• Polygroup Limited Mco v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2020 · IPR2016-01612 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 of the ’186 patent were held unpatentable; other remanded challenged claims were not, and substitute claims 29 and 30 were allowed.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated our Original Decision in part and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Polygroup Ltd. MCO v. Willis Elec. Co., Ltd, 759 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2019). After conferring with the parties, we permitted additional briefing to address the issues on remand from the Federal Circuit. Paper 196.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “electrical connection in a single step (e.g., “‘when’ the mechanical connection is made, an electrical connection is also made”) as Patent Owner alleges. Rather, claim 1 requires “a first trunk electrical connector” and “a second trunk electrical connector” with “the second tree portion [being] electrically connectable to the first tree portion such that a portion of the first trunk electrical connector of the first trunk portion contacts a portion of the second trunk electrical connector of the second trunk portion.” Although the claim also requires that “the second tree portion is mechanically coupleable to the first tree portion about a central vertical axis,” the claim permits that mechanical connection to be independent of the electrical connection. Giving claim 1 its proper reading, there is no dispute that Miller teaches first and second trunk electrical connectors or that its tree portions are coupleable about a central vertical axis as outlined in the Petition. See Pet. I 45–48.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner contends that one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings based on those from Lessner. Pet. II 65–70. Petitioner reasons, for example, that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to enhance the mechanical and electrical connections between the electrical contacts sets and wiring assemblies of Miller[] with the detachable electrical connectors of Lessner” for “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly.” Id. at 65–66 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner further reasons that “the detachable connectors of Lessner provide a quick-connect engagement allowing the builder to easily and quickly attach the wires to the terminals on the trunk connector during assembly,” which “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts.” Id. at 66. Petitioner’s contentions as to why one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings are unpersuasive. As discussed above, Petitioner cited Miller’s plug and socket connectors as corresponding to the recited trunk connectors. Petitioner’s proposed modification in the Miller alone challenge adds an additional connection point in Miller’s plug and socket connectors, further complicating assembly, rather than providing greater “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly” as alleged. Petitioner’s additional reasoning that the proposed modification “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts” is equally unpersuasive. The only difference resulting from the modification is that the plug and socket connectors could be removed from their respective wiring assemblies. That is, it provides for removal of one connector by providing yet another connector, which fails to provide a benefit because Miller’s plug and socket connectors are loose, rather than fixed within the trunk portions like Patent Owner’s connectors. For at least these reasons, Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability of claim 7 of the ’186 patent by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “D. Secondary Considerations As explained in the Original Decision, Patent Owner provides evidence related to non-obviousness of the claims. Original Decision 43–60. Considering that evidence, as explained in the Original Decision, relative to the fact that Miller alone teaches each element of these claims in a single embodiment16, we determine that Patent Owner’s evidence does not outweigh Petitioner’s case of obviousness for claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has established by the preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 are unpatentable. Petitioner has failed to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that claim 7 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,454,187 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,454,187
• Polygroup Limited Mco v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2020 · IPR2016-01610 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 of the ’186 patent were held unpatentable; other remanded challenged claims were not shown unpatentable, and substitute claims 29 and 30 were allowed.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandMixed

    “On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated our Original Decision in part and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Polygroup Ltd. MCO v. Willis Elec. Co., Ltd, 759 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2019). After conferring with the parties, we permitted additional briefing to address the issues on remand from the Federal Circuit. Paper 196.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “and the second wire are detachably connected to the first trunk electrical connector of the first trunk portion.” Petitioner acknowledges that “Miller does not expressly teach that the wiring assembly is ‘modular’ or ‘separably connected.’” Pet. II 65. Petitioner contends that “assemblies for providing a detachable connection between electrical contact sets and wiring harnesses were well-known in the art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner contends that “Lessner teaches a ‘quick-disconnect electrical connector for receiving and releasably retaining a male tab connector’ and a [person of skill in the art (POSA)] would recognize that it may be used to create detachable connections between the electrical contacts of a connector or plug, and the wires of a wiring assembly.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 1:10–11; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner contends that one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings based on those from Lessner. Pet. II 65–70. Petitioner reasons, for example, that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to enhance the mechanical and electrical connections between the electrical contacts sets and wiring assemblies of Miller[] with the detachable electrical connectors of Lessner” for “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly.” Id. at 65–66 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner further reasons that “the detachable connectors of Lessner provide a quick-connect engagement allowing the builder to easily and quickly attach the wires to the terminals on the trunk connector during assembly,” which “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts.” Id. at 66. Petitioner’s contentions as to why one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings are unpersuasive. As discussed above, Petitioner cited Miller’s plug and socket connectors as corresponding to the recited trunk connectors. Petitioner’s proposed modification in the Miller alone challenge adds an additional connection point in Miller’s plug and socket connectors, further complicating assembly, rather than providing greater “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly” as alleged. Petitioner’s additional reasoning that the proposed modification “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts” is equally unpersuasive. The only difference resulting from the modification is that the plug and socket connectors could be removed from their respective wiring assemblies. That is, it provides for removal of one connector by providing yet another connector, which fails to provide a benefit because Miller’s plug and socket connectors are loose, rather than fixed within the trunk portions like Patent Owner’s connectors. For at least these reasons, Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability of claim 7 of the ’186 patent by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedUnpatentable

