- K-40 Electronics, LLC v. Escort, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2014 · IPR2013-00240 · APJ Trenton A Ward · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 11–12, 15–18, 22–33, 41–72, and 74–85 are unpatentable; claims 36–38 were not shown unpatentable, because the prior art did not establish their continuous-signal location tracking limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, [a party] must establish three things: ‘(1) construct[ion of] an embodiment or perform[ance of] a process that met all the [claim] limitations [ ]; [ ](2) . . . determin[ation] that the invention would work for its intended purpose,’” and “(3) the existence of sufficient evidence to corroborate inventor testimony regarding these events.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “A ‘rule of reason’ analysis is applied to determine whether the inventor’s prior conception testimony has been corroborated.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Here, the only evidence of the successful reduction to practice of the claimed invention for its intended purpose prior to January 27, 1998 is the testimony of the inventor, Mr. Orr. “It has long been the case that an inventor’s allegations of earlier invention alone are insufficient—an alleged date of invention must be corroborated.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d at 1291 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1170; Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). We conclude that the record is lacking sufficient evidence corroborating Mr. Orr’s testimony, which alone is insufficient. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence its claim of reduction to practice of the claims 1–6, 15–16, 22–29, 33, 41–52, 54–66, 68–72, 75, 77–83, and 85 of the ’905 patent prior to January 27, 1998. Therefore, Hoffberg and Fleming, III are prior art to the ’905 patent.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“forth in the challenged claims of related U.S. Patent No. 7,999,721 at issue in IPR2013–00203. For the same reasons set forth in the ’203 Decision at pages 6–8, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that “correlates to a police signal” should be construed to mean an undefined determination made by comparing a received signal to the attributes of actual police signals. Accordingly, we construe “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to a police signal” as “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to one or more characteristics of a police signal.” 2. “position determining circuit” Claim 1 recites “a position determining circuit generating a location signal.” Ex. 1001, col. 25, l. 50 (emphasis added). Independent claims 43 and 68 provide similar recitations regarding a “position determining circuit.” Patent Owner proposes that “position determining circuit” should be construed to mean “a device for receiving information related to geographic locations.” PO Resp. 22. Patent Owner made similar arguments with respect to the “position determining circuit” set forth in the challenged claims of related U.S. Patent No. 7,999,721 at issue in IPR2013–00203. For the same reasons set forth in the ’203 Decision at pages 6–8, we determine that the “position determining circuit” must be involved in determining the position of the device, rather than merely receiving information related to geographic locations of the device, as proposed by Patent Owner. Accordingly, we construe “position determining circuit” as “a circuit for determining a position of a device.”” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments because they are not commensurate with the scope of the claims. As discussed above, we construe the phrase “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to a police signal” as “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to one or more characteristics of a police signal.” The ’905 patent Specification describes that this correlation may be implemented based on “any of the techniques” described in the many patents incorporated by reference in the Specification. Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 50–56. Therefore, the correlate limitation recited in the independent claims can involve many prior art techniques, such as those disclosed in Hoffberg. For example, Petitioner argues that Hoffberg discloses the use of a “commercially available radar detector.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 33, ll. 9–15). More particularly, Hoffberg discloses “an event sensor is provided, such as a police radar and laser speed detection system (e.g., “radar detector”)” to detect signals and determine whether they correlate to a law enforcement signal. Ex. 1002, col. 33, ll. 9–15. We determine, therefore, that Hoffberg discloses the claimed correlating limitation. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that Hoffberg discloses all limitations of independent claims 1, 43, 54, 68, and 81. Patent Owner does not address dependent claims 2–4, 15, 17–18, 22–24, 28–29, 31–33, 41–42, 44–48, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64–65, 67, 69–72, 76–80, and 82–84 with separate, specific arguments against the anticipation challenge based on Hoffberg. See PO Resp. 28–38. As to dependent claims 2–4, 15, 17–18, 22–24, 28–29, 31–33, 41–42, 44–48, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64–65, 67, 69–72, 76–80, and 82–84, Petitioner provides sufficient evidence to show that Hoffberg discloses the additional recited limitations in those claims. Pet. 20–26, 28–32, 34–48. For example, Petitioner argues that the claim 15 limitation that the information associated with geographic locations includes information identifying rejectable signals at a geographic location is met by Hoffberg’s disclosure that “further information is also stored, such as a time of the event, its character or nature, and other quantitative or qualitative aspects.” Pet. 21 (quoting Ex. 1002, col. 18, l. 64–col. 19, l. 4 (emphasis omitted)). In a further example, Petitioner argues that the claim 28 requirement that the police warning receiver include “storage for vehicle history information identifying vehicle activities including geographic locations” is met by Hoffberg’s disclosure that the “memory stores information describing the event as well as the location of the event.” Pet. 29 (quoting Ex. 1002, col. 22, ll. 18–29 (emphasis omitted)).