• Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Astrazeneca ABInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 14, 2016 · IPR2016-01325 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Mylan did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–20 obvious over McLeskey alone or with Howell 1996.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” Id. at 416. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. We are, nevertheless, cautioned not to “rely on hindsight reasoning to piece together elements to arrive at the claimed invention.” In re NTP, Inc. 654 F.3d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Care must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction by using the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Thus, a finding of obviousness, “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, a party petitioning the Board for a determination of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). D.” slip op. at 19

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art. The parties’ propose similar, albeit non-identical, definitions of one of ordinary skill in the art, both of which are consistent with the high level of ordinary skill demonstrated by the prior art asserted in the Petition. See Pet. 14–15; Prelim. Resp. 11–12. Discerning no present conflict between the parties’ proposals, we rely on the level of ordinary skill in the art of developing and treating hormone dependent diseases of the breast as demonstrated by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). B.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “patentable weight, the term “therapeutically significant” should be construed to mean “any blood plasma fulvestrant concentration greater than or equal to at least 2.5 ngml-1 that is achieved for at least 4 weeks after injection.” Pet. 17–18. Patent Owner does not argue that Petitioner’s proposed interpretation is unreasonable, but contends that the meaning of the term is clear from the Specification and context of the claim phrase itself. See Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 68; Ex. 1001, 9:24–27 (expressly defining “therapeutically significant” fulvestrant blood plasma levels as “at least 2.5 ngml-1, ideally at least 3 ngml-1, at least 8.5 ngml-1, and up to 12 12 Our reasoning extends to the wherein clauses of dependent claims 2 and 10, also challenged by Petitioner at page 16, footnote 9, of the Petition. ngml-1 of fulvestrant [] achieved in the patient.”). We agree with Patent Owner. No express construction of this term is required.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “and 9, “wherein the method achieves a therapeutically significant blood plasma fulvestrant concentration of at least 2.5 ngml-1 for at least four weeks,” is merely a statement of intended result entitled to no patentable weight. Pet. 16–17. For the reasons set forth at pages 12–16 of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, we do not find Petitioner’s argument persuasive.12 For example, rather than merely stating the result of intramuscularly administering the recited formulation, as Petitioner argues, the wherein clause dictates both the administration duration and dose of the formulation, i.e., an amount sufficient to provide a therapeutically significant blood plasma fulvestrant concentration of at least 2.5 ngml-1 for at least four weeks. See Prelim. Resp. 15 (relying on Exhibits 2002 ¶ 37–39, Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 33–37, and citations therein). That these parameters are further limited in claims 2, 10 (“the therapeutically significant blood plasma fulvestrant concentration is at least 8.5 ngml-1”) further indicates that the wherein clauses provide defining characteristics. See Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 60).” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,329,680
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Ltd. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Monosol RX, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2016 · IPR2016-01111 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 9, 15, 62–65, 69–73, or 75 were unpatentable over either asserted § 103 combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner proposes a construction for one claim phrase: “dried without the loss of substantial uniformity,” appearing in independent claims 1 and 62. Pet. 15. According to Petitioner, that claim phrase should be construed broadly to mean “any method of drying.” Id. In support of that construction, Petitioner asserts only that Patent Owner’s expert witness in a co-pending litigation “testified that the claims were not limited to any particular form of drying, or any particular drying parameters.” Id. Patent Owner correctly notes that Petitioner has not explained why it has failed to account for the phrase “without the loss of substantial uniformity” in its proposed construction. Prelim. Resp. 8. Further, Patent Owner proposes that, under the broadest reasonable construction standard, the claim phrase “dried without the loss of substantial uniformity” should be given its plain meaning. Id. Based on the record, we agree.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Nor has Petitioner explained persuasively that a skilled artisan would have understood that individual doses of a pharmaceutical film cut by a rotary die can only be manufactured this way if the film does not vary more than 10%. Pet. 31–32. Petitioner’s argument and Dr. Celik’s testimony in that regard rely upon a statement in the challenged patent that “[c]urrently, as required by various world regulatory authorities, dosage forms may not vary more than 10% in the amount of active present.” Pet. 32; Ex. 1003 ¶ 101; Ex. 1001, 2:42–45. Petitioner and Dr. Celik acknowledge, however, that not all regulatory authorities require that limit. Specifically, Petitioner and Dr. Celik recognize that in the United States, “any given dose of the drug must have the same amount of active as any other dose, within a variance of 15%,” referring to the standard set by the United States Food and Drug Administration. Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. Thus, at best, Petitioner’s reliance on the disclosure of the challenged patent regarding the standards set by the FDA or “various world regulatory authorities” provides a motivation for a person of skill in the art to modify the cited prior art to achieve a product film wherein the individual unit doses do not vary by more than 15%, or perhaps not more than 10%. However, even if such motivation exists, Petitioner has not shown how that the cited prior art or other knowledge in the art at the time of the invention would have informed an artisan how to reach that goal. As Patent Owner correctly asserts, “[r]ecognition of a need does not render obvious the achievement that meets that need.” Prelim. Resp. 17 (quoting Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) and Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Insofar as Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have needed only routine experimentation to make films within the claimed variance limitation, we are unpersuaded. Pet. 27, 34. In a somewhat cursory manner, Petitioner supports that contention by asserting that a person of skill in the art “would have understood that mixing, de-gassing, viscosity and drying are all important variables to control in order to ensure uniformity, and would have been able to make routine adjustments of these variables in Chen’s process to meet the 10% limit.” Pet. 34. Dr. Celik makes a similar statement in his declaration. Ex. 1003 ¶ 104. However, neither statement by Petitioner or Dr. Celik includes a discussion of facts allegedly supporting those assertions.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “indicating near-maximal release, and that the final values for the drug release “are clustered within ±10% of 100.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 103. According to Dr. Çelik, “[f]rom these data, a person of ordinary skill would reasonably have concluded that the films were within the claimed 10% limit.” Id. We are unpersuaded. In particular, what is missing from Dr. Çelik’s testimony is an explanation of his data analysis. Chen’s Figure 5 is reproduced below: Ex. 1005, Fig. 5. Chen’s Figure 5 shows the release profile of four active agents from films according to Chen’s Examples 5–8. Ex. 1005, 16:27–28. Chen does not discuss the data represented in Figure 5 or otherwise provide it.2 Nor does 2 Petitioner asserts that the Board “has found on appeal in three reexaminations directed to similar subject matter that Chen discloses substantial uniformity.” Pet. 35. As discussed, infra, those decisions did not Dr. Çelik present his opinion regarding the relevant specific data points reflected in Figure 5. Rather, Dr. Çelik opines, in a conclusory fashion, that the data shows, despite the unexplained error bars in the figure and lack of specific data points provided, that “the final recorded values for the data collected . . . fall at or within ‡ 10% of 100% (i.e., 90% to 110%),” and that a person of skill in the art would, therefore, conclude that “Chen’s films had at least the claimed uniformity.” Ex. 1003, 38 n.7. Because Dr. Çelik has not provided a reliable factual basis for his opinion on this matter, those opinions are not entitled to persuasive weight. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (a declaration expressing an opinion of an expert without disclosing underlying facts may be given no weight).” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,603,514
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Ltd. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Monosol RX, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2016 · IPR2016-01112 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of establishing that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner correctly notes that Petitioner does not rely on its proposed claim construction in the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 7. Nor does Petitioner provide any discussion supporting its position that the construction that it proposes represents the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent, other than asserting that it is the same construction that was proffered in a district court proceeding. For purposes of this decision, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrases apply. Id. at 7. In any event, this Decision does not turn on the claim phrases for which Petitioner has proposed a construction.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “particular, Petitioner has not explained adequately why a person of skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Chen and Shiraldi. As discussed, supra, Chen describes using a mixture of two or more types of the same hydrocolloid that differ only in molecular weights and Shiraldi describes selecting and blending various polymers. Petitioner has not shown that a person of skill in the art would have understood that Shiraldi teaches or suggests selecting various polymers based upon high and low molecular weights. Nor has Petitioner established that Chen’s teaching to combine two or more types of the same hydrocolloid having differing molecular weights involved selecting a mixture of high and low molecular weights in the manner claimed. Indeed, neither reference provides a teaching or an example of such a practice. The example in Chen relied upon by Petitioner includes only a low molecular weight polyethylene oxide. Pet. 32 (referring to Chen Example 11 using a polyethylene oxide having an average molecular weight of 100,000 Da). In contrast to Chen, Schiraldi preferred and exemplified only high molecular weight polyethylene, in a range well beyond that recited in the claims for that component. That is, Schiraldi describes the ethylene oxide useful for its invention as having “a relatively high molecular weight” and preferring molecular weights above 3,000,000, whereas the claims recite a molecular weight range of 600,000 to 900,000. See Ex. 1004, 4:25–31. Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that the cited prior art, alone or in combination, taught or suggested a film comprising both low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxide in the respective ranges recited by the claims, or with the specific percentage of the low molecular weight component required. The portions of Dr. Mumper’s declaration cited by Petitioner do not provide any further support for Petitioner’s position. We note that Dr. Mumper does not explain why the polyethylene oxides molecular weights limitation would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill over the combined teachings of the prior art. Instead, Dr. Mumper opines only that the skilled artisan “would be highly motivated to vary the amounts of the low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxide to achieve the desired effects including, but not limited to drug solubility, mucoadhesion and drug release rate.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. That opinion does not address a skilled artisan’s motivation, ability, or reasonable expectation of successfully achieving a film comprising the specific ranges and proportion of low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxides required by the claims. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d at 1074 (a showing of obviousness must be supported by evidence, as shown by some objective teaching in the prior art or by knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art that would have led that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “The portions of Dr. Mumper’s declaration cited by Petitioner do not provide any further support for Petitioner’s position. We note that Dr. Mumper does not explain why the polyethylene oxides molecular weights limitation would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill over the combined teachings of the prior art. Instead, Dr. Mumper opines only that the skilled artisan “would be highly motivated to vary the amounts of the low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxide to achieve the desired effects including, but not limited to drug solubility, mucoadhesion and drug release rate.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. That opinion does not address a skilled artisan’s motivation, ability, or reasonable expectation of successfully achieving a film comprising the specific ranges and proportion of low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxides required by the claims. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d at 1074 (a showing of obviousness must be supported by evidence, as shown by some objective teaching in the prior art or by knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art that would have led that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention).” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 8,017,150
• Presidio Components, Inc. v. Avx CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2016 · IPR2015-01332 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 7–12 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish a sufficient reason to modify Galvagni’s capacitor.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Harperizing, or “corner rounding,” is typical. It merely describes one exemplary capacitor manufacturing process in which “the surfaces are cleaned of adhering lead contaminations and the edges and corners are eroded, i.e., rounded off, so that after the scrubbing the inside electrodes . . . are made substantially flush to the end faces of the monolithic ceramic body.” Florian, 10:16–22. On the other hand, Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Shanfield, testifies that “Galvagni does not Harperize or corner round its components,” and that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have avoided Harperization not least because it would have added processing time to an already labor-intensive process of Galvagni that could lead to longer cycle time, as well as dimensional variability that could lead to lower yield.”) Shanfield Decl. ¶¶ 71–72; see also id. at ¶ 73 (not Harperizing to contain or reduce manufacturing cost). On this record, we credit the testimony of Dr. Shanfield. We are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that it was “typical” to Harperize the ends 18 of capacitor 16 taught in Galvagni prior to the vapor deposition of layer 21 illustrated in Figure 4 of Galvagni.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we construed the phrase “negligibly over the top surface” (independent claims 1 and 12) to mean “a small amount of material is formed on the top surface.” Dec. to Inst. 7–9. Neither party disputes our determination or proposes additional terms for construction. Based on the record developed during this proceeding, we maintain this construction.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “On this issue, we agree with Patent Owner. Galvagni’s teachings of in-circuit testing of individual components are limited to using the ends, not the tops, of those components. Ex. 1002, 3:7–10, 6:24–30. Petitioner’s argument that testing probes of 0.05 mm were commercially available is not persuasive because Petitioner makes a comparison only to the dimensions taught in the ’547 patent without providing sufficient evidence that any negligible termination resulting from Harperization of Galvagni’s capacitor would also have been 0.05 mm. Even if it were, any negligible termination on a top surface of Galvagni’s capacitor would be very small relative to the end surface of Galvagni’s capacitor, and, therefore, would not “make it easier to access the capacitor for in-circuit test” (Pet. 17). Finally, even assuming Petitioner is right that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “test the individual components in a manner that minimizes wasted PCB (printed circuit board) space” (Pet. 15), Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence that such a person would have valued that factor more highly than the other considerations identified by Dr. Shanfield—i.e., (1) the efficiency of testing groups of components rather than individual components, or (2) using pads on the PCB to reduce the risk of damage to components. After weighing the arguments and evidence, including the testimony of both parties’ experts, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by the purported advantages for in-circuit testing to modify Galvagni’s capacitor 16 to include terminations extending negligibly over a top surface.” slip op. at 13

