- Unified Patents, LLC v. Mel Navip, LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 23, 2023 · IPR2023-00083 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3 are obvious over Niemoeller, Nishizaki, and Yamamoto, and claims 4–5 over those references and Keely.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“As Fintiv notes, the Board generally disfavors discretionary denial when litigation did not involve the petitioner, unless “the issues are the same as, or substantially similar to those already or about to be litigated, or other circumstances weigh against redoing the work of another tribunal.” Fintiv at 13–14. Given that we that have no indication the litigation is or will be stayed pending an IPR, we decline to speculate as to the possibility of a stay. Thus, this factor is neutral as to discretionary denial.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“2. Discretion Under § 325(d) Petitioner contends that we should not exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Pet. 72. Petitioner asserts that no proceeding involving the ’368 Patent has been previously brought before the Office, and that none of the references cited herein was before the Examiner during prosecution. Id. Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. See Prelim. Resp. As such, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, or an equivalent field, and at least two years of work experience involving telecommunications, signal processing, or speech recognition technology.” Pet. 6; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Petitioner further asserts that “[m]ore education 7 Because we determine Fintiv factors 1–5 weigh against discretionary denial, we need not consider the compelling merits question. See CommScope Techs. LLC. v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 6 (Feb. 27, 2023) (“The Board should first assess Fintiv factors 1–5; if that analysis supports discretionary denial, the Board should engage the compelling merits question.”) (precedential). can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner provides a generally commensurate statement in the Preliminary Response, supported by its declarant. Prelim. Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 9–11). Because we do not discern any substantive difference in the parties’ formulations, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[n]o formal claim constructions are necessary in this proceeding because ‘claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Pet. 12 (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Petitioner also asserts that because no claim terms use the term “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply, but Petitioner provides charts identifying the specific portions of the specification that describe the corresponding structure for each such potential limitation, should we decide the presumption is overcome and § 112 ¶ 6 applies. Id. at 12–18. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner “that no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding and that no terms in the Challenged Claims use the terms ‘means’ to recite any means-plus-function limitations.” Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term in the challenged claims of the ’368 Patent requires specific construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Similarly, because no claim recites an explicit “means” limitation, and because neither party deems construction under § 112 ¶ 6 necessary, we construe all limitations of the challenged claims in accordance with their ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,060,368 - Commscope, Inc. v. TQ Delta, LLC.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2023 · IPR2023-00068 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 9–16 as time-barred under § 315(b), and denied CommScope’s motion for joinder as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“The ’664 IPR, however, has been terminated. Nokia of Am. Corp. v. TQ Delta, LLC, IPR2022-00664, Paper 24 at 3 (PTAB Dec. 8, 2022). Thus, there no longer is a pending proceeding in the ’664 IPR for Petitioner to join. As a result, Petitioner’s request to join the ’664 IPR is moot, and the Petition is not timely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). IV. CONCLUSION The Motion for Joinder is denied as moot because the ’664 IPR already has been terminated, and the Petition is denied because it was not filed within the time period set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Motion for Joinder is denied as moot; and” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,844,882 - Commscope, Inc. v. TQ Delta, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2023 · IPR2023-00064 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–4 as time-barred under § 315(b) and denied joinder as moot because the proceeding to be joined had terminated.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner served 2Wire, Inc. (“2Wire”), a privy of Petitioner,1 with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’048 patent in February 2014. Ex. 2001; Ex. 2002. Patent Owner served Petitioner with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’048 patent on August 17, 2021. Ex. 1027; Ex. 3001. Petitioner filed the Petition more than one year later on October 26, 2022. Pet. 79. Petitioner does not dispute those facts, but instead relies on its request to join the ’666 IPR to avoid the time limit in Section 315(b). Pet. 1 (“Because . . . this is a copycat petition . . . accompanied by a motion for joinder . . . , the time bar under § 315(b) does not apply.”); Mot. 8–10 (“the one-year time limitation does not apply to a request for joinder”). The ’666 IPR, however, has been terminated. Nokia of Am. Corp. v. TQ Delta, LLC, IPR2022-00666, Paper 23 at 3 (PTAB Dec. 8, 2022). Thus, there no longer is a pending proceeding in the ’666 IPR for Petitioner to join. As a result, Petitioner’s request to join the ’666 IPR is moot, and the Petition is not timely under Section 315(b).