• Everstar Merchandise Co., Ltd. v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 18, 2025 · PGR2019-00056 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Remand

  Claims 2–7, 9–19, 21–25, 27, 30, 31, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious; Petitioner did not prove claims 8, 20, 26, 28, 29, and 32 unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandMixed

    “The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan,” concluding “[n]othing more is required to establish a motivation to combine.” Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4. The Federal Circuit observed that “Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1,” and accordingly, “reverse[d] the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate[d] the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent,” remanding to us for further proceedings. Id. at 4–5. With those instructions in mind, we review the Petitioner’s allegations regarding claims 2–33.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “F. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the First Final Written Decision, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least two years of experience in the design of decorative lighting, or (2) at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field, and a basic familiarity with circuits used in decorative lighting.” Paper 40, 12. We see no reason to depart from that earlier determination.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties agree that we do not need to construe any claim terms. Pet. 8–9; PO Resp. 16–17. We likewise agree. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner did not dispute that the combined teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose each limitation of claim 1. Patent Owner, however, did dispute Petitioner’s proposed reasons for combining Kumada and Debladis ’120, and argues that Debladis ’120 is not analogous art. PO Resp. 36–61. The Federal Circuit stated that substantial evidence only supports the conclusion that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120. The factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan. Nothing more is required to establish a motivation to combine. Given that Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1, we reverse the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent. Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4 (internal citations omitted). The Federal Circuit further noted Patent Owner’s secondary considerations arguments as to claim 1 and stated [t]he cited evidence consists only of a temporal connection between the introduction of Willis’s invention and the UL 588 standards, and deposition testimony of a single witness who seemingly disclaimed any connection between the two. This is not sufficient to rescue a claim as to secondary considerations. Id. at 4, n. 5 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that claim 1 would have been obvious over Kumada and Debladis ’120. 6. Analysis of Independent Claim 33” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,222,037 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,222,037
• Fitbit, Inc. / Wahoo Fitness LLC. v. Blackbird Tech, LLC D/B/A Blackbird Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 12, 2019 · IPR2018-00275 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over Amano; claim 6 was shown unpatentable as obvious over Kato and Amano.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Under district court-type claim construction, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of 8 record (Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also In re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“While claims are generally given their broadest possible scope during prosecution, the Board’s review of the claims of an expired patent is similar to that of a district court’s review.”) (internal citation omitted)). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence” (DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17)). There is a “heavy presumption,” however, “that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning” (CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). We determine that no claim terms require express construction (see Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy)).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been [1] a person with a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis, or [2] a person with a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis or “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience. . . .” (Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 45–47)). Patent Owner does not dispute the educational level or experiential aspects of Petitioner’s definition in its Response (see generally PO Resp.). We note that the assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding (see Okajima at 1355). Based on our review of 12 the ’212 Patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’212 Patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Choudhury and Dr. Michael Caloyannides, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s description of a skilled artisan as possessing (1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis, or (2) a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis, is supported by the current record.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not identify any disclosure in Amano that describes calculating pitch based on any distance. That pitch has a length/time measurement does not change the lack of disclosure of Amano of any counting of steps in determining the distance traveled. Indeed, Amano’s FFT processing merely determines when a step has occurred through identification of peak frequency of the second order harmonic wave component, to determine pitch; however, the FFT processing does not count steps to be used in further calculation.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Amano does not disclose calculation of distance travelled, as recited in claims 2 and 5, as set forth above. Further, Petitioner has not persuaded us an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to modify the FFT processing which identifies a peak frequency of a second harmonic to measure the pitch, to calculate a distance travelled as recited in claims 2 and 5 instead. Petitioner provides no additional discussion of this limitation in its Petition, instead relying on its anticipation arguments (Pet. 50–51). Thus, Petitioner has not articulated any reason why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Amano to teach calculating a distance travelled.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,434,212 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,434,212
