- Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pet.”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 to institute a post-grant review of U.S. Patent No. 11,966,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent”), claims 1–20. We issued an Institution Decision (Paper 12) granting the petitioned review. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“thereby supporting our conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “affordance” in claim 1 refers to an interactive user interface element.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner’s reliance on Low’s” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,966,920 mixedClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,966,920 - Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable under each asserted obviousness ground, including Chang and Fang, because Petitioner proved unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Additionally, we note that Patent Owner did not cross-examine Mr. Ryan Bauer, who provided a detailed, 169-page expert report providing, on behalf of Petitioner, his opinions about the issues in this proceeding. See Exhibit 1003. Mr. Bauer’s testimonial evidence in this proceeding remains unrebutted.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. Based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that the Examiner construed the term “self- contained, in-bra wearable device” to mean “complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290).14 According to Petitioner, “[Patent Owner] did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner contends that all other terms “should receive their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“(3) 1[a][1] a diaphragm configured to prevent milk from reaching an air pump by forming a seal around its outer edge; Petitioner relies on Fang for the disclosure of a diaphragm, as stated in this clause. Pet. 25–26. Petitioner asserts the proposed combination of elements suggest a breast pump device that would have used a diaphragm pump including first and second diaphragm housing components and an elastic diaphragm, “in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 25. As also asserted by Petitioner, Fang discloses that flexible diaphragm 7 (i.e., a membrane) is configured to prevent milk from reaching the pump. Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 19 (“The elastic diaphragm 7 is used to prevent milk from flowing into the air pump main unit 8.”). Mr. Bauer testifies: The flexible diaphragm [diaphragm 7 in Fang] forms a watertight and airtight seal around its outer edge. In doing so, the diaphragm prevents the passage of milk from reaching the air pump and facilitates generation of negative pressure during operation. Fang also explains that the elastic diaphragm 7 deforms away from the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber, which then creates negative air pressure in the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 11,813,381 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,813,381 - PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco Limited And Willow Innovations, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00554 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 17–19 and 21–33 on every asserted ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 17 is unpatentable over Furrer alone and Furrer with Alvarez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, based on the analysis in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–33). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 32. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 33. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.6” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no formal claim constructions are necessary for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding. Pet. 3. We agree. Given the lack of dispute on this record, we do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Mr. Bauer further testifies: For electric-powered breast pumps, the only two options for providing electricity to the pump was either via a wire plugged into an outlet or via a battery, as would have been well-known to a POSITA. It would have been obvious for a POSITA to utilize a battery as the power source for Furrer’s pump as it was one of the two available options and would have provided known benefits. Ex. 1003 ¶ 93. As to why this a person of ordinary skill would have chosen the option of a battery powered breast pump, Mr. Bauer testifies that: Selection of battery power for Furrer’s pump would have beneficially provided a portable system that was usable during travel. Additionally, such a configuration would have allowed the user to move freely about a room, or be positioned in a location within a room without being tethered to a wall plug, allowing the user to, for example, sit or lay in the most convenient location while using the system without having to worry about being close to an outlet. Such mobility provided by selecting battery power for Furrer’s pump would have particularly aligned with Furrer’s suggestion for a ‘hands-free’ and discrete solution. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138, 143, 145 (further discussing the motivation to combine Furrer and Alvarez in the context of Ground 1B). Based on the record before us, without any evidence or argument to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently for purposes of trial institution that Furrer, alone or in combination with Alvarez, discloses the claimed control unit comprising a battery, and a pump.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,806,454 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00629 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Beard and Laufer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of one or more claims of the ’711 Patent. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of claims 1–20 on the grounds identified in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had the following qualifications: [E]ither (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the aerospace or avionics fields, or (2) at least four years of experience in any of the above industries. 