- PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00068 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–21, applying the construction of “association” used in the parallel petition.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“The Director Review Decision determined that we should not have instituted inter partes review in both proceedings. DR 1. Instead, we “should have construed [‘association’] and instituted review of, at most, one of the petitions.” Id. at 3. Given this, the Director Review Decision vacated this proceeding’s Institution Decision and the 70 Institution Decision, remanding “to the Board panel to determine which of the two proceedings, if Board should construe the term ‘association,’” the Director Review Decision instructed us to “consider the parties’ claim construction arguments in making [our] determination.” Id. at 4. As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding. II. ORDER It is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the petitioned institution of inter partes review of the ’872 patent is denied.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,954,872 - PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00070 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable over Capalik.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewOther
“Patent Owner then filed a Request for Director Review, arguing that Petitioner did not need two petitions to challenge the ’872 patent’s claims. Paper 19. Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart granted Director Review. Paper 25 (“Director Review Decision” or “DR Dec.”); IPR2025-00068, Paper 25. The Director Review Decision vacated this proceeding’s Institution Decision and the 68 Institution Decision, remanding “to the Board panel to Authorizing the parties to brief “how the Board should construe the term ‘association,’” the Director Review Decision instructed us to “consider the parties’ claim construction arguments in making [our] determination.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Thus, the parties agree on the correct construction of “association.” And the parties persuade us to adopt their construction: “association” does not require any classification as authorized or unauthorized. Pet. 4–8; PO Remand Br. 1–3; Pet. Resp. Br. 1–2. This construction of “association” is the one applied in this Petition’s claim challenges, which comports with (1) our earlier determination that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and (2) Petitioner’s preference for this Petition over the 68 Petition. Pet. 4–8, 13–74; Dec. 10–22; Paper 3, 2; Pet. Resp. Br. 2, 5.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“D. The Merits of Petitioner’s Claim Challenges In our Institution Decision, after weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determined that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent as obvious over Capalik. E.g., Dec. 16–22. Based on all of the arguments and evidence currently of record, we remain persuaded that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent. Indeed, as discussed above in Section II.A, the parties’ agreement on the correct construction of “association” reinforces this determination. III. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, having determined that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent is unpatentable, we institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition IV. ORDER It is: ORDERED that inter partes review of claims 1–21 of the ’872 patent is instituted on all grounds presented in the Petition; and” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“institution under § 325(d). Prior to our Institution Decision, Patent Owner did not argue we should deny under § 325(d). See generally Prelim. Resp.; Pet. Resp. Br. 4. Patent Owner first raised § 325(d) while its Request for Director Review was pending, emailing the Office with a request to brief § 325(d) in view of Ecto World. Ex. 3101, 4–5. The Office did not grant that request. Id. at 1. Nor did the Director Review Decision authorize Patent Owner to brief § 325(d). It only authorized Patent Owner “to file a ten-page brief explaining how the Board should construe the term ‘association.’” DR Dec. 4. In sum, Patent Owner’s unauthorized § 325(d) arguments are waived. Moreover, even if Patent Owner had not waived its § 325(d) arguments, we find Petitioner’s § 325(d) arguments more persuasive.” slip op. at 16
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,954,872 - PTAB · Sep 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00763 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand
Instituted review of claims 7 and 11 on the § 103 ground over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Decision”). Petitioner requested Director Review of the Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- RemandOther
“considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Decision”). Petitioner requested Director Review of the Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - PTAB · Sep 3, 2024 · IPR2023-00797 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Remand