• Fitbit, Inc. / Wahoo Fitness LLC. v. Blackbird Tech, LLC D/B/A Blackbird Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2019 · IPR2017-02012 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over Amano; claim 6 was shown unpatentable as obvious over Kato and Amano.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Under district court-type claim construction, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of 8 record (Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also In re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“While claims are generally given their broadest possible scope during prosecution, the Board’s review of the claims of an expired patent is similar to that of a district court’s review.”) (internal citation omitted)). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence” (DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17)). There is a “heavy presumption,” however, “that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning” (CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). We determine that no claim terms require express construction (see Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy)).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been [1] a person with a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis, or [2] a person with a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis or “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience. . . .” (Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 45–47)). Patent Owner does not dispute the educational level or experiential aspects of Petitioner’s definition in its Response (see generally PO Resp.). We note that the assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding (see Okajima at 1355). Based on our review of 12 the ’212 Patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’212 Patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Choudhury and Dr. Michael Caloyannides, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s description of a skilled artisan as possessing (1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis, or (2) a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in motion tracking, motion analysis, inertial sensing, or signal analysis, is supported by the current record.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not identify any disclosure in Amano that describes calculating pitch based on any distance. That pitch has a length/time measurement does not change the lack of disclosure of Amano of any counting of steps in determining the distance traveled. Indeed, Amano’s FFT processing merely determines when a step has occurred through identification of peak frequency of the second order harmonic wave component, to determine pitch; however, the FFT processing does not count steps to be used in further calculation.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Amano does not disclose calculation of distance travelled, as recited in claims 2 and 5, as set forth above. Further, Petitioner has not persuaded us an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to modify the FFT processing which identifies a peak frequency of a second harmonic to measure the pitch, to calculate a distance travelled as recited in claims 2 and 5 instead. Petitioner provides no additional discussion of this limitation in its Petition, instead relying on its anticipation arguments (Pet. 50–51). Thus, Petitioner has not articulated any reason why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Amano to teach calculating a distance travelled.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,434,212 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,434,212
• Tomtom, Inc. v. Blackbird Tech, LLC D/B/A Blackbird Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2019 · IPR2017-02023 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable over Jimenez, Levi, and ordinary-skill knowledge; claims 6–8 were not shown unpatentable because Jimenez did not teach the claimed transmitter.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We find the ’212 Patent is directed to data for a particular user (see, e.g., ’212 Patent, Abstract). This conclusion is supported by the Specification. Indeed, all discussion in the ’212 patent is directed to a pedometer for use by and relying on data obtained from an individual user. Thus, the Specification suggests that the term “calibration” should be construed as a process that correlates a user’s stride rate and stride length. The Oral hearing confirms this conclusion. In the Oral Hearing, Petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Doshi, responded to a request to identify the calibration and the plurality of calibrations as follows: JUDGE STEPHENS: So what are you pointing at in the 212 patent as being [a] calibration and the plurality of calibrations? MR. DOSHI: That’s in column 5. So at column 5 it says that after a proper warm up the user completes a sample run or walk on the track at normal pace, et cetera, et cetera. So it's saying that here’s S1 and following completion of the first run, so here it’s saying you’re doing different walks at different speeds . . .where you're having the user walk at different walking speeds and measuring their step size as you do that (Trans. 