  • ExcludeNot reached

    “We decline to assess the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude. As discussed above, even considering the identified evidence, we have concluded that Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 6,144,547 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,144,547
• Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2016 · IPR2015-01331 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable: Heron anticipates claims 1–4, and Heron combined with Monsorno ’926 renders claims 5–6 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Petitioner submits that each term of the challenged claims should be given its ordinary meaning.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agreed in its Preliminary Response that claim terms should be given their ordinary meaning, and did not propose that any terms be construed separately in its Patent Owner Response. Prelim. Resp. 8. For the purposes of this Final Written Decision, we determine that none of the claim terms in the ’879 patent require express construction.” slip op. at 6

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Specifically, Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibits 1004, 1006, 1008, 1009, 1010, and 1011, portions of Dr. Randall’s Declaration concerning those exhibits (paragraphs 65–75, 87–94, and 124–151 of Ex. 1012), as well as Appendices E, G, J, L, M, N, O and P of Dr. Randall’s Declaration on the grounds that they relate to patentability challenges that did not form the basis of our Institution Decision in this proceeding. Id. at 2–4, 6, 7. Patent Owner additionally seeks to exclude paragraphs 22 and 25 of Dr. Randall’s Declaration under Fed. R. Evid. 702 for failing to be based on sufficient facts or data. Id. at 4–5. Furthermore, Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1015, Dr. Shanfield’s deposition transcript, on the grounds that the testimony cited to at 8:21–9:2 in Exhibit 1015 was objected to for lack of relevance. Id. at 7. Because we did not rely upon any of the exhibits, portions of Dr. Randall’s Declaration, or the cited testimony from Dr. Shanfield’s deposition transcript that are sought to be excluded in this Final Written Decision, we dismiss Patent Owner’s motion to exclude as moot. V.” slip op. at 22

