• Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01235 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable under either obviousness ground because Szrek did not disclose a pre-printed lottery ticket without lottery numbers associated at customer purchase.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “real party in interest. Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 32–34. In the Institution Decision, we stated: To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party of interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial. Inst. Dec. 11. In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner did not raise the issue of challenging Petitioner’s identified real party in interest. See generally PO Resp. Thus, we need not address this issue further because we find that Patent Owner has waived any challenge to Petitioner’s identification of the real parties in interest in this proceeding. See Paper 12 (Scheduling Order), 9 (“Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.”).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13).5 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. 5 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’135 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “Following the block quote from Yacenda, the applicant then stated, “[b]ased on the foregoing, Yacenda’s system is directly opposite of the instant claims, as the instant claims require a ‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.’” Ex. 1002, 76. This statement is clear and unmistakable. It (1) specifically states that “the instant claims require” and (2) then states what the claims require—a “‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” We fail to see how the applicant could have been more clear in stating a requirement of the Challenged Claims. And, by doing so, the applicant narrowed the scope of what would otherwise be encompassed in the meaning of “pre-printed lottery ticket” and therefore what would otherwise be encompassed in the scope of the Challenged Claims—a lottery ticket which has lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We do not find Mr. Hutton’s testimony particularly helpful. First, we have addressed the points raised by his testimony in our discussion above because they are largely the same as the arguments raised in Petitioner’s Reply. Second, we find his testimony entitled to very little weight because he applies an incorrect understanding of the caselaw, which mirrors Petitioner’s incorrect and arguably misleading quotations of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Quest. In particular, in paragraph 5, Mr. Hutton states the following as his understanding of the law as it applies to prosecution disclaimer: “I also understand that in order to disclaim embodiments within the specification, the statements should have some indication that the applicant intended to surrender embodiments from the specification.” Ex. 1038 ¶ 5 (emphasis added). This then leads Mr. Hutton to state: “[t]hus, in my opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not view applicant’s statements as a disclaimer, because the applicant never stated that they intended to surrender multiple embodiments described in the specification.” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). As we explained above in responding to a similar argument by Petitioner, the caselaw does not require an applicant to expressly state whether a disclaimer excludes particular embodiments of the subject specification when disclaiming claim scope during prosecution. See Quest, 924 F.3d at 1229. And, as noted above, counsel for Petitioner agreed that such a statement explicitly disclaiming particular embodiments is not required. Tr. 12:18–13:17. Third, although we have considered Mr. Hutton’s testimony, we find it “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of” “pre-printed lottery ticket.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. In particular, we are cognizant of the Federal Circuit’s guidance that we “should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by . . . the prosecution history.” Id. at 1318 (internal quotation omitted). In this instance, for the reasons explained above, we find that Mr. Hutton’s testimony is clearly at odds with the applicant’s arguments during prosecution and that his testimony is based on a misunderstanding of what is required by the governing caselaw for prosecution history disclaimer.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 9,865,135 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,865,135
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., Hoffman-La Roche AG, And Abbvie Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00052 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–4, 8–14, and 18–26 not shown unpatentable because they were entitled to priority before the November 2018 Venclexta Label, which therefore was not prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “We do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although Petitioner did not expressly recite hematological malignancies, Petitioner did refer to expertise in clinical oncology, which would encompass the blood cancers recited in the claims. Neither party identifies a difference in the analysis or conclusions that would be based on differences in the ordinary skill in the art analysis. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties do not identify any issue relating to the preamble that would impact our analysis. We recognize that Patent Owner is suggesting that Petitioner’s expert, at least, is reading the word “clinical” into the treatment language of claim 1. However, the plain language of the claim 1 preamble states “treating lymphoma or leukemia in a human patient” and is supported by a straightforward definition in the Specification of the ’087 patent, expressly limiting the invention to treatment of human patients. See Ex. 1001, 16:25–38. We therefore find that the preamble terms do not need claim construction because there is no actual dispute suggesting that, for example, claim 1 implicitly recites the term “clinical.” See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 5