The Board denied institution because Honda did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 23, 24, 26, or 27 were obvious over either asserted combination.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of challenged claims 23, 24, 26, and 27 of the ’302 patent. Accordingly, constrained by the record before us, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’302 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive, and the above testimony of its technical expert, Mr. Alberth, even more so. Based on the foregoing and the record before us, we find Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that the ’586 Provisional lacks written description support for the feature of a transmitter configured to form and transmit, in response to a received request, “the probing signal with a code sequence modulated in the frequency domain,” as recited in independent claim 23. Although not its burden, we find Patent Owner sufficiently evidences that the disclosure of the ’586 Provisional would have reasonably conveyed to skilled artisans that the inventor possessed the features of the subject limitation. 5. Conclusion For the reasons expressed above, and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Koo is prior art to the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that any of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable as obvious over the combination of 802.16a-2003, 802.16-2001, and Koo.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“But in doing so, Petitioner ignores the context in which the skilled artisan would have read Kitroser: where IEEE, the governing body issuing the Call for Contributions, itself explicitly questioned “if [implementing 802.16a in a mobile systems environment] is technically feasible and, if so, at what level” (Ex. 2007, 1 (emphasis added)), and where, as noted above, Kitroser provides no explanation, support, or other commentary for its “no changes” statements, and admits such statements are “subject to change in form and content after further study” and subject to amendment and withdrawal entirely (Ex. 1007, 1–4 (emphasis added)). Based on the foregoing, although Petitioner may have identified a “reason” that the skilled artisan allegedly would have combined 802.16a with Kitroser, we are not persuaded that it is a rational reason, i.e., a reason sufficiently shown to have a rational underpinning at the time of the invention of the Challenged Claims. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (To support the legal conclusion of obviousness, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” for combining elements in the manner claimed. (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988)).” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’302 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Buehrer (Ex. 1003 ¶ 23), except that we omit the two instances of “at least” to remove the unbounded nature of the definition.” slip op. at 13
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,771,302 - PTAB · Aug 15, 2024 · IPR2023-01339 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 4–9, 12, and 14 on the asserted §103 ground based on Peev and Spitballs.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewOther
“(“Decision Denying Institution”). The Director has now reversed and remanded our Decision Denying Institution. Paper 12 (“Remand Dec.”). Further, the Director ordered institution of inter partes review. Id. at 21.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“in showing that at least one of the claims challenged . . . would have been obvious over Peev and Spitballs.” Remand Dec. 17. Additionally, having considered arguments from Patent Owner vying for discretionary denial of inter partes review, the Director “decline[d] to exercise . . . discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review.” Id. at 21. Accordingly, the Director “reverse[d] [our Decision Denying Institution] and remand[ed] to the Board to institute trial.” Id. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated in the Director Review Decision (Paper 12), the Director has determined there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 8,640,683 - PTAB · May 15, 2024 · IPR2023-00268 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–10, 16–18, and 21–25 based on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation and obviousness.
RulingsRemand decision- RehearingOther
“On August 11, 2023, a majority of the panel entered a Decision denying institution of inter partes review. Paper 9 (“Board Decision”). On September 11, 2023, Petitioner timely filed a request for Director Review of the Board Decision. Paper 10. On November 7, 2023, the Director delegated Director Review of the Board Decision to a Delegated Review Panel (“DRP”). Paper 11. On February 21, 2024, the DRP issued a decision granting Petitioner’s request for Director Review rehearing, vacating the Board Decision, and remanding to the original panel to reconsider whether to institute review. Paper 14 (“DRP Dec.”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“[T]he Board’s cases addressing earlier trial dates as a basis for denial under NHK have sought to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality.” Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (designated precedential). Fintiv sets forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. In evaluating the factors, we take a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review. Id. We are also guided by the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, issued June 21, 2022 (“Guidance Memo”),1 which provides several clarifications concerning the application of the Fintiv factors. One such clarification instructs that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Guidance Memo 3; see also id. at 7–8. Thus, we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution if a petitioner makes a stipulation similar to that provided in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (designated precedential in relevant part). 