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Although a Reply may properly respond to arguments raised in Patent Owner’s Response (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)), it is not an opportunity for Petitioner to identify, for the first time, new and different prior art elements that are alleged to satisfy the claim requirements. Here, Petitioner’s reliance on trimming plate 15 is materially different from its prior reliance on capacitor plates 2a, 4a, 2c, 4b, etc., especially with respect to the requirement of “one of said contacts members connecting to an end surface of said electrode layer.” Whereas the Petition pointed to, and our Institution Decision relied upon, Bonini’s teaching that the capacitor plates extend to the left or right side portions of capacitor body 3 in order to contact terminal-forming coating 13 or 14 (see Pet. 17; Inst. Dec. 10; Ex. 1002, 3:5– 21, Fig. 2), Petitioner’s new argument relies upon Bonini’s teaching that trimming plate 15 has a narrow tab 15" having an edge 15' that extends to a difference surface (lateral side margin) of ceramic body 3. See Reply 8; Ex. 1002, 2:69–3:1. Because Patent Owner was not given a fair opportunity in this proceeding to respond to this argument, we consider Petitioner’s argument to be improper under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) as not responding to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response and, therefore, decline to consider it. See In re Nuvasive, Inc., 2016 WL 6608999, Nos. 2015-01672, 2015-1673, slip op. at 11–13 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2016).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “dielectrics having “coextensive” length and width dimensions. PO Resp. 30–33. We disagree, as we find that requirement satisfied by the capacitor shown in Heron’s figures. Specifically, “FIG. 1 shows in side section view of a capacitor,” “FIG. 2 shows in exploded view four green ceramic layers that are stacked, sintered and terminated to make the capacitor of FIG. 1,” and “FIG. 3 shows in perspective view the capacitor of FIG. 1.” Ex. 1003, 2:25–31, Figs. 1–3. Figures 4, 7, and 8 show side sectional views, while figures 5 and 6 show top views of capacitors with alternate electrode geometries. Ex. 1003, 2:32–36; Figs. 5–8. Taken as a whole, these figures indicate plainly that the lengths and widths of dielectric layers 10 and 11 terminate at the same location, thereby satisfying the “coextensive” requirement. Patent Owner contends that reliance on Heron’s figures is improper under the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000). PO Resp. 31–33. We do not find Hockerson’s holding to be applicable here. Unlike with the claim at issue in Hockerson, which was construed to require that the “central longitudinal groove” has a width that must be less than the combined width of the two peripheral fins, the challenged claims do not require any particular size or proportion. The requirement that the dielectric layers have coextensive length and width dimensions can be assessed by simply viewing the figures of Heron, and no additional measurements are necessary to make that determination. It is well established “that a claimed invention may be anticipated or rendered obvious by a drawing in a reference, whether the drawing disclosure be accidental or intentional.” In re Meng, 492 F.2d 843, 847 (CCPA 1974). Patent Owner also contends that the Petition fails to identify what specific elements in Heron correspond to numerous claim elements. PO Resp. 34–37. We disagree. As noted above, the Petition identifies specific teachings of Heron, and includes a claim chart mapping Heron’s teachings to the claim elements. Pet. 18–24. In particular, Patent Owner argues that the Petition does not specify where the claimed “electrode layer” is found in Heron. PO Resp. 34–35. As Patent Owner recognizes, however, the Petition identified overlapping buried electrodes 15 and 16 for this claim element. See Pet. 19–20. We find this to be sufficient as both layers 15 and 16 satisfy the claim requirements of having dimensions smaller than the dielectric layer, being mounted on the first surface of a dielectric layer, and extending to a side face of the capacitor body so as to contact the end terminations. Patent Owner also argues that the Petition fails to specify where in Heron “opposite polarity” is taught. PO Resp. 35–36. We find that the Petition’s identification of end terminations 22 and 24 is sufficient. See Pet. 23–24. As explained by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Randall, in order to store charge, a voltage must be imposed across the terminals of Heron’s capacitor, “and the resulting voltage difference across the two contact members 22 and 24 establishes the opposite polarities of the capacitor.” Ex. 1014 ¶ 38. Finally, Patent Owner argues that the Petition fails to specify where “said second surface of said first dielectric layer” is found in Heron. PO Resp. 36–37. The Petition, however, noted that “[a]s seen in Fig. 2, each dielectric layer has a length and width, as well as a first and second surface.” Pet. 19. The Petition further notes that “Heron discloses that green ceramic (dielectric) layer 10 would be first formed and screen printing the electrode pattern 15 thereon.” Id. at 18. Because the Petition identifies electrode layer 15 as being on the “first surface” of the first dielectric layer 10, we find that the Petition also sufficiently identified the opposite surface of dielectric layer 10 as satisfying the requirements of the “second surface.” Figure 1 of Heron shows terminations 22 and 24 provided on the bottom, i.e., “second surface,” of the dielectric layer and extending to the edges of the capacitor body. The Petition, therefore, identified sufficiently the specific features of Heron’s capacitor that correspond to the claim elements. Based on those identified features, and the record developed during this proceeding, we find that Heron anticipates claims 1–4.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 6,992,879 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,992,879
• Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2016 · IPR2015-01330 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Horie and Coleman under § 102.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “argues that “the second electrode layer” must be formed on the external capacitor surface that is mounted on the current source. PO Resp. 7–16. We disagree. Nothing in the claim language suggests that a second electrode layer must be positioned in relation to the current source. Rather, the claim specifies only “a second electrode layer formed as a pad for contact with the second surface of the first dielectric layer,” wherein the first dielectric layer is an internal layer of the monolithic capacitor chip. Patent Owner relies upon the opinion of its expert, Dr. Stanley R. Shanfield, Ph.D., to assert that “pad” ordinarily means “mat” or “cushion” and thus connotes a mounting or landing surface, such as against a printed circuit board. Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 38). In support of this opinion, Dr. Shanfield cites a) a general dictionary definition of “pad” from the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993) , and b) a 2003 (post-filing date) document entitled “Microwave Office Element Catalog” describing a “multiplate ceramic chip capacitor” with an indication that one can “set size and properties of contact pads.” Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 38–39, Exs. C and D. Neither extrinsic document, however, specifies that an electrode layer that is formed as a contact pad for a multilayer chip capacitor must necessarily be mounted on the printed circuit board or otherwise close to the current source. Moreover, during oral argument, Patent Owner acknowledged that the printed circuit board is not part of the claimed device. Tr. 80:1–4.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “with the claim at issue in Hockerson, which was construed to require that the “central longitudinal groove” has a width that must be less than the combined width of the two peripheral fins, challenged claim 1 does not require any particular size or proportion. The requirement that the dielectric layers have co-extensive length and width dimensions can be assessed by simply viewing the figures of Horie, and no additional measurements are necessary to make that determination. It is well-established “that a claimed invention may be anticipated or rendered obvious by a drawing in a reference, whether the drawing disclosure be accidental or intentional.” In re Meng, 492 F.2d 843, 847 (CCPA 1974). Moreover, the specification of Horie is not “completely silent on the issue” of whether the dielectric layers are co-extensive. Cf. Hockerson, 222 F.3d at 956. In particular, Horie discloses that “the laminated body obtained is cut in vertical and horizontal directions to obtain each chip-like laminated body.” Ex. 1002, 7:11–13.3 Although Patent Owner suggested that the use of the terms “vertical” and “horizontal” in Horie could nonetheless encompass cutting the layers at an angle (Tr. 95:15–97:4), we find no support for that position. We, thus, find that Horie’s teaching that each layer in the laminate comprising the capacitor body is cut to the same length and the same width dimensions, in combination with Figure 3, satisfies the “co-extensive” requirement. See Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 32–34.” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedOther

    “PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner filed a motion to exclude certain evidence. Paper 28. Specifically, Patent Owner seeks to exclude certain exhibits and the portions of Dr. Randall’s testimony concerning patentability challenges that did not form the basis of our Institution Decision in this proceeding. Id. at 2–6. Petitioner filed a response indicating that it does not dispute Patent Owner’s motion to exclude for any reason. Paper 30. Because we did not rely upon any of the evidence sought to be excluded in our Final Written Decision, we dismiss Patent Owner’s motion to exclude as moot. V.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 6,337,791 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 6,337,791
• Luye Pharma Group Ltd. / Luye Pharma(Usa) Ltd. et al. v. Alkermes Pharma Ireland Ltd. And Alkermes Controlled Therapeutics, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2016 · IPR2016-01095 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–13 and 17–23 were unpatentable over Goldenheim alone or in the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.4, 42.108. Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1‒13 and 17‒23. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of those claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “[U]nless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102. . . . [I]t is not enough that the prior art reference . . . includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Here, as noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner is using disparate teachings of the Goldenheim reference to attempt to establish that the claims of the challenged patent are anticipated by that reference. The disclosure of Goldenheim of a viscosity of 35 cp in certain instances is a single sentence from that document, and Goldenheim provides no guidance as to what those circumstances may be. Petitioner has not sufficiently established that the ordinary artisan would have read that viscosity limitation into the formulation used by Example 16, which Petitioner relies upon to meet the concentration of microparticles required by challenged claim 1. In that regard, we note that Example 16 does not mention viscosity, and specifically teaches the use of an injection vehicle of 0.5% CMC and 0.1% Tween 80 in water. Ex. 1004, 52:27‒28” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “references remedy the deficiencies discussed above with respect to the anticipation rejection. As the Supreme Court pointed out in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), “a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” Id. at 418. Rather, the Court stated: [I]t can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does . . . because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known. Id. at 418-419 (emphasis added); see also id. at 418 (requiring a determination of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue”) (emphasis added). In the instant proceeding, Petitioner has not provided a reason, however, as to why the ordinary artisan would have taken Goldenheim’s one mention of a viscosity of 35 cp and applied it to the formulation in Example 16 relied upon by Petitioner to meet the concentration limitation of independent challenged claim 1. Specifically, as noted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 20), Goldenheim teaches that “[i]n certain instances, the final reconstituted product viscosity may be, e.g., about 35 cps” (Ex. 1004, 35:11) but does not explain what those instances may be, much less tying that disclosure to the concentration of microparticles used in Example 16, which makes no mention of viscosity.” slip op. at 14

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,667,061
• Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2016 · IPR2016-00690 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing, finding no abuse of discretion in its determination that Petitioner failed to show claim 1 unpatentable because the claimed dose reduction was unpredictable.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “We concluded that the record as a whole, including FDA Guidance 1999, supported a mere invitation to experiment as rejected in In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation, 676 F.3d 1063, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Dec. at 19, 22–23; see id. at 22 (“Such invitations to experiment do not, in light of the present record, predict the dosage reduction of the subject claim.”). The Decision, including our citation to Cylobenzaprine, makes clear our implicit rejection of Petitioner’s argument that, “to arrive at the claimed dosages, a POSA need only have followed FDA Guidance 1999’s comprehensive guidelines for the performance of drug interaction and dose regimen studies” using only “routine experimentation” and with “predictable results.” Pet. 54–55, 58; Reh’g Req. 4–5. Petitioner’s reliance on Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989) and Genzyme” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Unlike in Merck and Genzyme, the present case does not involve predictable results that may be confirmed or fine-tuned by routine experimentation. Rather, upon careful consideration of the asserted prior art as a whole, we determined that, “it could not be predicted whether a change in iloperidone metabolism would have increased, decreased, or had no effect on the risk of QT prolongation” and, thus, the amount of dose reduction (if any) was unpredictable and would need to be determined empirically. Dec. at 22–23 (quoting Prelim. Resp. 15–16); see also id. at 22 (stating that, “the art as a whole taught a careful evaluation of [drugs such as iloperidone] for evidence of clinically-relevant drug-drug interactions, which may or may not be addressed with dose reductions”).1 Thus, our determination rejects Petitioner’s contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have arrived at the claimed dosage reduction by routine experimentation. See Coherus Biosciences, Inc., v. Abbvie Biotechnology LTD., Case IPR2016- 00189, slip op. at 2 (PTAB July 14, 2016) (Paper 27) (“The Board is not obligated to respond in writing to every unpersuasive argument made before it.”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded we misapprehended or overlooked any of Petitioner’s arguments.” slip op. at 4