21:1–10; see also Tr. 19:4–7) JUDGE ZADO: Okay. And then so taking that further then, I understand your argument to be that in the 212 patent the runner for the first sample S1 will run at one pace and that’s, according to Petitioner, that's one calibration and then the runner will run at a second pace for the S2 sample and that’s the second calibration, and then the runner will run at a third pace and then that's the S3 sample and then that's a third calibration? Is that Petitioner's argument? MR. DOSHI: Yes 13 (Tr. 22:4–11). Therefore, based on Petitioner’s statements at the Oral Hearing, the term “calibration” should be construed as the process of taking a sample that correlates step rate and step length for an individual.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute the educational level or experiential aspects of Petitioner’s definition in its Response (see generally PO Resp.), 18 despite Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Caloyannides, opining that the level of ordinary skill would not be so limited as proposed by Mr. Blackadar: I note that although the qualifications Mr. Blackadar describes would qualify one as a PHOSITA in this case, I do not believe the definition of a PHOSITA here would be so limited. The technology of the ‘212 Patent implicates other fields, such as Sports Medicine, Exercise Science, and Physiology. I believe that a bachelor’s degree in one of these fields, or a similar field, with at least two years of practical experience working with pedometers and/or health or fitness trackers or sensors, or an advanced degree in one of these areas, could qualify one as a PHOSITA in this case (Ex. 2001 ¶ 26). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art would mean a “[person having ordinary skill in the art] under Patent Owner’s definition would be more well-informed than Patent Owner’s own expert” (Pet. Reply. 2); however, we do not read Patent Owner’s assertion or Dr. Caloyannides’ testimony as suggested by Petitioner. Rather, we read Dr. Caloyannides’ testimony as expanding the fields of expertise. We do not observe a meaningful difference between the parties’ assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding (see Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355). Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment. Based on our review of the ’212 Patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’212 Patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Mr. Blackadar and Dr. Caloyannides, we adopt and” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved (In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Here, Petitioner has persuaded us that Levi is from the same field of endeavor as the ’212 Patent –– pedometers that count the number of steps taken to calculate distance traveled (see Pet. 20). Specifically, although Levi adds a navigation feature, Levi is directed to a pedometer that, in pertinent part, adjusts step size according to step frequency in order to estimate distance traveled by a user (Levi, 6:6–43). Levi states “[t]he present invention for a ground speed/distance sensor is an improvement over a common hiker’s pedometer” and “[t]he present invention analyzes the frequency of a user’s footsteps to aid in the detection of future footsteps, and further to aid in determining the size of footsteps taken by the user” (Levi, Abstract, 2:57–60, 2:65–67). Similarly, the ’212 Patent is directed to a pedometer and specifically, a pedometer that calculates actual stride lengths of a user based on relative stride rates (’212 Patent, Abstract). Thus, both the ’212 Patent and Levi are from the same field of endeavor –– pedometers or devices that include or rely on pedometers. Furthermore, both Levi and the ’212 Patent are pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved –– accurate distance identification. 44 Patent Owner additionally argues “[t]he different problems addressed” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A holding of obviousness can be based on a showing that “there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed” (KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). Such a showing requires some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. (id. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As admitted by Patent Owner, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known a user’s stride length could vary with stride rate at the time of invention (see PO Resp. 52). As noted by Petitioner, Levi discloses using a dynamic step size algorithm that “improve[s] the accuracy of distance 49 measurements of a human footstep sensor” (Pet. Reply 25 (citing Levi, 6:17–21)). We further credit Mr. Blackadar’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to improve Jimenez using Levi’s dynamic step size algorithm, to improve the calculated distances (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 92). Indeed, we find that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Jimenez and Levi to “monitor [ ] the distance traveled more accurately than prior pedometers that calculated distance based on average stride length” (Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 90), 32 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92)). In particular, we find that, given it was known a user’s stride length could vary with stride rate, as admitted by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 52), an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to implement a data processor that accounted for this relationship, such as that described in Levi (Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 93–94)).” slip op. at 49