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “d. Analysis Considering the Wands factors as a whole, we find that the limited breadth of the claims, presence of several working examples, significant amount of direction and guidance provided by the ’087 patent, predictability in treating blood cancers with Bcl-2 inhibitors like GDC-0199, and high level of skill in the art are balanced against a large quantity of experimentation. Based on our consideration of the entirety of the evidence, we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that undue experimentation would not have been required to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with the claims of the ’087 patent. One underlying theme of Petitioner’s contentions and Petitioner’s expert testimony is the repeated contention that clinical trials were not completed by Patent Owner. See, e.g., Pet. 48 (“venetoclax (GDC-0199) was not FDA-approved”); Ex. 1020 ¶ 193. We find these arguments unpersuasive as we agree with Patent Owner that “[i]t is well established that a patent may be secured, and typically is secured, before the conclusion of clinical trials.” In re Montgomery, 67 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Particularly as to the dependent claims, a preponderance of the evidence of record does not support a finding that undue experimentation would have been required to administer three different doses of GDC-0199 starting with 100 mg, to use multiple daily dosing cycles of one day, to continue until disease progression occurs, or to combine with other treatment compounds. We find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s position that any of the dependent claims fail to comply with the enablement requirement.” slip op. at 23

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Applying Rai and Wertheim to the instant facts, we agree with Patent Owner that, factually and legally, in the ’087 patent “the claimed dosages of 100 mg, 200 mg, and/or 400 mg of GDC-0199 are adequately supported.” PO Second Suppl. Brief 2 (citing PO Resp. 11, 27–29; PO Sur-reply 19, 21– 22; Ex. 1001, 24:20–29.) In particular, the ’087 patent describes all three specific dosage values 100 mg, 200 mg, and 400 mg in the context of an escalating drug dosage series and Petitioner points to no persuasive statements in the specification that dispute either the effectiveness or the operability of GDC-0199 at any of these dosages.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,110,087 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,110,087
• Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand

  The majority determined claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst; the dissent would have found them obvious.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We determine Patent Owner’s reading of the claim limitation is the better one. The limitation begins with the verb “locating,” and it therefore makes sense that the clause would recite what is located (i.e., encryption information) and where it is located (i.e., within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video). In other words, it is reasonable that the second and third clauses of the limitation both modify the first clause (for example, as could perhaps be expressed through the use of commas as “locating encryption information, that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video, within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video”).10 On the other hand, Petitioner’s reading of the limitation, 10 In general, we recognize that the use of commas to set off phrases in claim drafting is not consistent. We included commas above to illustrate Patent Owner’s understanding of the claim limitation. allowing only the second clause to modify the first, while not unreasonable, makes less sense. That is, the encrypted information identifies the encrypted portions of frames, which in turn are within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. Reading the claim in its entirety, the encrypted portions of frames would be understood to be located within the requested portions of the stream; it does not seem necessary for the claim to expressly recite that aspect. For example, the very next limitation— limitation [m] of claim 1—refers to “each encrypted portion of the frames of video” but does not expressly recite “within the requested portions of the selected stream.” Ex. 1001, 27:58–60. Thus, when limitation [l] recites “within the requested portions of the selected stream,” it seems more likely that the clause refers to where that encrypted information is located rather than simply to indicate the obvious location of the encrypted portion of the frames of video. We therefore view Patent Owner’s reading of the claim language as the better one.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed

    “I am persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17– 19, 69–70). I agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41– 15:60). I determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 52

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “I agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, specifically pages 1–7, attempt to address aspects of claim 1 for the first time on remand. I also agree that Patent Owner’s arguments attempt to recharacterize limitations [j] and [k] to raise issues that Patent Owner did not raise previously, in contravention of our Order that issues raised needed support from “where those issues were raised in previous briefings by the parties.” Paper 56, 2. I have addressed whether scalability and FEC are integral to how Chen operates above, as well as whether the Petition relies on those aspects, supra. The questions about how Chen operates and what portions of Chen are asserted in the ground of unpatentability were previously raised, but now are being considered or reconsidered, based on the Federal Circuit’s decision. In Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, pages 1–7, the citations to argument previously raised do not support the arguments now presented by Patent Owner on remand. As such, I determine Patent Owner’s new arguments fall outside the scope of remand, and I dismiss these arguments seeking to distinguish limitations [j] and [k] from the cited prior art combination.24” slip op. at 62