    “D. Secondary Considerations As explained in the Original Decision, Patent Owner provides evidence related to non-obviousness of the claims. Original Decision 43–60. Considering that evidence, as explained in the Original Decision, relative to the fact that Miller alone teaches each element of these claims in a single embodiment16, we determine that Patent Owner’s evidence does not outweigh Petitioner’s case of obviousness for claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has established by the preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 are unpatentable. Petitioner has failed to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that claim 7 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 21

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “The figure reproduced above is a portion of Miller’s Figure 2, which is a front, partial section view of its artificial tree, along with Petitioner’s annotations noting Miller’s electrical connections (circled in red). Pet. I 29. As seen above, Petitioner cites Miller’s plug and socket connection as the electrical connection recited in the claims. See Pet. I 33 (“Miller also teaches that wires 22 of trunks 3, 5 are electrically connectable via plug and socket connectors of Fig. 2.”), 42, 57–58 (presenting similar contentions for claims 20 and 28). The problem with Petitioner’s contentions that rely on Miller alone is that the electrical connection in Miller is independent of the mechanical connection of tree portions (i.e., the mechanical connection does not result in the electrical connection in the manner claimed). For at least this reason, Petitioner’s challenges to claims 10, 20, and 28 based on Miller alone fail.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,454,186 mixed
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,454,186
• Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00627 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 10–16, 21–23, 25, and 38–46 are unpatentable; claims 6–9, 17–20, 24, and 47 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Although the dictionary defines “periodically” as “from time to time” or “at regular intervals of time,” based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner that its proposed construction is how one skilled in the art would have understood that term in the context of the ’345 patent Specification. Turning first to the intrinsic evidence, the Specification explains that “[t]he future and current minimum values are calculated continuously and initiated periodically, for example, every 5 seconds.” Ex. 1001, 8:37–39. Although the Specification later notes that “[i]t will be appreciated that, while specific values are used as in the several equations and calculations employed in the present invention, these values may be different than those shown” (id. at 8:64–67), this passage does not mean that the Specification contemplates arrangements where “periodically” is simply “from time to time.” Rather, we determine that statement from the Specification indicates that the specific amount of time (i.e., every 5 seconds) may vary. Turning now to the extrinsic evidence, the testimony of Dr. Douglas supports our conclusion, explaining that “at regular intervals of time” is the “only . . . definition . . . consistent with the understanding of a person skilled in the art in light of the specification of the ’345 Patent and its use in the particular field of audio signal processing” because [l]ike the “period” of an audio signal itself, which is the amount of time it takes for a signal to repeat itself, “periodically” as recited in claims 6 and 9 and throughout the remainder of the specification of the ’345 Patent refers to actions that occur at regular intervals (e.g., every 5 seconds rather than merely “from time to time”). Ex. 2002 ¶ 48. Moreover, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Hochwald testifies that outside of the context of the ’345 patent Specification, “periodically” means “at regular time intervals” (Ex. 2005, 99:13–15), and when asked about that term’s meaning in the context of the ’345 patent Specification, Dr. Hochwald simply noted that “all I can do is read what it says,” which is that “[i]t’s doing something periodically, for example, every five seconds” (id. at 100:4–6). Accordingly, the testimony from Dr. Douglas, as well as that from Dr. Hochwald, supports Patent Owner’s construction. In summary, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction of “periodically,” requiring “at regular intervals of time,” because (1) this is consistent with how this term is used in the context of the ’345 Patent Specification; and (2) this is supported by the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Patent Owner responds that, because Helf uses average values (i.e., the average of eight consecutive values), it does not disclose using a minimum value. PO Resp. 17–23. Patent Owner acknowledges that the ’345 patent, itself, uses a “smoothing process [that] produces frequency bins with multiple smoothed magnitude values, ultimately finding the minimum of all of the values,” but contends that “Helf’s averaging process produces a single output representing one average of the original samples.” Id. at 20–21 (underlining omitted) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:14–28; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72). We disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the differences between Helf and the ’345 patent. While Helf may ultimately produce a single minimum value, as discussed above, that value is based on a minimum value of the averages calculated over the given time period. At oral hearing, Patent Owner acknowledged that Helf determines many averages values (i.e., the averages of the eight consecutive frames) and determines a minimum of those values. See, e.g., Tr. 22:2–6. The claim simply requires a “future minimum value,” and does not preclude that value from being a minimum value taken from a set of average values. Indeed, such an interpretation of the claim would be inconsistent with the ’345 patent’s use of smoothed values noted by Patent Owner. Ex. 1001, 8:14–28. The testimony of Dr. Douglas cited by Patent Owner does not convince us otherwise. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72 (effectively repeating Patent Owner’s contentions, which are unpersuasive for the reasons set forth above). Accordingly, we are persuaded that Helf’s minimum value (Mk) corresponds to the “future minimum value” recited in claims 4 and 39.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed

    “With respect to its “running minimum estimator,” Helf explains that the “running minimum estimator” is used “when either the speech signal is never absent for more than a second or the background noise itself is never constant in spectral shape.” Ex. 1010, 8:11–15. Helf acknowledges that its “running minimum estimator” is “much less accura[te]” than its “stationary estimator,” which is typically used for background noise estimates. Id. at 8:15–17. As a result, Helf only uses its “running minimum estimator” if “[i]t has been more than 10 seconds since the last update of the background noise spectral estimate due to the Stationary Estimator,” and “[t]he difference, D, between the past background noise estimate, which may have resulted from the Stationary Estimator or the Running Minimum Estimator, and the current Running Minimum Estimator is great.” Id. at 8:32–42. We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,363,345 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,363,345
• Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00626 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 12–25, 38, and 47 are unpatentable; claims 4–11 and 39–46 are not shown unpatentable, chiefly because the proposed Hirsch–Martin combination was not supported.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Reply, Petitioner contends that, “[i]n this configuration [where W = 1], any purported distinction between windows and sub-windows in Martin vanishes and [Patent Owner]’s argument is irrelevant,” acknowledging that the proposed modification eliminates Martin’s sub-windows. Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner further contends that Patent Owner “incorrectly argues that the use of sub-windows is central to Martin’s algorithm” and “[n]othing in Martin suggests that the use of sub-windows is required.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 6–8). We disagree with Petitioner, and credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald with respect to Martin’s use of sub-windows because, as discussed below, Dr. Hochwald’s testimony is not consistent with the disclosure of Martin, while the testimony of Dr. Douglas is consistent with that disclosure. See, e.g., Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 6–9 (asserting that Martin does not expressly require sub-windows); Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 94–96 (discussing Martin’s use of at least two sub-windows for monotonic determination). As noted above, Martin’s algorithm requires a determination of whether or not “the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing.” Ex. 1006, 1094. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to modify Hirsch’s system based on a scenario from Martin where W = 1 because such a scenario is counter to the entire purpose of Martin. Even Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Hochwald, acknowledges that a single data point (i.e., W = 1) cannot be used to determine whether something is monotonically increasing. See Ex. 2005 69:10–17 (explaining that you need at least two data points to make such a determination, meaning W ≥ 2). Petitioner fails to provide persuasive reasoning as to why one skilled in the art would have modified Hirsch’s teachings in a manner that is contrary to the express disclosure of Martin.” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner attempts to cure these deficiencies in its Reply, contending that, “[e]ven where Martin’s algorithm is configured to use multiple sub-windows, it still teaches the claimed ‘future minimum.’” Pet. Reply 8. We do not consider this new argument, as it is a new theory of unpatentability presented for the first time in the Petitioner’s Reply. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed Cir. 2016) (“A patent owner . . . is undoubtedly entitled to notice of and a fair opportunity to meet the grounds of [unpatentability].”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). For at least these reasons, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 4–11, 39–42, and 46 are unpatentable over the combined teachings of Hirsch and Martin.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Hirsch is directed to “techniques . . . to estimate the noise spectra or the noise characteristics for noisy speech signals” that “can be combined with a nonlinear spectral subtraction scheme.” Ex. 1005, 153. Hirsch discusses use of “FFT based spectral analysis” (id. at 154), for example, which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “generating the frequency spectrum of said audio signal thereby generating frequency bins of said audio signal” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27). Hirsch discusses use of an “adaptive threshold” for each frequency bin to distinguish between speech and noise (Ex. 1005, 153), which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “setting a threshold for each frequency bin using a noise estimation process” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27). Hirsch describes comparing spectral components to their corresponding thresholds to determine if speech is present (Ex. 1005, 153), which Petitioner cites as corresponding to the “detecting for each frequency bin whether the magnitude of the frequency bin is less than the corresponding threshold, thereby detecting the position of noise elements for each frequency bin” recited in claim 1 (Pet. 27–28). Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Hirsch discloses each and every element of claim 1. We also are persuaded that Hirsch discloses each and every element of claim 38 for the reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1, as well as the “subtracting said noise elements . . . from said audio signal” additionally recited in claim 38. With respect to the recited “subtracting,” Petitioner cites Hirsch’s discussion of spectral subtraction. Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1005, 153–155). As Petitioner notes, “[t]he spectral subtraction technique shown in Hirsch subtracts the noise estimate from each sub-band or ‘bin’ and sets any negative values to zero” (id. (citing Ex. 1005, 153)), which “is the same technique used in the ’345 patent” (id. (citing Ex. 1001, 6:58–61, 7:16–27)). Claims 2, 3, 12, 13, 21, and 23 depend from claim 1, and Petitioner cites to relevant portions of Hirsch as disclosing the additional limitations of those claims. See Pet. 28–31. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s unrebutted arguments and evidence related to how Hirsch properly accounts for each and every element of these dependent claims, which we adopt for purposes of this decision. Specifically, we find that Hirsch discloses the additional limitations recited in those claims based on the citations to Hirsch therein and the supporting expert testimony. See id. Based on our review of the record before us, the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s contentions that claims 1–3, 12, 13, 21, 23, and 38 are anticipated by Hirsch.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed

    “Initially, we agree with Petitioner that one skilled in the art would have considered Martin’s teachings, generally, when reviewing the teachings of Hirsch, as Martin is specifically referenced in Hirsch itself. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that one skilled in the art would have modified Hisch’s system based on the teachings of Martin in the particular manner proposed by Petitioner. Consistent with Patent Owner’s contentions noted above, Martin describes determining “[t]he noise power estimate is based on the minimum of signal power within a window of L samples” and “[f]or reasons of computational complexity and delay the data window of length L is decomposed into W windows of length M such that M * W = L,” and provides an example where W=4. Ex. 1006, 1094. Martin distinguishes between “slowly varying noise power” and “rapidly varying noise power” to determine its noise power estimate, with a determination of whether the minimum power in successive sub-windows is monotonically increasing central to its estimation. Id. “If the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing we decide on rapid noise power variation” and “the noise power estimate equals the power minimum of the last M samples Pn(i) = PMmin(i = r * M).” Id. “In case of non monotonic power the noise power estimate is set to the minimum of the length L window.” Id. Regardless of whether the noise power calculation is that for “slowly varying noise power” or “rapidly varying noise power,” Martin requires that first a determination is made as to whether or not “the minimum power of the last W windows with M samples each is monotonically increasing.” Id. (emphasis added). To the extent there can be any dispute on this issue, the testimony from Dr. Douglas supports the understanding that at least two subwindows are required to determine which noise power calculation to use. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 95, 96. In its Reply, Petitioner contends that, “[i]n this configuration [where” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 6,363,345 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,363,345