  Patent outcomesUS 6,434,212 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,434,212
• American Megatrends, Inc. / Micro-Star International Co. Ltd et al. v. Kinglite Holdings Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 19, 2017 · IPR2015-01515 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14, 17–19, 21–27, 30, 32–49, and 51–60 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 15, 16, 28, 29, and 50 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “evidence of record that certain claims of the ’912 patent are unpatentable as summarized in the table below: Claim(s) Reference(s) Basis unpatentable 1–14, 17, 18, 24–27, Chang and Dent 35 U.S.C. § 103 30, 32, 35–49, 51– 53, 55, 56, 59 and 60 Chang, Dent and Bizzarri 35 U.S.C. § 103 19, 21–23, and 54 Chang, Dent, and Aegis 35 U.S.C. § 103 33 and 34 Flaherty and Chang 35 U.S.C. § 103 57 and 58 Petitioner has not established unpatentability of claims 15, 16, 28, 29 and 50 by a preponderance of the evidence IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that claims 1–14, 17–19, 21–27, 30, 32–49, and 51–60 are unpatentable; and” slip op. at 64

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues that there is no motivation to combine Chang and Dent. PO Resp. 6–7. According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s analysis ignores fundamental differences in operation between the systems taught in the two references. PO Resp. 6. Chang establishes a connection with a server upon detection of a program in the PROM. Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 at 6:55–57 (“The system BIOS detects the existence of a program in a ROM socket on a network interface card (step 35) and passes control to this program (step 37).”)). Dent establishes communication only when there is a boot error. Ex. 1004 at 3:4–8 (“to enable remote system level diagnostics through a privately or publicly accessible network in the event of a boot error”). Patent Owner argues that given these differences, there would have been no motivation to combine these references. PO Resp. 6−7. We determine that the differences noted by Patent Owner would not dissuade one of ordinary skill from combining the teachings Chang and Dent. As noted above, Chang, during a boot sequence and prior to loading its operating system (OS), uses its BIOS to enable network communication. Dent describes a boot sequence that establishes an interconnection over a network for remote servicing of an electronic system upon experiencing a boot error. Thus, they address the same general problem and are similar in overall approach to solving that problem.” slip op. at 21

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner continues to argue for a more restrictive construction of “network-enhanced software” that would require various specific functions of software described in the Specification. PO Resp. 8. However, we do not read into this claim term limitations of particular embodiments in the absence of a reason to do so. Here there is none. The term “network-enhanced software” appears only in the claims and not elsewhere in the Specification. We find no description of the term “network-enhanced software” in the Specification that would rise to the level of a definition. Embodiments are described as including a “network-enhanced BIOS.” The term “BIOS” appears in some, but not all, of the claims. We regard the term “network-enhanced software” as being broader in scope than “network-enhanced BIOS” based on our understanding that the term BIOS connotes to computer engineers specialized software particular to the rudimentary operation of a computer. We therefore adopt our preliminary constructions along with our reasoning expressed in our Decision to Institute for purposes of this decision. Dec. to Inst. 12−14.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “knowledge of one of ordinary skill when reading Chang and Dent. This knowledge includes the subject matter described by Melo, Banset, IBM and Bartek. The ordinarily skilled person reading these references would appreciate that when a computer using an Intel 80386 or 80486 processor is first turned on, it begins operation in “real mode.” Pet. 37; Ex. 1019 ¶ 53. Petitioner establishes that Chang meets the “second BIOS” limitation by offering the unrebutted Righi testimony which explains the knowledge of one of ordinary skill of real and protected modes, and that it would have been obvious to execute the second BIOS in protected mode, which was well-known at the time of the invention. Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 48–57. Patent Owner offers no testimony to counter the Righi testimony. We find that, at the time of the invention, real and protected modes were commonly used modes of operation in Intel processors and that these modes would have been known to those of ordinary skill. One of ordinary skill would have applied this knowledge along with the specific teachings of Chang and Dent to make the claimed invention. We therefore conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 37 and 51 are unpatentable based on Chang and Dent.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 5,978,912 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 5,978,912