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMixed

    “7 Patent Owner’s Brief on Remand recognizes that there are two arguments Patent Owner raised in its Patent Owner Response that were not addressed in the Final Written Decision. See PO Remand Br. 1 (citing PO Resp. 24–37 (the construction of “locating encrypted information . . . within requested portions”), 38–58 (referring to Patent Owner’s “common keys” argument)). 8 The Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42). See Final Dec. 28–37 (granting-in-part, denying-in-part, and dismissing-in-part Petitioner’s Motion). Our determinations on that Motion were part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. Because the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the Final Written Decision and the Federal Circuit’s decision does not impact our previous rulings on the Motion, we maintain those rulings here. Additionally, on remand, Petitioner requested authorization to file a motion for sanctions, which we held in abeyance until the parties’ briefing on remand was complete. See Ex. 3003, 1. Petitioner requests sanctions because of the impropriety of Patent Owner’s remand brief, including new claim construction arguments for limitations [1j] and [1k], and prejudice to Petitioner. Id. at 3, 5. Although we reserved further consideration of Petitioner’s request, we expanded both the time and pages allowed for Petitioner’s responsive brief, and also allowed Petitioner to address any related issues in its responsive brief. Id. at 1. Having considered the parties’ briefing on remand, and given that we do not reach the claim construction arguments that Petitioner objected to in its request for authorization to file a motion for sanctions, we deny Petitioner’s request.” slip op. at 5

  Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,225,588
• Guardant Health, Inc. v. University Of WashingtonNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2023 · IPR2022-00817 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 were not proven unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a reason to combine the Travers references with a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Here, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art by March 20, 2012 would typically have an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., with research experience in genomics, molecular biology, bioinformatics, or a related field, or could have less education but significant professional experience in one or more of these fields. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 46–47). Patent Owner states that for the purposes of this proceeding, it does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the skill level. PO Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 28–30). After reviewing the record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languagePlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues that, in a few instances, the ’127 patent discloses “sequence reads” as corresponding to “multiple and distinct sequencing reactions.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 4:12–18, 4:45–49, 9:5–9, 9:11–12). Those disclosures, however, relate to “only one method for making the invention and do[] not automatically lead to finding a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 797 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner does not point to, and we cannot find, any intrinsic evidence that would limit “sequence reads” as Patent Owner contends. Patent Owner also relies on Travers as extrinsic evidence that supports its argument. PO Resp. 9. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that Travers “refers to the sense and antisense target DNA sequences as subreads, which are distinct from the ‘raw read sequence’ or ‘raw read’ that comprises all of the subreads physically linked together.” Id. (citing Ex. 1021, 2). Patent Owner, however, ignores that Travers ’075 refers to the sequence of a sense or antisense strand as a “sequence read,” and not a subread. See Ex. 1018 ¶ 61. As a result, we find insufficient evidence to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “sequence read” as requiring “multiple and distinct sequencing reactions.”7 Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Based on the complete record, we see no need to expressly address any other claim term.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. First, the prior art references Petitioner relies on relate to sequencing SMRTbell templates; specifically, they teach two polymerase binding sites in the two hairpin adapters per SMRTbell molecule, one on each end of the target molecule. See Ex. 1021, Fig. 1. They do not speak to concatemers with multiple polymerase binding sites interspersed along the molecule. Second, as explained above, a two-round RCR already generates three polymerase binding sites. See Ex. 2014 ¶ 178. Thus, even if we were to agree with Petitioner that the optimal stoichiometric ratio for SMRTbell templates applies to RCR produced concatemers, the polymerase to concatemer template ratio is at least three, i.e., 50% higher than the number Petitioner points to.11 See Reply 16 (citing Ex. 1035, 34). 11 The product of one round of RCR replication has only two polymerase binding sites. But, with only one copy of A and A each, it would not satisfy Third, and most importantly, the prior art does not support Petitioner’s arguments. The SMRT sequencing “approach is based on eavesdropping on a single DNA polymerase molecule working in a continuous, processive manner.” Ex. 2021, 1 (“Within each [ZMW] chamber, a single DNA polymerase molecule is attached to the bottom surface.”). Indeed, in SMRT sequencing, polymerase molecules are randomly distributed among the ZMWs, leading to a Poisson distribution of occupancy. At optimal loading, the distribution is 36.8% empty ZMWs, 36.8% with just one polymerase, and 26.4% with two or more. In this experiment, ~35% of the ZMWs produced traces indicative of single DNA polymerase occupancy, of which 82% produced full-length reads.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