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“The ’666 IPR, however, has been terminated. Nokia of Am. Corp. v. TQ Delta, LLC, IPR2022-00666, Paper 23 at 3 (PTAB Dec. 8, 2022). Thus, there no longer is a pending proceeding in the ’666 IPR for Petitioner to join. As a result, Petitioner’s request to join the ’666 IPR is moot, and the Petition is not timely under Section 315(b). III. CONCLUSION The Motion for Joinder is denied as moot because the ’666 IPR” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,276,048 - Commscope, Inc. v. TQ Delta, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2023 · IPR2023-00066 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–8 as time-barred under § 315(b), and denied joinder as moot because the proceeding sought to be joined had terminated.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner served 2Wire, Inc. (“2Wire”), a privy of Petitioner,1 with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’381 patent in February 2014. Ex. 2001; Ex. 2002. Petitioner filed the Petition more than one year later on November 1, 2022. Pet. 79. Petitioner does not dispute those facts, but instead relies on its request to join the ’665 IPR to avoid the time limit in Section 315(b). Pet. 1 (“Because . . . CommScope will file an accompanying motion for joinder . . . , the time bar under § 315(b) does not apply.”); Mot. 8–10 (“the one-year time limitation does not apply to a request for joinder”). The ’665 IPR, however, has been terminated. Nokia of Am. Corp. v. TQ Delta, LLC, IPR2022-00665, Paper 23 at 3 (PTAB Dec. 8, 2022). Thus, there no longer is a pending proceeding in the ’665 IPR for Petitioner to join. As a result, Petitioner’s request to join the ’665 IPR is moot, and the Petition is not timely under Section 315(b).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“The ’665 IPR, however, has been terminated. Nokia of Am. Corp. v. TQ Delta, LLC, IPR2022-00665, Paper 23 at 3 (PTAB Dec. 8, 2022). Thus, there no longer is a pending proceeding in the ’665 IPR for Petitioner to join. As a result, Petitioner’s request to join the ’665 IPR is moot, and the Petition is not timely under Section 315(b).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,836,381 - Lyft, Inc. v. Rideshare Displays, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01601 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable as obvious over both listed combinations; the contingent motion to amend is granted, replacing them with substitute claims 3 and 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Prelim. Resp. 5. At the institution stage, we adopted Petitioner’s more general formulation, with a qualification. We stated we would also expect a person of ordinary skill to also have at least some experience in wireless cellular network protocols, as suggested by Patent Owner. Institution Dec. 19. We reasoned that our review of the ’199 patent and the cited prior art did not suggest that specific experience with data privacy policies and protection models would be required, given the focus of the ’199 patent on more general principles of cellular communications and signaling. Id. at 19– 20. However, we observed that the arguments presented by the parties did not depend on the definition of the person or ordinary skill, and therefore, we concluded that our decision would be the same under either formulation. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“device associated with a driver at all.” PO Resp. 39 (citing Valenti III Decl. ¶ 94). Patent Owner continues, “Petitioner’s expert acknowledges that Lalancette does not disclose the use of a mobile communication device associated with the driver.” Id. (citing Williams Dep. 128:14–129:25, 132:1–8). This is a misrepresentation of Mr. Williams’s testimony. He was not asked whether Lalancette “discloses” a mobile communication device; he was asked to agree whether Lalancette “identi[fies] the mobile computer as a mobile communication device.” Williams Dep 129:10–13. He explained his response later in his testimony: “In the passage where [Lalancette] references mobile computer, it doesn’t have a specific form factor discussion such as referencing Smartphones.” Id. at 132:5–8. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that this limitation is not met by Lalancette and we do not find the testimony of its expert, Dr. Valenti, credible or helpful. See Valenti III Decl. ¶¶ 94 (“Lalancette does not disclose a mobile device associated with a driver at all.”). As Petitioner points out, the argument supported by Dr. Valenti is an “attempt to improperly narrow the definition of a mobile device to only mean a smartphone of the driver.” Pet. Reply 24. We find that this argument and the supporting expert testimony are contradicted by the ’199 patent specification. See id, at 24–25 (quoting Ex. 1001, 3:10–11, defining mobile communication device broadly). We, therefore, find that the mobile computer disclosed in Lalancette meets the requirement of this claim limitation for a “mobile communication device associated with the driver.” We find for the reasons given that Petitioner demonstrates that Lalancette and Kemler meet limitation 1E.” slip op. at 45
