• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00246 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–29 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations; the contingent motion to amend claims 30–41 is denied for lack of written-description support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name its corporate parent, ResMed Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 39. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 42. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 43. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 51.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.10 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as “POSITA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 44); PO Resp. 4. 9 Patent Owner does not assert any objective indicia of nonobviousness. See generally PO Resp. 10 For purposes of this Decision, we apply a priority date of November 4, 2005. See supra n.4. Because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner does not persuade us to construe the term as “a value [or calculated value] that indicates how dire a patient’s symptoms are.” Patent Owner points to nothing in the intrinsic record that purportedly supports this construction, and we agree with Petitioner that “the patent specification’s disclosures regarding determining a level of symptom severity are broad, establishing that it can generally be derived from any sensor data and/or breathing events.” Pet. Reply 3–4; see also Ex. 1001, 3:44–46 (“Signals from the[] sensors are then analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms of the subject’s sleep disorder.”). Patent Owner relies only on expert declarations to support its construction. But as indicated by the Federal Circuit, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is especially applicable here, where neither Dr. D’Ambrosio’s nor Dr. Schwartz’s declaration was prepared for this proceeding, and neither declarant was subject to cross examination on their opinions. Moreover, neither of the declarants was opining on claim construction; rather, they were addressing indefiniteness and/or written description issues. See Ex. 1058 at 7 (heading addressing definiteness); Ex. 2026 at 18 (heading addressing written description). Further, Dr. Schwartz appears to have been making an argument about certain patent claims (not the challenged ’333 patent) based on Patent Owner’s own statements made during prosecution of a separate patent application. See Ex. 2026 ¶ 47 (“[T]he similar term used in the ’284 patent claims (‘data of severity of sleep disorder symptoms’) does not find written description support in the specification by a disclosure of the same statistics disclosed in Wright, because CleveMed argued those statistics are not related to severity of sleep disorder symptoms.” (emphasis added)). Patent Owner has not persuaded us that Dr. Schwartz’s testimony has direct applicability to the claim term at issue here. Dr. Borkholder’s testimony is likewise unpersuasive. Aside from citing Dr. D’Ambrosio’s and Dr. Schwartz’s declarations, Dr. Borkholder cites Exhibits 2027 and 2016. These exhibits discuss indices such as AHI and RDI that are used to assess the severity of a patient’s symptoms, but Patent Owner has not adequately explained how they bear on construction of the claim term at issue here, which is not addressed in these exhibits. Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 32–33. Accordingly, we accord Dr. Borkholder’s claim construction opinions little weight, because they are unsupported by reference to objective, corroborating evidence of record. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations . . . may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 15 (PTAB 2023) (precedential) (explaining that declaration testimony that “is conclusory and unsupported” and which “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support . . . is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that Petitioner has the better argument. Tidal volume refers to “the volume of air that is inspired or expired during a respiratory cycle.” Ex. 2028, 13–14; PO Resp. 10. “[H]ypopnea events are defined as a reduction of ≥50 % or 74 % in tidal volume from baseline and apnea events as absence of tidal volume for at least 10s.” Ex. 2028, 13–14 (emphasis omitted). Toge teaches that a control unit analyzes collected data (e.g., the flow rate) and calculates tidal volume. Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶¶ 34–38. The calculated tidal volume is “a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy” because it represents, e.g., the “level of airway obstruction the patient experiences during the sleep apnea treatment using the PAP device.” Pet. 15. As Dr. Chatterjee explains: Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is a quantified level of data because Toge discloses that Fp is monitored with respect to threshold values (id., [0051]) and because Fp is a function of Ft, Fa, and Fb, which are quantitative values. Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is severity data because Toge discloses that tidal volume is indicative of whether the patient’s breathing warrants “emergency measures” (id., [0039]) and whether to “send an alert” in “an emergency where the patient’s breathing has drastically weakened” (id., [0055]). . . . . Because Toge discloses determining tidal volume (determine a quantified level of severity data) based on Ft, Fa, and Fb (id., [0035]), which corresponds to the subject’s condition (subject’s sleep apnea symptoms) while using the device (during the therapy) (id., [0036], [0037]), Toge discloses determin[ing] a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy. Ex. 1005 (Chatterjee Decl.) ¶¶ 122–125. Patent Owner’s attempt to dismiss tidal volume as a mere “breathing metric” is unavailing. First, Petitioner correctly “notes that in the paragraph PO cites to in Dr. Schwartz’s declaration, he indicates that breathing metrics are a level of severity data.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 2026 ¶ 46 (“standard sleep disordered breathing metrics” [ ] were well validated indicators of the type and severity of sleep disordered breathing”)). Second, Dr. Kirkness explains that tidal volume represents the level of airway obstruction, e.g., apnea “is the most severe form of reduction in airflow [and] the absence of airflow results in quantified tidal volume of zero milliliters per breath.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 157, 159; see also PO Resp. 10–11 (Patent Owner recognizing that an apnea is defined as absence of tidal volume for at least 10 seconds). The calculated tidal volume thus indicates severity because it is used to adjust the PAP system, e.g., in the case of decreasing tidal volume, a medical professional can change the airflow settings “to counter/treat the more severe level of airway obstruction observed from the decreasing tidal volume.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 158; Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶ 39.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 11,857,333 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,857,333
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00115 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 10, 11, 14, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 33, and 35 are unpatentable; claim 15 is not shown unpatentable, based on the four asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were in public use prior to the claimed inventions, are not prior art that can form the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 80

