- Foursquare Labs, Inc. v. Mimzi, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 19, 2020 · IPR2019-01287 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution on claims 1–19 in place because the challenged prior-art and priority arguments did not show an abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Id. The Board applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a decision on a petition for rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“As an initial matter, we first note that we determined in the Institution Decision that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over Ramer3 and Hayashi.4 Inst. Dec. 28–32. Patent Owner does not seek rehearing of that determination. Thus, even were we to agree with Patent Owner that Yoo is not prior art, we conclude that Patent Owner has not shown that the Institution Decision should be modified because we still would have instituted an inter partes review based on the Ramer/Hayashi ground. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (prohibiting institution “unless the Director determines that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); cf. Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018- 00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two dependent claims out of twenty challenged claims); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7, 42–43 (PTAB Jan. 3 Ramer, US 2007/0061302 A1, published Mar. 15, 2007 (Ex. 1004, “Ramer”). 4 Hayashi, US 2007/0255831 A1, filed Apr. 28, 2006, published Nov. 1, 2007 (Ex. 1005, “Hayashi”). 24, 2019) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two claims out of twenty-three challenged claims).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportOther
“governing statute was 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2013), as amended by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”). Inst. Dec. 13–19. On the record available at the time, we agreed with Petitioner that the ’981 Patent included claims with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013, the effective date of the AIA amendment to § 102. See id.; Reply 1–2; AIA § 3(n)(1). Specifically, we determined (preliminarily) that the challenged claims are not adequately supported by the written description of U.S. Patent Application No. 12/181,956 (“the ’956 Application”), and, thus, could not claim priority to the ’956 Application, the only application in the priority chain that was filed before the AIA’s relevant effective date. Inst. Dec. 17–19. Under post-AIA § 102(a)(2), a published patent application of another inventor (like Yoo) is prior art if it “was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” Yoo was filed on May 6, 2008. Ex. 1003, code (22). Consequently, under post-AIA § 102(a)(2), Yoo would qualify as prior art because its filing date is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.2 Ex. 1001, code (60). 2 We note that Yoo’s effective filing date precedes all of the possible effective filing dates listed on the face of the ’981 Patent, including the July 29, 2008 filing date of the ’956 Application. See Ex. 1001, code (60). As noted above and discussed further below, however, whether the claims are supported by the ’956 Application relates to the threshold issue of whether post-AIA § 102(a)(2) applies to Yoo.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“As an initial matter, we first note that we determined in the Institution Decision that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over Ramer3 and Hayashi.4 Inst. Dec. 28–32. Patent Owner does not seek rehearing of that determination. Thus, even were we to agree with Patent Owner that Yoo is not prior art, we conclude that Patent Owner has not shown that the Institution Decision should be modified because we still would have instituted an inter partes review based on the Ramer/Hayashi ground. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (prohibiting institution “unless the Director determines that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); cf. Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018- 00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two dependent claims out of twenty challenged claims); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7, 42–43 (PTAB Jan. 3 Ramer, US 2007/0061302 A1, published Mar. 15, 2007 (Ex. 1004, “Ramer”). 4 Hayashi, US 2007/0255831 A1, filed Apr. 28, 2006, published Nov. 1, 2007 (Ex. 1005, “Hayashi”). 24, 2019) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two claims out of twenty-three challenged claims).” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,128,981 - Asustek Computer, Inc. / Asus Computer International v. Avago Technologies General IP (Singapore) Pte. LtdRehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 8, 2017 · IPR2016-00647 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s request for reconsideration and added institution of the §102 Cioffi challenge to claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. CONCLUSIONS For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that our Decision to Institute overlooked or misapprehended the matters discussed in this Decision, and that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its challenge as to the patentability of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 as being anticipated by Cioffi. The Board has not made a final determination on the patentability of any challenged claims or the construction of any claim terms. Our final decision will be based on the record as fully developed during trial.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,430,148 - Gordon * Howard Associates, Inc. v. Lunareye, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2016 · IPR2014-01213 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103 based on the instituted combinations of Mohan, Oncore, Roach, and Lewis.