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We declined to adopt this implicit construction (and the related construction “actively generate”). Institution Dec. 23. The claims themselves do not require the controller to “actively formulate” a new indicator for the same rider requesting a subsequent trip for that second trip, or that “a new signal be actively formulated each time a ride is dispatched,” as Patent Owner’s analysis asserts. See infra. Nor is it clear how this construction is supported by the ’199 patent specification. The ’199 patent describes the controller as “communicatively coupled to the transceiver.” Ex. 1001, 2:10–11. Further, “[t]he controller is adapted to generate a first signal to be transmitted by the transceiver to a mobile communication device.” Id. at 2:12–14. Elsewhere in the patent, “controller” is defined as “any type of computing device, computational circuit, or any type of processor or processing circuit capable of executing a series of instructions that are stored in a memory associated with a with the controller.” Id. at 3:6–10. The operation of the controller is also described as follows: “The controller 110 may generate a first signal (also referred to herein as a ‘notification signal’) that is transmitted via the transceiver 120 to the mobile communication device 150 associated with the driver D.” Id. at 5:14–17. Still further, “[t]he controller 110 generates four different notification signals, NOTIFICATION-A, NOTIFICATION-B, NOTIFICATION-C, and NOTIFICATION-D, to be transmitted by the transceiver 120 to a first DRIVER'S MOBILE DEVICE 150A, a second DRIVER'S MOBILE DEVICE 150B, a third DRIVER'S MOBILE DEVICE 150C, and a fourth DRIVER'S MOBILE DEVICE 150D, respectively.” Id. at 6:39–46. And further, “[i]n other embodiments, wherein the vehicle identification system 11 is utilized, an indicatory signal to the rider's mobile communication device may be generated by the controller 110.” Id. at 7:4–7. In none of these descriptions of the controller’s operation is there” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find that the Petition and supporting expert testimony sufficiently demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill would have combined the teachings of Kemler and Kalanick with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 21–25. In addition to the reasons given supra, Petitioner explains that Kalanick’s “on-demand service system can also use location information from the driver’s device and/or transport information . . . to automatically determine the driver’s state or state of the transport service.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 29, 35). Petitioner explains that in Kalanick, “[w]hen a service application on the driver’s device determines that the transport service is to change state, such as to ‘arriving now,’ based on a determination that the driver is within a predetermined distance, the service application can trigger the indication device to output the user’s specific color.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 37). Thus, Kalanick’s system can “control the indication device to output the user’s color or other unique distinctive indicator based on the transport state.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, ¶ 38). Petitioner explains that Kemler describes a central dispatching system in which one or more server computing devices of the centralized dispatching system may select a vehicle to be dispatched based upon the location of the client computing device. Id, (citing Ex. 1008, 10:3–33). Thus, Petitioner explains that Kemler, like Kalanick, “discloses ride-matching based on proximity and distance to match requesting riders with drivers based at least in part on the proximity of their respective locations.” Id. Petitioner demonstrates that “a [person of ordinary skill] would find it obvious to modify Kalanick’s vehicle identification system in view of Kemler, at least because both systems disclose substantially similar ride-matching techniques based on proximity and distance to match requesting riders with drivers based at least in part on the proximity of their respective locations.” Id. at 23–24. Petitioner also explains that a person of ordinary skill would “anticipate success of such a modification.” Id. at 24. Petitioner explains that “the controller in Kalanick is already in communication with the car and could easily send a signal to activate the display with the unique code.” Id. (citing Williams I Decl. ¶ 121). Petitioner recognizes that although both Kalanick and Kemler “focus” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,559,199 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,559,199 - Lyft, Inc. v. Rideshare Displays, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01598 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 11–20 are unpatentable as obvious over either asserted combination; the motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 29, 31, and 32.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Prelim. Resp. 5. At the institution stage, we adopted Petitioner’s more general formulation, with a qualification. We stated “[w]e would also expect a person of ordinary skill to also have at least some experience in wireless cellular network protocols, as suggested by Patent Owner.” Institution Dec. 16. We reasoned that our review of the ’637 patent and the cited prior art does not suggest that specific experience with data privacy policies and protection models would be required, given the focus of the ’637 patent on more general principles of cellular communications and signaling. Id. However, we observed that the arguments presented by the parties did not depend on the definition of the person or ordinary skill, and, therefore, our decision would be the same under either formulation. Id. at 16–17.