• Duodecad It Services Luxembourg S.à.R.L. / Friendfinder Networks Inc. et al. v. Wag Acquisition, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 20, 2016 · IPR2015-01036 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7, 14, and 21 were not shown unpatentable because the references lack per-user server tracking.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “A given reference is publicly accessible upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been [1] disseminated, or [2] otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 2008. Even though Chen issued prior to the USPTO PAIR system, Chen FH was and remains easily requisitioned by any interested person from the USPTO by making the appropriate request and paying the appropriate fee.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that initially operating Chen in rush mode would cause unstable operation. The only evidence Patent Owner has presented is the declaration testimony of Dr. Mayer-Patel, which was weakened as a result of cross-examination.  For example, Dr. Mayer-Patel admitted that simply setting the water marks to different values would avoid the potential hysteresis instability. See Ex. 1016, pp. 64−66. Further, both Chen and Chen FH disclose that transmission starts in rush mode. Chen states: “transmission occurs in rush mode when the amount of data falls below the lower water mark, i.e., there is not enough data in the client agent packet buffer (33).” Ex. 1004, 6:43–45. Chen FH states at page 86 in the “open file” line: “read data from disk and rush them to CA” (emphasis added). We credit Dr. Polish’s testimony that “Chen and the Chen File History teach that the mode that is used at the start of transmission is the rush mode.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 58. Dr. Mayer-Patel was cross-examined regarding “thrashing.” When asked about setting gamma levels to achieve a stable system, Dr. Mayer- Patel answered that he would set the gammas to different levels for transitioning from rush to normal modes than for transitioning from normal to rush modes. Ex. 1016, 66:9–18; see Ex. 1005, 86–87 (discussing gamma values); Reply 14 n.2 (discussing hysteresis). Based on the testimony of Dr. Mayer-Patel and the evidence cited by Petitioner (Reply 14–15), we conclude that one of ordinary skill would have known how to set gamma levels defining mode transitions to provide the appropriate amount of hysteresis to prevent thrashing, e.g., in the manner that a thermostat hysteresis is set to avoid too rapid a cycling of a furnace. We find that if Chen were operated initially in “rush” mode, it would” slip op. at 29

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that initially operating Chen in rush mode would cause unstable operation. The only evidence Patent Owner has presented is the declaration testimony of Dr. Mayer-Patel, which was weakened as a result of cross-examination.  For example, Dr. Mayer-Patel admitted that simply setting the water marks to different values would avoid the potential hysteresis instability. See Ex. 1016, pp. 64−66. Further, both Chen and Chen FH disclose that transmission starts in rush mode. Chen states: “transmission occurs in rush mode when the amount of data falls below the lower water mark, i.e., there is not enough data in the client agent packet buffer (33).” Ex. 1004, 6:43–45. Chen FH states at page 86 in the “open file” line: “read data from disk and rush them to CA” (emphasis added). We credit Dr. Polish’s testimony that “Chen and the Chen File History teach that the mode that is used at the start of transmission is the rush mode.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 58. Dr. Mayer-Patel was cross-examined regarding “thrashing.” When asked about setting gamma levels to achieve a stable system, Dr. Mayer- Patel answered that he would set the gammas to different levels for transitioning from rush to normal modes than for transitioning from normal to rush modes. Ex. 1016, 66:9–18; see Ex. 1005, 86–87 (discussing gamma values); Reply 14 n.2 (discussing hysteresis). Based on the testimony of Dr. Mayer-Patel and the evidence cited by Petitioner (Reply 14–15), we conclude that one of ordinary skill would have known how to set gamma levels defining mode transitions to provide the appropriate amount of hysteresis to prevent thrashing, e.g., in the manner that a thermostat hysteresis is set to avoid too rapid a cycling of a furnace.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that ISO-11172 would have been well known to those of ordinary skill. It was at the time of the ’839 patent already published and utilized. ISO-11172 demonstrates that it was known to encode frames at constant and variable bit rates. We are not persuaded that Chen’s focus on variable bit rates teaches away from the use of either constant or variable bit rates. The fact that a standard, published before Chen, describes the use of both in detail suggests that it was well known to those of ordinary skill in the art. We therefore conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence of record that Chen describes the constant bit rate feature of claims 3, 10 and 17. We find that Petitioner has produced sufficient evidence to establish that claims 3, 10, and 17 are unpatentable over Chen, Chen FH, and ISO-11172. See Pet. 38–39 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–70).” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,364,839 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,364,839
• QSC Audio Products, LLC v. Crest Audio, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 1, 2015 · IPR2014-00131 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15, 18, 19, 21, and 24–26 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 20 and 23 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We determine the obviousness issues guided by the evidence of the level of ordinary skill in the art presented by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). From the Porambo reference, which Patent Owner does not contest is in the field of endeavor of the invention in question, we understand that the level of ordinary skill in the art, at a minimum, pertains to audio amplifiers and the incorporation of DSPs in audio amplifiers. See Ex. 1006, Abstract (describing the features of the audio amplifiers and DSPs at issue in Porambo).