- Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, and 15 are unpatentable over Ground 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioners contend that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had “Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Patent Owner does not dispute this position at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioners’ proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that “fixed” or “configurable” requires more than what is agreed to by the parties––i.e., the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint are either set prior to operation or can be set during operation. We disagree that the ’972 patent defines “fixed or a configurable endpoint” as “a number of descriptive fields of the endpoint.” Rather column 8, lines 5–6, of the ’972 patent states that “[a]n endpoint is defined by a number of descriptive fields,” which speaks more about the mechanism used to establish the characteristics and operational parameters of the endpoint than it does about how “fixed” or “configurable” would be understood by a skilled artisan. And the fact that an endpoint may be defined by descriptive fields does not inform a skilled artisan that “fixed” or “configurable” requires the endpoint to allow the processing device to correctly interpret and utilize the data from the endpoint. Correctly interpreting and utilizing data may be the goal, but that goal is not turned into a requirement of the claims because the recited endpoint is fixed or configurable. Similarly, there is no basis for making that goal a requirement simply because a fixed endpoint is described as providing basic functionality and a configurable endpoint is described as being configurable by the base unit either while pairing or via the processing device. As a result, we find little merit in Patent Owner’s contention that the language “fixed or a configurable” requires a process for setting up the characteristics and operational parameters of an endpoint within a device so that the processing device can correctly interpret and utilize the data of this endpoint. Patent Owner, however, will have an opportunity during trial to further develop this contention.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableInstituted
“Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioners would prevail in showing that Beel discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a base unit having a transmitter and a first peripheral device having a receiver and at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint, where the at least one fixed or a configurable endpoint is a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device. Petitioners’ offers evidence, supported by its expert declarant, that the endpoints disclosed in Beel are either fixed, such as a mass storage unit with predefined characteristics, or configurable, such as a virtual audio interface that may change configuration based on driver instructions or use context. Pet. 32–33. As Petitioners point out, the ’972 patent itself acknowledges that Beel’s Figure 11 illustrates a system comprising a combination of vendor-specific and standard endpoints, and further interprets these endpoints to correspond to drivers and host applications used for functionality like screen sharing and audio streaming, which demonstrates a direct conceptual and structural alignment between the ’972 patent and Beel. Id. Furthermore, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates sufficiently that Beel describes a peripheral device acting as a virtual composite device capable of emulating different functions—such as a USB audio speaker—while rerouting the data stream (e.g., RTP audio stream) over the network. Id. For instance, Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently Beel discloses or suggests that audio data can be captured by a virtual sound card interface implemented within the peripheral device, re-encoded, and transmitted to the base unit for playback or synchronization with video content. Id. In addition, Petitioners have demonstrated sufficiently that Beel’s architecture supports the requirement that the endpoint of the functional device—whether it is a camera, microphone, or speaker—is made available through or exposed on the peripheral device. Id. The functional device’s capabilities are effectively rendered accessible to the processing device by way of the peripheral device, which acts as an intermediary. Id. Petitioners’ evidence demonstrates sufficiently that this exposure can occur via logical interfaces, such as USB Audio Class (UAC) virtual drivers, that allow the processing device to recognize and interact with these endpoints using standard protocols. Id. Furthermore, Petitioners show sufficiently Beel discloses that the peripheral device may include software that facilitates communication with and presentation of media content on the processing device, further demonstrating that the endpoints are not only present but also actively used for data transmission. Id. Patent Owner’s arguments, at least at this stage of the proceeding, fail to undermine Petitioners’ showing because they are largely just that–– attorney arguments––without sufficient evidentiary backing and because they lack sufficient clarity regarding how the recited claim language distinguishes Beel’s disclosed system. First, Patent Owner makes several representations that Petitioners misplace its reliance on certain teachings or suggests found in Beel and that Beel does not support the contention Petitioners make, but Petitioners’ positions are backed the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and Patent Owner offers no contradictory evidence for why a skilled artisan would understand Beel differently. And, suffice it to say that, when the declaration of Dr. Almeroth is considered in juxtaposition with the cited evidence from Beel, we have found declarant Dr. Almeroth sufficiently persuasive to demonstrate Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on the point. For example, Patent Owner simply argues that “there is no indication in Beel of using any fixed or a configurable endpoint of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device” (Prelim. Resp. 31), but declarant Dr. Almeroth