- PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-00910 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–6 over all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing; denied joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an inter partes review, the petitioner must show with particularity why each challenged claim is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Patent Owner argues the Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because (1) “Petitioner’s inability to commit to non-duplicative efforts between the District Court Litigation and this proceeding weighs in favor of discretionary den[ial]” (Prelim. Resp. 59), and (2) Petitioner failed to request a conference call prior to filing its Motion for Joinder (Prelim. Resp. 59–60). Petitioner asserts that no trial date has been set in the parallel district court litigation, which Patent Owner does not dispute. Pet. 55; Prelim. Resp. 59–60. Additionally, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (CTPG) states that “[a] party who files a motion for joinder should arrange a conference call . . . within five business days of filing the motion.” CTPG 76 (Nov. 2019) (emphasis added).8 In light of the termination of the earlier proceeding, Petitioner’s failure to request a conference call is harmless error. Thus, we find Patent Owner’s arguments unpersuasive and decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1–6 of U.S. Patent No. 9,445,041 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’041 patent”). Petitioner also filed a Motion for Joinder requesting joinder with IPR2022-01548 (Paper 2), but IPR2022- 01548 has since terminated due to settlement (IPR2022-01548, Paper 18). Therefore, we deny the Motion as moot. Patent Owner Advanced Coding Technologies, LLC filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a [b]achelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, with 2–3 years of experience in digital video processing, or a related field, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). Patent Owner states that it applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for the purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 29. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, with the exclusion of “at least” in defining the education 6 US 2011/0097059 A1, published Apr. 28, 2011. Ex. 1008. Petitioner refers to “Sekiguchi” as “Seikiguchi.” See, e.g., Pet. 3. level, which would render the definition open-ended and inclusive of persons of expert-level skill.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,445,041 - Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2022-00993 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 6, 7, 10–14, 19, 20, 23–30, and 32 are unpatentable under § 103 based on Sullivan995, Sullivan460, and Matthews.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“not implicitly define the phrase “analyzing the breathing patterns,” as proposed, because Patent Owner has failed to show any sufficient evidence that the ’994 patent clearly expresses an intent to redefine the phrase or define the phrase in terms other than its plain and ordinary meaning. In other words, implied lexicography does not apply here. Accordingly, after reviewing Patent Owner’s contentions in light of all the evidence of record, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction; instead, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “analyzing the breathing patterns” in our consideration of the issues before us.18” slip op. at 31
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“D. Other Claim Terms The Parties do not dispute the construction of any other claim terms, and we find that no other terms require express construction to resolve the controversy between the Parties. Accordingly, we do not construe any other claim terms expressly. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375 (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803)).” slip op. at 31
- Skill levelOther
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Kirkness’s testimony, proposes that a” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“19, 20, 23–26, 28–30, and 32 and supported on the complete record before us, and, therefore, we adopt them as our own findings. See Pet. 66– 77. Accordingly, for the reasons explained by Petitioner, we find that the combination of Sullivan995, Sullivan460, and Matthews satisfies the elements of claims 6, 7, 10–14, 19, 20, 23–26, 28–30, and 32.” slip op. at 49
Patent outcomesUS 6,988,994 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,988,994 - Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2022-00992 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–5 and 7–14 over Sullivan995 and Sullivan460, and claim 6 over those references and Matthews.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“A. “troubled wakefulness” Petitioner proposes that we construe “troubled wakefulness” to mean” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“not implicitly define the phrase “analyzes the data to determine the patient’s breathing patterns,” as proposed, because Patent Owner has failed to show any sufficient evidence that the ’024 patent clearly expresses an intent to redefine the phrase or define the phrase in terms other than its plain and ordinary meaning. In other words, implied lexicography does not apply here. Accordingly, after reviewing Patent Owner’s contentions in light of all the evidence of record, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction; instead, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “analyzes the data to determine the patient’s breathing patterns” in our consideration of the issues before us.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, we find Petitioner has” slip op. at 53
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“because it too is based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “analyzes the data to determine the patient’s breathing patterns,” which we do not adopt for the reasons explained above. Patent Owner’s additional arguments in response to Ground 2 are directed to motivation to combine, reasonable expectation of success, and objective indicia of nonobviousness, which we address below. For the reasons discussed above, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive as to claim 6 and supported on the complete record before us. Accordingly, we find that the combination of Sullivan995, Sullivan460, and Matthews satisfies the subject matter of claim 6.” slip op. at 70