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “As to his audio amplifier experience, Dr. Ellis completed a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering with numerous years of experience as a research assistant researching audio signal processing, sound synthesis and analysis. Ex. 1004, 1. Dr. Ellis stated during his deposition that, although he is an expert in digital signal processing (IPR2014-00129, Ex. 2002, 154:15–16), he has experience in the design of amplifiers from his undergraduate education. Id. at 124:7–20. Dr. Ellis designed and tested microphone amplifiers as a post-doctoral student at the Computer Science Institute at Berkeley, id. at 111:13–113:4, and currently is designing amplifiers that can drive speakers with the goal of incorporating these into his professional work. Id. at 120:4–121:12. We also note, as discussed above, the field of the ’544 Patent invention is related to audio amplifiers generally and the incorporation of DSPs. We find that although Dr. Ellis is less experienced than Mr. Cordell in the area of amplifier design, he is qualified sufficiently to testify about audio amplifiers as they relate to DSPs. Patent Owner also argues that Dr. Ellis must himself be a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 15–16. Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive, because, to testify as an expert under FRE 702, a person need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art, but rather “qualified in the pertinent art.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research, Inc., 439 Fed. App’x 882, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (non-precedential) (upholding admission of the testimony of an expert who “had experience relevant to the field of the invention,” despite admission that he was not a person of ordinary skill in the art). As noted above, Dr. Ellis is qualified in the pertinent art. Finally, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Ellis spent an unreasonably short amount of time reviewing this case before providing his opinion, i.e., only ten hours. PO Resp. 17–18. We find that the amount of time Dr. Ellis chose to spend with the case likely is based on his experience with the subject matter and the difficulty of the subject matter. Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the time spent on the proffered opinion affects the weight we give his opinions.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “signal processing function programs and program data for defining function parameters.” Ex. 1001, 6:43–45. Thus, the Specification suggests that both the functions and parameters are transmitted to the DSP. Additionally, the Federal Circuit, when faced with similar claim language, determined that the phrase “at least one” followed by a list of categories separated by “and” rather than “or” suggests a conjunctive list in which each one of the members of the list is necessary to satisfy the claim. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 885–86 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A common treatise on grammar teaches that ‘an article of a preposition applying to all the members of the series must either be used only before the first term or else be repeated before each term.’” (quoting William Strunk, Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style 27 (4th ed. 2000)). SuperGuide points out that each term in the list embraces a different category, each of which must take on a chosen value: “Every disclosed embodiment teaches that the user must choose a value for each designated category.” Id. at 887. That is the case here where functions have associated parameters. For the above reasons, consistent with the plain English meaning and the Specification, we construe “at least one of a signal processing function and a signal processing function parameter” to require that both a signal processing function and a signal processing parameter must be present in the prior art to meet that claim limitation.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not assert that a removable connection itself is incompatible with Sudo. Rather Patent Owner asserts that the specific connections used by Krokstad are incompatible with Sudo. See PO Resp. 36. Patent Owner misses the point. The obviousness inquiry does not ask “whether the references could be physically combined but whether the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole.” In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”) The Supreme Court has made clear that we apply “an expansive and flexible approach” to the question of obviousness. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. Id. at 418. As the Supreme Court recognized, in many cases a person of ordinary skill “will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle,” recognizing that a person of ordinary skill “is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21. Both parties’ declarants agree that Sudo’s high-speed connection could be implemented using a PCI bus, which is a removable connection. Ex. 2002, 178:10–17; Ex. 1012, 93:1–94:19. Thus, given the motivation to create a removable connection, such as the one disclosed in Krokstad, we are persuaded that implementation of that connection in Sudo would not render it unsuitable for its intended purpose. Thus, for the reasons stated above, Petitioner has shown by a” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 5,652,544 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,652,544