states that “Beel discloses that a peripheral device can act as a ‘virtual audio device’ using a USB Audio Class (UAC) interface,” which “indicates that endpoints of the functional device are ‘exposed or made available on the first peripheral device’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 130 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 128–129). Patent Owner’s argument, without any evidentiary support, does little to undermine the opinion testimony from Dr. Almeroth about what Beel’s teachings would indicate to a skilled artisan. Second, although Patent Owner repeatedly states that Beel fails to” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,684,972 - PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00031 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim based on Norris anticipation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Considering the Fintiv factors (summarized above) as a whole, we find that trial in the District Court will not begin any earlier than February 2, 2026, and the trial date is very likely to be set back by at least a few weeks due to the delayed Markman process to fall around the same time as the Board’s late April 2026 statutory deadline, so the Fintiv analysis turns on other factors. See Fintiv, at 9. Further, the evidence presented here indicates the parties and the Court have not yet made a significant investment in the District Court Litigation, and Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation mitigates concerns of duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting decisions. Overall, we determine that efficiency and integrity of the patent system are best served by not exercising discretion to deny institution based on the District Court Litigation.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(iii) Conclusion as to Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the record shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenging claim 1 as anticipated by Norris.” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’435 patent “would have either (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical, Electrical, or Petroleum Engineering or an equivalent field, and at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production, or (2) at least four years of oil and gas industry experience including well drilling, completion, or production.” Pet. 7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 51. “Patent Owner applies the same skill level proposed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Pet. 7). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, it is not disputed, and it appears to be consistent with the ’435 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“First, we accept (for purposes of this Decision) Patent Owner’s construction of the claim term “acceptable threshold” as referring to a limit, wherein, when the limit is reached, something happens or changes. See Prelim. Resp. 18 (citing Exs. 2002, 2003, and 2004). We find, however, that this is how Norris’s control system operates, based on the present preliminary record. That is, Norris’s application controller 401 monitors the pressure within pressure-side manifold 250b as measured by pressure sensor 185, and compares that measured pressure with a desired pressure. See Ex. 1004, Figs. 2, 3A, and 3B, ¶¶ 22, 29–31, 35–37. Then, “upon variation from the desired settings,” Norris’s control system increases or decreases the operation of pumps 270 to “restore the desired pressure.” Id. at Fig. 2, ¶ 37 (emphasis added). Regardless of whether the desired pressure setting is applied as a single pressure value, or as a range having minimum and maximum pressure values, determining that the measured pressure varies from the desired pressure setting is applying a limit which, when it is reached, changes the operation of pumps 270. Second, based on the present preliminary record, we reject Patent Owner’s additional claim construction position that the claim term “acceptable” requires that the limit must be an “operational limit” representing a potential failure condition that results in shutting down one or more pumps 270. See Prelim. Resp. 19–22 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:65–6:9, 6:56–59, 7:63–66, 8:16–17, 8:25–28, 10:4–11, 11:11–18). It is true that the ’435 patent specification describes such an operational limit as one example of an “acceptable threshold.” See Ex. 1001, 5:65–6:6, 6:56–59, 7:63–66, 8:16–17, 8:25–28, 10:4–11, 11:11–18. However, the ’435 patent specification also describes another example of an “acceptable threshold” as “automatically adjusting” rather than turning off a pump (id. at 10:4–11), and indicates the control system may “adjust” the pumps and other system components “so that each is performing its job most efficiently.” Id. at 5:51–6:9 (emphasis added), 7:41–54, 8:1–9; see also id. at 6:40–61 (“Operating efficiencies for each individual component and the system 40 may be greatly improved,” for example “[p]ump efficiencies may be monitored . . . to optimize boost and rate . . . to deliver a consistent job.”). Patent Owner’s claim construction that would limit the scope of the claim term “acceptable threshold” to require applying an operational pump limit, to the exclusion of applying limits that simply optimize efficient pump operation, is contradicted by this intrinsic evidence. Indeed, claim 10 depends from independent claim 7 (which contains the same “acceptable threshold” limitation as claim 1), to further limit the scope of the claimed invention to “determining that the one or more parameters are indicative of a potential failure condition.” Id. at 12:63–64 (claim 7), 13:23–25 (claim 10) (emphasis added). Claim differentiation therefore suggests that the independent claims are broader than that.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,655,435 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.InstitutedPTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01436 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 9–11, 19, 21, and 22 based on both asserted obviousness grounds: Kaplan, Ahmed, and Deforche; and Maeda, Ahmed, and Deforche.