    “3. Summary In sum, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reason to sequence RCR replicated concatemers on PacBio’s sequencing platform with a reasonable expectation of success. Thus, Petitioner has not shown the Travers references render the claims 1–10, 12, and 15–28 obvious.12 F. Other Grounds Claim 11 depends from claim 1. Petitioner asserts that claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Travers ’075, Travers 2010, and NEB Expressions. Pet. 58–60. 12 The parties dispute whether there are objective indicia to support a conclusion of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 68–74; Reply 23–27; Sur-reply 27–29. We do not address this issue because we determine Petitioner has not met its burden in showing the reason to combine/modify the Travers references or the reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 10,760,127 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,760,127
• Edwards Lifesciences Corporation / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Aortic Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 25, 2023 · IPR2022-00556 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references did not teach or suggest the limitation requiring no outer graft covering between the fibers and outer frame.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “As the plain language of the claim term suggests, an “outer graft covering” must cover some, or all, of the metallic outer frame of the prosthetic heart valve. Consequently, and according to the plain and ordinary meaning, we understand an “outer graft covering” to be a structure, 29 such as a cloth, fabric or other material, that covers all, or part of, the metallic outer frame. Importantly, because an outer graft covering must cover the external surface of the outer frame, and specifically “between the first portion of fibers and the outer frame,” we understand this claim term to mean that the cover must extend over (i.e., “cover”) not only the struts and members of the metallic outer frame, but must also cover the open spaces, or interstices, in the spaces between those struts and members. Consequently, the ordinary and customary meaning of the limitation “free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame” is that there can be no such outer graft covering present anywhere between the outwardly extending fibers and the metallic outer frame.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As an initial matter, there is little disagreement between the parties and their experts that PET can be a graft covering. However, the disputed limitation requires something more. Specifically, it requires that “the outer seal is free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame.” We are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence of record, that Levi, Spenser II, or Walther, upon which Petitioner relies, teaches or suggests the incorporated limitation of claim 1 reciting “wherein the valve assembly is free of an outer graft covering between the first portion of fibers and the outer frame.” In our analysis, we must first determine what is meant by the claim term “outer graft covering.”” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Furthermore, our understanding of an outer graft covering as a material or structure that covers at least a portion of the outer surface of the prosthetic heart valve, such that both the struts and members of the metallic outer frame, as well as the interstices between those struts and members, is covered by the outer graft covering, reinforces our prior conclusion that the outer skirt of Levi constitutes an outer graft covering that is prohibited by challenged claim 1. We consequently conclude that Petitioner has not met 35 its burden with respect to demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Levi teaches or suggests the limitation reciting “wherein the outer seal is free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame.”” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 10,987,236 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,987,236
• Restem, LLC. v. Jadi Cell, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 18, 2023 · IPR2021-01535 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 were not proven unpatentable: Majore did not anticipate claims 1–13 and 15, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not establish the claimed limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 132, 133. Importantly, however, Dr. Olson does not cite anything to support his opinion that the ordinary artisan would have known that MSCs could be cultured to be renewable from subepithelial UC tissue. Nor does Dr. Olson explain why the artisan would have had this understanding aside from simply stating it. Majore uses the word “subepithelial” only once to explain that primitive stem cells are “distributed in subepithelial and intervascular regions,” but this does not teach what Dr. Olson asserts. Accordingly, Dr. Olson’s testimony is entitled to little weight. Xerox Corp., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15–16 (finding that an expert’s conclusory assertions that repeat the proposition for which they are offered without “any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning” in support are “conclusory and unsupported, add[] little to the conclusory assertion[s] for which [they are] offered to support, and is” slip op. at 52

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “21 The parties do not dispute that the preamble’s recitation of “isolated cell” serves as a limitation to claim 1 as it provides antecedent basis for its recitation later in the body of the claim. Accordingly, we treat the preamble as limiting. “When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.” See Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).” slip op. at 31

