- Toyota Motor Corporation v. American Vehicular Sciences LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2014 · IPR2013-00416 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4–10, 17, and 18 are unpatentable as anticipated by Probst and obvious over Scholl and Probst.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“AVS’s arguments are based in part on an improper limiting of the term “patterns” to exclude trends. We construe the term “pattern” to aid in the evaluation of the arguments presented by AVS regarding Scholl. The specification of the ’501 patent uses the term “pattern” in its description of pattern-recognition technology. In particular, according to the ’501 patent specification, detection of patterns is performed on time series data emitted by the sensors. Ex. 1001, 16:18–24. The ’501 patent specification describes various patterns that pattern recognition technology detects. For example, the ’501 patent specification states “[i]n some cases, the frequencies present in a set of data are a better predictor of component failures than the data itself.” Ex. 1001, 16:54–55 (emphasis added). Additionally, according to the ’501 patent specification, “[i]t is worth emphasizing that in many cases, it is the rate that a parameter is changing that can be as or more important that the actual value in predicting when a component is likely to fail.” Id. at 14:34–37 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the ’501 specification states: “[t]he pattern recognition algorithm thereby detects trends or patterns in the time series received from the sensors.” Ex. 1001, 18:29–30 (emphasis added). As used in the ’501 patent specification, therefore, “pattern” is a frequency of occurrences of certain data present in a set of data, a rate of change of data, or a trend of data. For the reasons discussed above, we construe “pattern” as a frequency of occurrences of certain data present in a set of data, a rate of change of data, or a trend of data. 3.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“AVS’s contention is inconsistent with the specification of the ’501 patent. In particular, the ’501 patent contemplates that prediction of a failure of one of the components or subsystems encompasses failures due to the manner in which the operator is operating the vehicle, or driver error. Ex. 1001, 15:38–40. One example provided in the ’501 patent is predicting accelerated failure due to a driver driving at a speed higher than appropriate for a low gear. Id. at 15:38–44. As an additional example, the ’501 patent specification describes predicting a rollover due to high speed. Id. at 26:21– 25. The ’501 patent describes a further exemplary failure that occurs because of how an operator operates a vehicle, by stating “a failure mode can be designed into the mechanism [to enable a restorable system] . . . when the tire goes flat as, for example, when a nail [] punctures the tire.” Id. at 76:19–23. A nail puncturing a tire is often due to a driver driving over a nail. AVS’s contention also is inconsistent with other language recited in claim 1. In particular, claim 1 recites, “whereby a breakdown of the vehicle that might occur if the predicted failure of the component were to occur is thereby avoided” (emphasis added). According to claim 1, breakdown of a vehicle is a possibility, but not a certainty when a component fails. AVS does not describe persuasively how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand what types of functions are “normal” in the context of the claim and the ’501 patent specification. The exemplary failures described in the ’501 patent specification, such as a vehicle rollover or a flat tire, are simply states of inability of a component, a wheel or a tire, respectively, to perform a function that the component was designed to do.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Whether Probst Meets the Limitations of Claims 1, 6–8, 17, and 18 Toyota’s claim charts persuasively read all elements of each of claims 1, 6–8, 17, and 18 onto the disclosure of Probst. Pet. 27–34 (citing Ex. 1003, Abstract, 1:10–29, 1:45–54, 1:67–2:29, 2:42–48, 3:9–15, 4:25–68, 5:30–37, 6:6–15, Fig. 1). For instance, claim 1 recites a method for predicting impending failures. As Toyota correctly asserts, Probst is directed to a process for determining the operating condition of a vehicle, including “imminent critical operating conditions.” Pet. 25-26 (citing Ex. 1003, Abstract). Additionally, claim 1 requires analyzing detected patterns in obtained sensor data to create a prediction of an impending failure of one of the components or subsystems. Toyota correctly notes that Probst’s diagnostic process entails generating a pattern based on sensor signals and comparing this pattern with preset patterns to determine when the limit pattern for a critical operating condition is approached. Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1003, Abstract; col. 1, ll. 36-54; col. 2, ll. 24-30; col. 4, ll. 62-68; col. 5, ll. 22-59; col. 6, ll. 19-29). Exemplary sensor data that is monitored includes a pressure sensor that determines loading of a chassis spring of the motor vehicle. Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:67–2:7). Regarding recitation in claim 1 of informing the user about the predicted failure, Toyota also correctly notes that Probst describes warning a user of the vehicle. Pet. 26, 31-32 (citing Ex. 1003, col. 1, ll. 24-29; col. 2, ll. 42-46; col. 4, ll. 62-68).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Whether Toyota Has Satisfied the Requirements for Combining Scholl and Probst As indicated above, we determine that Toyota has articulated sufficient reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the technique of directing predicted failure information through a satellite transceiver, as described in Scholl, into the failure prediction system of Probst. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 398. Additionally, in light of the contentions and evidence presented by Toyota, we find that modifying Probst’s disclosure of indicating to the user of the vehicle when the vehicle approaches a critical condition with Scholl’s disclosure of transmitting indications of faults to a remote location is no more than a predictable use of familiar prior-art elements according to their established functions, therefore rendering the recited invention obvious. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In particular, Toyota relies on the declaration of its expert, Mr. Andrews, who states that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been motivated to use Scholl’s satellite transceiver with Probst’s failure prediction system. Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 121–24). Mr. Andrews states that Scholl explains that transmissions to dealers, manufacturers, and owners allow for maintenance, generation of repair instructions, or the development of future diagnostics and prognostics by a vehicle manufacturer. Ex. 1007 ¶ 122 (citing Ex. 1002, 1:12–18, 2:58–68, 6:55–60). Mr. Andrews also states that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood in June 1995 that Probst’s warning measures could extend to transmission of information relating to predicted failures to remote entities. Id. ¶ 124. We find that the testimony of Toyota’s expert is consistent with the disclosure of Scholl and Probst. For example, Mr. Andrew’s testimony regarding Scholl’s explanation of benefits for transmitting to dealers, manufacturers, and owners is consistent with the disclosure of Scholl. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 6:56–60 (“[T]he present invention provides a method for relaying information between a vehicle and a remote location . . . [that] is used to perform diagnostics and prognostics, to generate repair instructions, and in the development of future diagnostics and prognostics.”). Additionally, we credit Mr. Andrews’s testimony (Ex. 1007 ¶ 124) because modifying Probst’s disclosure of warning measures (Ex. 1003, 4:62–68) with Scholl’s disclosure of transmitting indications of faults to a remote location (Ex. 1002, 4:8–26) is no more than a predictable use of familiar prior art elements according to their established functions, therefore rendering the recited invention obvious. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 8,019,501 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,019,501 - Toyota Motor Corporation v. American Vehicular Sciences LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00415 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 13, 15, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 13, and 15 as anticipated by Asano; claims 1, 2, 5, 13, and 15 by Scholl; claim …
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“acted as his own lexicographer and coined a new meaning for the term “automatically” different from the ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art. Regarding the portion of the ’210 patent specification cited by AVS, as an initial matter, AVS misquoted the text of the ’210 patent specification at column 112, lines 24 through 31. See Ex. 1001, 112:24–31. Nevertheless, AVS’s quoted ’210 patent language, both as quoted by AVS and as it is in the ’210 patent, does not appear to be in the form of a definition. Rather, the text is a portion of the description of preferred embodiments. AVS contends that AVS’s construction is consistent with the purpose of the invention of the ’210 patent, which is to notify the dealer so that corrective action may be taken to prevent vehicle breakdown. PO Resp. 16– 17. However, “[t]he name of the game is the claim.” In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Stated objectives and preferred embodiments are not read automatically into claims.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Despite AVS’s argument, we are not persuaded that the disclosure Toyota points to in Asano (Pet. 21–23 (citing Ex. 1003, 2:12–15, 2:25–30, 3:10–11, 5:41–46, 6:14–47, 8:65–9:14, Figs. 1, 6)) is not disclosure of a determination of whether any component “is operating non-optimally, is expected to fail, or has failed,” as recited in claim 1. Asano describes that CPU 7 of vehicle mounted computer 105 “carries out computations based on the above mentioned operating condition signals in accordance with multiple programs stored in ROM 21.” Ex. 1003, 6:43–47. The operating condition signals referred to by Asano are received from sensors, which sense “engine operating conditions.” Id. at 6:20–21. Asano describes exemplary sensors that sense operating conditions of the engine and other components of a vehicle including “engine cooling water temperature (TWS) 32,” “air/fuel ratio (O2S) 34,” “[b]attery voltage,” and “throttle valve opening and rotation speed.” Id. at 6:20–24; see also id. at 2:25–30 (“the vehicle mounted station detected operating conditions are performed . . . to detect at least one of water temperature, air flow ratio air fuel quantity, battery voltage, throttle valve opening angle, engine speed, transmission gear position and suspension setting.”). AVS does not focus on that part of Asano’s disclosure, identified and explained in the Petition, which describes a basic diagnosis performed onboard a vehicle using engine operating conditions such as the temperature of the engine cooling water, the ratio of air to fuel, the battery voltage, and the rotation speed of the engine. Pet. 21–23 (citing Ex. 1003, 2:12–15, 2:25–30, 3:10–11, 5:41–46, 6:14–47, 8:65–9:14, Figs. 1, 6). Rather, AVS acknowledges that Asano discloses a “basic abnormal diagnosis” and “abnormal codes” and then AVS discusses what these “could be” (PO Resp. 21–22) in absence of Asano’s description of performing computations using engine operating conditions (Ex. 1003, 6:14–47). Nonetheless, even if AVS is correct that Asano’s engine operating conditions could be considered to be parameters and Asano’s computations are to see if these parameters are outside a preset range, determining that a parameter, such as one of those disclosed in Asano relating to engine operating conditions, is outside of a preset normal range is at least a determination of whether any of the components is operating non-optimally, as recited in claim 1. AVS cites to the Declaration of Mr. Lawrence Kennedy (Ex. 2002). Mr. Kennedy states that Asano’s basic abnormal diagnosis “could mean that the sensor is picking up some abnormality in the system that it is sensing.” Id. ¶ 67. Mr. Kennedy further states, for example, if a vehicle hits ice and its wheels spin faster, the vehicle speed sensor may detect an abnormal speed. Id. ¶ 68. Mr. Kennedy, however, does not explain persuasively why in his example he concludes that determining that the wheels of a vehicle are spinning abnormally fast is not an indication that the wheels are operating non-optimally. Mr. Kennedy also does not explain persuasively how he arrives at his opinion in light of the computations performed by CPU 7 based on the engine operating condition signals disclosed in Asano (Ex. 1003, 6:14–47). Notwithstanding the counter-arguments in AVS’s Patent Owner Response, which we have considered fully, we are persuaded that Toyota has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Asano discloses, “a diagnostic system arranged on the vehicle to determine whether any of said components is operating non-optimally, is expected to fail or has failed and generate an output indicative or representative of the determination of the non-optimal operation, expected failure or actual failure of any of said components,” as recited in claim 1. We additionally are persuaded that Toyota has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Asano.