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “‘electronics for power and control’”). According to Mr. Crosby, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood based on the disclosure of this setup that these speed and motor parameters were monitored by a sensor providing feedback to the controller.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 725. Mr. Crosby identifies no support for this opinion, which we give little weight to. The mere fact that Bourque’s pump used software to control speed and motor parameters does not show that Bourque used “one or more sensors” to provide feedback signals to the external control unit. Indeed, Petitioner fails to identify any evidence that Bourque used any “sensor” to monitor “speed and motor parameters.” Mr. Crosby also states that “[e]ach of the ‘ultrasonic flow probe’ and the ‘solid-state catheter-type pressure transducer’ described in [Bourque] is a ‘sensor’ as recited in Claim 33 that provides feedback signals to the external control unit (e.g., ‘electronics for power and control’ and ‘data acquisition’).” Id. ¶¶ 581, 726. Mr. Crosby’s opinion is again unsupported by the evidence, because, as explained above, there is no teaching in Bourque that either the “ultrasonic flow probe” or the “pressure transducers” used in the “in vitro characterization” studies were part of the heart assist pump device. Based on our review and consideration of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence directed to claim 11, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted combination of Bourque and Wampler teaches or suggests each of the limitations of dependent claim 11. We reach the same conclusion for the same reasons with regard to claim 33.” slip op. at 48

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, a second magnetic device “positioned” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,674,517 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,674,517
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00096 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10, 12, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Fed. R. Evid. 702 serves “a ‘gatekeeping role,’ the objective of which is to ensure that expert testimony admitted into evidence is both reliable and relevant.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There is no question that the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby is relevant to the asserted motivation to combine and reliable, only whether it becomes “not relevant” or “unreliable,” in light of limited scope upon which grounds of unpatentability may be based under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), because the testimony is based on, or supported by, knowledge of physical devices and publications discussing physical devices. Patent Owner directs us to no support for the notion that an expert’s testimony in an inter partes review must be limited to only the prior art relied upon as grounds for unpatentability and may not take into account any knowledge of, or publications concerning, other “physical devices” that would have been known to a person of ordinary skill at the relevant time. See generally Mot.25 In sum, we find that Patent Owner has 25 Patent Owner improperly asserts for the first time in its Reply in support of the Motion that “Petitioner in this case is improperly relying on non-prior art evidence.” Mot. Reply 3. This argument was not made in the Motion, and Patent Owner fails to identify what “non-prior art evidence” it seeks to exclude. We recognize that Petitioner appears to raise the argument that “non-prior art evidence” may be relied upon by an expert, but Petitioner also fails to identify what evidence it is referring to and that argument was not responsive to any issue Patent Owner raised in the Motion. See Mot. Resp. 5. To the extent the Parties intend “non-prior art evidence” to refer to the testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby, we view the issue as pertaining to the weight afforded that testimony, in light of the supporting evidence relied upon, rather than one of admissibility. for the exclusion of evidence in this proceeding and deny the Motion.” slip op. at 83

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “D. Claim Construction In this proceeding we construe claims using the same claim” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Rationale in Support of Asserted Combination Petitioner shows, and there is no dispute, that Bourque and Wampler” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 11,351,356 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,351,356
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00114 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has no tendency to make any fact of consequence in this trial more or less probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 77