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “[JUDGE NEWMAN:] So if -- if the comparison is possible, why did you not present evidence of that comparison? MR. FITZPATRICK: We --we’ve had the -- we had this discussion with our -- with our expert, and our conclusion was that it’s just not -- it wasn’t necessary. The conclusion was that the -- the evidence that’s in the -- in the prior art references, including the fact that it clearly practices the exact same steps as the claims, that was sufficient to -- and would anticipate or render obvious the claims. That’s the only reason we didn’t present evidence -- our own evidence.” slip op. at 38

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Ex. 1007 ¶ 168 (alteration in original). We agree that an ordinary artisan would be motivated to look to the teachings of analogous references for information, but to establish obviousness, a party must show that “there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)). Petitioner has not provided sufficient rationale to explain why the ordinary artisan would have been motivated to make the isolated cell with the specific marker profile or why the artisan would have looked to the cited references themselves out of the wide range of references available in the art.” slip op. at 64

  Patent outcomesUS 9,803,176 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,803,176
• Edwards Lifesciences Corporation / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Aortic Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00034 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner failed to show claim 6 unpatentable because none of the seven asserted grounds established the required absence of an outer graft covering between the fibers and outer frame.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “November 2012 would have been an interventional cardiologist with a working knowledge of heart valve designs and endovascular prostheses.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We determine that, as the plain language of the claim term suggests, an “outer graft covering” must circumferentially cover some, or all, of the metallic outer frame of the prosthetic heart valve. See Merriam-Webster, Cover, available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cover (last visited March 2, 2023) (defining “cover,” relevantly, as “something that is placed over or about another thing”). See Ex. 3004. Consequently, we understand an “outer graft covering” to be a structure, such as a cloth or fabric or other material, that circumferentially covers all or part of, the metallic outer frame. Importantly, because an outer graft covering must cover the external surface of the outer frame, we understand this claim term to mean that the cover must extend over (i.e., “cover”) not only the struts and members of the metallic outer frame, but must also cover the open spaces, or interstices, in the intervals between those struts and members. Consequently, we construe the limitation reciting “free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame” to mean that there can be no such outer graft covering present anywhere between the outwardly extending fibers and the metallic outer frame.” slip op. at 40

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Reply to Patent Owner’s Response, or otherwise provide any additional argument or evidence to demonstrate that the outer skirt of Levi does not constitute the outer graft covering prohibited by claim 6. Consequently, our initial determinations stand. Furthermore, our definition of outer graft covering herein as “a material or structure that circumferentially covers at least a portion of the outer surface of the prosthetic heart valve, such that both the struts and members of the metallic outer frame, as well as the 45 interstices between those struts and members, is covered by the outer graft covering” reinforces our prior conclusion that the outer skirt of Levi constitutes an outer graft covering that is prohibited by claim 6. We consequently conclude that Petitioner has not met its burden with respect to demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Levi teaches or suggests the limitation reciting “wherein the outer seal is free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame.”” slip op. at 45

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Both the descriptions and Figure 22 of Spenser II show a cloth covering the proximal outer surface of the metallic outer frame of the prosthetic heart valve, including the spaces between the struts and members of the frame. Furthermore, the reference discloses that any fibers extending outwardly from the cloth arise from the surface of the cloth, and are not attached directly to the frame, as depicted in Figure 11 of the ’846 Specification. Thus, even were such fibers made of the same material as the cloth, which is not clear from the reference’s disclosure, the cloth would be between the surface-residing fibers and the metallic outer frame. We conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the sleeve-like cloth or fabric of Spenser II corresponds to an outer graft covering between its fibers and its outer frame, and such a covering would be between Spencer II’s surface fibers and its metallic outer frame. Such an outer graft cover is expressly prohibited by the language of claim 6, even if it and associated extending fibers are of the same material.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 10,966,846 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,966,846
• Edwards Lifesciences Corporation / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cardiovalve Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 6, 2022 · IPR2021-01051 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board granted the non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–10 and replacing them with claims 11–20, which Petitioner failed to prove unpatentable over Goldfarb ’267.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “We conclude that Petitioner’s arguments are insufficient to meet its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Goldfarb ’267 anticipates, or renders obvious, the limitation of proposed substitute claim 11 reciting “advancing the end of the first-clip arm and the end of the second-clip arm out of the delivery tube before advancing the support portion out of the delivery tube” merely requires advancing the ends of the clip arms out of the delivery tube “before advancing the support portion out of the delivery tube.” Moreover, Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive with respect to proposed substitute dependent claims 12–20 due to their dependence from, and incorporation of, the limitations of proposed substitute claim 11. See Supp. Mot. Amend. 1, Reply Supp. Mot. Amend. 1. We therefore conclude that these proposed substitute claims are similarly neither anticipated by, nor obvious over, Goldfarb ’267. III. CONCLUSION We GRANT Patent Owner’s non-contingent Motion to Amend and Supplemental Motion to Amend, canceling original claims 1–10 and replacing them with substitute claims 11–20. Additionally, for the foregoing reasons, and after having analyzed the entirety of the record and assigning appropriate weight to the cited supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that proposed substitute claims 11–20 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 57