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,138,432
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Ltd. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Monosol RX, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Oct 31, 2016 · IPR2016-01112 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its denial of additional discovery because Patent Owner did not show the decision should be modified.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “response to the first Request for Production that none of the requested agreements, or drafts thereof executed on or before May 31, 2016 exist. Opp. 17. May 31, 2016 is the date that Petitioner filed its petitions in these proceedings. In the Decision, we explained, among other things, that, generally, the Board has considered the relationship between entities alleged to be in privity at the time of the service of the complaint and that Patent Owner has not alleged privity existed between Petitioner and Teva at that time. Dec. 7. We explained further that “[e]ven accepting arguendo that Petitioner’s acquisition of Teva’s ANDAs . . . established privity between Petitioner and Teva, Patent Owner has not proffered persuasive evidence that indicia of privity existed at any time prior to the filing of the present Petition.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008)). Those reasons alone support our determination that Patent Owner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed additional discovery would uncover something useful in support of its contention that Petitioner and Teva were in privity at the relevant time. Thus, we are not persuaded that our Decision should be modified based upon Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s response to the second Request for Production leaves open the possibility that correspondence or communications, dated prior to May 31, 2016, relating to the later-executed agreements, or drafts thereof, may exist and provide something useful to support Patent Owner’s contention that privity existed between Petitioner and Teva on or before the filing date of the Petitions. Reh’g. Req. 6. As we stated in the Decision, “Patent Owner’s evidence and argument in support of its discovery requests fail to demonstrate more than a mere possibility or mere allegation that something useful will be found.” Dec. 7.” slip op. at 4

  • Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, deniedDenied

    “response to the first Request for Production that none of the requested agreements, or drafts thereof executed on or before May 31, 2016 exist. Opp. 17. May 31, 2016 is the date that Petitioner filed its petitions in these proceedings. In the Decision, we explained, among other things, that, generally, the Board has considered the relationship between entities alleged to be in privity at the time of the service of the complaint and that Patent Owner has not alleged privity existed between Petitioner and Teva at that time. Dec. 7. We explained further that “[e]ven accepting arguendo that Petitioner’s acquisition of Teva’s ANDAs . . . established privity between Petitioner and Teva, Patent Owner has not proffered persuasive evidence that indicia of privity existed at any time prior to the filing of the present Petition.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008)). Those reasons alone support our determination that Patent Owner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed additional discovery would uncover something useful in support of its contention that Petitioner and Teva were in privity at the relevant time. Thus, we are not persuaded that our Decision should be modified based upon Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s response to the second Request for Production leaves open the possibility that correspondence or communications, dated prior to May 31, 2016, relating to the later-executed agreements, or drafts thereof, may exist and provide something useful to support Patent Owner’s contention that privity existed between Petitioner and Teva on or before the filing date of the Petitions. Reh’g. Req. 6. As we stated in the Decision, “Patent Owner’s evidence and argument in support of its discovery requests fail to demonstrate more than a mere possibility or mere allegation that something useful will be found.” Dec. 7.” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

    “response to the first Request for Production that none of the requested agreements, or drafts thereof executed on or before May 31, 2016 exist. Opp. 17. May 31, 2016 is the date that Petitioner filed its petitions in these proceedings. In the Decision, we explained, among other things, that, generally, the Board has considered the relationship between entities alleged to be in privity at the time of the service of the complaint and that Patent Owner has not alleged privity existed between Petitioner and Teva at that time. Dec. 7. We explained further that “[e]ven accepting arguendo that Petitioner’s acquisition of Teva’s ANDAs . . . established privity between Petitioner and Teva, Patent Owner has not proffered persuasive evidence that indicia of privity existed at any time prior to the filing of the present Petition.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008)). Those reasons alone support our determination that Patent Owner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed additional discovery would uncover something useful in support of its contention that Petitioner and Teva were in privity at the relevant time. Thus, we are not persuaded that our Decision should be modified based upon Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s response to the second Request for Production leaves open the possibility that correspondence or communications, dated prior to May 31, 2016, relating to the later-executed agreements, or drafts thereof, may exist and provide something useful to support Patent Owner’s contention that privity existed between Petitioner and Teva on or before the filing date of the Petitions. Reh’g. Req. 6. As we stated in the Decision, “Patent Owner’s evidence and argument in support of” slip op. at 4