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a second magnetic device . . . positioned to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–37. Claim 11 recites, in relevant part, “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor so as to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor relative to the one or more walls via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Id. at 6:42–48. Petitioner argues that “magneto coupling” means “a transfer of torque from one rotating permanent magnetic component to another rotating permanent magnetic component via a magnetic field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–87). According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the ’879 patent, which describes “a coupling between two rotating ‘bar magnets’—a drive wheel rotates one bar magnet which causes another bar magnet (connected to a rotor) to rotate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55 (analyzing Ex. 1001, 2:28–52, 4:44–64, Fig. 2)). Patent Owner argues that “magneto coupling” should be afforded “its plain and ordinary meaning, which would encompass a magnetic coupling through both rotating magnets and the use of a rotating magnetic Owner directs us to the testimony of Mr. Leschinsky, who explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’879 patent to use “magneto coupling” to generally describe “a way to couple the rotor to a drive element while sealing the two from one another and avoiding use of a direct mechanical coupling.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 67. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner provides no recognizable basis for limiting the plain meaning of magnetic coupling to one type of magnet and excluding another type of magnet.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc., v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989–992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide a sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’879 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 13 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable

    “reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claims 1 and 11, as well as by claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14– 16, and 18–20, which depend from either claim 1 or claim 11. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes [that] ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,572,879 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,572,879
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00112 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 10, 11, 14, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; the other asserted grounds were not established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’357 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 11 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 9–11; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)). distinguished “magneto coupling” drives from drives using stators. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1011, 1 (explaining that the rotating field is generated by rotating magnets in a magnetic coupling pump and by electric stator windings in a stator pump)). Petitioner does not explain how this cited reference evidences that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “magneto coupling” requires rotating permanent magnets. At most, this reference teaches an example device that provides “magneto coupling.” See Ex. 1011, 1. In sum, we agree with Patent Owner that “magneto coupling,” consistent with our Institution Decision, encompasses generating a rotating field either by rotating magnets or by an electromagnet / stator. See Inst. Dec. 22” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “ignores the readily apparent fact that the lower arrow is placed in a location that misrepresents the minimum distance between the magnetically driven rotor and the second magnetic device to suggest that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor,” as required by claim 1. Petitioner purports to justify this misrepresentation by asserting that “the vast majority of the impeller 74 is spaced significantly farther apart from the stators 90 and 94 than the magnetic pieces 88 are positioned from the stators 90 and 94.” Id. at 33–34. Claim 1 does not recite any feature based on the “vast majority” of a component and it is readily apparent from Petitioner’s own annotated version of Figure 11a that the distance from both the “motor magnets [88]” and “impeller 74” to the “circular electromagnetic stator[s] [90 and 94]” is the same. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has provided a “misleading Figure with two red arrows denoting measurement distances to illustrate its incorrect view that the second magnetic device is farther from the magnetically driven rotor than from the first magnetic device.” PO Resp. 13–15 (providing an annotated version of Wampler’s Figure 11a with an orange arrow showing that in Wampler the distances from the second magnetic device to both the rotor and the first magnetic device are the same). Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor.”” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To orient the pump in the least obtrusive position (i.e., in the human configuration, as in Figure 3), it was decided that the rotational axis of the pump’s rotor should be perpendicular to the body’s long axis. That resulted in a sharp bend in the flow before it enters the impeller. To minimize the losses in this transition, the flow is slightly accelerated through this elbow. that this type of elbow [i.e., the elbow used with Bourque’s centrifugal pump] was unnecessary,” applying Wampler to Bourque would have improved “blood flow.” Pet. 73 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 418–419; Ex. 1007, 402; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). As explained above, Wampler does not teach that “this type of elbow” was unnecessary. Bourque uses a centrifugal pump with an additional elbow specifically so that the centrifugal pump may be oriented “in the least obtrusive position.” Ex. 1007, 402. Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to support Petitioner’s assertion that eliminating the elbow from Bourque would improve “blood flow.” Mr. Crosby’s declaration provides no additional explanation or support to show how “blood flow” would have been improved. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 419. Nor does Mr. Crosby address the fact that Bourque expressly states that “flow is slightly accelerated” through the elbow to “minimize losses in this transition.” Ex. 1007, 402. Eliminating the elbow from Bourque, as Petitioner and Mr. Crosby propose, would mean the pump could no longer be placed in “the least obtrusive position” according to Bourque and there is no persuasive evidence that such a modification would improve blood flow.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 11,351,357 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,351,357
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 4, 2026 · IPR2025-00113 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable under §103 over Schima and Akamatsu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claim 1, as well as by claims 2–5, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 17, which depend from claim 1. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes that ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have positioning that is next to one another, perhaps touching or sharing a common side, when measured along the axis.’” Pet. Reply 11 (citing PO Resp. 17). Petitioner mischaracterizes Patent Owner’s arguments and ignores Patent Owner’s showing that “axially adjacent” components are “distinct from components that are aligned with one another such that they overlap or occupy the same portion of an axis” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “endeavor of the ’415 patent (i.e., “[a] method and device to assist the performance of a heart with at least one pump that is formed as a rotary pump and driven via magneto coupling”). See Ex. 1001, code (57); Ex. 1005 code (57); Ex. 1006, 1. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Schima and Akamatsu are analogous art to the ’415 patent.” slip op. at 71