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Having weighed the evidence and Petitioner’s argument, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as: (1) a mechanical or biomedical engineer with at least three years of experience in designing or developing medical devices who would, where necessary or desired, work or consult with others including a physician to develop such a medical device; or (2) an interventional cardiologist or cardiac surgeon with at least three years of experience developing and/or using medical devices in the heart, and who would, where necessary, work or consult with others including an engineer to develop such a medical device. See Pet. 15–16.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Vesely. Ex. 1003. We have reviewed the credentials of Dr. Vesely and consider him qualified to provide the opinions for which his testimony has 4 Goldfarb et al. (US 7,563,267 B2, July 21, 2009) (“Goldfarb ’267”) (Ex. 1005). 5 Petitioner refers to Goldfarb’s ’267 disclosure of a further alternative at Ex. 1005 col. 27 ll. 57–60 as Embodiment A. See Pet. 19. We understand the asserted Embodiment A to encompass the description that extends to Ex. 1005 col. 28, l. 9. See Pet. 24–48. 6 Goldfarb et al. (US 7,635,329 B2, December 22, 2009) (“Goldfarb ’329”) Ex. 1006. 7 Ex. 1005 cols. 17–23, ll. 66–29, Figs. 9–16; see Pet. 21–22. been submitted. See id. ¶¶ 1–9; see also Ex. 1004 (Dr. Vesely’s curriculum vitae).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “is described in Goldfarb ’267 as plainly a single, unitary structure and, as such, each portion argued as separate elements by Petitioner (i.e., male element (yellow), female element (green), coupling member 19 (blue) and flexible arms 19A and 19B (dark blue)) together form a solid, single component. Thus, all of the “elements” described by Petitioner as being “separate” are in fact a single unit that: (1) bears the weight of the fixation device during delivery; (2) absorbs and transfer the axial and rotational forces imposed by the shaft 12; and (3) holds the device in the correct orientation. Petitioner points to no disclosure of Goldfarb ’267 that suggests these elements act independently or separately to perform the functions of the unitary component, nor can we discern any such disclosure. We therefore find that Petitioner’s argument that only the “male element” portion of coupling member 19 constitutes the “support portion” recited in proposed substitute claim 11 is an arbitrary and unduly restrictive interpretation of the reference’s disclosure. This is particularly true given that Petitioner points to no portion of the male element of coupling member 19 performing a supporting function that is not shared by the other elements of coupling member 19. We conclude that the better understanding of the reference is that the entirety of coupling member 19 (including flexible arms 10A and 19B11) constitutes an analogous support portion, as recited by substitute claim 11, because it provides a unitary structure that performs the supporting functions enumerated by Petitioner.” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 10,702,385 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,702,385
• Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 29, 2022 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because Coffee did not disclose the claimed copying, and Coffee combined with Heijden did not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In our Initial and Rehearing Decisions, we noted that Patent Owner did not contest Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art at that stage of the proceeding and we found “Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’308 patent and the prior art of record.” Initial Dec. 13 (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978)); Rehearing Dec. 16 (same). Therefore, we adopted Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Initial Dec. 13; Rehearing Dec. 16. In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s offered level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 7. Accordingly, we maintain our preliminary finding by adopting Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, as set forth above.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “received message 7102 and the header of the response message 7202 are not the same. PO Resp. 25 (citations omitted); Pet. Reply 14. In the Petition, Petitioner argued that “header information” was the same in each message (received and response). Pet. 32 (citations omitted), 36–37. Petitioner relies on Tables 58 and 63, which show “Header.” Id. at 32–33, 37. Petitioner also relies on paragraphs 102 and 118 of Mr. Andrews’s Declaration. Neither the Petition nor Mr. Andrews’s Declaration, however, provide any sufficient basis to find that even a portion of the header or header information is copied from the received message to the response message. Mr. Andrews states his opinion as though it were fact without providing the underlying factual support for his opinion. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102, 118; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). In cross-examination, Mr. Andrews provided additional information explaining which portion of the headers he believes are the same, but he still does not provide any explanation as to why he believes the information is copied. See, e.g., Ex. 2007 at 111:3–25. The same is true of Petitioner’s Reply, which reiterates Mr. Andrews’s deposition testimony, but still fails to provide any reason as to why Coffee’s charts or Mr. Andrews’ testimony necessarily means that Coffee copies a portion of the header from the received message to the response message. See Continental Can Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”). And, despite Petitioner’s identification of a “Header” listed in Tables 58 and 63, Coffee does not expressly describe the header or part of the header as being copied from the received message to the response message. The Petition and Mr. Andrews also state that “if Coffee did not employ such copying, the response message would not automatically include information extracted from the received message.” Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 118). But, Coffee does not expressly describe the header as being “extracted from the received message” or describe automatically including the header in a response message to make the leap argued by Petitioner and Mr. Andrews. Accordingly, on the full record before us, we find that Petitioner has not established that Coffee explicitly or inherently discloses copying the header or header information and we do not credit Mr. Andrews’ testimony, discussed above, because he fails to provide the underlying factual basis for the opinions offered.” slip op. at 43