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the applications from which the ’711 Patent claims priority were all filed after this date, the post-AIA version of §103 applies. See Ex. 1001, codes (60), (63). 2 U.S. Patent No. 9,769,387 B1, iss. Sept. 19, 2017 (Ex. 1009). 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2017/0059692 A1, pub. Mar. 2, 2017 (Ex. 1010). 4 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2012/0106800 A1, pub. May 3, 2012 (Ex. 1021). 5 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2017/0161911 A1, pub. June 8, 2017 (Ex. 1007). 6 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2013/0301905 A1, pub. Nov. 14, 2013 (Ex. 1024). 7 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2012/0004844 A1, pub. Jan. 5, 2012 (Ex. 1025). 8 PCT App. Pub. No. WO 2017/123477 A1, pub. July 20, 2017 (Ex. 1022). 9 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2017/0160751 A1, pub. June 8, 2017 (Ex. 1005). Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–54). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s proposed formulation. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is (1) consistent with the ’711 Patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Singhose. B.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“But the Detecting Limitations of claims 1, 19, and 20, merely require that a target be “detected.” The Detecting Limitations do not require that target detection be performed “aboard the reference UAV,” and claim 19 does not recite or require “machine learning.” Moreover, the Specification makes clear that the claims should not be limited to aspects of the disclosed embodiments, as Patent Owner proposes to do here. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:56–59 (“The invention is described in connection with such embodiments, but the invention is not limited to any embodiment. The scope of the invention is limited only by the claims . . . .”) Patent Owner additionally fails to cite any lexicographic definition or clear and unambiguous disclaimer of claim scope sufficient to limit the claims in the manner it proposes. We, thus, are not persuaded that the Detecting Limitations require “applying aboard the reference UAV a machine learning model to the capture image for: (i) identifying a target in the captured image.”” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Priority Date of the Challenged Claims Petitioner contends that claims 1–20 of the ’711 Patent “should not have priority to the October 9, 2016 filing date of U.S. provisional [patent] application 62/405,972 due to a lack of written description support.” Pet. 3. Petitioner thus “assumes” a priority date of October 1, 2017 (the filing date of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/556,449) for purposes of this proceeding. Id. at n.2; see also Ex. 1003, code (60). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s contention that the ’711 Patent is not entitled to a priority date earlier than October 1, 2017. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s undisputed contention that the ’711 Patent is not entitled to a priority date prior to 10 Any determination, no matter how designated in this Institution Decision (except our ultimate decision to institute), is preliminary and non-binding. Our Final Written Decision, based on a fully developed record of arguments and evidence, will state our binding determinations, findings, and conclusions. If a party disagrees with this preliminary construction, or any other determination set forth in this Institution Decision, that party should present its arguments at trial. The parties are reminded that any arguments not made during trial will be considered waived. Patent Owner is further reminded that arguments in the Preliminary Response are not preserved and will be considered waived at trial unless those arguments are re-raised in the Patent Owner Response. The parties are additionally reminded that arguments raised in subsequent briefing must be set forth in full in the briefs themselves, and may not be incorporated by reference from prior filings such as the Preliminary Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). October 1, 2017.11 Accordingly, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that all of the cited references qualify as prior art. See Pet. 4–6. D.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,514,711 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00530 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–9 on all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Whitmarsh.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of claims 1–9 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“permission module,” as used in claim 1, has “a well understood structural meaning in the computer technology field.” 792 F.3d at 1350. Rather, the limitation in question is “drafted in the same format as a traditional means-plus-function limitation, and merely replaces the term ‘means’ with ‘nonce’ word ‘module,’ thereby connoting a generic ‘black box’ for performing the recited computer-implemented functions.” Id. And, while claim 1 recites the “outputs” of the permission module (i.e., a determination regarding the permissions of an aerial system), “the claim does not describe how the [permission module] interacts with other components in the [discrimination system] in a way that might inform the structural character of the limitation- in-question or otherwise impart structure to the [permission module] as recited in the claim.” Id. at 1351. We also reviewed the Specification, and we agree with Petitioner that the Specification identifies the following structure as corresponding to the claimed permission module: “storage on-board the disruption module 105, storage on-board the identification receiver 102, a remote computing system connected to the disruption module…, or [] any other suitable computing system.” See Pet. 12; Ex. 1001, 9:64–10:4. slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableInstituted
“from nearby UAVs wireless communications that include information or signatures unique to the UAVs, such as a MAC [media access control] address of the UAV, that is used to identify the transmitting UAV.” Pet. 16– 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 27; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 8, 10, 13, 15–17; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 117–118). For example, Petitioner cites Whitmarsh’s teachings that “[a]ll drones have a unique identifier, such as a media access control (MAC) address, that can be determined or read by the DDS [drone defense system] and can be used to identify the drone.” Id. at 16 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 13). Based on these teachings, Petitioner submits that the signal received from the UAVs includes an aerial system identifier signal unique to the aerial system. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 27; Ex. 1006 ¶ 13).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,249,199 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00525 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claim 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood it is obvious over Beard.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claim 21, the sole challenged claim. We, therefore, institute inter partes review of claim 21 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[E]ither (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the aerospace, avionics, telecommunications, or electronic device manufacturing industry, or (2) at least four years of industry experience in any of the above industries. Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 47). Patent Owner does not presently dispute Petitioner’s proposed formulation. See generally Prelim. Resp. For 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. US 2016/0253907 A1, published Sept. 1, 2016 (Ex. 1010). 4 PCT Pub. No. WO 2016/078093 A1, published May 26, 2016 (Ex. 1011). 5 PCT Pub. No. WO 2016/154949 A1, published Oct. 6, 2016 (Ex. 1012). 6 U.S. Pat. App. Pub. No. US 2016/0127890 A1, published May 5, 2016 (Ex. 1013). 7 PCT Pub. No. WO 2015/043123 A1, published Apr. 2, 2015 (Ex. 1014). purposes of this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is (1) consistent with the ’959 Patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Chowdhary. B.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“But before describing the embodiments cited by Patent Owner, the Specification plainly states: “Any terms not expressly defined herein have their conventional meaning as commonly understood by those having skill in the relevant art(s).” Ex. 1001, 4:64–67. Thus, the Specification itself cautions against construing the claim terms such as “secure identifier” as limited to the scope of the disclosed embodiments. Here, Patent Owner has not cited any express definition of “secure identifier,” or identified any explicit disclaimer of claim scope that might justify narrowing the scope of this claim term to specific embodiments disclosed in the Specification. In the absence of such a definition or disclaimer, we are not persuaded that the scope of the claim term “secure identifier” should be limited to specific aspects of the preferred embodiments cited by Patent Owner. See Prelim. Resp. 7–14. On this record, and at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction and preliminarily construe “secure identifier” as “a credential that can be used to securely verify the identity of a device, such as an airborne object or ground-based transmitter.”8” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“’071 Application lack adequate written description support for the “secure identifier” claim limitation. For a patent claim to be entitled to the priority date of an earlier-filed application, the earlier application must provide complete written description support for the claim as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). L.A. Biomedical Rsch. Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d 1049, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“L.A. Biomed”). To satisfy this requirement, the written description must “reasonably convey” to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession on the claimed priority date of each limitation of the later-claimed subject matter. L.A. Biomed, 849 F.3d at 1057. It is not enough that an earlier application’s disclosure “renders the later-claimed invention obvious;” as “the disclosure must describe the claimed invention with all its limitations.” L.A. Biomed, 849 F.3d at 1057. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application lack adequate written description support for the “secure identifier” limitation of claim 21. We have preliminarily construed “secure identifier” as “a credential that can be used to securely verify the identity of a device, such as an airborne object or ground-based transmitter.” See supra § II.B. As discussed above, the Specification of the ’959 Patent does not use the term “secure identifier,” but the Specification contains extensive discussion of the need for an identification credential that is secure (e.g., difficult for a bad actor to clone or impersonate). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:56– 65 (discussing the need for a system that is difficult to “clone”), 10:20–49 (discussing the need “trust” between a drone and ground-based equipment, and the need for a way to verifying the drone’s credentials), 11:5–12:62 (disclosing the use of encryption and a rotating SSID to generate a secure identifier for a drone). None of the portions of the Specification cited above is present in the ’153 Provisional or the ’071 Application. See generally Ex. 1006, 1007. The ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application discuss the need for identifiers for low-altitude aircraft (see, e.g., Ex. 1006, 2; Ex. 1007, 9), but there is no discussion of any need for an identification credential to be secure or resistant to cloning or impersonation. See generally Ex. 1006, 1007. The ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application do not disclose the use of encryption, SSIDs (much less rotating SSIDs), or any other technologies for the purpose of verifying the authenticity of an identification credential. See generally id. Based on our review of the ’153 Provisional and ’071 Application, we preliminarily conclude that neither of these applications would have reasonably conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor then had possession of the concept of the “secure identifier” that was later claimed in the ’959 Patent.