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “endeavor of the ’415 patent (i.e., “[a] method and device to assist the performance of a heart with at least one pump that is formed as a rotary pump and driven via magneto coupling”). See Ex. 1001, code (57); Ex. 1005 code (57); Ex. 1006, 1. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Schima and Akamatsu are analogous art to the ’415 patent.” slip op. at 71

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “not identified a persuasive basis under any of the Federal Rules of Evidence for the exclusion of evidence in this proceeding and deny the Motion.” slip op. at 78

  Patent outcomesUS 11,376,415 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,376,415
• Biofrontera Inc. / Biofrontera Bioscience GmbH et al. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01312 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 16, 17, and 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Lundahl and Larsen; Ground 2 was conceded, and the motion to exclude was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has not provided a valid justification for requiring a POSITA to have both an engineering degree and a medical degree. Prelim. Resp. 22. We agree, insofar as Petitioner has not clearly set out any particular explanation or evidence in support of its dual-degree requirement. In all other respects, we note that the parties’ proposed definitions are largely similar. Because we determine that Patent Owner’s proposed definition is reasonable and consistent with the ’028 patent and the cited art, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition. In any event, our Decision does not turn on this level of skill determination. B.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “device “[f]or the treatment of large-area tissues,” such as the backs of human patients, wherein several applicators 13 are “flexibly connected to each other through hinges.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 72). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have been motivated “to incorporate Larsen’s solution of connecting light applicators by hinges, to allow for adjustability of Lundahl’s device to provide the desired irradiance and irradiance uniformity to all target areas during PDT.” Id. (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 127). According to Petitioner, a “POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Lundahl with Larsen, because both references describe similar illuminators for using light to treat conditions on a patient’s skin.” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 128). Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lundahl also involves using LEDs as a light source instead of Lundahl’s fluorescent tubes. Id. According to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to make this change because: (1) LEDs had a lower cost and a longer lifetime than fluorescent tubes; (2) fluorescent tubes were known to have inconsistent light output within the tube itself; and (3) “the use of LEDs would be more practical to reduce spacing between light sources and the edges of the panels, as opposed to the bulky metal couplings at the end of fluorescent tubes, to reduce optical dead space across the light surface.” Id. (citing Ex. 1014, 4:41–42, 6:31–42; Ex. 1015 ¶ 129). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success with this modification because Lundahl and Larsen “describe similar illuminators and the conversion from fluorescent tubes to LEDs was a routine practice prior to 2015.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 131). Patent Owner does not meaningfully dispute the Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine Lundahl and Larsen. See generally PO Resp. To the extent Patent Owner argues that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the combination because it would negatively affecting uniform illumination (PO Resp. 24), the motivating benefit here—using adjustable LED panels instead of monolith fluorescent tubes—outweighs the alleged disadvantages for the many reasons given by Petitioner, including greater adjustability and improved LED performance. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify.”); Reply 14. We are persuaded that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Lundahl and Larsen for the reasons advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s reasoning (i.e., that it would have been obvious to try placing the hinges on the inner side surfaces) is unsupported and conclusory. PO Reps. 53–54. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to identify a single prior art reference showing hinged structures on inner side surfaces. Id. This argument ignores that Larsen expressly identifies hinges on at least bottom side surfaces, and Petitioner merely proposes modifying their location from the bottom sides to inner sides. We find credible Dr. Grove’s testimony that relocating hinges would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9 We further point out that the ’028 patent also suggests that gaps do” slip op. at 24

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,697,028 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,697,028
• Solaris Oilfield Site Services Operating, LLC / Solaris Oilfield Site Services Personnel, LLC v. Masaba, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01179 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Waldner, Dynatek, and additional references; the Board cancelled all challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Also, to the extent Masaba relies on extrinsic expert testimony, we note that Masaba’s expert cites absolutely no support for his understanding of the claims, much less explains why we should adopt his understanding over the plain and ordinary meaning of “conveying aggregate” and “moving aggregate.” See Ex. 2004 ¶ 34. Absent supporting citations, such extrinsic testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. As such, we reject the notion that Waldner’s discharge chute member 242 is not a conveyor “for conveying aggregate” or “for moving aggregate,” as required by claim elements 1[h] and 1[i].” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Dr. Durham does not possess the necessary level of skill in the art to qualify as an expert in this case. Looking at the specification of the ’689 patent and the prior art of record, we think Masaba sets the bar too high. We acknowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art should have some education and/or experience in the mechanical art of conveying aggregate materials, but we do not think opining on the ’689 patent and asserted prior art necessarily requires that person to have the amount of education and experience that Masaba advocates. The ’689 patent relates generally to an “aggregate transferring system for receiving aggregate from a vehicle and elevating the aggregate to a higher vertical level for deposit into, for example, a silo.” Ex. 1001, 1:15– 18. And, as described in the ’689 patent and discussed later, the transferring system is an assembly of known types of conveyors, such as a belly-dump truck conveyor, a bucket elevator, and an articulated belt conveyor, for transferring the aggregate horizontally and vertically from a belly-dump truck to the discharge point, such as a silo. Without doubt, Dr. Durham has enough education and experience to reliably opine on the combination of known parts.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction needed