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,017,150
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Ltd. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Monosol RX, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Oct 31, 2016 · IPR2016-01111 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s request for rehearing, leaving in place its denial of additional discovery because Patent Owner did not show the decision should be modified.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “response to the first Request for Production that none of the requested agreements, or drafts thereof executed on or before May 31, 2016 exist. Opp. 17. May 31, 2016 is the date that Petitioner filed its petitions in these proceedings. In the Decision, we explained, among other things, that, generally, the Board has considered the relationship between entities alleged to be in privity at the time of the service of the complaint and that Patent Owner has not alleged privity existed between Petitioner and Teva at that time. Dec. 7. We explained further that “[e]ven accepting arguendo that Petitioner’s acquisition of Teva’s ANDAs . . . established privity between Petitioner and Teva, Patent Owner has not proffered persuasive evidence that indicia of privity existed at any time prior to the filing of the present Petition.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008)). Those reasons alone support our determination that Patent Owner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed additional discovery would uncover something useful in support of its contention that Petitioner and Teva were in privity at the relevant time. Thus, we are not persuaded that our Decision should be modified based upon Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s response to the second Request for Production leaves open the possibility that correspondence or communications, dated prior to May 31, 2016, relating to the later-executed agreements, or drafts thereof, may exist and provide something useful to support Patent Owner’s contention that privity existed between Petitioner and Teva on or before the filing date of the Petitions. Reh’g. Req. 6. As we stated in the Decision, “Patent Owner’s evidence and argument in support of its discovery requests fail to demonstrate more than a mere possibility or mere allegation that something useful will be found.” Dec. 7.” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “response to the first Request for Production that none of the requested agreements, or drafts thereof executed on or before May 31, 2016 exist. Opp. 17. May 31, 2016 is the date that Petitioner filed its petitions in these proceedings. In the Decision, we explained, among other things, that, generally, the Board has considered the relationship between entities alleged to be in privity at the time of the service of the complaint and that Patent Owner has not alleged privity existed between Petitioner and Teva at that time. Dec. 7. We explained further that “[e]ven accepting arguendo that Petitioner’s acquisition of Teva’s ANDAs . . . established privity between Petitioner and Teva, Patent Owner has not proffered persuasive evidence that indicia of privity existed at any time prior to the filing of the present Petition.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008)). Those reasons alone support our determination that Patent Owner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed additional discovery would uncover something useful in support of its contention that Petitioner and Teva were in privity at the relevant time. Thus, we are not persuaded that our Decision should be modified based upon Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s response to the second Request for Production leaves open the possibility that correspondence or communications, dated prior to May 31, 2016, relating to the later-executed agreements, or drafts thereof, may exist and provide something useful to support Patent Owner’s contention that privity existed between Petitioner and Teva on or before the filing date of the Petitions. Reh’g. Req. 6. As we stated in the Decision, “Patent Owner’s evidence and argument in support of its discovery requests fail to demonstrate more than a mere possibility or mere allegation that something useful will be found.” Dec. 7.” slip op. at 4

  • Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, deniedDenied

    “response to the first Request for Production that none of the requested agreements, or drafts thereof executed on or before May 31, 2016 exist. Opp. 17. May 31, 2016 is the date that Petitioner filed its petitions in these proceedings. In the Decision, we explained, among other things, that, generally, the Board has considered the relationship between entities alleged to be in privity at the time of the service of the complaint and that Patent Owner has not alleged privity existed between Petitioner and Teva at that time. Dec. 7. We explained further that “[e]ven accepting arguendo that Petitioner’s acquisition of Teva’s ANDAs . . . established privity between Petitioner and Teva, Patent Owner has not proffered persuasive evidence that indicia of privity existed at any time prior to the filing of the present Petition.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008)). Those reasons alone support our determination that Patent Owner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed additional discovery would uncover something useful in support of its contention that Petitioner and Teva were in privity at the relevant time. Thus, we are not persuaded that our Decision should be modified based upon Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s response to the second Request for Production leaves open the possibility that correspondence or communications, dated prior to May 31, 2016, relating to the later-executed agreements, or drafts thereof, may exist and provide something useful to support Patent Owner’s contention that privity existed between Petitioner and Teva on or before the filing date of the Petitions. Reh’g. Req. 6. As we stated in the Decision, “Patent Owner’s evidence and argument in support of its discovery requests fail to demonstrate more than a mere possibility or mere allegation that something useful will be found.” Dec. 7.” slip op. at 4

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,603,514

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.