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“2. Assertion of Scholl as Prior Art Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or, Alternatively, Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Regarding Toyota’s assertion of Scholl as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or, alternatively, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), on the face of Scholl is an issue date of March 21, 1995. Ex. 1002. Scholl also indicates that the patent was granted from an application that was filed in the United States on December 22, 1992. Id. AVS claims a priority date of June 7, 1995 for the ’210 patent. Prelim. Resp. 2. AVS has not submitted evidence of conception earlier than June 7, 1995. Based on this record, Toyota has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Scholl issued in the United States before the invention by AVS and, therefore, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Additionally, based on this record, Toyota has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Scholl was granted on an application filed in the United States before the invention by AVS and, therefore, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Toyota’s statement that nothing in Corwin states that the connection is uni-directional is not sufficient to show that Corwin discloses the limitation of claim 18. Additionally, the description of the “AFRS fault warn output,” which Toyota and Toyota’s expert rely on, does not describe displaying the AFRS output or sending it to EICAS 21 or another display. Toyota argues that the EICAS display is “intended to provide information to the pilot and crew” and depriving the crew of this information would be “silly.” Reply 14. Toyota and Toyota’s expert, however, acknowledge two possibilities: displaying information and relaying it to the crew by warning lights and aural warnings. Id.; Ex. 1011 ¶ 109. Toyota has not shown that the AFRS fault output necessarily would be displayed on a display in the vehicle in a position to be visible from the passenger compartment, as recited in claim 18. Toyota states that AVS presents a convoluted argument regarding Figure 3 of Corwin. Reply 14. The statements of AVS’s expert, however, are consistent with Corwin’s description of the benefits of transmitting data to the ground. For instance, Corwin describes the invention as follows, “[t]he invention relates to fault reporting and, more particularly to an aircraft maintenance scheduling system by which fault-related data onboard an operational aircraft is processed through a communications channel to a ground terminal.” Ex. 1006, 1:4–8; see also id. at 5:40–45 (“Purpose of Equipment” is to “suppl[y] fault outputs when failures are detected to the ACARS for transmission to ground-based maintenance operations.”). In light of the Declaration by AVS’s expert, Dr. Young, we cannot determine that Toyota has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Figure 3 of Corwin illustrates bi-directional communication including transmission from AFRS to EICAS for display. Toyota’s expert does not specifically refer to Figure 3. Toyota’s expert, additionally, does not explain sufficiently his evidentiary basis for saying one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the AFRS fault output would have been displayed, in light of the disclosure of Corwin. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). We, therefore, conclude that Toyota has not provided sufficient evidence showing that Corwin describes “arranging a display in the vehicle in a position to be visible from the passenger compartment; and displaying the output indicative or representative of the failure or expected failure of any of the components on the display,” as recited in claim 18. For the foregoing reasons, Toyota has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 18 is anticipated by Corwin.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 7,650,210 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,650,210 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00760 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties without issuing a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties have requested that these trial proceedings be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On August 6, 2014, the Board authorized2 the parties to file a Joint Motion to Terminate these proceedings along with a true copy of any and all settlement agreements between them related to the patent at issue. The parties filed in each case a Joint Motion to Terminate3 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 327(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. The parties also filed in each case a Joint Motion to Treat the Parties’ Settlement Agreement as Business Confidential4 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and Rule 42.74. The settlement agreement5 purports to settle matters between the parties with respect to each of the patents at issue in this inter partes review. Each of the captioned inter partes reviews is in its preliminary stage. A decision on the respective Petitions6 has not yet been rendered. The parties have identified the following USPTO proceedings that are pending.