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“accompanying description requiring that GPS Receiver 48 and Controller 36 be physically distinct components. Even if there was such a requirement, however, “a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). LunarEye’s reliance on other figures and descriptions of embodiments in the specification is unpersuasive for the same reason. See PO Resp. 20–21 & n.48; see also Ex. 2031 ¶¶ 14–15 (LunarEye’s proffered expert relying on descriptions of embodiments for opinion that data selecting device is external to GPS receiver). Merely describing a narrower embodiment does not constitute the clear disclaimer required to apply the limitation at issue to the claim. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In addition, LunarEye also contends the claim language itself indicates the recited GPS receiver (or location-signal generating device) and data selector are physically distinct components. PO Resp. 22. LunarEye asserts claims 1 and 2 recite that the GPS receiver produces “GPS data” first, and that the data selector operates on that output of the GPS receiver to produce “selected GPS data.” Id. at 22–23. According to LunarEye, this claim language requires that the GPS receiver and data selector be “distinct,” i.e., physically separate. See id. at 20–22. The claim language, however, does not support LunarEye’s position. Although claims 1 and 2 recite the GPS receiver and data selector separately and recite distinct functions for each, nothing in those claims indicates these structures must be physically separated or precludes one being housed physically within the other, particularly under their broadest reasonable interpretation. LunarEye does not present any compelling evidence indicating otherwise.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“to combine Mohan, Oncore, and Roach. Pet. 12–16. For example, GH argues that both Mohan and Oncore are directed to GPS receiver technology, and that combining them would have involved a simple substitution that would achieve predictable results. Id. at 12. GH also contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by Oncore’s discussion of the advantages of its GPS receiver technology, and that applying that technology in combination with Mohan would have amounted to nothing more than the use of a prior art element for its established function to obtain its stated benefits. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 1007, 1.1). Likewise, GH asserts that combining Roach with Mohan would have involved a simple substitution with predictable results, which would have amounted to the use of Roach’s prior art cellular communications system for its established function to achieve its known benefits. Id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1008, 9:6– 30). In addition to the prior art references, GH also relies on the Declaration of Dr. Janky, whose testimony supports GH’s contentions. Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 96– 102. We have considered Dr. Janky’s testimony, including his underlying analysis and reasoning, and find it credible. Based on all of the evidence presented, including Dr. Janky’s testimony, GH has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that one of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Mohan, Oncore, and Roach in the manner advanced by GH. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“are unpersuasive. LunarEye argues that the asserted prior art references teach away from the combinations advanced by GH. PO Resp. 45–57. Specifically, LunarEye contends Mohan states that a device constructed according to its teachings should conform to certain size constraints to achieve adequate miniaturization. Id. at 48–52. The GPS device described in Oncore14 are too large and are, thus, incompatible with Mohan, according to LunarEye. Id. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because none of the claims of the ’035 patent require miniaturization, nor do they include any limitations restricting the size of the claimed apparatus or any recited component device. LunarEye does not identify any portion of Mohan that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages combining Mohan and Oncore in the manner advanced by GH. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Merely describing the benefits of a miniaturized GPS device does not teach away from non-miniaturized devices. See id.; In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” Keller, 642 14 LunarEye does not argue that the GPS device of Lewis, or the communications devices of Roach, are incompatible with Mohan’s purported size restrictions. F.2d at 425. Thus, whether the Oncore GPS receiver is too large to be incorporated physically into the Mohan GPS device is inapposite, because the challenged claims do not recite any limitations on size.” slip op. at 27