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “proceeding and on the full record before us, we do not find that Coffee’s silence is sufficient to support Petitioner’s argument. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Gamon Plus, Inc., 787 Fed. Appx. 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“We do not find any error in the Board changing its understanding of the teachings of [a prior art reference] from the institution decision to the final written decision. ‘The Board is not bound by any findings made in its Institution Decision. At that point, the Board is considering the matter preliminarily without the benefit of a full record. The Board is free to change its view of the merits after further development of the record, and should do so if convinced that its inclinations were wrong.’” (quoting Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2016))). Coffee does not explain the process by which the IOD of the received message is included in the response message; rather, Coffee just states that the response message “contains the IOD of the message being answered.” See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 56:63–67 (see full text quoted above). In particular, although Coffee attributes certain actions to the operator, the lack of attribution to the operator does not necessitate that the only viable possibility remaining is that Coffee copies the IOD from the received message to the response message. Even if it may be said that Coffee probably (or possibly) copies the IOD, that probability is not sufficient to find that Coffee necessarily copies the IOD. See Continental Can, 948 F.2d at 1269 (“Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”).7 Additionally, on the full record before us, we determine that Mr. Andrews’s testimony, as with his testimony as to copying of the header and selected response, fails to provide any factual or underlying support for his opinions expressed therein. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 100–102. In particular, the leap occurs in paragraph 102, where Mr. Andrews takes the fact that some information (at least the IOD) from the received formatted message is included with the response message to opine that this means the information is “copied over.” Id. ¶ 102. But, again, Coffee is silent. And because Mr. Andrews did not provide any underlying factual basis for his opinion, we do not credit his testimony as to copying the IOD. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 48