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 6,670,905 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,670,905 - PTAB · Sep 2, 2014 · IPR2014-00472 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion to terminate the preliminary IPR proceeding and terminated it without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment2 and terminate without rendering a final written decision under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that the joint motion to terminate this proceeding is GRANTED and the proceedings are hereby terminated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the settlement agreement shall be treated as business confidential information.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,096,358 - K-40 Electronics, LLC v. Escort, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 27, 2014 · IPR2013-00203 · APJ Trenton A Ward · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 are anticipated by Hoffberg, claims 2–8 and 10 by Fleming, III, and claims 2–10 are obvious over Fleming, III and Hoffberg.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, [a party] must establish three things: ‘(1) construct[ion of] an embodiment or perform[ance of] a process that met all the [claim] limitations [ ]; [ ](2) . . . determin[ation] that the invention would work for its intended purpose,’” and “(3) the existence of sufficient evidence to corroborate inventor testimony regarding these events.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “A ‘rule of reason’ analysis is applied to determine whether the inventor’s prior conception testimony has been corroborated.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that “correlates to a law enforcement signal” should be construed to mean an undefined determination made by comparing a received signal to the attributes of actual police signals. As Patent Owner stated in the Specification, there are numerous techniques known in the prior art for comparing a received signal to known characteristics of law enforcement signals. See Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 45-52. Furthermore, as noted by the Petitioner, Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Grindon, stated that standard examples of correlating a received signal to a law enforcement signal include adjusting city/highway signal detection thresholds and making sure a signal is present through several sweeps. Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1019, 36:15-37:4; 37:5-18). Therefore, as generally set forth in the disclosures of standard correlation techniques incorporated into the ’721 patent by reference, correlating a received signal must be interpreted broadly as analyzing one or more characteristics of a received signal in comparison with the known characteristics of law enforcement signals. Accordingly, in light of the Specification and in the context of the claims, we construe “providing a warning if a received signal correlates to a law enforcement signal” as “providing a warning if a received signal correlates to one or more characteristics of a law enforcement signal.”” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner fails to provide any objective evidence to corroborate Mr. Orr’s testimony that he reduced to practice the GPS lockout concept and associated position determining circuit prior to January 27, 1998 other than the tst4600k.bas file (Ex. 2086), which he concedes does not incorporate the position determining circuit. See Ex. 2073, ¶¶ 79-95. For example, Mr. Orr states in his Declaration that he “used the laptop and the spacebar in the laboratory in Stage 1 to illustrate the GPS lockout concept to other CMI employees,” but failed to cite any evidence to corroborate this testimony. Id. ¶ 80. Furthermore, Mr. Orr states in his Declaration that “my prototype had a position determining circuit” and an alert section that would “alter and/or not provide the alert if the location signal correlated to a location of a rejectable signal.” Id. ¶ 92. Patent Owner fails, however, to cite to any evidence to corroborate this testimony by Mr. Orr. See id. ¶¶ 80, 92. Mr. Orr was questioned at the oral hearing as to whether there was any evidence in the record of the successful test results or observations of the GPS lockout feature that Mr. Orr alleged to have reduced to practice in his Declaration. Tr. 39:15–41:5. During the hearing, Mr. Orr testified that he was not aware of any documents submitted in the record by Patent Owner providing such test results or observations. See id. In addition to a failure to provide sufficient objective evidence supporting the actual reduction to practice by the 1996 prototype of the position determining circuit and the associated GPS lockout concept, Patent Owner fails to provide sufficient corroborating testimony by others that witnessed Mr. Orr’s prototype successfully implementing the GPS lockout concept. Specifically, Patent Owner submitted testimony from four declarants, fellow employees of Mr. Orr at CMI: (1) Beth Andrews (Ex. 2053), (2) Gregory Blair (Ex. 2054), (3) Jim Brandon (Ex. 2055), and (4) Daniel Kindel (Ex. 2056). Ms. Andrews and Mr. Blair testified only that in 1996, the GPS lockout concept was a desired feature for a future radar detector product by CMI. See Ex. 2053 ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. 2054 ¶¶ 3-5. Neither Ms. Andrews nor Mr. Blair testified, however, that they witnessed or even were aware of an actual reduction to practice of a prototype demonstrating the GPS lockout concept. See Ex. 2053 ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. 