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“MOTION TO SEAL GH moves to seal Exhibit 1028. Mot. Seal. 2. As this is the Final Written Decision, we consider GH’s Motion to Seal as a motion to expunge Exhibit 1028 from the record pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.56. Exhibit 1028 was not relied on for this Decision. Consequently, GH’s motion is granted, and Exhibit 1028 will be expunged. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that claims 1–24 of U.S. Patent No. 6,484,035 B2 are held unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103; and FURTHER ORDERED that Exhibit 1028 is expunged from the record.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 6,484,035 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,484,035 - PTAB · Dec 7, 2015 · IPR2015-01438 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding before deciding whether to institute review of claims 1–3 and 8–12.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“they have settled their disputes regarding the ’104 patent. Paper 7, 2. The parties further represent that there are numerous related matters in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that have been dismissed with prejudice or stayed pending final determination of two related inter partes reviews involving U.S. Patent No. 7,550,870 B2 (“the ’870 patent”). Id. at 3. Based on the joint requests filed by the parties in the two proceedings involving the ’870 patent, those cases have been terminated. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Cyber Switching Patents, LLC, Cases IPR2015-00690 & IPR2015-00725 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2015) (Paper 33 in each proceeding). Lastly, the parties do not represent that the ’104 patent is involved in any other proceedings before the Office. See generally id. at 2–4. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering any further decisions. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,672,104 - Opower Inc. v. Cleantech Business Solutions, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 25, 2015 · CBM2014-00155 · APJ Karl D Easthom · CBM · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–16 after Patent Owner disclaimed all claims in the trial.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Here, Patent Owner has disclaimed, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321, claims 1–16, all claims involved in this trial. Paper 28. The statutory disclaimer constitutes a request for entry of adverse judgment.1 III. CONCLUSION Entry of judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–16 of the ’245 patent is appropriate.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“1 During a telephone conference on November 17, 2015, which included counsel for both parties and the panel, counsel for Petitioner stated he did not object to the request for adverse judgment, but requested that the panel issue with this judgment findings of fact and legal determinations arising from papers of record. Petitioner expressed a concern over a potential for duplicated efforts in ongoing reissue proceedings involving the ’245 patent. We exercise our discretion and decline the request to supplement the record. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d) (3) (i) (precluding Patent Owner from obtaining claims that are not “patentably distinct from a finally refused or canceled claim”).” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,489,245 - Gordon * Howard Associates, Inc. v. Lunareye, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2015 · IPR2014-00712 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 3 is unpatentable under § 103 over Mohan and Oncore because their combination teaches or suggests each limitation and a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“argument. LunarEye relies on the specification’s descriptions of certain embodiments. For example, Figure 2 of the ’035 patent is a block diagram depicting certain features of an embodiment of the claimed invention, including Global Positioning Satellite System Receiver 48 (“GPS Receiver 48”) and Controller 36. Ex. 1002, Fig. 2, 5:49–6:8. As an initial matter, LunarEye does not identify anything in Figure 2 or its accompanying description requiring that GPS Receiver 48 and Controller 36 be physically distinct components. Even if there was such a requirement, however, “a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“reorders the selected location data” in either the Petition or the Preliminary Response, we construed the term due to its significance in the analysis of GH’s asserted grounds of unpatentability. Inst. Dec. 9. Specifically, we construed the term preliminarily in the Decision on Institution as “arranges the selected location data into the desired order for transmission.” Id. This construction was based on the ’035 patent specification, which describes the reordering function: An example of the data selector function is illustrated in FIGS. 6 and 7. The Motorola® GT Plus OncoreTM GPS family of chips produces an digital output signal 86 containing bits representing the latitude, longitude, height, velocity, and heading of the apparatus 12 and the current time, as shown in FIG. 6. . . . Preferably, only the bits representing latitude, longitude, velocity and heading 88 are included in the data to transmit signal 56, as shown in FIG. 7. . . . Further, it may be desirable to change the order that the various portions of the information are transmitted. For example, it may be desirable to send the heading portion first. The data selector selects the data to be transmitted and arranges it into the desired order. Ex. 1002, 7:4–20 (emphasis added). We concluded, “the specification explains that reordering the selected location data encompasses arranging the data received from the location-signal generating device (e.g., a GPS device) into the order desired for transmission.” Inst. Dec. 9. The ordinary meaning of the term “reorders”—as contrasted with “orders”—indicates a change in order. The specification supports this understanding of the term, stating that “it may be desirable to change the order that the various portions of the information are transmitted.” Ex. 1002, 7:15–17 (emphasis added). Therefore, based on the parties’ arguments and evidence developed since the Decision on Institution, we now determine the broadest reasonable interpretation of “reorders the