• Van Der Hoeven Horticultural Projects B.V. v. Houweling Nurseries Oxnard, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 6, 2018 · IPR2017-00476 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 29 is unpatentable over Reisinger under § 103; claims 1–28 were not shown unpatentable because Reisinger’s ducting is not an end gable and the proposed combination lacked a sufficient rationale.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “and 2 above, the “gabled end” is a region at an end wall of the greenhouse separated from the growing section by a partition. The ’617 patent also explains that “the greenhouse can be arranged without a gabled end,” and provides an example of such an arrangement as one where “the first louver [is] arranged over the fans with the cooling mechanism located at the fans such that ambient air can be pulled directly into the tubes with the air passing the cooling mechanism for additional cooling” and “[p]ipes . . . provide an air passageway between the second vent and the fans during the mode when air from within the crop section is to be recycled.” Ex. 1001, 9:33–41 (emphases added). As noted above, in such arrangements, a direct flow path is provided between first vent 24/first louver 30 to draw ambient air into the system and piping provides a flow path from second vent 34/second louver 36 for air recirculation from growing section 16. We find that “piping,” as used in the ’617 patent, is ducting, as that term is used in the art. Consistent with that finding, Patent Owner’s declarant Mr. Turkewitsch distinguishes ducting from structure such as a plenum or a chamber. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 53:22–55:10. Accordingly, we determine that the alternate example from the ’617 patent noted above discloses use of a ducted system in place of gabled end 14 for air flow. Based on the Specification, therefore, we find that ducting or other piping is not considered an “end gable” in the ’617 patent. As discussed further below, for purposes of this decision, we do not need to determine the precise requirements of the term “end gable” in the claims in order to determine that Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability of the claims including that term because we at least determine that, even under the broadest reasonable interpretation, an “end gable” does not include ducting.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Petitioner contends that Reisinger’s fresh air inlet 2, for example, corresponds to the “one or more vents” and flap 10 corresponds to the “one or more mechanisms selectively moveable to cooperate with said one or more vents to control air flow through said one or more vents.” Pet. 64–65 (referencing discussion of similar limitations in claim 1 discussed on pages 35–40 of the Petition). Petitioner explains that Reisinger’s climate control system also meets the additional limitations directed to operation of the “climate control system” in claim 29. Id. (referencing discussion of similar limitations in claim 1 discussed on pages 40–44 of the Petition). We are persuaded by those contentions, which Patent Owner does not dispute.10 With respect to any requirement that the claim has regarding a roof and sidewalls, generally, we are also persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions in connection with those features. See, e.g., Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 86– 88). Petitioner explains, for example, that “a POSA would have understood Reisinger to disclose them because a greenhouse was known to include a ceiling, and Reisinger’s disclosed function of smoothly adjusting the ratio of fresh air and recirculated air would not work unless the air inlets 1 and 2 were enclosed on the sides.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute those contentions, which, as stated above, we find persuasive.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Reisinger’s greenhouse and climate control system, because . . . Landstrom is in the same field of endeavor as Reisinger,” “there would have been a reasonable and predictable expectation of success to a POSA in combining the teachings of Reisinger and Landstrom to incorporate Landstrom’s end gable chamber into Reisinger,” and “incorporating Landstrom’s end gable chamber into Reisinger’s greenhouse and climate control system including vents, louver and airflow modes does not change the principle of operation of either component.” Id. at 79–81. Patent Owner disputes whether Landstrom teaches an “end gable” or an “end portion,” and contends that Petitioner has failed to establish that one skilled in the art would have combined Landstrom’s teachings asserted by Petitioner in connection with those features with Reisinger. PO Resp. 66– 72, 74–75. Even accepting Petitioner’s contentions that Landstrom teaches an “end gable” and an “end portion” as required by the claims, Petitioner has failed to establish sufficiently that one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to include those features from Landstrom in Reisinger’s system. Sufficient rationale for combing features from multiple references requires more than those references merely being in the same field of endeavor and that the combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success and not change the principle of operation. See Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention”). We are lacking any, let alone sufficient, rationale from Petitioner in this proceeding.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “obviousness in Patent Owner’s Response fails to address any relation of the claim elements, or even any particular claim, to that evidence. See PO Resp. 76–80. Nevertheless, even if we were to assume some nexus, that nexus appears to be between Patent Owner’s evidence and the features of claims 1 and 17, rather than those of claim 29. For example, in its discussion of copying, Patent Owner asserts “the ModulAir design has the same ‘corridor’ (or ‘end gable’) design as that of the Ultra Clima®.” Id. at 78. As noted above, claim 29 recites an “end portion,” rather than the “end gable” recited in claims 1 and 17. Moreover, Patent Owner presents evidence of similar designs, rather than actual copying. See, e.g., id. (“the designs are almost identical”). “[C]opying requires the replication of a specific product.” Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). That products are similar is not persuasive evidence of copying. See Iron Grip, 392 F.3d at 1325 (“Not every competing product that arguably falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying. Otherwise every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent.”). With respect to industry praise, we note that evidence, too, is only relevant when it is directed to the merits of the invention claimed. See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Patent Owner fails to provide any connection between the particular features of claim 29 and the alleged industry praise. Nevertheless, even if we were to assume sufficient nexus had been established by Patent Owner, when we weigh all of the evidence, for and against patentability, we determine that the preponderance of the evidence weighs in favor of unpatentability of claim 29. As explained above, we are persuaded that Reisinger, itself, in a single embodiment, teaches each of the features found in claim 29, other than expressly describing a roof and sidewalls. As also explained above, however, we are persuaded that one skilled in the art would readily appreciate that greenhouses include a roof and sidewalls, which Patent Owner does not dispute. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s evidence does not outweigh Petitioner’s evidence of obviousness.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,707,617 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,707,617