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Resp. 12–14. The fact that Kalanick may not “disclose any problem” arising from the possibility of two passengers in the same area having the same signal does not prove a problem did not exist or that a person of ordinary skill would not be motivated to improve upon the solution for it. See Pet. Reply 5–6. Similarly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that there would be no reasonable expectation of success based on Kemler’s disclosure of a server farm. PO Resp. 24 (“The immense expense and complexity of operating a server ‘farm’ would be a reason to avoid Kemler’s teachings.”). Testimony from Mr. Williams establishes the advantages of such systems. Pet. Reply 7 (citing Williams I Decl. ¶¶ 124); Williams Dep. 82:1–88:25, 92:13–93:1; Williams III Decl. ¶¶ 34–35.5” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find that the Petition and supporting expert testimony sufficiently demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill would have combined the teachings of Kemler and Kalanick with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 21–27; Williams I Decl. ¶¶ 113–125; Williams III Decl. ¶¶ 5–17. In addition to the reasons given supra, Petitioner explains that Kalanick’s “on-” slip op. at 30
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“The ’637 patent describes an indicator as “a ‘code’ (e.g., a text string or an alphanumeric string), an icon, or other identifier, on the display 130 and on a mobile communication device 140 associated with the user P to enable the user P to identify the vehicle that he/she has requested for a ride service.” Ex. 1001, 4:6–10. Consistent with this description in the specification, we construed the term “indicator” as a code (e.g., a text string or an alphanumeric string), an icon, or other identifier, for display to enable a match between a user/rider and a driver. Institution Dec. 20. We did not see a basis in the claims or specification for Patent Owner’s contention that a “new unique indicator” must be “actively formulate[d] . . . for each rider-driver trip while the driver is in transit.” Id. at 20 (citing Prelim. Resp. 29). Patent Owner does not address the construction of “indicator” in its Response. For the reasons given, therefore, we maintain our construction of this term. We discuss Patent Owner’s contention that a new indicator must be “actively formulated” further in connection with our consideration of the claim term “generate,” infra.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 9,892,637 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,892,637 - Lyft, Inc. v. Rideshare Displays, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01599 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, and 6–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kalanick and Kemler, anticipated by Lalancette, or obvious over Lalancette and Kemler.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Prelim. Resp. 5. At the institution stage, we adopted Petitioner’s more general formulation, with one qualification. Inst. Dec. 19. We stated we would also expect a person of ordinary skill to have at least some experience in wireless cellular network protocols, as suggested by Patent Owner. Id. at 19–20. We reasoned that our review of the ’987 patent and the cited prior art did not suggest that specific experience with data privacy policies and protection models would be required, given the focus of the ’987 patent on more general principles of cellular communications and signaling. Id. at 20. However, we observed that our decision would be the same under either formulation. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We also find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Williams, Petitioner’s expert, “acknowledges that Lalancette does not disclose the use of a mobile communication device associated with the driver.” Id. (citing Ex. 2022, 128:14–129:25, 132:1–8). Patent Owner misrepresents Mr. Williams’s testimony. Mr. Williams was not asked whether Lalancette “discloses” a mobile communication device, but rather was asked “You’ll agree that La[l]ancette doesn’t identify the mobile computer as a mobile communication device associated with the driver?” Ex. 2022, 129:10–13. specifically referenced, that description is not in that passage.” Id. at 129:14–16. Notably, Mr. Williams also testified that (i) “[t]he nature of La[l]ancette requires some sort of computing device in the taxi that has the ability to receive and communicate in order to get information, for example, icon information from the central computer”; (ii) “mobile computer . . . has a variety of form factors inclusive of something like a [s]martphone”; and (iii) “[i]n the passage where [Lalancette] references mobile computer, it doesn’t have a specific form factor discussion such as referencing [s]martphones.” Id. at 125:17–22, 129:20–25, 132:5–8.” slip op. at 38
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. “indicator” In our Institution Decision, we construed the term “indicator” as a “code (e.g., a text string or an alphanumeric string), an icon, or other identifier, for display to enable a match between a user/rider and a driver.” Inst. Dec. 22. We determined this construction was consistent with the description of an indicator in the specification of the ’987 patent. Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:9–13). Neither party challenges this construction, which we maintain for this Final Written Decision. See PO Resp. 6; Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Because the specification and prosecution history do not explicitly provide a definition for the term “generate,” we looked to extrinsic sources to determine its plain meaning. Inst. Dec. 24. The Federal Circuit has approved the use of dictionaries for guidance in claim construction, “so long as the extrinsic evidence does not contradict the meaning otherwise apparent from the intrinsic record.” Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (approving of “consult[ing] a general dictionary definition of [a] word for guidance” in determining ordinary meaning); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. general dictionary definitions as an aid to claim construction.”) (citation omitted). One dictionary definition of “generate” is “to bring into existence: such as: . . . to originate by a vital, chemical, or physical process: PRODUCE.” See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/generate. We therefore construed the term “generate” as it relates to the controller in reference to a signal in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to originate or produce the signal.” Inst. Dec. 24–25.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 10,169,987 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,169,987 - Lyft, Inc. v. Rideshare Displays, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01602 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious over Lalancette; the Board did not reach the anticipation or Kalanick–Kemler obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“On the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s definition, with the above qualification, is consistent with the ’417 patent and the asserted prior art, and thus, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis herein, however, does not turn on which of the parties’ definitions we adopt. The parties’ statements made during the oral hearing are consistent with this point. See Tr. 75:17–18 (Patent Owner stating that “[i]t’s not clear to us that the level of ordinary skill arguments actually matter”), 106:12–17 (Petitioner stating that its arguments do not depend on which definition we adopt). In sum, we maintain Petitioner’s definition, as qualified, for the level of one of ordinary skill in the art, and employ it in our analysis of the parties’ unpatentability arguments.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“In addition, because the Specification and file history do not explicitly provide a definition for the term “generate,” we look to a dictionary definition to illustrate its plain meaning for the parties. The Federal Circuit has approved the use of dictionaries for guidance in claim construction, “so long as the extrinsic evidence does not contradict the meaning otherwise apparent from the intrinsic record.” Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (approving of “consult[ing] a general dictionary definition of [a] word for guidance” in determining ordinary meaning); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur decisions, including Phillips, do not preclude the use of general dictionary definitions as an aid to claim construction.”) (citation omitted). A dictionary definition of “generate” is “to bring into existence: such as: . . . to originate by a vital, chemical, or physical process: [produce].” Merriam-webster.com (accessed April 8, 2022), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/generate (Ex. 3001). We therefore construe the term “generate” as it relates to the controller in reference to a signal in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, which is to originate or produce the signal.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Simply put, these arguments incorrectly conflate “signal” and “indicator” (e.g., icon). Claim 1 recites that a controller generates a signal, rather than reciting that the controller generates an indicator. Ex. 1001, 8:1–6. And the Specification of the ’417 patent is replete with examples of the controller generating signals, including those that represent an indicator, for transmission by a transceiver, which is different than generating the indicator itself. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:1–5, 5:4–7, 6:30–37, 6:62–65. And we find unavailing Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 requires a new indicator (e.g., icon) for each trip, and that the indicator cannot be pre-selected. PO Resp. 32. The language of claim 1 sets forth no such requirements. Ex. 1001, 7:31–8:14. Notably, Patent Owner does not cite to the Specification or claim language to support these arguments. PO Resp. 30–32. Rather, Patent Owner cites to the testimony of Dr. Valenti. Id. (citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 78–82). We find that this testimony lacks factual 7 The’417 patent describes “an indicator” as “a ‘code’ (e.g., a text string or an alphanumeric string), an icon, or other identifier.” Ex. 1001, 4:8–10 (emphasis added). support and is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that when “an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term[,] . . . it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence”). In addition, because the Specification and file history do not explicitly provide a definition for the term “generate,” we look to a dictionary definition to illustrate its plain meaning for the parties. The Federal Circuit has approved the use of dictionaries for guidance in claim construction, “so long as the extrinsic evidence does not contradict the meaning otherwise apparent from the intrinsic record.” Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (approving of “consult[ing] a general dictionary definition of [a] word for guidance” in determining ordinary meaning); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur decisions, including Phillips, do not preclude the use of general dictionary definitions as an aid to claim construction.”) (citation omitted). A dictionary definition of “generate” is “to bring into existence: such as: . . . to originate by a vital, chemical, or physical process: [produce].” Merriam-webster.com (accessed April 8, 2022), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/generate (Ex. 3001). We therefore construe the term “generate” as it relates to the controller in reference to a signal in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, which is to originate or produce the signal.