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’002 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 9–11, 19, 21, and 22 of the ’002 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art and does not propose an alternative level. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’002 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“term “pre-installed generic driver. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Those proposed constructions are consistent with the lexicographic definition provided in the ’002 patent. In a section titled “Definitions,” the ’002 patent states: The term “pre-installed generic driver” is intended to mean a driver which is installed on a processing device such as a computer as a standard driver, e.g. is installed with the installation of the operating system. Such a driver is standard for the operating system and can drive a standard class of peripheral devices coupled to or connected to the processing device. Ex. 1001, 14:32–38. We apply this lexicographic definition in our analysis below.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we determine Petitioner’s rationale to combine to be sufficient. We note that at this stage of the proceeding Petitioner’s rationale to combine is supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth as to the knowledge of a POSITA. Patent Owner’s argument as to the knowledge of a POSTIA are unsupported. On this record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Ahmed and Deforche teach that using separate audio and video drivers was “preferred” and “has the advantage that the need for a specific driver for the communication between the wireless modem device and the computer device can be avoided.” Pet. 26–28, 36–37 (citing Ex. 1014, 18:26–19:21; Ex. 1030 ¶ 9). “If a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,762,002 - Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitutedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00948 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 7–10, 12, 13, and 19 on all asserted grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Hanisch-Dunagan combinations with added references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Hanisch in view of Dunagan and Hayashi, Meador, or Shin. 5. Claims 2, 3, and 7–10 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’097 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue those claims. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a master’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, materials science/engineering, or a related field, and three to five years of experience in design and implementation of battery recycling processes.” Pet. 15–16. Patent Owner argues to the contrary that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have [had] at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, materials science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithium-ion batteries.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On the present record, neither party argues that the result would be any different should we adopt a different definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’097 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “[t]he ’097 Patent expressly defines ‘drying’ to mean ‘the removal of at least one solvent in the conducting salt.’” Pet. 16 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:23–25). Petitioner also argues that “[a]ll other terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning under Philips and do not need further construction for the purposes of this Petition.” Id. Patent Owner argues that “[n]o claim terms require express construction to determine that the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability of any claim and, thus, deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 13. Based on the present record, we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this time.6 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“On the present record, we do not find the relationship between URT and Petitioner to be significant to the degree that raises concerns under Valve and General Plastic. In Valve, two factors affected the determination that there was a significant relationship between the two petitioners at issue: “Valve and HTC were co-defendants in the District Court litigation,” and “the petitions . . . challenge[d] the same claims of the [challenged] patent.” IPR2019-00062, Paper 11, 10. Here, one of these factors is absent, and the other is not entirely present. URT and Petitioner are not co-defendants in the related infringement lawsuit, which accuses only Petitioner. Ex. 2014, 1. As for the claims challenged in the two petitions, Patent Owner is correct that all claims challenged in the present proceeding are also challenged in IPR2024-00887, but the reverse is not true. The petition in IPR2024-00887 challenges claims 15–17 of the ’097 patent, none of which is challenged here. Compare Pet. 3, with IPR2024-00887, Paper 2, 4–5. Thus, there is a significant difference between the present situation and that in Valve.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,050,097 - Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00635 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–14 on the asserted §103 ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that Fluidmaster would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (footnote omitted). The Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 9 (referencing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph)).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the Petition and the Preliminary Response (including any authorized submissions) “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, and solely for the purposes of this Decision, we determine that Petitioner’s asserted ground satisfies the standard for institution.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d, 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Although this Decision might appear to indicate that certain Patent Owner arguments would not be persuasive, we do not shift the ultimate burden away from Petitioner.