Patent outcomesUS 10,384,024 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,384,024 - Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2022-00994 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Sullivan995, Sullivan460, and Matthews; the Board did not reach the other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“the specification . . . we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F. 3d at 1371 (citing Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). “We depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.” Id. In order for a patentee to act as its own lexicographer, the “patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning’” and “must ‘clearly express an intent’ to redefine the terms.” Bradium Tech., 923 F.3d at 1044.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience” and that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 89). Petitioner further contends that the “Petition does not turn on this precise definition, and the challenged claim[s] would be unpatentable from the perspective of any reasonable person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 90). Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 11. Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’344 patent and the prior art. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art in this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“At the outset, we agree with Petitioner that “enablement ‘is not a requirement to prove invalidity under § 103.’” Pet. Reply 23 (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Moreover, we also agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood a preset level is established from previously-acquired data, such as an average level, as Sullivan995 discloses. Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1005, 17:3–27, Fig. 12; Ex. 2015, 38:2–16). Sullivan995 discloses the computing system may “calculate control values of patterns for each patient based on moving average values or such values or patterns will be pre-programmed into the computing system.” Ex. 1005, 17:14–18. According to Sullivan995, when “signals deviate from predetermined values or patterns the computer system generates a signal which is sent to the feedback speed controller on the blower motor.” Id. at 17:19–22.” slip op. at 48
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“The Board uses a two-step analysis in evaluating nexus between the claimed invention and objective evidence. Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33 at 32–33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential), aff’d sub nom. Zaxcom, Inc. v. Lectrosonics, Inc., 2022 WL 499848 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2022). We first consider whether the patent owner has demonstrated “that its products are coextensive (or nearly coextensive) with the challenged claims,” resulting in a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Id. at 32. If not, that “does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations”; “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. at 33 (quoting Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–75). “Where the offered secondary consideration actually results from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). There is no requirement that the objective evidence of non-obviousness be tied exclusively to claim elements that are not disclosed in the prior art, and the claimed combination as a whole may serve as a nexus for the objective evidence. Id. (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 56
Patent outcomesUS 9,168,344 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,168,344 - Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2022-00989 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5–11, 13, and 15–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Sullivan995 and Sullivan460; anticipation was not shown, and the other obviousness ground was not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience” and “[a]dditional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 77). Petitioner further states that the “Petition does not turn on this precise definition, and the challenged claims would be unpatentable from the perspective of any reasonable person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 78). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 15–16. We find that the ’539 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’539 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“awake state” Claim 24 recites, in part, “to determine whether breathing patterns indicate an asleep state or an awake state.” Ex. 1001, 11:36–12:7; see also id. at 9:49–64 (claim 1 reciting “between an awake state and an asleep state”), 10:42–56 (claim 11 reciting “at least one of an awake state or an asleep state”). In regard to its allegations of obviousness, Petitioner’s arguments suggest an “awake state” ordinarily means when a patient is not asleep. Pet. 36–37, 42. By contrast, with regard to its allegations of anticipation, Petitioner argues that under Patent Owner’s “implied construction of ‘an awake state’ based on [Patent Owner’s] infringement allegations” in district court, “the patient is in an awake state when there is an absence of obstructions or other breathing patterns indicative of sleep.” Id. at 68–70 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 2, 158, 159). Petitioner provides no further support for this “implied construction” purportedly taken from Patent Owner’s district court allegations. Id. Dr. Kirkness, in support of Petitioner, applied the plain meaning of all terms and phrases. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. In regard to supporting Petitioner’s allegations of anticipation, Dr. Kirkness merely assumed Patent Owner’s purported district court claim construction “position to be true.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 253. In this proceeding Patent Owner does not propose an express meaning for “awake state.” See PO Resp. 29–33. More generally, Patent Owner states that the ’539 patent “teaches how to distinguish between an awake state and an asleep state.” Id. at 8. From the arguments of the Parties, we discern no dispute in this proceeding that a plain and ordinary meaning of an “awake state” is a state in which a patient is not asleep. See Ex. 1001, 3:1–5 (distinguishing between “a wake state” and “a sleep state”), 7:22–24 (describing an embodiment with a processing arrangement that “may determine whether the patient is in a sleep state or a wake state based on the breathing pattern”).8 We apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “awake state” in this proceeding and further determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an awake state means “an absence of obstructions or other breathing patterns indicative of sleep.