    “We reject this argument for several reasons. First, nowhere does the plain language of the claims specify how the aggregate is conveyed or moved from the conveyor extension assembly’s inlet to its outlet, be it passively by means of gravity or actively by means of a conveyor belt. Instead, the claims simply use those verbs according to their plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to transfer or deliver” or “to cause to go or pass” from one place to another. See Ex. 3001, 253 (defining “convey”), 760 (defining “move”).10 Second, the specification of the ’689 patent similarly uses these terms in a plain and ordinary sense, without ever attributing to them some sort of special meaning. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:9–12 (“The apparatus 10 is suitable for performing the transfer of aggregate from 10 We reference the original pagination of the dictionary in which these definitions appear. one location to another, such as, for example, from a vehicle carrying the aggregate to a silo 1 for storing the aggregate.”). The ’689 patent specification also makes clear that active conveyance of the aggregate is an option and not a requirement of the claimed invention, stating that the conveyor extension assembly “may further include a conveyor belt 150.” Ex. 1001, 10:60–66 (emphasis added). Limiting claim elements 1[h] and 1[i] to a device “for actively conveying” or “for actively moving aggregate” would improperly import limitations from the specification into the claims. Thus, based on the intrinsic evidence, we determine that claim elements 1h and 1k are properly construed to encompass passive and/or active movement of the aggregate via the conveyor extension assembly.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached

    “Owner asserts” that two claim terms—“unloader structure” and “trailer structure”—should be construed as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Solaris submits an express construction detailing the corresponding structure in the specification for performing the recited function of the claimed unloader and trailer structures. See id. at 24–25. Only in disputing Solaris’s Ground 3 does Masaba advocate that the claim term “trailer structure” should be construed under § 112(f), and then only in conjunction with dependent claims 3 and 21. See PO Resp. 58. As such, we address Masaba’s proposed construction in our analysis of Ground 3. We now turn to Solaris’s grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 11,780,689 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,780,689
• Revvo Technologies, Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, Inc.Other
  PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8

  None
  Patents in suitUS 11,835,421
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Shen and Soldano did not establish a reasonable likelihood of anticipating claims 1–7.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “II. ANALYSIS In our Decision, we concluded that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing that either Shen or Soldano anticipated claims 1–7. Dec. 18, 26. Petitioner argues that we should institute review for three reasons. First, Petitioner argues that we abused our discretion by (a) “refusing” to interpret the scope of the claimed” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Owner’s interpretation of “carrier” as meaning “one or more components for supporting ROSA components such as an AWG.” Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 11). For our analysis of Petitioner’s challenges, we referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as Petitioner’s second alternative construction. Id. We also noted that Petitioner appeared to dispute Patent Owner’s interpretation when it argued that “carrier” should mean “a ceramic or silicon substrate.” Id. (quoting Pet. 10). We referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as the first alternative construction. Id. Rather than resolve this apparent dispute about the meaning of “carrier,” we found that both of Petitioner’s anticipation challenges failed under both interpretations of “carrier.” Id. at 10–26. Because we found that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden regardless of which interpretation of “carrier” applied, we found it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over that interpretation. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons expressed in Parts II.B–C below, we maintain our conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of proving that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any claim under either interpretation of “carrier.” Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in our alleged “refusal” to interpret “carrier.”” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Reh’g Req. 14. We cannot weigh Petitioner’s arguments based on its assertions about “caselaw” because Petitioner cited no cases to support its arguments. See id. Nevertheless, we infer that Petitioner intends its statements of “caselaw” to refer to the requirements to make out a case for anticipation. If so, Petitioner demonstrably miscasts what appear to be the legal principles for proving anticipation. As stated in our Decision: “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” Dec. 7. Making a showing that a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim thus necessarily requires proof that a single reference “expressly or inherently” describes every element of that claim and with all elements being arranged in the reference as they are in the” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 10,379,301

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.