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“indicator” (e.g., icon). Claim 1 recites that a controller generates a signal, rather than reciting that the controller generates an indicator. Ex. 1001, 8:1–6. And the Specification of the ’417 patent is replete with examples of the controller generating signals, including those that represent an indicator, for transmission by a transceiver, which is different than generating the indicator itself. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:1–5, 5:4–7, 6:30–37, 6:62–65. And we find unavailing Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 requires a new indicator (e.g., icon) for each trip, and that the indicator cannot be pre-selected. PO Resp. 32. The language of claim 1 sets forth no such requirements. Ex. 1001, 7:31–8:14. Notably, Patent Owner does not cite to the Specification or claim language to support these arguments. PO Resp. 30–32. Rather, Patent Owner cites to the testimony of Dr. Valenti. Id. (citing Ex. 2023 ¶¶ 78–82). We find that this testimony lacks factual 7 The’417 patent describes “an indicator” as “a ‘code’ (e.g., a text string or an alphanumeric string), an icon, or other identifier.” Ex. 1001, 4:8–10 (emphasis added). support and is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that when “an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term[,] . . . it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence”). slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 10,748,417 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,748,417 - Motorola Mobility LLC v. Maxell, Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Feb 24, 2023 · IPR2022-01348 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 2–9, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable on the asserted Phillips and Russ grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’394 patent on the grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe only terms that are in controversy and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We determine that, as shown below, it is not necessary to explicitly construe any claim terms in order to make this institution decision. 12,13” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached
“17 We adopt the parsing of the claims as set forth in the Petition in order to follow the contentions in the Petition. 18 “[W]here a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.” Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The preamble of claim 2 is a statement of purpose or intended use and claim 2 otherwise appears to define a structurally complete invention. Thus, our initial determination is that the preamble of claim 2 is not limiting. However, we need not decide whether the preamble of claim 2 is limiting as we determine the Petitioner establishes the cited art teaches a digital content reproducing apparatus. Figure 1 of Phillips depicts “an interactive television system.” Ex. 1005, 4:60–61. As quoted in the Petition (Pet, 27–28), the related description of Figure 1 of Phillips states, “[c]ontent such as television programming and digital music may be provided from programming sources 12 to television distribution facilities such as television distribution facility 14 using communication path 16” (Ex. 1005, 6:32–36) and “[t]he user equipment may receive television and music programming and other information from television distribution facility 14 over communication paths 26, 27, and 28” (id. at 6:56–59). Patent Owner does not argue the preamble of claim 2. Based on this record, we determine that the preamble of claim 2 is disclosed by Phillips.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“Phillips and as obvious in view of Phillips and Ackley, and Phillips and Wallis. Pet. 8. Petitioner further challenges claims 3, 6, and 9 in view of Phillips and Uchida, Phillips and Ackley and Uchida, and Phillips and Wallis and Uchida. Id. For each of these additional challenges based on Phillips alone and Phillips in combination with additional references, the Petition includes a detailed argument for each challenged claim in which the cited art is mapped to the limitations and, for each obviousness challenge, contentions as to motivation to combine. Id. at 25–59. For each of these challenges based on Phillips alone and Phillips together with one or more other references, Patent Owner limits its arguments to those discussed above with regard to Phillips. See generally Prelim. Resp. We have considered all of Petitioner’s challenges based on Phillips alone and Phillips in combination with one or more references and Patent Owner’s contrary arguments relating to Phillips. We determine that for each of these challenges Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the claims challenged in the Petition are unpatentable. For each of these additional claims and challenges, Petitioner has shown that institution is independently appropriate under the applicable legal standard. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 40
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,170,394 - Motorola Mobility LLC v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 2, 2023 · IPR2022-01287 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–6 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same prior art had been presented and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“cumulative to at least Kijima and Tani, as well as Petitioner’s cumulative use of Sawanobori, Silver, and Teranishi, we find that part one of the Advanced Bionics framework is met. Other Board decisions have reached the same conclusion given circumstances similar to this case. See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Power2B, Inc., IPR2021-01190, Paper 11 at 15–17 (PTAB Jan. 6, 2022).” slip op. at 22
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,059,177
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.