1 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_ memo_20220621_.pdf. Petitioner stipulates “not to pursue, in the[Delaware litigation], any argument that the Challenged Claims are invalid on any ground that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in this [inter partes review], should th[e] petition be instituted.” Pet. 86; see also Ex. 1057, 1 (“If the Patent Trial and Appeal Board institutes a proceeding for [this inter partes review], [Petitioner] will not pursue in the [Delaware litigation], any argument that the challenged claims of the patent in [this inter partes review] are invalid on any ground that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in [this inter partes review] proceeding.”). Accordingly, pursuant to the Guidance Memo, we decline to exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution. slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the information presented establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. At this preliminary stage, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims or any underlying factual and legal issues. See TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that “there is a significant difference between a petitioner’s burden to establish a ‘reasonable likelihood of success’ at institution, and actually proving invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence at trial”). Accordingly, inter partes review is instituted as to all challenged claims and all proposed grounds of unpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). V. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 5–10, 16–18, and 21–25 of the ’779 patent is instituted with respect to all grounds set forth in the Petition; and” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. We note that Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Vancura, uses essentially the same definition as Petitioner. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 33. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,200,779 - PTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00224 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motion to terminate the proceedings as to Subaru of America, Inc. based on settlement and granted confidential treatment of the settlement agreement.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“between the two parties “has been made in writing, and a true copy of the same is [filed] as Exhibit 2026” and “[t]here are no other collateral agreements between the Parties made in connection with, or in contemplation of, the termination sought.” Mot. 2. The Motion does not indicate that Subaru is a defendant in any pending district court litigation asserting the challenged patents. Id. at 2–3. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate the instant proceedings with respect to Subaru. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.72, 42.74. The proceedings shall continue with respect to Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and Hyundai Motor America (in Case IPR2021-00720) (collectively, “Petitioner”), under the terms set forth in our decision granting the motion for joinder in each proceeding. See IPR2021-00720, Paper 39; IPR2021-00721, Paper 37.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,355,405 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2017 · IPR2016-00788 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held that claims 15, 18, and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Johnson or Hitt because neither reference disclosed containment walls standing on the floor.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“broadest reasonable interpretation of the disputed claim language requires that the containment walls stand “on” the floor. In the recitation “containment walls standing upwardly from said floor,” the word “from” indicates that the containment walls are disposed “on” the floor. Consistent with this, all of the various embodiments of the invention disclosed by the ’611 patent consistently show sidewalls of a rail car that stand or rest on underlying floor of the car, as Patent Owner notes. See, e.g., PO Resp. 7–12; Ex. 1001, Figs. 1–10. Patent Owner also relies on the testimony of Mr. Long, in discussing the meaning of “standing upwardly from.” See, e.g., PO Resp. 17–21 (citing Ex. 2118 ¶¶ 101–102, 144–161). Specifically, Mr. Long testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that in the ’611 patent, the term “standing” is used in “its positional sense,” citing, for instance, to a dictionary definition of “standing” as “to rest or remain upright on a base or lower end.” Ex. 2118 ¶ 145 (citing Ex. 2112, 7). Mr. Long’s testimony and the underlying support for that testimony shed favorable light on the meaning of “standing upwardly from” that is urged by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“containment walls standing upwardly from said floor.” Pet. 24–28. The Petition notes that Johnson discloses floor 26 and side sheet 16. Id. at 24– 25. The Petition contends that “[b]ased on the vertical direction of the ‘side frame assembly,’ . . . , a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood Johnson to teach that the containment walls stand ‘upwardly from said floor.’” Id. at 25. Showing the uncorrected versions of Figures 1 and 2 of Johnson, the Petition elaborates that “[t]his is further shown, e.g., in Fig. 2, where wall 16 is generally perpendicular with respect to the floor 26.” Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1106, Fig. 2; Ex. 1103 ¶ 132). These statements do not indicate, much less prove, that Johnson discloses a containment wall that stands on a floor. Observing the vertical direction of side frame 12 and the perpendicular orientation of side sheet 16 to floor 26 does not establish that side frame 12 or side sheet 16 is disposed on floor 26. The cited testimony of Mr. Miller notes that Figure 2 shows “side sheet 16 is shown as standing normal to the floor.” Ex. 1103 ¶ 132. This too facially does not indicate, much less prove, that side sheet 16 is disposed on floor 26. slip op. at 13
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDenied