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Next, we turn to the Specification. “While we read claims in view of the specification . . . we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F. 3d at 1371 (citation omitted). “We depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.” Id. In order for a patentee to act as its own lexicographer, the “patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning’” and “must ‘clearly express an intent’ to redefine the terms.” Bradium Tech., 923 F. 3d at 1044. In this case, Patent Owner does not argue that it disavowed the full scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of claim 24, nor does Patent Owner argue that it explicitly defined “analyzing the breathing patterns” in the Specification. See, e.g., PO Resp. 29–32. We determine that there is no disavowal nor any explicit lexicographic definition of “analyzing the breathing patterns” in the Specification. Patent Owner instead relies on an “implied lexicography” theory as to why we should construe the phrase as Patent Owner proposes. PO Sur-reply 2, 6–7 (citing, inter alia, AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We disagree.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments—that Petitioner fails to show any motivation to combine and that Sullivan460 is not enabled— merely because Dr. Kirkness indicated in a deposition that he did not know how a preset level is calculated from a sentence in Sullivan460. As Petitioner explains, enablement “is not a requirement to prove invalidity under §103.” Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1357 (under §103, “a reference need not be enabled; it qualifies as a prior art, regardless, for whatever is disclosed therein”). Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that the Challenged Claims do not require any preset level for a flow rate, and a person of ordinary skill “would have understood that a preset level is established from previously-acquired data or data from a previous window of time, such as an average level, for example, as taught in Sullivan995.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 2014, 38:2–16; Ex. 1005, 17:3–27, Fig. 12). Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s assertion is unsupported, and that “Petitioner is obligated to address this challenge, and failed to do so.” PO Sur-reply 18–19 (citing In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 110 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). We find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive because they are supported by the asserted references. Sullivan995 discloses that the computing system may “calculate control values of patterns for each patient based on moving average values or such values or patterns will be pre-programmed into the computing system.” Ex. 1005, 17:14–18. According to Sullivan995, when “signals deviate from predetermined values or patterns the computer system generates a signal which is sent to the feedback speed controller on the blower motor.” Id. at 17:19–22. Based on this disclosure, and given that Sullivan460 incorporates Sullivan995 by reference, we agree with Petitioner that Sullivan460’s disclosure of detecting that the flow rate has fallen below a preset level would have informed a person of ordinary skill that this level was predetermined, so that “the controller 100 activates the nCPAP apparatus 90 to supply air to the patient 30 at a pressure which ameliorates or eliminates the upper airway flow limitation.”16 Ex. 1006, 10:17–21.” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 9,427,539 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,427,539 - Resmed, Inc. v. New York UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2022-00988 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–30 unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence, based on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“ORDER21 Upon consideration of the record before us, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 45) is denied; FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 46) is denied;” slip op. at 82
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“1. “troubled wakefulness” Dependent claims 12 and 22 each recite, “wherein the awake state is a” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“not implicitly define the phrase “analyzes the data to determine the patient’s breathing patterns,” as proposed, because Patent Owner has failed to show any sufficient evidence that the ’009 patent clearly expresses an intent to redefine the phrase or define the phrase in terms other than its plain and ordinary meaning. In other words, implied lexicography does not apply here. Accordingly, after reviewing Patent Owner’s contentions in light of all the evidence of record, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction; instead, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “analyzes the data to determine the patient’s breathing patterns” in our consideration of the issues before us.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 9,108,009 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,108,009 - Trend Micro, Inc. v. Taasera Licensing LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00800 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Trend Micro did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–5 were unpatentable over Mukherjee and Cooper.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Having reviewed all of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of any of claims 1–5. For the following reasons, Petitioner does not address persuasively claim 1’s recitation of “the native computing environment which includes a network analyzer, an integrity processor, an event correlation matrix, a risk correlation matrix, and a trust supervisor.” Ex. 1001, 40:1–4 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 12
- BurdenNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not support sufficiently its position that Mukherjee discloses claim 1’s “event correlation matrix” and “risk correlation matrix.” Pet. 45–46. For example, when addressing the claimed “event correlation matrix,” Petitioner does not substantiate its position that Mukherjee describes “operation of the fourth layer of the expert model as mapping events to security issues.” Pet. 46 identify any express disclosure of Mukherjee mapping events to security issues in its fourth layer. Ex. 1005, 13; Pet. 45–46.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not support sufficiently its position that Mukherjee discloses claim 1’s “event correlation matrix” and “risk correlation matrix.” Pet. 45–46. For example, when addressing the claimed “event correlation matrix,” Petitioner does not substantiate its position that Mukherjee describes “operation of the fourth layer of the expert model as mapping events to security issues.” Pet. 46 identify any express disclosure of Mukherjee mapping events to security issues in its fourth layer. Ex. 1005, 13; Pet. 45–46.