• Willis Electric Co., Ltd. v. Polygroup Macau Ltd. (Bvi)Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 7, 2018 · IPR2017-00309 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 4 are unpatentable over Chen and McLeish; the challenges to claims 2–3 and 5–10 were not established, and the Otto and McLeish ground failed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Claim 1 recites “a plurality of tree trunk sections” and a “power distribution subsystem comprising a female end . . . having . . . a channel void” and specifies that the “power distribution system [is] disposed within an inner void of a second [tree] trunk section.” There is no dispute that each embodiment of the ’416 patent shows the power distribution subsystem is a component separate and distinct from the tubular structure defining the body of the various “tree trunk sections.” For example, Figure 8 of the ’416 patent, reproduced above in the summary of the ’416 patent, shows the power distribution subsystem as a separate component with female end 700 of the power distribution subsystem, itself, defining channel receiving void 710. Id. at 12:38–44, Fig. 8. Although the Specification of the ’416 patent makes clear that the patent is not limited to these embodiments (see, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:14–56), the claims specifically recite a “power distribution subsystem” separate and distinct from the “tree trunk section.” Specifically, they require the “power distribution subsystem [is] disposed within an inner void of [the tree] trunk section.” Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, the plain language of claim 1 requires that the “channel void” is formed in the “power distribution subsystem,” rather than some combination of an external surface of the power distribution subsystem and an internal surface defining the inner void of tree trunk section.4 Petitioner’s contentions regarding the word “having” do not persuade us otherwise. Petitioner’s proposed construction is unreasonably broad, as it is divorced from the plain language of the claims. The evidence before us, discussed above in this section, supports Patent Owner’s contentions that “the female end [of the power distribution subsystem] having . . . a channel void” requires that “channel void” is formed in the female end of the power distribution subsystem. For at least these reasons, we determine that the “channel void” in claim 1 must be formed in the female end of the power distribution subsystem (i.e., not defined only by an outer wall of the power distribution system in combination with an interior void of the tree trunk section).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Chen was published on March 29, 2012. Ex. 1007, (65). A provisional patent application, such as the one at issue in this proceeding, is available to the public upon written request and payment of a fee after, for example, the non-provisional application is published. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.11(a) and 1.14(a)(1)(v). We see no basis for Patent Owner’s position that Chen’s provisional patent application was not sufficiently publicly available. Indeed, as noted above, Patent Owner’s position is premised on the mistaken understanding that provisional patent applications are not publicly available until the corresponding non-provisional filing issues as a patent. Patent Owner acknowledges it has no particular support for its contentions. See, e.g., Tr. 38:22–39:1 (“And while both sides have cited a variety of cases, surprisingly to me there is no case that precisely addresses this.”). Based on the record before us, we determine that the disclosure from the provisional application was properly incorporated by reference in Chen and publically available as of the publication date of the application resulting in the Chen patent (i.e., March 29, 2012). Therefore, the provisional application is part of the disclosure of Chen.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “As for the “spring activated contact” limitations, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions that spring-activated contacts were well known in the art at the time of the invention. See Pet. 33–35 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1007, 2:5–18, 11:21–28, 12:30–37; Ex. 1011, 12:64–67; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 101–104). Indeed, there appears to be no dispute concerning that contention. See, e.g., PO Resp. 24. Nevertheless, we find that McLeish discloses spring-activated contacts. Ex. 1011, 12:64–67. Moreover, Chen also discloses, for example, “bringing a pair of spring contacts into alignment with a pair of terminals to make an electrical connection.” See Ex. 1007, 2:5–18. Further, we credit Dr. Durfee’s testimony, which provides additional evidence that spring-activated contacts were well known at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 101–104. We are also persuaded that one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to utilize a spring-activated contact in the provisional application at least because “such a contact in the central void of the female end [would] secure a reliable connection.” Pet. 35; see also id. at 41–42. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale in connection with the disclosure of the provisional application. With respect to the non-provisional disclosure, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s rationale is based on impermissible hindsight, that there is no evidence Chen’s connectors suffered from problems requiring the proposed modifications, and that the proposed modifications would render Chen inoperable. PO Resp. 22–29. To the extent these contentions are relevant to Petitioner’s proposed modification to the provisional application’s disclosure, we determine that Patent Owner’s response does not identify fault in Petitioner’s persuasive contentions with respect to the proposed modifications to the teachings of the provisional application’s disclosure. The provisional application explains that the portion considered the “central void” by Petitioner is “a conductive cylinder forming a recess 452 for receiving electrical connector [43]8.” Ex. 1008, 31. Petitioner’s proposed modification is simply to include a spring-activated contact on recess 452 to aid the engagement between recess 452 and electrical connector 438. Pet. 35; see also Tr. 59:8–9 (“With McLeish we’re only looking in this proceeding for very limited disclosure of electrical contacts.”). That recess 452 is part of what the provisional application’s disclosure, itself, characterizes as the female end. For at least the reasons explained above, we do not agree that such a modification is based solely on the disclosure from the ’416 patent. Nor does the proposed modification render the arrangement disclosed in the provisional application inoperable. Rather, spring-activated contacts improve the connection. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 102 (“[S]pring-activated contact(s) will ensure a more reliable electrical connection between two contacts. This is especially true where the electrical connections are detachable.”).” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,863,416 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,863,416