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,713,959 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVInstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–31 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Beel and Dinka and over van de Laar and Kaplan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of the ’347 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive at least because Dinka expressly describes using VoIP technology on computer terminals 102. Ex. 1006, 5:45–48 (“A plurality of computer terminals 102 are shown coupled to the Internet 101, each comprising a network interface for communicating over the Internet.”), 6:7–8 (“Each computer terminal 102 is installed with a communication client application 110.”), 6:23–26 (“The communication client applications 110 [of computer terminals 102] and 113 [of television sets 103] are preferably peer-to-peer clients for setting-up and conducting VoIP calls according to peer-to-peer principles as discussed above.”). Thus, Dinka does not lead a skilled artisan in a direction divergent from the path taken in the ’347 patent. Moreover, “[a] reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its primary purpose.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, even though Dinka expresses a preference for conducting VoIP calls using a television set, a skilled artisan still would have considered Dinka’s teaching of using computers for such calls. See id. at 1334 (“This court has further explained that just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.”). Patent Owner’s teaching-away argument is unpersuasive. slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyOther
“a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103, 129. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,347 - Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVInstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00597 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–22 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In sum, on the current record, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka. f) Claims 2–22 The parties present their arguments for independent claim 11 along with those for claim 1. Pet. 44–45; Prelim. Resp. 19, 23. Claims 2–10 and 22 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Claims 12–21 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 11. Patent Owner does not present separate arguments for claim 11 or the dependent claims. We have analyzed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for claims 2–22 (Pet. 36–46) and, on the current record, conclude that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claims 2–22 would have been obvious over Beel and Dinka.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and alleged admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’346 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededOther
“Patent Owner accepts the Petition’s claim construction for the purposes of” the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In light of Patent Owner’s acceptance, and because the proposed constructions are, on this record, consistent with the evidence cited by Petitioner, we, too, accept Petitioner’s proposals for “providing simulations or translations, as required,” and “data transformations,” as recited in claim 1, for purposes of this Decision. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any other claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Dr. Almeroth does not provide a reason why a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Beel and Dinka, and that, instead, he “summarily concludes that Skype’s status as ‘well-known’ somehow would have motivated the combination of Dinka with Beel.” Prelim. Resp. 16. We disagree. Dr. Almeroth testifies that Skype, as taught in Dinka, would have been an example of the type of application that would have run on Beel’s system and that applying Dinka’s teachings would have improved Beel’s similar system in the same manner as it improved Dinka’s, with predictable results. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 117, 132. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976))). On the current record, including Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine the teachings of Beel and Dinka have rational underpinning.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,346 - PTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Amazon would show at least one claim unpatentable over Shin and Aoyama.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in demonstrating at least one of claims 1–7 of the ’675 patent is unpatentable. We begin our analysis with the principles of law that generally apply to an asserted ground based on obviousness, we then assess the level of skill in the art, next we provide brief overviews of Shin and Aoyama, and then we address the parties’ contentions with respect to independent claims 1, 6, and 7.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person having ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Env’t Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or 4 At this stage in the proceeding, SoundClear does not present arguments or evidence of secondary considerations. See Prelim. Resp. more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case.” Id. at 696–97. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Stern, Amazon argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to controlling the audio output of electronic devices. Work experience could substitute for formal education and additional formal education could substitute for work experience. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–32). In the Preliminary Response, SoundClear does not address Amazon’s assessment of the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Amazon’s uncontested assessment of the level of skill in the art because (1) it is consistent with the ’675 patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stern.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support determining that a person of ordinary skill in the would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Shin and Aoyama. As one example, Amazon contends that the proposed combination is merely the addition of one known element (i.e., “Aoyama’s natural language processing and information retrieval”) to another known element (i.e., “Shin’s voice processing and response device”) to obtain predictable results (i.e., “identifying a user’s intent and providing information responsive to such intent”). Pet. 19–20 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; Ex. 1002 ¶ 83). As another example, Amazon contends the proposed combination also represents the addition of one known element (i.e., “Aoyama’s word replacement” feature) to another known element (i.e., “Shin’s distance-based content abbreviation/simplification”) to obtain predictable results (i.e., “using word replacement to simply content for distant users”). Id. at 25–26 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; Ex. 1002 ¶ 100). Amazon also presents sufficient arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support determining there is a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination. Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 84), 27–28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 97, 98 Fig. 7). To the extent SoundClear argues that Amazon is required to identify a problem a person of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to solve when combining the teachings of Shin and Aoyama, we do not agree. See Prelim. Resp. 31–32. This line of argument runs contrary to the principles of law articulated in KSR. In KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized “an expansive and flexible approach” to an obviousness evaluation. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415; see also Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“KSR did not impose a rigid requirement to identify . . . a problem to be solved in the art . . . .”). The Supreme Court stated that, “[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents,” amongst other things, “to determine whether there was apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that, “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420.” slip op. at 26
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the preliminary record, we discern no deficiency in Amazon’s characterizations of Shin, Aoyama, or the general background knowledge in the art. In addition, for purposes of institution, we are persuaded by Dr. Stern’s testimony concerning the relevant disclosures in Shin and Aoyama. At this stage of the proceeding, SoundClear argues that Shin does not teach limitations 1[b]—“a voice classifying unit configured 1[b][i] to calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor 1[b][ii] to classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance.” See Prelim. Resp. 19–22. a. Limitations 1[b]—“a voice classifying unit configured to 1[b][i] calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor to 1[b][ii] classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance” In the Preliminary Response, SoundClear contends that Shin fails to teach voice classification because “Shin is incapable of distinguishing [between] multiple voices.” Prelim. Resp. 21. More specifically, SoundClear argues that Shin cannot teach classifying a voice into a first voice or second voice because “Shin never refers to a ‘first user’ or ‘second user’ or ‘multiple users.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 generally); see also id. at 26– 27 (arguing that Amazon misstates the record because Shin never discloses a “first voice” nor a “second voice”). Instead, SoundClear asserts that Shin only contemplates a single user (i.e., user 10) when calculating the distance between the user and an electronic device (e.g., Shin’s electronic device 100). Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 38). Based on the preliminary record, Amazon presents sufficient evidence that would support a finding that Shin teaches “a voice classifying unit configured to calculate a distance between the user and the output-content control device by a proximity sensor to classify the voice into either a first voice or a second voice based on the calculated distance.” Pet. 10–14. Shin discloses that “processor 120 may determine an output scheme of corresponding content based on a distance between a user and the electronic device 101.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 53. Shin’s processor 120 accomplishes this distance calculation by using distance detection module 180, which may include various sensors, such as a proximity sensor. Id. ¶ 66; see also id. ¶ 153 (disclosing an embodiment where electronic device 901 includes sensor module 940, which, in turn, includes proximity sensor 940G). Shin’s Table 3 illustrates how the distance between the user and electronic device 101 determines the output scheme. Id. ¶ 86, Table 3. For instance, Shin’s Table 3 illustrates classifying the user’s voice input as a “first voice” when the distance between the user and electronic device 101 is between 1 to 2 meters, and classifying the user’s voice input as a “second voice” when the distance between the user and electronic device 101 is less than 1 meter. Id. ¶¶ 86, 87, Table 3.” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,244,675
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.