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“A PHOSITA in the field to which the ’698 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or research experience in the design or development of toilet products, parts, and accessories. Prelim. Resp. 14. In view of the present record, we see no material difference between the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner and that proposed by Dr. Cameron. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSITA, as it appears to be consistent with the ’698 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,934,698 - Ravin Crossbows, LLC v. MCP IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00523 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 and 9–20 on the § 103 ground over Darlington and Islas, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, and the Preliminary Sur-reply as well as all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge of at least one claim of the ’017 patent as unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’017 patent on the ground stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts a person having ordinary skill in the art on the priority date of the ’017 patent: would have had (i) a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering, materials science, or a similar technical field; (ii) a working knowledge of and/or experience with projectile weapon (e.g., archery bow) operation and performance; and (iii) two to four years of experience with designing and manufacturing of consumer products. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 25–28). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s uncontested definition because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’017 Patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Further, Patent Owner does not directly address Petitioner’s reasons why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Darlington and Islas with a reasonable expectation of success. See generally Prelim. Resp. Rather, Patent Owner’s arguments against the proposed combination are based on the distinction between let out and take up ends of the cited references. See id. at 57–60. Patent Owner relies on the testimony of Dr. Reinholtz in support of this argument. However, Dr. Reinholtz merely restates Patent Owner’s arguments that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized the distinction between the function of take up and let out ends of power cables and “would not have incorporated features from the ‘let out’ end of a power cable to the ‘take up’ end of a power cable because the ‘let out’ end and the ‘take up’ end perform different functions, namely, to ‘let out’ or ‘take up’ the power cable respectively.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 84. As we discussed above, at this stage of the proceeding, we preliminarily determine that this argument is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1. For these reasons, we find that Petitioner sufficiently shows that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Darlington and Islas with a reasonable expectation of success for the reasons stated by Mr. Lange. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 55–61. His testimony is sufficiently supported by citations to Darlington and Islas as well as other references supporting his testimony of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at ¶ 55 (citing Ex. 1007, 1008). Because his testimony is sufficiently based on evidence, Patent Owner’s contention that the proposed combination is based on improper hindsight is unavailing based on the present record. See In re Cree, 818 F.3d 694, 702, n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 43
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“The crux of Patent Owner’s contentions that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the teachings of Darlington and Islas is that the functions of the take up and let out ends of the cams disclosed in Darlington and/or Islas are different. To evaluate this argument, we first examine the language of claim 1. Claim 1 recites a first rotatable member and a second rotatable member. Ex. 1001, 6:55–57. Patent Owner’s “reverse wrap” concept, as claimed is recited with respect to only one of the rotatable members, i.e., the first rotatable member. Id. at 7:1–7. Claim 1 does not limit the first rotatable member to either a take up end or a let out end. See id. Patent Owner does not propose a construction of claim 1 that would limit the first rotatable member to a take up end. See generally Prelim. Resp. Consequently, at this stage of the proceeding, it appears arguments regarding allegedly different functions of the take up and let out ends of Darlington and/or Islas are not commensurate with the scope of claim 1. Further, Patent Owner does not directly address Petitioner’s reasons why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Darlington and Islas with a reasonable expectation of success. See generally Prelim. Resp. Rather, Patent Owner’s arguments against the proposed combination are based on the distinction between let out and take up ends of the cited references. See id. at 57–60. Patent Owner relies on the testimony of Dr. Reinholtz in support of this argument. However, Dr. Reinholtz merely restates Patent Owner’s arguments that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized the distinction between the function of take up and let out ends of power cables and “would not have incorporated features from the ‘let out’ end of a power cable to the ‘take up’ end of a power cable because the ‘let out’ end and the ‘take up’ end perform different functions, namely, to ‘let out’ or ‘take up’ the power cable respectively.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 84. As we discussed above, at this stage of the proceeding, we preliminarily determine that this argument is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1. For these reasons, we find that Petitioner sufficiently shows that an” slip op. at 42