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner and Dr. Nielson do not show persuasively how or why Mukherjee’s discussion of performing these other actions discloses mapping events to security issues. Pet. 45–46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 187–188. For example, Dr. Nielson’s testimony that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known that ‘attack signatures,’ in the context of IDS, refers to patterns of behavior known to be related to attacks” does not provide sufficiently objective or logical support for his conclusion that “Mukherjee discloses ‘mapping integrity warnings to endpoint events.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 188. Nor does Dr. Nielson’s other testimony. Id. ¶¶ 187–188.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,990,948 - Trend Micro, Inc. v. Taasera Licensing LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00799 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–7 would have been unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Patent Owner that Petitioner has not addressed limitation 1[f] persuasively. Pet. 43–44; Prelim. Resp. 19–21. Even assuming Petitioner is correct that Miliefsky’s network-based assets list constitutes “temporal events,” as recited in claim 1, Petitioner does not persuasively address certain other aspects of the claim language. For example, Petitioner does not support sufficiently its contention that “Miliefsky teaches ‘generating . . . temporal events based at least in part on analyzing the third party network endpoint assessments.’” Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 198–201) (emphasis added). Petitioner cites Miliefsky’s paragraph 94, which does not expressly disclose generating the alleged temporal events (the network-based assets list) based at least in part on analyzing third party network endpoint assessments. Ex. 1006 ¶ 94; Pet. 44. According to Petitioner, however, Miliefsky discloses “configuration data collected or processed at particular time (‘temporal events’) can be combined with vulnerability assessment data and include related data, which . . . is disclosed as being sourced from third parties.” Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 201). Petitioner also argues that “internal assessments such as the generated network asset list are disclosed as being combined with external assessments to provide feedback to each other (e.g., to produce control lists).” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 202–203; Ex. 1006 ¶ 94). Even if accurate, these arguments do not show sufficiently for institution that Miliefsky teaches generating temporal events based at least in arguments indicate that Miliefsky discloses combining the alleged temporal events (the network-based assets list) with third party network endpoint assessments. As Patent Owner observes, combining temporal events with endpoint assessments logically would not constitute generating the temporal events based on the endpoint assessments. Prelim. Resp. 20–21.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or a related field, or an equivalent technical degree or equivalent work experience, and an additional one to two years of education or experience in the field of computer security topics.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 83). Petitioner adds that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner states that it “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 13. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears to be consistent with the ’616 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION We apply the same claim construction standard used in district courts, namely that articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). In applying that standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Both parties express that we do not need to construe any claim language explicitly. Pet. 10–11; Prelim. Resp. 11. Having considered the record, we agree with the parties that no explicit claim construction is Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). C. GROUND 1 – ALLEGED OBVIOUSNESS OVER MUKHERJEE AND MILIEFSKY” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner that Petitioner has not persuasively addressed limitation 1[g]’s requirement for “correlating . . . the received endpoint events and the generated temporal events.” Ex. 1001, 40:6–7; Pet. 45–47. Petitioner does not provide a sufficiently persuasive, objective basis for its contention that it would have been obvious to include Miliefsky’s network-based assets list “into the correlation operations of Mukherjee.” Pet. 46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 216). Petitioner argues that Mukherjee suggests such a modification in the following passage: The fourth layer of the model introduces the event in context. There are two kinds of context: temporal and spatial. As an example of temporal context, behavior which is unremarkable during standard working hours may be suspicious during off-hours [35]. The IDM, therefore, allows for the application of information about wall-clock time to the events it is considering. Wall-clock time refers to information about the time of day, weekdays versus weekends and holidays, as well as periods when an increase in activity is expected. In addition to the consideration of external temporal context, the expert system uses time windows to correlate events occurring in temporal proximity. This notion of temporal proximity implements the heuristic that a call to the UNIX who command followed closely by a login or logout is more likely to be related to an intrusion than either of those events occurring alone. Such related patterns of behavior are also referred to as attack signatures [23,24]. Ex. 1005, 13 (emphases added consistent with emphases in Petition); Pet. 45–46. Petitioner does not sufficiently support its position that this passage of Mukherjee would have suggested adding a network-based assets list into certain information, but not an assets list. Ex. 1005, 13. And, as Patent Owner notes, the only “correlat[ing]” mentioned in the cited passage is “correlat[ing] events occurring in temporal proximity.” Id.; Prelim. Resp. 21–22. Petitioner does not provide a persuasive, objective basis for its view that these disclosures suggest including Miliefsky’s network-based assets list into the process of correlating temporally proximate events. Pet. 46. Petitioner does not, for example, persuasively show for institution how or why Mukherjee’s discussion of correlating temporally proximate events and/or its reference to attack signatures allegedly would have suggested correlating Miliefsky’s network-based assets list and endpoint events. Id. Nor does Dr. Nielson’s testimony substantiate Petitioner’s argument that the cited passage of Mukherjee suggests the proposed modification. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 216). Indeed, Dr. Nielson does not testify that Mukherjee suggests including a network-based assets list in correlation operations. E.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 216. Moreover, Petitioner and Dr. Nielson do not otherwise sufficiently support Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to correlate Miliefsky’s network-based assets list and Mukherjee’s events. Pet. 46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 209–220. Consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments, Petitioner and Dr. Nielson do not articulate or substantiate a sufficiently persuasive reason that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had for modifying Mukherjee to correlate Miliefsky’s network-based assets list and Mukherjee’s temporally proximate events. E.g., Pet. 45–47; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 209–220; Prelim. Resp. 21–22. Petitioner and Dr. Nielson do not, for example, explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,092,616 - Trend Micro, Inc. v. Taasera Licensing LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00801 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
Denied institution because neither Munetoh and Rajan nor Rajan and Munetoh showed a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–7 and 9 obvious under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Ex. 1005, 2–3. Petitioner maps the claimed “one or more executable file binaries of the application and loaded components of the application” to the “software components” executed during Munetoh’s trusted-bootstrap process. Pet. 23. Petitioner maps the claimed “attestation server” to Munetoh’s server-PVA. Id. at 19, 21, 27. But Petitioner fails to show that Munetoh’s server-PVA receives the “software components” executed during Munetoh’s trusted-bootstrap process. See id. at 22–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 158–165.” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or a related field, or an equivalent technical degree or equivalent work experience, and an additional one to two years of education or experience in the field of computer security topics.” Pet. 10. Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Dr. Nielson’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, “Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12 (quoting Pet. 10). Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’441 patent as well as the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this proceeding only, “Petitioner proposes that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 10. Further, Petitioner asserts that “no specific claim constructions are necessary to apply the asserted prior art to” the challenged claims. Id. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, “Patent Owner believes that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” Prelim. Resp. 9. Additionally, Patent Owner notes that in the Consolidated Litigation Patent Owner and Petitioner have proposed constructions for certain claim language, including the following terms and limitations in claim 1: (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,327,441 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01165 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Peloton would show at least one claim obvious over Morris and Ray.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Mr. Rawl’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “is a person having: (i) a bachelor’s degree in an exercise related field or mechanical or electrical engineering and (ii) three to five years of industry experience in designing cardiovascular exercise equipment (such as treadmills, bicycles, steppers, ellipticals) or in a similar field.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34).6 Petitioner also asserts that a person could qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan with less education but more experience or less experience but more education. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–34). Patent Owner has not taken a position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’340 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner “does not believe construction of any term is necessary to resolve the invalidity challenges in this Petition.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 29–30). Petitioner explains that, as of the filing of the Petition, none of the claim terms recited in the ’340 patent have been construed in a prior proceeding. Id. Patent Owner has not taken a position as to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. On the present record, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“3. Motivation to Combine and Reasonable Expectation of Success Petitioner contends Morris and Ray describe exercise equipment (e.g., treadmills) that detect a user’s presence while using the equipment and present the user’s exercise data on a display while a user is exercising to motivate the user to exercise and improve the user’s exercise experience. Pet. 12. Petitioner asserts one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings of Morris and Ray by incorporating Ray’s camera and software instructions for validating user exercise data in Morris’ treadmill apparatus with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 13. In particular, Petitioner contends Morris provides an express motivation to install and use Ray’s camera for user detection by teaching that “its exercise equipment could be fitted with optical sensor(s).” Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 33). Additionally, Petitioner asserts Morris’ treadmill includes an information processing system that processes sensor signals and includes virtual reality content on a screen displayed to the user. Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 32, 34–36, 50, 56–58, Figs. 6, 11–12C, claims 29–37). Thus, Petitioner contends “the signal processing and display system of Morris had the necessary capabilities to accommodate Ray’s user detection/validation software and implement, with a reasonable expectation of success, its functionalities that included producing and presenting the motivational image of the user exercising.” Id. at 13–14. Additionally, Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Morris and Ray because of “Ray’s express teachings that its user validation/motivation technology could be ‘easily and affordably merged’ into a treadmill.” Pet. 14 (quoting Ex. 1004, 9:55–57). Petitioner asserts incorporating these features into Morris’ treadmill “would have been obvious and produced predictable results with a reasonable expectation of success.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 142–143).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,227,340
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.