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,048,032 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00763 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties under the settlement, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that the joint motions to terminate these proceedings are GRANTED and the proceedings are hereby terminated as to all parties including, Petitioners and Patent Owner; and FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ joint requests that the settlement agreement, as filed in each case, be treated as business confidential information and kept separate from the file of the involved patent under the provisions of to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c), are GRANTED.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,292,850 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00762 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties after settlement, without issuing a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties have requested that these trial proceedings be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On August 6, 2014, the Board authorized2 the parties to file a Joint Motion to Terminate these proceedings along with a true copy of any and all settlement agreements between them related to the patent at issue. The parties filed in each case a Joint Motion to Terminate3 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 327(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. The parties also filed in each case a Joint Motion to Treat the Parties’ Settlement Agreement as Business Confidential4 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and Rule 42.74. The settlement agreement5 purports to settle matters between the parties with respect to each of the patents at issue in this inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,292,850 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00759 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties after settlement, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties have requested that these trial proceedings be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On August 6, 2014, the Board authorized2 the parties to file a Joint Motion to Terminate these proceedings along with a true copy of any and all settlement agreements between them related to the patent at issue. The parties filed in each case a Joint Motion to Terminate3 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 327(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. The parties also filed in each case a Joint Motion to Treat the Parties’ Settlement Agreement as Business Confidential4 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and Rule 42.74. The settlement agreement5 purports to settle matters between the parties with respect to each of the patents at issue in this inter partes review. Each of the captioned inter partes reviews is in its preliminary stage. A decision on the respective Petitions6 has not yet been rendered. The parties have identified the following USPTO proceedings that are pending.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,142,413 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2014 · IPR2014-00761 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties have requested that these trial proceedings be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On August 6, 2014, the Board authorized2 the parties to file a Joint Motion to Terminate these proceedings along with a true copy of any and all settlement agreements between them related to the patent at issue. The parties filed in each case a Joint Motion to Terminate3 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 327(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. The parties also filed in each case a Joint Motion to Treat the Parties’ Settlement Agreement as Business Confidential4 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and Rule 42.74. The settlement agreement5 purports to settle matters between the parties with respect to each of the patents at issue in this inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,048,032 - PTAB · Jun 16, 2014 · IPR2014-00130 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated IPR2014-00130 as to all parties without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” The requirement for terminating review with respect to Petitioner is met. Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “If no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” FLIR Systems is the sole petitioner in this review. The Board has discretion to terminate this review with respect to e- Watch as Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,970,183 - PTAB · Mar 28, 2014 · IPR2013-00412 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated IPR2013-00412 as to Toyota and AVS without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“ORDER Termination of Proceeding 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 On March 26, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate this inter partes review with respect to both Petitioner (“Toyota”) and Patent Owner (“AVS”). Paper 35. Also on March 26, 2014, the parties filed a copy of their written settlement agreement covering Patent 6,738,697 involved in this inter partes review (Ex. 2001), and a joint request to have their settlement agreement treated as confidential business information under 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) (Paper 36). The parties represent that there are no collateral agreements referred to in their settlement agreement. Paper 35, 1.” slip op. at 1
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelOther
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” The requirement for terminating review with respect to Petitioner is met. Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “If no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Toyota is the sole petitioner in this review. The Board has discretion to terminate this review with respect to AVS as Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,738,697 - PTAB · Mar 28, 2014 · IPR2013-00413 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motion and terminated IPR2013-00413 as to Toyota and AVS without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” The requirement for terminating review with respect to Petitioner is met. Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “If no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Toyota is the sole petitioner in this review. The Board has discretion to terminate this review with respect to AVS as Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,738,697
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.