• Microsoft Corporation v. Iplearn-Focus, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2016 · IPR2015-00095 · APJ Richard E Rice · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 18, 22, 37, and 39 are unpatentable; claims 38, 40–42, 48, 55, and 56 are patentable, based on anticipation and obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “in the art (“POSITA”). According to Petitioner’s expert, Dr. David Forsyth, a POSITA would have had a combination of experience and education in computer vision and the design of human-computer interfaces. This typically would consist of a minimum of a bachelor of science in Computer Science or Electrical Engineering (or a related engineering field) plus either a year of graduate training or 2-4 years of relevant experience. The POSITA also would have been familiar with the design of, theory behind, principles of operation of, intended use of, and the underlying technology used in computer vision and human-computer interfaces. Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. David Crane, testifies that a POSITA “would have had a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in the field of computer engineering, computer science or electrical engineering and at least two to three years of experience relating to humanmachine interface design.” Ex. 2009 ¶ 15. Based on the competing arguments and evidence of record, we largely accept Patent Owner’s proposed definition. The definition proposed by Petitioner appears to be overly narrow because of its focus on “computer vision.” We have made minor modifications to Patent Owner’s definition to clarify the educational requirement, and to broaden the experience requirement to include at least a year of graduate training as an alternative to work experience, consistent with the background of researchers in the field as indicated by prior art references such as Hutchinson. See Ex. 1004, 1533–1534. We determine that a POSITA would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field, and at least a year of graduate training, or two years of work experience, relating to human-machine interfaces.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “(emphasis added). In the Institution Decision, we determined that the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification of the term “window” is a bounded sub-region of a computer display that is capable of displaying a distinctly different type of information than one or more other sub-regions of the computer display. Inst. Dec. 8 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:20–42). Neither of the parties proposes any change to that interpretation, and our review of the evidence does not indicate that any change is necessary. Consequently, we maintain our previous interpretation.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “the parties, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Hutchinson anticipates claim 1. See Pet. 14–15, 29–32; Pet. Reply 3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–51. As set forth in Petitioner’s claim chart, Hutchinson discloses each limitation of claim 1, including the “acquiring,” “analyzing,” “determining,” and “adjusting” steps. See Pet. 29–32. For example, the “adjusting” step requires “adjusting, by the computing device, materials for presenting to the user if the determining determines that the volitional input suggests the user not paying attention to materials in the first window.” Corresponding to that step, Hutchinson discloses that, after the user gazes for a period of time at a menu option in a display window, a tone sounds and an icon (cursor) appears in the display window in line with the gaze, but the enabled option is aborted if the user does not continue to gaze at the menu option for an additional period of time. Ex. 1004, 1530; see Pet. 31–32; Pet. Reply 3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 49–50. The abort mechanism of Hutchinson’s computing device discloses the “adjusting” step by aborting the enabled option (“adjusting . . . materials for presenting to the user”) if the computing device determines, itself, that the user is not directing his or her gaze at the menu option in the window (“if the determining determines that the volitional input suggests the user not paying attention to materials in the first window”). See Ex. 1004, 1530; supra Section II.A.5.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “claim 2. Pet. 20, 41–42; Pet. Reply 5–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–55. We agree, for example, that Hutchinson discloses “waiting for a period of time before adjusting,” as required by claim 2, “so that the user has a moment to alter his or her gaze before the system adjusts what is being presented.” Pet. 20, 41 (citing Ex. 1004, 1530; Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). With respect to the “network” requirement, we also agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to retrieve materials from another computing device over a network. Id. at 20, 42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 9, 15, 55). There is evidence of record that Black, for example, discloses such retrieval. Ex. 1003 ¶ 97. Further, we agree that Hutchinson discloses “adjusting comprises switching to alternative materials that are different from materials that would have been presented,” and that including “materials on a product” would have been obvious, as Petitioner contends. Pet. 20, 41–42 (citing Ex. 1004, 1530– 1531; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–55). Patent Owner responds that: “the ‘waiting before adjusting’ step must be performed after the ‘determining’ step and, additionally, be a distinct step from the ‘determining step’”; and that “Hutchinson . . . does not disclose a ‘waiting before adjusting step’ that is either separate and distinct from the ‘determining’ step or subsequent to it.” PO Resp. 29. Patent Owner argues that, “[a]t most, Hutchinson discloses waiting as part of the determining step.” Id. at 30. Patent Owner’s argument is not consistent with our interpretation that claim 2 encompasses “waiting for a period of time” as part of the “determining” step. See supra Section II.A.4. Hutchinson’s system satisfies the “waiting for a period of time before adjusting” step by allowing the user “a moment” to change or abort an enabled option before the system performs it. Ex. 1004, 1530 (emphasis added). The system performs the option only if the user continues to stare at the enabled option for a period of time (“a moment”) after a tone sounds and an icon appears. Id. For the reasons given, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Hutchinson renders obvious claim 2.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 8,475,174 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,475,174