• K-40 Electronics, LLC v. Escort, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 29, 2014 · IPR2013-00240 · APJ Trenton A Ward · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 11–12, 15–18, 22–33, 41–72, and 74–85 are unpatentable; claims 36–38 were not shown unpatentable, because the prior art did not establish their continuous-signal location tracking limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, [a party] must establish three things: ‘(1) construct[ion of] an embodiment or perform[ance of] a process that met all the [claim] limitations [ ]; [ ](2) . . . determin[ation] that the invention would work for its intended purpose,’” and “(3) the existence of sufficient evidence to corroborate inventor testimony regarding these events.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “A ‘rule of reason’ analysis is applied to determine whether the inventor’s prior conception testimony has been corroborated.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Here, the only evidence of the successful reduction to practice of the claimed invention for its intended purpose prior to January 27, 1998 is the testimony of the inventor, Mr. Orr. “It has long been the case that an inventor’s allegations of earlier invention alone are insufficient—an alleged date of invention must be corroborated.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d at 1291 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1170; Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). We conclude that the record is lacking sufficient evidence corroborating Mr. Orr’s testimony, which alone is insufficient. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence its claim of reduction to practice of the claims 1–6, 15–16, 22–29, 33, 41–52, 54–66, 68–72, 75, 77–83, and 85 of the ’905 patent prior to January 27, 1998. Therefore, Hoffberg and Fleming, III are prior art to the ’905 patent.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “forth in the challenged claims of related U.S. Patent No. 7,999,721 at issue in IPR2013–00203. For the same reasons set forth in the ’203 Decision at pages 6–8, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that “correlates to a police signal” should be construed to mean an undefined determination made by comparing a received signal to the attributes of actual police signals. Accordingly, we construe “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to a police signal” as “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to one or more characteristics of a police signal.” 2. “position determining circuit” Claim 1 recites “a position determining circuit generating a location signal.” Ex. 1001, col. 25, l. 50 (emphasis added). Independent claims 43 and 68 provide similar recitations regarding a “position determining circuit.” Patent Owner proposes that “position determining circuit” should be construed to mean “a device for receiving information related to geographic locations.” PO Resp. 22. Patent Owner made similar arguments with respect to the “position determining circuit” set forth in the challenged claims of related U.S. Patent No. 7,999,721 at issue in IPR2013–00203. For the same reasons set forth in the ’203 Decision at pages 6–8, we determine that the “position determining circuit” must be involved in determining the position of the device, rather than merely receiving information related to geographic locations of the device, as proposed by Patent Owner. Accordingly, we construe “position determining circuit” as “a circuit for determining a position of a device.”” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments because they are not commensurate with the scope of the claims. As discussed above, we construe the phrase “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to a police signal” as “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to one or more characteristics of a police signal.” The ’905 patent Specification describes that this correlation may be implemented based on “any of the techniques” described in the many patents incorporated by reference in the Specification. Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 50–56. Therefore, the correlate limitation recited in the independent claims can involve many prior art techniques, such as those disclosed in Hoffberg. For example, Petitioner argues that Hoffberg discloses the use of a “commercially available radar detector.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 33, ll. 9–15). More particularly, Hoffberg discloses “an event sensor is provided, such as a police radar and laser speed detection system (e.g., “radar detector”)” to detect signals and determine whether they correlate to a law enforcement signal. Ex. 1002, col. 33, ll. 9–15. We determine, therefore, that Hoffberg discloses the claimed correlating limitation. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that Hoffberg discloses all limitations of independent claims 1, 43, 54, 68, and 81. Patent Owner does not address dependent claims 2–4, 15, 17–18, 22–24, 28–29, 31–33, 41–42, 44–48, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64–65, 67, 69–72, 76–80, and 82–84 with separate, specific arguments against the anticipation challenge based on Hoffberg. See PO Resp. 28–38. As to dependent claims 2–4, 15, 17–18, 22–24, 28–29, 31–33, 41–42, 44–48, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64–65, 67, 69–72, 76–80, and 82–84, Petitioner provides sufficient evidence to show that Hoffberg discloses the additional recited limitations in those claims. Pet. 20–26, 28–32, 34–48. For example, Petitioner argues that the claim 15 limitation that the information associated with geographic locations includes information identifying rejectable signals at a geographic location is met by Hoffberg’s disclosure that “further information is also stored, such as a time of the event, its character or nature, and other quantitative or qualitative aspects.” Pet. 21 (quoting Ex. 1002, col. 18, l. 64–col. 19, l. 4 (emphasis omitted)). In a further example, Petitioner argues that the claim 28 requirement that the police warning receiver include “storage for vehicle history information identifying vehicle activities including geographic locations” is met by Hoffberg’s disclosure that the “memory stores information describing the event as well as the location of the event.” Pet. 29 (quoting Ex. 1002, col. 22, ll. 18–29 (emphasis omitted)).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 6,670,905 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,670,905

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.