision, we determine and ascribe the appropriate weight to all proffered evidence and, when appropriate, comment upon the weight ascribed.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 6,655,733 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,655,733 - Seagate Technology (US) Holdings, Inc. / Seagate Technology LLC v. Enova Technology Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2015 · IPR2014-01449 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 40–53 are unpatentable under § 103 over Sullivan and SATA Standard because the combination renders the claimed cryptographic SATA operations obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Decision to Institute did not provide express constructions for any of the terms of the challenged claims, noting that “claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Dec. to Inst. 6–7 (quoting Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Patent Owner’s Response does not propose any claim constructions, asserting instead that “even under the claim constructions proposed by Petitioner[], the references of record do not render any claims of the ’057 Patent obvious.” PO Resp. 15. The parties’ arguments in this proceeding following the Decision to Institute do not provide any reason to deviate from the claim construction approach in the Decision to Institute. Based on the record before us, we need not provide express constructions for any claim terms.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the field of this invention would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, and two years of experience in a relevant field, or equivalent knowledge and experience. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 16–17). Patent Owner’s Response does not address specifically the level of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Thomas M. Conte, testifies that because the claims of the ’057 patent describe a cryptographic apparatus, which is a computer hardware device, one of ordinary skill in the art should have experience with the hardware of devices and systems. Ex. 2061 ¶ 18. Dr. Conte’s testimony does not persuade us that hardware encryption experience is a prerequisite for the level of ordinary skill, such that persons having a software background or a degree in computer science are excluded from being persons of ordinary skill. See id. Although the Specification of the ’057 patent and the challenged claims disclose a “cryptographic device,” the ’057 patent teaches that “[t]he above-described embodiments may be implemented in hardware and/or software form, as desired.” Ex. 1001, 12:10–11. After considering the evidence of record, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’057 patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering or computer science, and at least two years of experience.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“adequately for the disclosure in Sullivan that is broader and more general. For example, in the Background section, Sullivan describes that “[a] system is needed whereby transmission of data in a serial channel can be accomplished in-line and in real time, where the data and control information can be treated separately for both encryption purposes and for handling various types of attacks and covert processes embedded in or achieved by the transmitted information.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 6 (emphasis added); see also id. at ¶ 10 (“The control information, which may include commands and status information, can be subjected to filtering and rejecting operations by the encryption unit, to pass through only a predetermined set of commands and/or to reject a predetermined set of commands.”); id. at ¶ 55 (“[T]he filter module 730 may be configured as an information or command pass filter or blocking filter for any control information that may be included in the packet 700, whether or not in the header.”) (emphasis added); id. at claim 9 (“transmitting the encrypted information with the associated control information to the second device, where the associated control information is transmitted in an unencrypted form”). In view of these teachings, we agree with Petitioner that “Sullivan describes making encryption decisions based on the type of data and not simply the location of the data (e.g., in a header or in a payload).” Reply 8. Further, a skilled artisan would not have understood Sullivan’s teaching to strip out the header and encrypt the payload as a prescription for how each individual FIS should be treated when Sullivan is applied to a SATA device, because that encryption strategy would yield a non-functioning SATA device. It is undisputed that implementing Sullivan in a SATA device in this manner would result in a non-functional system, because doing so would result in encryption of payloads that should not be encrypted, thereby rendering the FISes unintelligible to the host or the peripheral device intended to process them. See PO Resp. 25; Reply 9. As summarized above, Patent Owner argues that this non-functionality demonstrates a flaw in Petitioner’s proposed combination. See PO Resp. 25. Yet, we view Patent Owner’s argument regarding non-functionality as detracting from the persuasiveness of Patent Owner’s contentions regarding how a skilled artisan would have understood Sullivan’s disclosure. In particular, it strains credulity that a skilled artisan would apply Sullivan in the manner Patent Owner urges when doing so would result in a non-functioning device. We agree with Petitioner that an artisan having ordinary skill and creativity would not have applied Sullivan’s teachings in such a simplistic and plainly counterproductive fashion. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”); see also Reply 9–10 (citing In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). We further agree with Petitioner that a skilled artisan would have recognized that “Sullivan teaches a flexible cryptographic device that can be implemented using a variety of data transfer protocols . . . and is designed to ‘accommodate[] whatever standard is used.’” Reply 8–9 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 50).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“However, because Sullivan describes the rejection feature as alternative or additional, we find Dr. Long’s description of how a skilled artisan would have understood these teachings to be more credible. Dr. Long testifies that Sullivan’s paragraph 55 “reminds us there’s a number of ways to do this, look-up table, formula logic, whatever. It discloses the idea of you can pass some subset of commands to the encryption unit, and you can block other set of commands. It’s silent on the intersection of those two sets.” Ex. 2060, 74:3–8. Elaborating further, Dr. Long testifies: 3 Sullivan does not state expressly what becomes of the information that is rejected. Dr. Conte testifies that it is “rejected and filtered out.” Ex. 2061 ¶ 122. Dr. Long appears to be in agreement that information blocked by the rejection feature is not processed further. See Ex. 2060, 74:17–18 (testifying that “[t]here is a set of things that are blocked, which means they don’t go anywhere”). There’s a set of things that are passed to the encryption unit. There is a set of things that are blocked, which means they don’t go anywhere. And a person of ordinary skill in the art would think this through, but there could be things that are in neither set. Id. at 74:16–21. In other words, Sullivan’s description of the filter module leaves open the possibility that some of the information will be neither passed for encryption nor rejected and discarded. Thus, Sullivan’s description of the filter module does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage a skilled artisan from causing certain FISes to bypass the cryptographic engine. Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that passing a PIO Setup FIS without encrypting it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan implementing Sullivan’s teachings in view of SATA Standard. As discussed above in the context of the “associated with” limitation, we agree with Petitioner that Sullivan teaches that control information should not be encrypted or decrypted. For example, Sullivan’s claim 9 describes “transmitting the encrypted data with the associated control information to the second device, where the associated control information is transmitted in an unencrypted form.” Ex. 1002, claim 9. Further, Dr. Long testifies that a skilled artisan would have known that the PIO setup FIS contains control information. Ex. 1006 ¶ 82, 179. Accordingly, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that it would have been obvious to pass a PIO Setup FIS from device interface to host interface without encrypting it.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 7,900,057 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,900,057 - PTAB · Dec 7, 2015 · IPR2015-01438 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding before deciding whether to institute review of claims 1–3 and 8–12.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“they have settled their disputes regarding the ’104 patent. Paper 7, 2. The parties further represent that there are numerous related matters in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that have been dismissed with prejudice or stayed pending final determination of two related inter partes reviews involving U.S. Patent No. 7,550,870 B2 (“the ’870 patent”). Id. at 3. Based on the joint requests filed by the parties in the two proceedings involving the ’870 patent, those cases have been terminated. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Cyber Switching Patents, LLC, Cases IPR2015-00690 & IPR2015-00725 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2015) (Paper 33 in each proceeding). Lastly, the parties do not represent that the ’104 patent is involved in any other proceedings before the Office. See generally id. at 2–4. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering any further decisions. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,672,104 - Hart Communication Foundation v. Sipco, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 13, 2015 · IPR2014-00751 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–4 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 1 and 9–13 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish the claimed wireless retransmission.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distances.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 6. Although we credit those opinions of Mr. Gannon, we find more compelling the bases for Dr. Almeroth’s opinion that one of skill in the art would be disinclined to use wireless communication at multiple levels of Enterprise Server CM’s tree hierarchy.