2054 ¶¶ 3-5. Mr. Kindel testified that in 1996, Mr. Orr was conducting research into the benefits and feasibility of adding GPS to a radar detector, but Mr. Kindel failed to state that he witnessed an actual reduction to practice of such a prototype. See Ex. 2056 ¶ 3-6. Finally, Mr. Brandon testified that during his time at CMI, he was aware that Mr. Orr was working on a GPS enabled radar detector prototype prior to 1998 and the “purpose of this prototype was to mark the locations of false radar signals.” Ex. 2055 ¶ 2-3. Mr. Brandon fails, however, to state that he witnessed or even was aware of an actual reduction to practice of such a prototype. See id. Here, the only evidence of the successful reduction to practice of the position determining circuit and the associated GPS lockout concept of the claimed invention for its intended purpose prior to January 27, 1998 is the testimony of the inventor, Mr. Orr. “It has long been the case that an inventor’s allegations of earlier invention alone are insufficient—an alleged date of invention must be corroborated.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d at 1291 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1170; Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). We conclude that the record is lacking sufficient evidence corroborating Mr. Orr’s testimony, which alone is insufficient. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence its claim of reduction to practice of the challenged claims prior to January 27, 1998. Therefore, Hoffberg and Fleming, III are prior art to the ’721 patent.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Hoffberg.2 Pet. 19-38. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,999,721 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,999,721 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2014 · IPR2014-00582 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the three proceedings before institution, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Each of the captioned inter partes review cases is in its preliminary stage. The Petition in each of the captioned cases has not been granted. Under these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment4 and terminate each of the trials without rendering a final written decision under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,149,124 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2014 · IPR2014-00588 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the proceedings before institution, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Each of the captioned inter partes review cases is in its preliminary stage. The Petition in each of the captioned cases has not been granted. Under these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment4 and terminate each of the trials without rendering a final written decision under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,466,795 - U.S. Bancorp v. Retirement Capital Access Management CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 22, 2014 · CBM2013-00014 · APJ Trenton A Ward · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 13, 14, 18, 30, and 31 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim an abstract economic concept without meaningful additional limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Decided for patent owner
“To construe means-plus-function language in a claim, one “must look to the specification and interpret that language in light of the corresponding structure, material, or acts described therein, and equivalents thereof, to the extent that the specification provides such disclosure.” In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). More particularly, to construe properly the limitations in claims 13 and 30 reciting a “means for causing said future retirement payments . . . to be deposited into said account,” the limitations “shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.3 As noted by Patent Owner (PO Resp. 29), the corresponding structure within the specification supporting the means-plus-function limitation states the following: “[b]enefits source 12 of system 10 disburses retirement payments directly to an individual direct deposit account 14 in a designated depository 16. Preferably, this is accomplished utilizing the well-known technique of electronic funds transfer.” Ex. 1003, col. 5, ll. 18–22. Accordingly, we construe “means for causing . . . to be deposited into said account,” recited in claims 13 and 30, to mean “disbursing directly to said account utilizing an electronic funds transfer.”” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Unlike the means-plus function claims, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the term “deposited” in method claims 1 and 18 should similarly be interpreted to mean “deposited via direct deposit.” PO Resp. 30–33. Patent Owner fails to point to any support in the specification of the ’582 patent that would require the construction of the term “deposited” to mean a direct deposit or electronic funds transfer. If an inventor acts as his or her own lexicographer, the definition must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The specification of the ’582 patent does not set forth expressly a definition of “deposited.” In fact, as cited above, the ’582 patent states that deposits are “[p]referably” conducted with the “well-known technique of electronic funds transfer,” but the specification does not limit the term “deposited” to this implementation. Ex. 1003, col. 5, ll. 20–22 (emphasis added). Even in cases where the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims are not necessarily limited to that embodiment. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (It is not enough that the only embodiment, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation to limit a claim to that particular limitation.). Here, the specification itself indicates that electronic deposits are preferable, but not required. Therefore, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “deposited” recited in claims 1 and 18 as limited to “deposited via direct deposit.”” slip op. at 8