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,354,017 - Ravin Crossbows, LLC v. MCP IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00522 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 and 7–19 based on Darlington and Islas, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had (i) a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering, materials science, or a similar technical field; (ii) a working knowledge of and/or experience with projectile weapon (e.g., archery bow) operation and performance; and (iii) two to four years of experience with designing and manufacturing of consumer products. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 25–28). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s uncontested definition because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’989 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“contemporaneous knowledge of the activities of Mr. McPherson in or around 2008 or the bows that are pictured in Exhibits 2002 and 2003. See generally Ex. 2007. Rather, Dr. Reinholtz testifies “that the 2009 model year Mission Menace bow and the 2009 Mathews McPherson Series Monster bow embodied the claim limitations of the ’989 patent” based on his comparison of the disclosure in the Krenz articles “to the claims of the ’989 patent . . . from the perspective of a” person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. ¶ 32. Due his lack of personal contemporaneous knowledge, his testimony cannot corroborate Mr. McPherson’s testimony concerning reduction to practice and we give it no weight in that regard.13 We turn first to the Krenz articles. Mr. Ozanne14 holds the position of” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“reduction to practice, the applicant must have: (1) constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the claim and (2) determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose.” Steed, 802 F.3d at 1318. “That is, to reduce any particular claim to practice, the applicant must have constructed an operational embodiment within the scope of that claim.” Nintendo of America Inc. v. iLife Technologies, Inc., 717 Fed. Appx. 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (addressing Steed’s above, two-prong standard). The Board may find an actual reduction to practice based on, for example, “testimony of the inventors, corroborating witnesses, and corroborating documentary evidence” (id. at 1002) if “[t]his evidence, taken together, is sufficient for a reasonable mind to conclude that the prototype created by the inventors . . . was within the scope of claims . . . and would work for its intended purpose” (id. at 1003). But if “[t]he prototype has not been shown to meet all the limitations of the[] claims, . . . the record thus lacks evidence sufficient to support the . . . conclusion [of an actual reduction to practice].” Id. at 1004 (citing Steed, 802 F.3d at 1318). “[A]n inventor’s testimony alone is insufficient to establish an earlier reduction to practice. Medichem[, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.], 437 F.3d [1157,] 1169–71.” “In the final analysis, each corroboration case must be decided on its own facts with a view to deciding whether the evidence as a whole is persuasive.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Berges v. Gottstein, 618 F.2d 771, 776 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).” slip op. at 20
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,683,989 - Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00633 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Brown and Ho.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’993 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’993 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“presented to the Office.” Prelim. Resp. 31– 36. In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d) we use a two-part framework, as follows: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 9 (referencing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph)).” slip op. at 8
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner provides no sufficient evidence to rebut Dr. Cameron’s testimony as to what a POSITA would have known from Guoxin and Ho’s drawings and as to the alleged motivations to combine Guoxin and Ho. Based on Petitioner’s evidence and analysis, and taking into account the Preliminary Response, at this stage of the proceeding, we determine that the information in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Guoxin and Ho.” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] in the field to which the ’993 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or research experience in the design or development of toilet products, parts, and accessories. Prelim. Resp. 16. Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Cameron asserts that: A [POSITA] with respect to the subject matter of the ’993 patent at the time of the priority date, January 27, 2014, would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, or other technical training in product design or equivalent work experience. This person would also possess at least one year of experience in developing and/or evaluating mechanical aspects of fluid systems. Ex. 1004 ¶ 29. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSITA, as it is consistent with the ’993 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, we see no material difference between the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner and that proposed by Dr. Cameron.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,139,993 - Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00634 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Brown and Ho.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’105 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–24 of the ’105 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (“IDS”), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent. Id. at 7–8. Here, it is not disputed that Brown and Bjerke were listed on an IDS and, thus, were previously presented to the Office. Pet. 12, n.4; Prelim. Resp. 33. It is also not disputed that Guoxin, Ho, Calmettes, Hall, Kimber, and Schuster were not previously presented to the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 33. Patent Owner argues that Guoxin, Brown, and Ho are cumulative of a reference, DeMarco9, that was previously presented to the Office and relied upon to reject the claims. Prelim. Resp. 33 Patent Owner argues that Guoxin, Brown, and Ho are cumulative to DeMarco because all of the “references are completely silent as to whether the purported ‘extended portion’ is integrally molded with the purported body of the toiled fill valve.” Id. at 33–36. Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive. As can be seen from our discussion of Ho in our analysis below, on this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has sufficiently shown for purposes of institution how Ho allegedly teaches the claimed integrally molded extended portion. We, thus, are not persuaded that at least Ho is cumulative of DeMarco. Grounds 1–4 rely upon combinations of prior art that include Ho. Ground 5 is based upon Schuster, which was not previously presented to the 9 U.S. Patent No. 5,708,991 (Ex. 1024). Office. Accordingly, we determine that discretionary denial is not warranted. Because we determine that part one of the framework is not satisfied, we need not turn to part two to determine whether Petitioner demonstrates that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. For the reasons discussed above, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“On this record, we are persuaded by Patent Owner that the claim phrase “integrally molded with” should be construed to mean “molded together as a single structure” and to exclude items created as separate pieces and attached together later. Patent Owner’s construction is consistent with the plain language of the claims, which requires the extended portion be “integrally molded with” the body and not just the extended portion be integral with the body. Further, we determine that Patent Owner’s construction is consistent with the ’105 patent, which discloses that “the bowl fill valve 109 may be molded as a portion of the toilet fill valve 100 or it may be snapped or clamped into place, or it may be attached to the toilet fill valve 100 in some other manner, etc.” Id. at 2:23–26 (emphasis added). At this stage of the proceeding, we construe “integrally molded with” to mean molded together as a single structure.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Patent Owner next disputes that a POSITA would have combined Guoxin and Ho and argues that Petitioner’s alleged rationale to combine Guoxin and Ho as conclusory and lacks sufficient support. Prelim. Resp. 40–42. We determine that Petitioner has sufficiently articulated a motivation to combine Guoxin and Ho to support institution. Petitioner asserted motivation to combine — improved strength and integrity of connection — is supported by the testimony of Dr. Cameron. Dr. Cameron testifies: “Integrally molding the extended portion of Guoxin with the inlet device as taught by Ho would be advantageous in improving the strength and integrity of the connection, and to make it easier to manufacture and assemble.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 125. Based on the record at this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the combination of Guoxin and Ho teaches element 1B.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,103,105 - PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00098 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–38 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, we do not discern a material difference between the parties’ respective definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. For example, neither party provides argument that any position in their papers depends on any distinction between their definitions. However, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill as most closely aligning with the problems and solutions in the ’708 patent and prior art of record. For example, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, the claims are not limited to livestock farmer or commercial manure applicators. Further, and also contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, Petitioner’s definition allows for “those most familiar with manure agitation equipment – livestock farmers and the manure application business” through the definition’s statement that “[a] POSA would have had a working” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Neither party expressly addresses the plain and ordinary meaning of “between” or argues that “between” is defined in the ’708 patent. The website Merriam-Webster.com defines “between” as “in the time, space, or interval that separates.” Ex. 3002, 1. The concept of “in the space that separates” is consistent with Patent Owner’s position that a buoyant element is positioned in the space between the wheels. Prelim. Resp. 24. “between” in the same context as the claims, but as noted by Patent Owner, Figure 3 does illustrate a first buoyant element between, or in the space that separates, a first set of tires on one side of the vehicle and a second buoyant element between, or in the space that separates, a second set of tires on the opposite side. Id. at 24–25; see also Ex. 1001, Fig. 2 (illustrating buoyant elements between the wheels). Patent Owner’s declarant testifies that “[a] POSITA would understand the two buoyant elements shown in FIG. 3 on the right and left sides of the vehicle as being ‘a first buoyant element situated between the first front wheel and the first rear wheel and a second buoyant element between the second front wheel and the second rear wheel.’” Ex. 2004 ¶ 82. This is uncontroverted.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“No other terms require express construction at this stage. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Patent Owner’s argument does not discredit Petitioner’s position or reasoning. Patent Owner admits that Melnikov teaches exactly what Petitioner relies on it as teaching. Patent Owner does not contest that Truxor would be safer without a human operator and thus does not contest the reason to combine. Rather Patent Owner identifies that Melnikov teaches a propulsion system and pump with a design different from Truxor. Though, Melnikov may also suggest to one of skill in the art to make additional 6 English language translation of Ex. 1027. number of changes individually, or collectively. Further, Patent Owner does not argue, and we see no reason to believe, that adding remote control to Truxor is not within the ability of one of skill in the art. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,541,708
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.