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“articulated clearly in the Petition, and it is, nevertheless, unpersuasive in light of Dr. Almeroth’s testimony. Nor are we persuaded by Petitioner’s general argument that various of the references disclose wireless communications that a person of skill in the art would have found obvious to implement in the tree hierarchy disclosed by Enterprise Server CM. See id. at 2–4. That argument is insufficiently supported by evidence that responds to the several issues raised by Dr. Almeroth. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (unsupported attorney argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 7,468,661 mixed§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,468,661 - DISH Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00499 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution in place only for claims 1–4, 7–10, and 13–14 on Goldwasser-based grounds; Truog-based grounds and Ground 10 remain denied.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“personal knowledge as to when and how the Truog thesis was made available to the public, and his testimony also is insufficient evidence of the library’s specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers in the relevant time period between Truog’s purported publication in 1989 and the ’444 patent’s 1992 priority date.” Dec. 11. For reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded of error in this determination. Mr. Bender’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence of either general library practice or the specific facts surrounding the purported publication of Mr. Truog’s thesis.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“personal knowledge as to when and how the Truog thesis was made available to the public, and his testimony also is insufficient evidence of the library’s specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers in the relevant time period between Truog’s purported publication in 1989 and the ’444 patent’s 1992 priority date.” Dec. 11. For reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded of error in this determination. Mr. Bender’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence of either general library practice or the specific facts surrounding the purported publication of Mr. Truog’s thesis.” slip op. at 5
- Other 314aInstitution denied
“10 over the teachings of Goldwasser, Yifrach, and Ulmer (“Ground 10”). Req. Reh’g 12. We exercised our discretion and declined to institute on this ground. Dec. 19. Petitioner does not direct us to anything that was” slip op. at 8
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 5,930,444 - Microsoft Corporation v. Biscotti Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 20, 2015 · IPR2015-01053 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied joinder and denied institution of review of claims 1, 4, and 5 because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Petitioner has established sufficiently that joinder to the ’1458 IPR is warranted. Granting joinder would complicate the substantive issues in the ’1458 IPR significantly more than Petitioner suggests. We do not agree with Petitioner’s assertion that “granting joinder results in essentially one new substantive issue—whether the HDMI Specification (Ex. 1007) discloses the HDMI element.” Joinder Motion 9. Joinder would add to the ’1458 IPR obviousness challenges to claims 1, 4, and 5, thereby adding for each of these challenges the numerous issues that any obviousness analysis entails. Additionally, the challenge raised in the present Petition does not rely on the same references as the pending challenges in the ’1458 IPR. Unlike the challenge raised in the present Petition, no pending claim challenge in the ’1458 IPR relies on the HDMI Specification. See ’1458 Institution Decision 33–34. Indeed, joinder would add a significant dispute regarding the public accessibility of the HDMI Specification.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“review when the petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner (or petitioner’s real party in interest or privy) is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b). That one-year time bar, however, does not apply to a request for joinder. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (final sentence); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). This is an important consideration here because Petitioner was served with a complaint asserting infringement of the ’182 patent more than one year before filing the Petition in this proceeding. See Joinder Motion 2–4. As noted above, the ’182 patent is involved in a district court proceeding in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas captioned Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 2:13-cv-01015-JRG (E.D. Tex.) (“District Court Proceeding”). Joinder Motion 2; Pet. 3–4. Petitioner represents that the complaint in the District Court Proceeding was served on Petitioner on November 27, 2013. Joinder Motion 2. As noted above, the present Petition was filed on April 17, 2015. Thus, absent joinder of this proceeding to the ’1458 IPR, institution based on the current Petition is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,144,182 - Microsoft Corporation v. Biscotti Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 19, 2015 · IPR2015-01052 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied joinder and denied institution of review of claims 13–16, 33, 34, 46, and 82–86 because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“warranted. Granting the joinder sought by Petitioner would complicate the substantive issues in the ’1457 IPR significantly more than Petitioner suggests. Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, joinder would do more than simply add evidence that the HDMI Specification is prior art. See Joinder Motion 8. Joinder would add to the ’1457 IPR an obviousness challenge to claims 13–16, 33, 34, 46, and 82–86, thereby adding the numerous issues that any obviousness analysis entails. Additionally, contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, the challenge raised in the present Petition does not rely on the same references as the pending challenges in the ’1457 IPR. See Joinder Motion 8 (“The -01052 proceeding involves . . . the same prior art . . . as the -01457 proceeding.”). Unlike the challenge raised in the present Petition, no pending claim challenge in the ’1457 IPR relies on the HDMI Specification. See ’1457 Institution Decision 31. Indeed, joinder would add a significant dispute regarding the public accessibility of the HDMI Specification. Additionally, granting joinder would add significant procedural complications and delay resolution of the ’1457 IPR. In the ’1457 IPR, Patent Owner has filed its Response, and the date for the oral hearing is only weeks away. Granting joinder would require adjusting the schedule to allow Patent Owner discovery on the issues presented by the challenge in the present Petition. Petitioner does not offer a practical way to accommodate the additional discovery and briefing without rushing significantly all involved or delaying the final written decision beyond its current due date of March 19, 2016.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“III. DECISION ON THE PETITION Institution of inter partes review is barred when the petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b). The present Petition was filed more than one year after Petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’182 patent. See Joinder Motion 2, 4. Accordingly, in view of our decision to deny Petitioner’s Joinder Motion, we deny the present Petition because it was not filed within the time limits imposed under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 16
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,144,182 - Oracle Corporation v. Crossroads Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01063 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–14 because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b); the joinder motion was moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“Section 315(b) normally bars institution of inter partes review when the petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b). The one-year time bar, however, does not apply to a request for joinder. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (final sentence); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). In a “Statement of Material Facts,” Petitioner states that it “was served with a complaint asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,425,035 more than one year before filing the petition.” Mot. 1. Without joinder of Petitioner in this proceeding as a party to the ’777 proceeding, the Petition would be barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Because the Joinder Motion is moot, the present Petition is time barred, and, therefore, we deny the Petition because it was not filed within the time limits imposed under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). III.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION The Joinder Motion states that “Petitioner Oracle Corporation respectfully requests joinder pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) of the above-captioned inter partes review with NetApp, Inc. v. Crossroads Systems, Inc., IPR2015-00777.” Mot. 1. Because we declined to institute inter partes review in the ’777 proceeding, the Joinder Motion is moot.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,425,035 - Netapp Inc. v. Crossroads Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 3, 2015 · IPR2015-00777 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–14 under § 325(d), finding the petition presented substantially the same prior art and arguments as an earlier proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. The Petition in this proceeding presents the same prior art and substantially the same arguments previously presented in the ’1197 proceeding. As in the ’1197 proceeding, Petitioner relies on CRD-5500 User Manual, CRD-5500 Data Sheet, Smith, Kikuchi, Bergsten, and Hirai. Compare Pet. 3 with ’1197 proceeding Paper 1, 5 (“’1197 Pet.”). Petitioner also presents substantially the same arguments regarding the proposed combinations of (1) the CRD-5500 User Manual, CRD-5500 Data Sheet, and Smith; (2) Kikuchi and Bergsten; (3) Kikuchi, Bergsten, and Smith; and (4) Bergsten and Hirai. Compare Pet. 6–57 with ’1197 Pet. 11–56. To the extent that there are any substantive differences in the arguments or new arguments, we agree with Patent Owner that those different or new arguments could have been submitted in the ’1197 proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. 1. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that, in the present Petition, the “same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office” in the ’1197 proceeding.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,425,035 - HTC Corporation / HTC America, Inc. v. NFC Technology, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00384 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied HTC’s rehearing request and left in place its discretionary denial of institution on claims 13–15 and 19 based on § 325(d) and follow-on petition concerns.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. (Emphasis added.) When rehearing a Decision on Institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for patent owner