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“In accordance with the Supreme Court’s “framework for distinguishing patents that claim . . . abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts,” we must first “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 2355. In Alice Corp., the Supreme Court determined that the claims at issue were “drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement,” i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski [v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)], the concept of intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” Alice Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 2356 (citations omitted). With respect to the first step of the “Mayo framework,” the Supreme Court concluded in Alice Corp. that “there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement” in Alice Corp. and that “[b]oth are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have used that term.” Alice Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 2357. Here, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s claims are directed to the abstract concept of advancing funds based on future retirement payments. Reply 4. Patent Owner does not disagree. Tr. 40 (Patent Owner’s counsel stated at the oral hearing that Patent Owner is “happy to accept what [Petitioner] claim[s] is the abstract concept.”). Similar to the concept of intermediated settlement in Alice Corp. and the concept of risk hedging in Bilski, we find that the concept of advancing funds based on future retirement payments is an economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and squarely within the realm of abstract ideas.” slip op. at 12
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 6,625,582 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,625,582 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00760 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties without issuing a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties have requested that these trial proceedings be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On August 6, 2014, the Board authorized2 the parties to file a Joint Motion to Terminate these proceedings along with a true copy of any and all settlement agreements between them related to the patent at issue. The parties filed in each case a Joint Motion to Terminate3 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 327(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. The parties also filed in each case a Joint Motion to Treat the Parties’ Settlement Agreement as Business Confidential4 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and Rule 42.74. The settlement agreement5 purports to settle matters between the parties with respect to each of the patents at issue in this inter partes review. Each of the captioned inter partes reviews is in its preliminary stage. A decision on the respective Petitions6 has not yet been rendered. The parties have identified the following USPTO proceedings that are pending.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,048,032 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00763 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties under the settlement, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that the joint motions to terminate these proceedings are GRANTED and the proceedings are hereby terminated as to all parties including, Petitioners and Patent Owner; and FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ joint requests that the settlement agreement, as filed in each case, be treated as business confidential information and kept separate from the file of the involved patent under the provisions of to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c), are GRANTED.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,292,850 - ZTE (USA), Inc. v. Pragmatus Mobile LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00670 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding by settlement before deciding the petition.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“The parties have requested that these trial proceedings be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On August 5, 2014, the Board authorized (Paper 8) the parties to file a Joint Motion to Terminate this proceeding along with a true copy of any and all settlement agreements between them related to the patent at issue. On August 8, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Terminate (Paper 9) in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 327(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. The parties also filed a Joint Motion to Treat the Parties’ Settlement Agreement as Business Confidential pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and Rule 42.74 (Paper 10). The settlement agreement (Paper 11), marked “Confidential,” purports to settle matters between the parties with respect to the patent at issue in this inter partes review. This inter partes review is in its preliminary stage. A decision on the Corrected Petition (Paper 4) has not yet been rendered. The parties have not identified any other USPTO proceedings related to the patent at issue. Under these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment1 and terminate the trial without rendering a final written decision under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,466,795 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00762 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties after settlement, without issuing a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties have requested that these trial proceedings be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On August 6, 2014, the Board authorized2 the parties to file a Joint Motion to Terminate these proceedings along with a true copy of any and all settlement agreements between them related to the patent at issue. The parties filed in each case a Joint Motion to Terminate3 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 327(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. The parties also filed in each case a Joint Motion to Treat the Parties’ Settlement Agreement as Business Confidential4 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and Rule 42.74. The settlement agreement5 purports to settle matters between the parties with respect to each of the patents at issue in this inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,292,850
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.