• Microsoft Corporation v. Iplearn-Focus, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2016 · IPR2015-00097 · APJ Richard E Rice · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 13, 34, and 35 are unpatentable as anticipated by Hutchinson; claims 39 and 44 are unpatentable as obvious over Hutchinson and Krueger; claims 36 and 37 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Crane, testifies that a POSITA “would have had a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in the field of computer engineering, computer science or electrical engineering and at least two to three years of experience relating to human-machine interface design.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 15. Based on the competing arguments and evidence of record, we largely accept Patent Owner’s proposed definition. The definition proposed by Petitioner appears to be overly narrow because of its focus on “computer vision.” We have made minor modifications to Patent Owner’s definition to clarify the educational requirement, and to broaden the experience requirement to include at least a year of graduate training as an alternative to work experience, consistent with the background of researchers in the field as indicated by prior art references such as Hutchinson. See Ex. 1004, 1533–1534. We determine that a POSITA would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field, and at least a year of graduate training, or two years of work experience, relating to human-machine interfaces.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We find that the ordinary meanings of “content” are “[s]omething contained, as in a receptacle: the contents of my desk drawer; the contents of an aerosol can,”2 and “[i]nformation, such as text, video, and sound, usually as contrasted with its format of presentation: a television producer looking for content that was more entertaining.”3 Although the Specification does not define or use the term “content,” it sheds light on the meaning of the term, by describing a calibration technique utilizing the text and graphics (the content) of a message box to direct the user’s attention and to take a reference image. See Ex. 1001, 8:55–60 (describing a preferred embodiment 1 Exhibit 1033 does not contain Petitioner’s asserted definition, although, as referenced below, we found essentially the same definition on-line. 2 Ex. 1033. 3 http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/hmdictenglang/content_ 1/0?searchId=4da7a984-e49d-11e5-9bca-0e58d2201a4d&result=5 (last visited March 8, 2016). in which a reference image of the student’s face is taken when the student is looking at a message box containing the message “LOOK AT ME” and a picture of two eyes staring at the student; “the digital camera 180 takes a reference image of the student’s face, who typically looks at the two eyes”). Accordingly, we determine that the broadest reasonable construction consistent with the Specification of “content presented by the display” is “something contained within a portion of the display,” including, but not limited to, what is advocated for by Petitioner, i.e., “information, such as text, video, and sound.”” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “processor coupled to the imaging sensor and the display, the processor to analyze, relative to the display, at least the first set of measurements to identify whether the user is not paying attention to content presented by the display.” Specifically, as disclosed in Hutchinson, after the user gazes for a period of time at a menu box on the display, a tone sounds and an icon (cursor) appears in the menu box in line with the gaze, but the option associated with the menu box is aborted if the user does not continue to gaze at the box for an additional period of time. Ex. 1004, 1530; see Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71). Hutchinson’s processor meets the claim requirement for “a processor . . . to identify whether the user is not paying attention to content presented by the display” because, to implement the abort mechanism, the processor determines, itself, whether the user is not directing his or her gaze at the icon contained in the menu box, in accordance with our claim interpretation. See Ex. 1004, 1530; supra Section II.A.3.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Forsyth that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hutchinson and Krueger. As Petitioner argues, Hutchinson expressly contemplates using Erica with 7 Richard Epworth, Eye Movements, for a Bidirectional Human Interface, ICL TECHNICAL JOURNAL 384–411 (1990) (Ex. 1026). “hardware alternatives . . . such as head-tracking systems.” Ex. 1004, 1532 (emphasis added); see Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1004, 1532 and Ex. 2008, 108:21–109:7). Krueger not only discloses head-tracking, but touts its VIDEOTOUCH system as an improvement that identifies human-body features such as the head in real time, and without use of intrusive markers. Ex. 1008, 2:44–3:44, 4:5–10. We credit Dr. Forsyth’s deposition testimony explaining how Hutchinson’s eye-gaze system would have worked in combination with a head-tracking system. Ex. 2008, 93:16–102:1, 108:21– 109:7, 109:22–128:17. For example, we credit the following testimony:” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,538,321 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,538,321
• Schrader-Bridgeport International / Sensata Technologies Holding N.V. et al. v. Wasica Finance GmbH & Bluearc Finance AGSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 22, 2015 · IPR2014-00476 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 10, 12–19, and 21 are unpatentable over the stated Oselin grounds and combinations; claims 6 and 9 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “SUMMARY Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–5, 10, 12–19, and 21 of the ’524 patent are unpatentable. Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 6 and 9 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 34

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Indeed, the ’524 patent expressly discusses “measuring” with a switch-based pressure sensor when describing “measur[ing] the tire air-pressure by way of pressure sensors arranged on the vehicle wheels, which measurement signal is then displayed in a suitable way to the driver . . . for example, in DE-3930479 A1.” Ex. 1001, 1:45–49 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’524 patent describes a “pressure measuring device” as including either a device outputting a numeric value of air pressure or a switch-based device that indicates an anomalous pressure condition (e.g., high or low pressure). Consistent with the specification of the ’524 patent, we determine that the “pressure measuring device” recited in the claims can include a switch-based pressure sensor or a pressure sensor that outputs a numeric value of pressure.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “keying arrangement discussed by Patent Owner. Instead, as noted above, Petitioner simply relies on the discussion of “a frequency” in Oselin. When asked at oral hearing why the cited portion of Oselin (Ex. 1003, 8) is not related to a frequency shift keying arrangement, Petitioner replied that “[i]f [Oselin] wanted to talk about [frequency shift keying] and talk about frequencies that jump around, it would not be the common working frequency. It would be the common working frequencies.” Tr. 91:12–14. As noted above, Petitioner has no expert testimony supporting its contentions. At best, it is unclear whether Oselin uses a “constant” frequency, as required by claim 6. As such, the disclosure cited by Petitioner does not support the contention that Oselin explicitly discloses this feature by a preponderance of evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oselin anticipates claim 6.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “In response to Patent Owner’s contentions, Petitioner argues that “[t]he fact that Schultz drew schematics showing separate functional elements does not negate the fact that Schultz also taught that they could be integrated together.” Pet. Reply 14. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions. Schultz specifically notes that “the functions performed by the various elements comprising the foregoing schematic circuit diagrams may be implemented in a variety of ways,” and provides the example that “the functions performed by the pressure sensor circuit ma[y] be embodied in a unitary microchip (integrated circuit) for convenient disposition within the valve stem or valve stem cap of a vehicle tire.” Ex. 1005, 3:53–60. Schultz further explicitly states that “[t]he functional elements comprising the display unit may similarly be implemented in a microchip or microprocessor, and incorporated into a hand-held remote control display device.” Id. at 5:60–63. Patent Owner contends that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have recognized that the ‘functional elements’ implemented in Schultz’s microprocessor U3 include[] either the filter or amplifier U1.” PO Resp. 51. This is not persuasive because, as noted above, Schultz explains that “[t]he functional elements comprising the display unit may similarly be implemented in a microchip or microprocessor.” Ex. 1005, 5:60–62 (emphasis added). Patent Owner does not dispute that Schultz’s display unit 12 includes the filter and amplifier U1. Patent Owner additionally contends, contrary to the explicit teachings of Schultz noted above, that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have incorporated Schultz’s filter and amplifier U1 into the processor U3 for a number of reasons.” PO Resp. 51. For example, Patent Owner cites an “increase [of] the area of the processor by approximately 40%,” which “would undoubtedly entail additional expense to accommodate the larger processor.” Id. at 51–52. Obviousness, as a determination of unpatentability, is not a question of commercial viability as a practical business determination. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he fact that the two [prior art disclosures] would not be combined by businessmen for economic reasons is not the same as saying that it could not be done because skilled persons in the art felt that there was some technological incompatibility that prevented their combination. Only the latter fact is telling on the issue of nonobviousness.”). Based on the explicit teachings of Schultz, we are persuaded that one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to modify Oselin as proposed by Petitioner. Accordingly, Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, claim 4 would have been obvious over the combination of Oselin and Schultz.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 5,602,524 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 5,602,524
• Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Wasica Finance GmbH & Bluearc Finance AGSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2015 · IPR2014-00295 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 10–19, and 21 are unpatentable over the stated Oselin grounds; claims 6–9 and 20 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “device” excludes a switch-based pressure sensor. Initially, we note that the discussion of EP-A-0417712 and EP-A-0417704 (Exhibits 1024 and 1025, respectively) in the cited portion of the ’524 patent (i.e., Ex. 1001, 5:1–14) includes a discussion of “monitoring” tire pressure. Patent Owner, however, acknowledges that “the [’524] patent . . . uses the terms [monitor and measure] interchangeably” and notes that “[i]t is not crystal clear how to distinguish between the two.” Tr. 36:15–17. Regardless of whether “monitoring” and “measuring” are intended to have the same meaning in the ’524 patent, the ’524 patent expressly discusses “measuring” with a switchbased pressure sensor when describing “measur[ing] the tire air-pressure by way of pressure sensors arranged on the vehicle wheels, which measurement signal is then displayed in a suitable way to the driver . . . for example, in DE-3930479 A1.” Ex. 1001, 1:45–49 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We are not persuaded that Oselin’s general disclosure that “any modulation scheme” may be used anticipates the specific features of claim 6, which requires the use of “constant frequency” carrier waves. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oselin anticipates claim 6. 5. Claim 9 Claim 9 depends from claim 1 and further recites “every transmission from transmitter to receiver is completed with a transmission of at least a 4 bit sequence” that includes a first bit sequence, a second bit sequence, a third bit sequence, and a fourth bit sequence. Petitioner contends that the claimed “bit sequence” may be a single bit. Pet. 24–25; Pet. Reply 12–13. For example, Petitioner contends the claim requires that “the second, or third bit sequence is a data sequence which represents the measured pressure signal,” and Petitioner contends this is met by Oselin’s symbol S18. Pet. 24; Pet. Reply 12. Petitioner’s contentions are unpersuasive. Oselin explains that “symbols S1 . . . S20, each . . . may assume two different values (the logic positions ‘0’ and ‘1’),” each of which is “a logical binary symbol associated with one bit of data.” Ex. 1004, 6. As noted above, we construe “bit sequence” as requiring two or more bits. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, claim 9 is anticipated by Oselin.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “The Petition does not propose any specific rationale for a conclusion that claim 6 would have been obvious in view of Oselin other than alleging, generally, “to the extent that any of the variances in claim scope are not necessarily shown by the support included in the above claim chart, such variances would have obvious to a POSITA based on the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art as it existed at the purported time of the invention.” Pet. 29. The Petition offers the same conclusory rationale for the alleged obviousness of claim 9 in view of Oselin, but additionally alleges, generally, “for claim 9, a POSITA would have found the particular bit sequence arrangement to be a mere design choice.” Id. Petitioner’s contentions regarding design choice do not address sufficiently the deficiencies in Oselin’s teachings noted above. For example, the contentions do not address that Oselin’s symbol S18 is a single bit rather than a sequence. No further explanation is offered, in the Petition, to support the alleged obviousness of these claims. Petitioner’s Reply fails to cure these deficiencies, as it simply alleges that “it would be obvious to use a multi-bit sequence for the measured pressure signal, or for the preamble or postamble.” Pet. Reply 13. No persuasive explanation is offered, however, as to why a multi-bit sequence would have been obvious to use for Oselin’s alarm message. Oselin’s transmission uses “symbols S1 ... S20, each of which may assume two different values (the logic positions ‘0’ and ‘1’)” (Ex. 1004, 6), and “[t]he alarm message concerning the tire pressure is expressed by the presence (for example) of logic value of ‘1’ in the position of symbol S18” (id. at 30). A determination that claims would have been obvious to an ordinary” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

    “A determination that claims would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The required “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” is missing from the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 6 and 9 would have been obvious over Oselin.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 5,602,524 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,602,524

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