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “generally, including the alleged benefits of such and reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to include field-mapping information in Coffee’s MDT. See id. at 62–70. None of Petitioner’s discussion, however, explains how the combination of Coffee and Heijden remedies the deficiencies that we identified regarding Petitioner’s challenge based on Coffee. In particular, Petitioner does not assert or explain how the teachings of Heijden would be applied to Coffee such that Coffee would then copy or fill in the specific information from Coffee’s received message to Coffee’s response message, particularly as pertains to the header, Response, and IOD fields (which Petitioner relied on in the first ground), or any other information field from Coffee. The same is true of Mr. Andrews’s testimony. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 214–231. Additionally, it appears that Petitioner’s analysis of the combination of Heijden and Coffee maintains the position that Coffee copies information fields. See Pet. 70 (“Given that Coffee’s system already implements field mapping to copy information fields . . . .”). And, Mr. Andrews’s testimony similarly maintains that Coffee copies information fields. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 229 (“Coffee also discloses (at least inherently) field mapping by describing that data is copied from fields in request messages into corresponding fields in response message.”). But, as we explain in detail in the context of Petitioner’s challenge based on Coffee, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Coffee copies or fills in information from a received message to a response message. Thus, we do not find and Petitioner does not allege that Ground “1B” fills the gaps identified in Petitioner’s Ground “1A.”10 Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the combination of Coffee and Heijden would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1–4, 7–9, and 12 unpatentable.” slip op. at 60

  Patent outcomesUS 6,925,308 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,925,308
• Incyte Corporation v. Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 11, 2022 · PGR2021-00006 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–7 and 9–21 not shown unpatentable over either obviousness ground because Petitioner did not establish motivation to select Compound (I) from Silverman’s genus.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “It is not necessary for an expert’s experience or expertise to precisely match the art at issue. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, one offering expert testimony must at least have ordinary skill in the art to provide relevant and reliable testimony that is helpful to the factfinder. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools, Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf?MURL=). Dr. Patterson has a Ph.D. in Chemistry and over 30 years of experience in drug design, drug administration, evaluation of drug effectiveness, and participated in drug design for over 20 years. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4–10; Ex. 1008, 1–2. He is author or co-author on over eight peer-reviewed journal articles involving medicinal chemistry. Ex. 1007 ¶ 5. We find this level of skill to meet the qualifications for the level of skill in the art under the training and experience portion of the definition we have adopted for purposes of this opinion (see § II.B.), reproduced below: a Ph.D. in chemistry, pharmaceutical sciences, molecular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar background. A POSA would also have had at least several years of experience with drug design, drug development, clinical trials, or access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience. Likewise, a POSA would have had knowledge and experience in treating hair loss disorders, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. We note that Dr. Patterson himself also proposes this definition. Id. ¶ 102. However, Dr. Patterson does not have “knowledge and experience in treating hair loss disorders” and did not opine that, in regards to his testimony, he had access to a person with that knowledge and experience, as is proposed in the definition. See generally, Ex. 1007. Accordingly, we find Dr. Patterson qualified to opine on the level of ordinary skill with regard to issues of drug design, evaluation of effectiveness, and drug administration, but we find he is not adequately qualified to opine on the level of ordinary skill with regard to issues of treating hair loss disorders.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proposes the same definition as Petitioner, but adds that the skilled artisan “would also have had experience in JAK inhibition, deuteration, and AA [alopecia areata] formulations, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience.” Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2059 ¶ 14). Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Ko critiques Petitioner’s proposed definition as “incomplete, because it lacks any requirement for experience, or access to individuals with experience, in JAK inhibition, deuteration, and AA formulations.” Ex. 2059 ¶ 16. However, neither Dr. Ko nor Patent Owner explains what difference this additional direct experience would have provided to an artisan with the skill level proposed by Petitioner, particularly when Petitioner’s definition includes “experience in treating hair loss disorders,” and for which the record contains evidence that existing JAK inhibitors such as ruxolitinib had been identified as causing reversal of hair loss caused by AA. Ex. 1003, 1043. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition as consistent with the level of skill apparent in the cited prior art. In any event, as Patent Owner does not explain why its alternative definition would have any bearing on the outcome of the present case, and as we discern no appreciable difference in the parties’ definitions, we note our findings and conclusions would be the same regardless of which definition were adopted. We further note that the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. Therefore, we construe the challenged claims under the framework set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under this framework, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”), at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id. Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We have considered Petitioner’s claim construction proposals (see Pet. 21–23), which are uncontested (see generally Resp., not addressing construction), and find that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of rendering this Decision.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “Section 102(b)(1) provides two exceptions to § 102(a)(1) for disclosures made within one year of the effective filing date. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) provides that a disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) with respect to the claimed invention if: (A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,561,659 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,561,659

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.