“Petitioner’s citation of Johnson’s Figure 5 in the Reply is unavailing. When addressing the claim limitations “containment walls standing upwardly from said floor,” the Petition does not cite Figure 5 of Johnson. See Pet. 24–28. This section of the Petition cites paragraphs 54–56, 130– 132, 134, and 135 of Mr. Miller’s testimony (id.), and none of this testimony cites to or addresses Figure 5 of Johnson, either (see Ex. 1103 ¶¶ 54–56, 130–132, 134–135). Furthermore, it is not apparent that Figure 5 of Johnson shows the same embodiment as Figure 2; Johnson identifies Figure 5 as a cross-section of Figure 4, which Johnson introduces as “a partial side elevation view of a gondola railcar having a bolster.” Ex. 1106, 3:7–8. We determine that Petitioner’s citation of Johnson’s Figure 5 in the Reply is unavailing because it constitutes an improper new argument. In that respect, we do not regard Petitioner’s new reliance on Johnson’s Figure 5 in an attempt to address a deficiency raised by Patent Owner in its Patent Owner Response as constituting a proper response envisioned by our rules. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Furthermore, even if Petitioner’s citation of Figure 5 were a proper response, it would not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Johnson discloses the claimed relationship. We are persuaded that, without any other supporting evidence, Figure 5 of Johnson does not show the relationship between containment walls and a floor clearly enough to support, by a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner’s contention that Johnson discloses containment walls that stand on a floor.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not persuaded us that Johnson discloses containment walls that stand on the floor, as required by independent claim 15. Additionally, Petitioner has not asserted that it would have been obvious to modify Johnson’s railcar to have such a configuration, much less provided evidence and reasoning persuading us that it would have been obvious to do so. See, e.g., Pet. 24–28. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 15, 18, and 20 are unpatentable over Johnson.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,757,611 - PTAB · Dec 7, 2015 · IPR2015-01438 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding before deciding whether to institute review of claims 1–3 and 8–12.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“they have settled their disputes regarding the ’104 patent. Paper 7, 2. The parties further represent that there are numerous related matters in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that have been dismissed with prejudice or stayed pending final determination of two related inter partes reviews involving U.S. Patent No. 7,550,870 B2 (“the ’870 patent”). Id. at 3. Based on the joint requests filed by the parties in the two proceedings involving the ’870 patent, those cases have been terminated. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Cyber Switching Patents, LLC, Cases IPR2015-00690 & IPR2015-00725 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2015) (Paper 33 in each proceeding). Lastly, the parties do not represent that the ’104 patent is involved in any other proceedings before the Office. See generally id. at 2–4. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering any further decisions. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,672,104 - PTAB · Jun 9, 2015 · IPR2014-00245 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 were canceled; substitute claims 25–48 were denied because Patent Owner did not show patentability over the prior art, and claims 39–45 and 48 also failed § 101.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“establish that it is entitled to the relief requested. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Entry of proposed amendments is not automatic, but occurs only upon the patent owner having met the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 and demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, the patentability of the proposed substitute claims. See Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., Case IPR2012-00027, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB June 11, 2013) (Paper 26, “Idle Free”) (informative); Toyota Motor Corp. v. American Vehicular Scis. LLC, Case IPR2013-00419, slip. op. at 4–5 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 32, “Toyota”). For the reasons explained below, we conclude that Patent Owner has not met its burden with respect to claims 25–48.” slip op. at 10
- ScopeDecided for patent owner
“As discussed above, the claims do not require encrypting data before transmitting that data as part of the store instruction. Accordingly, we decline to import into the claims a limitation based on a specific embodiment in the Specification. See, e.g., SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.”). We decline to read the exemplary disclosure of encrypting the data before transmitting it with the store instruction into the broadest reasonable interpretation of “data.”” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“3. Written Description Support Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b), a motion to amend in an inter partes review must set forth “[t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended” and “[t]he support in an earlier-filed disclosure for each claim for which benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought.”” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“appliance to generate encrypted received data” and “store the encrypted received data in the second memory device,” recited in proposed substitute claim 25 and similarly recited in the other proposed substitute independent claims. See Reply 4–5. We agree with Patent Owner that McCanne does not disclose explicitly that its receiving TA is configured to “encrypt the original data received with the store instruction . . . to generate encrypted received data” and “store the encrypted received data in the second memory device.” See id. at 5. Thus, we are not persuaded that McCanne anticipates the proposed substitute claims, as asserted by Petitioner, because McCanne fails to describe each and every element as set forth in the proposed substitute claims, either expressly or inherently. See Opp. 8–12; Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” slip op. at 26
§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,392,684
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.