“that, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the two petitions challenge overlapping sets of claims.1 In particular, Petitioner expressly challenges claim 13 in both IPR2014- 01199 (see 1199 Dec. on Inst. 3) and IPR2015-00384 (Pet. 60 (“This Petition demonstrates that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioners will prevail in their challenge of patentability for Claims 13, 14, 15 and 19.” (emphasis added)). Further, to the extent that Petitioner argues that it only challenges the dependent claims, challenges to independent claim 13 are made expressly as part of the challenges to each of dependent claims 14, 15, and 19. Pet. 12–26 (claim 13 as unpatentable over Akiho); 31–39 (claim 13 as unpatentable over Amtmann); 44–46 (claim 13 as unpatentable over Amtmann and ECMA-340); 49–57 (claim 13 as unpatentable Charrat and Kuhl).2 With respect to claim 13, the asserted grounds in the Petition in IPR2015-00384 rely on the same references and make substantially the same arguments against claim 13 as those asserted in the Petition in IPR2014- 01199. As we indicated in the Decision on Institution, “we may exercise our discretion and decline to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)” based on the assertion of the same references against claim 13. 384 Dec. on Inst. 9–10. Moreover, although at the time Petitioner filed its second Petition, Petitioner did not know on which, if any, of its asserted grounds we might institute review, Petitioner’s request that we consider identical challenges to claim 13 in each” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for patent owner
“Petition is unquestionably an attempt to obtain a “second bite at the apple,” at least with respect to claim 13.3 384 Dec. on Inst. 11; see Reh’g Req. 1. Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner also relies upon Arisawa to challenge claims 14, 15, or 19 on another ground(s), Petitioner’s asserted grounds and arguments make clear that Akiho or Charrat and Kuhl, or both, allegedly teach the additional limitations recited in claims 14, 15, or 19. See, e.g., Pet. 26–30 (applying the teachings of Akiho to claims 14, 15, and 19), 39–43 (applying the teachings of Amtmann and Arisawa to claims 14, 15, and 19). Petitioner presents no evidence or argument that Arisawa was not known or available to Petitioner at the time the Petition was filed in IPR2014-01199. We also note that Arisawa is listed among the “References Cited” on page 2 in Kuhl. See Conopo, Inc. v. The Proctor & Gamble Co., Case IPR2014-00506, slip op. at 6 (PTAB July 7, 2014) (Paper 17) (informative) (“The instant Petition relies on thirteen pieces of prior art: six that were raised in the 505 Petition . . .; and seven that are new to this proceeding . . . . Unilever, however, presents no argument or evidence that the seven newly cited references were not known or available to it at the time of filing of the 505 Petition.”); see also Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP, Case IPR2015-00555, slip op. at 7 (PTAB June 19, 2015) (Paper 20) (“Petitioner simply presents arguments now that it could have made in [its earlier Petition], had it merely chosen to do so.”). Therefore, we deny Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing on this basis. 3 As noted below, however, Petitioner waited until after Patent Owner had filed a Preliminary Response in IPR2014-01199 before filing the follow-on Petition in IPR2015-00384.” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“presents evidence (e.g., Arisawa) and arguments that Petitioner had no reason to raise in the Petition in IPR2014-01199. Reh’g Req. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner had not asserted that Petitioner infringed dependent claims 14, 15, and 19 until after the Petition in IPR2014-01199 was filed. Id. Petitioner presents a timeline in its Request for Rehearing, in which Petitioner suggests that Patent Owner filed an amended complaint in the related litigation alleging for the first time that Petitioner infringed dependent claims 14, 15, and 19. Id. at 2. Petitioner argues in the Request for Rehearing that, on August 19, 2014, Patent Owner served a second set of infringement contentions in the lawsuit, asserting dependent claims 14, 15, and 19 for the very first time. Because it was too late to address those claims in the first petition, Petitioner[] prepared and filed this second petition for inter partes review on December 6, 2014. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not identify, however, where it raised this argument in its Petition in IPR2015-00384, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). See id. We determine that neither the timeline nor the fact that Patent Owner filed an amended complaint was raised or argued in the Petition in IPR2015-00384, as justification for filing a second petition. We could not have “misapprehended or overlooked” evidence or argument not previously presented. Therefore, we also deny Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing on this basis.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,665,664
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.