selected location data” is “changes the order of the selected location data into the desired order for transmission.”7 slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“initial order of the location data received by the GPS receiver. Id.; Tr. 50:23–53:2. LunarEye argues that when Oncore discusses generating multiple different NMEA messages, each message is constructed separately from the original, unordered data; thus, the data is ordered for each output message in the first instance, rather than reordered. PO Resp. 28–29; Tr. 53:3–18. In an obviousness analysis, however, we consider not only the express disclosures of the asserted prior art references, but also the “inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Here, the record indicates that a person of ordinary skill would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering and familiarity with GPS and communications technology, such as that gained from five years of professional experience in the design and implementation of GPS technology. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 38–41 (Dr. Janky’s testimony on level of ordinary skill); Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 8–9 (LunarEye’s proffered expert, Joseph McAlexander, adopting Dr. Janky’s testimony regarding level of ordinary skill). Considering the level of ordinary skill and the evidence of record, we find that Oncore would have taught or suggested to an ordinary artisan a device that changes the order of selected location data from one order (e.g., an NMEA message) to another order (e.g., a different NMEA message).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“claimed location-signal generating device and its related limitations. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:7–12, 3:5–15, Fig. 1). According to GH, the communications transmitter/receiver of Mohan teaches the claimed telemetry transmitter, and the disclosed power management system teaches the claimed enable controller and its related limitations. Id. at 26–30 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:2–15, 4:43–5:49, Figs. 1, 3). LunarEye does not dispute that Mohan teaches these aspects of claim 3 of the ’035 patent. The record supports GH’s contentions regarding Mohan.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 6,484,035 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,484,035 - Foursquare Labs, Inc. v. Silver State Intellectual Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 26, 2015 · IPR2014-00159 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Fraccaroli does not disclose all claim limitations arranged or combined in the same way.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“example when reviewing an allegedly anticipating prior art reference. Reply 7 (citing Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369 n.5). Nevertheless, we still must determine whether the reference discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, even while looking at the reference as a whole. See Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Claim 1 is a method claim reciting specific steps. Limitation [f] recites the step of “receiving, from the user, additional data regarding the user, the additional data being related to the geographic location of the user.” In Fraccaroli, only the convention application includes this step, with the information in the event field corresponding to the “additional data” recited in the claim. See Ex. 1003, 8:57–9:5. For limitation [h], which recites the step of “receiving from the user an access list of possible requesters of the data and the additional data,” Petitioner relies on information provided by the user in Fraccaroli’s closest friend application, i.e., a list of known persons with whom the user wishes to share information. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:44–48). Notably, Petitioner does not contend that the user in Fraccaroli’s convention application places the information center or registration desk on an access list. See Pet. 30–31; Tr. 60:7–11. Thus, the convention application does not include the step of receiving an “access list” from the user (limitation [h]), and the closest friend application does not include the step of receiving “additional data” from the user (limitation [f]). For limitation [j]—the step of providing location data and additional data to possible requesters on the access list—Petitioner cites Fraccaroli’s description of message signals sent after a match is made. Pet. 31–32. Petitioner contends that message signals containing information from a user’s matching profile are sent in any of the embodiments disclosed in Fraccaroli. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1003, 10:40–67). Nevertheless, Fraccaroli does not describe a process that includes both the steps of receiving “additional data” from a user and receiving an “access list” from a user. Therefore, even if message signals are sent in all embodiments or applications described in Fraccaroli, the reference does not disclose a process in which message signals including “additional data” are sent to possible requesters on an “access list,” as set forth in limitation [j]. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Fraccaroli discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in claim 1 and, thus, has not shown that Fraccaroli anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“example when reviewing an allegedly anticipating prior art reference. Reply 7 (citing Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369 n.5). Nevertheless, we still must determine whether the reference discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, even while looking at the reference as a whole. See Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Claim 1 is a method claim reciting specific steps. Limitation [f] recites the step of “receiving, from the user, additional data regarding the user, the additional data being related to the geographic location of the user.” In Fraccaroli, only the convention application includes this step, with the information in the event field corresponding to the “additional data” recited in the claim. See Ex. 1003, 8:57–9:5. For limitation [h], which recites the step of “receiving from the user an access list of possible requesters of the data and the additional data,” Petitioner relies on information provided by the user in Fraccaroli’s closest friend application, i.e., a list of known persons with whom the user wishes to share information. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:44–48). Notably, Petitioner does not contend that the user in Fraccaroli’s convention application places the information center or registration desk on an access list. See Pet. 30–31; Tr. 60:7–11. Thus, the convention application does not include the step of receiving an “access list” from the user (limitation [h]), and the closest friend application does not include the step of receiving “additional data” from the user (limitation [f]). For limitation [j]—the step of providing location data and additional data to possible requesters on the access list—Petitioner cites Fraccaroli’s description of message signals sent after a match is made. Pet. 31–32. Petitioner contends that message signals containing information from a user’s matching profile are sent in any of the embodiments disclosed in Fraccaroli. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1003, 10:40–67). Nevertheless, Fraccaroli does not describe a process that includes both the steps of receiving “additional data” from a user and receiving an “access list” from a user. Therefore, even if message signals are sent in all embodiments or applications described in Fraccaroli, the reference does not disclose a process in which message signals including “additional data” are sent to possible requesters on an “access list,” as set forth in limitation [j]. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Fraccaroli discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in claim 1 and, thus, has not shown that Fraccaroli anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 13
- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Subsequent to institution, Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing, Paper 8, which we granted for the limited purpose of modifying our construction of one claim term, Paper 13 (“Reh’g Dec.”). Thereafter, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response, accompanied by a Declaration of Dr. Craig Rosenberg. Paper 14 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply to the Patent Owner Response, along with a Declaration of Mr. Chris Schmandt. Paper 17 (“Reply”); Ex. 1027. We held an oral hearing on February 24, 2015. A transcript of the oral hearing is included in the record. Paper 27 (“Tr.”).” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 7,343,165 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,343,165 - Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC / Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. v. Velocity Patent LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 6, 2015 · IPR2014-01247 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request to cancel challenged claims 31 and 32 and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner before institution.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“of claims 31 and 32 (Paper 19). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), cancellation of all challenged claims leaving no remaining claims for trial is construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 31 and 32 of U.S. Patent No. 5,954,781, is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered herein against Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 5,954,781 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2014 · IPR2014-00336 · APJ Scott E Kamholz · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated IPR2014-00336 as to all parties; it did not decide patentability.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties filed a joint motion to terminate the instant proceeding (Paper 13 (“Mot.”)), and a true copy of their written settlement agreement (Ex. 1005) made in connection with the termination, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 317 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(b). The parties also jointly requested that their settlement agreement be treated as business confidential information under 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). Mot. 2-3. For the reasons provided below, the joint motion to terminate is granted. The joint request that the settlement agreement be treated as business confidential information is also granted.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,622,984 - PTAB · Sep 2, 2014 · IPR2014-00472 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion to terminate the preliminary IPR proceeding and terminated it without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment2 and terminate without rendering a final written decision under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that the joint motion to terminate this proceeding is GRANTED and the proceedings are hereby terminated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the settlement agreement shall be treated as business confidential information.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,096,358
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.