- Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 3, 2018 · IPR2017-01390 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held that claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed volume concentration in the formed magnetic layer.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“define the term “volume concentration.” In the context of the ’331 patent, “volume concentration” refers to the volume concentration of the magnetic particles in the formed magnetic layer.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(1) a bachelor’s degree in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience in the field of magnetic recording, or (2) a Master’s degree or higher in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, with an emphasis in magnetic recording, and at least three years of experience in the field of magnetic recording. Pet. 12; Ex. 1017 ¶ 60. Although Patent Owner does not expressly define the appropriate level of skill in the art in the Patent Owner Response or its Supplemental Response, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Bain, presents a definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in his declaration that is nearly identical to Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2001 ¶ 44. In view of this, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“information, is not sufficient evidence to establish that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that there is some magnetic alloy present “in the magnetic layer” of Mori. The relevant question, however, is how much and how Mori’s disclosed values were determined. Unlike the term “volume concentration,” for which the parties offered undisputed evidence regarding accepted meanings of the term in the art (i.e., packing fraction and pigment volume concentration), we have not been directed to similar evidence regarding the phrase “fill rate”/“filling rate” in Mori. Thus, although Mori states “[t]he filling rate by volume of the strongly magnetic alloy powder in the magnetic layer can be equal to or higher than 30%” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 11 (emphasis added)), Petitioner has not offered sufficient evidence demonstrating that the term “filling rate” in Mori refers to a final product-based value. As a result, we find that this language in Mori does not establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the combined teachings of Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest “[a] dual layer magnetic recording medium comprising . . . a magnetic upper recording layer formed over [a] lower support layer, the magnetic upper recording layer comprising a volume concentration of at least about 35% of a primary magnetic particulate pigment,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 16. Ex. 1001, 11:14–20, 12:25–31. Claims 2–15, 17, and 18 depend from claim 1 or claim 16, and, therefore, include the “volume concentration” limitation of claims 1 and 16. As a result, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest each limitation of claims 1–18, and, therefore, has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Aonuma and Mori.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 7,115,331 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,115,331 - PTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2017-02046 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution for claims 1–24 because it found no abuse of discretion in its analysis of “network access.”
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“What Petitioner describes, however, is not an “abuse of discretion,” but rather our determination based on the evidence and the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “network access.” As we explained in our Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, consistent with the “broadest reasonable construction” standard, “we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent disclosure.” Inst. Dec. 6 (citing In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“[i]ndependent Claims 1, 15, and 24 separately recite, and therefore, distinguish between, “a request from the user to access a content provider web site” and “network access.” These claims also require that the historic information retrieved for the user include “times and locations of network access and number of previous network accesses by the network access device. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, cols 12–14 (emphasis added)). Thus, in light of this record, we are unpersuaded that we erred. Instead, our decision was based on a reasoned analysis of the evidence and applied the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “network access,” as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish persuasively, that our decision not to institute an inter partes proceeding was based on an erroneous interpretation of law, not supported by substantial evidence, or an unreasonable judgment weighing relevant factors.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“but rather our determination based on the evidence and the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “network access.” As we explained in our Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, consistent with the “broadest reasonable construction” standard, “we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent disclosure.” Inst. Dec. 6 (citing In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).” slip op. at 4
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,657,594 - Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 7, 2018 · IPR2017-01268 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 15 and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Ishikawa; the petitioner did not show claims 1–11, 16, and 18–20 unpatentable over Aonuma or Aonuma and Abe.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) at the time of the ’774 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience” in industry or academic research relating to magnetic tape, or “a master’s degree or higher” in the same fields and at least three years of experience relating to magnetic tape. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65; Ex. 1018 ¶ 60). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response, and Dr. Talke agrees that it “is reasonable.” Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined that, based on the record at that time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed during trial. C.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedMixed
“considerably greater than Ishikawa’s stylus load of 50–300 μN (Ex. 1015 ¶ 45). The Talke Declaration does not address this discrepancy, and Dr. Talke stated during his deposition that reducing the stylus load would reduce scratching of the magnetic tape surface. Ex. 1030, 108:14–19 (“Q: Would reducing the contact pressure for the stylus instrument reduce the scratching of the magnetic tape surface by the stylus? A: Yes, it would, but you have to remember the other problem is the diameter and size of the stylus.”). Moreover, Petitioner provides evidence that it was not uncommon to use stylus-type profilometers to measure the properties of magnetic tape, even after Bhushan was published in 1996. See Reply 6. In particular, Petitioner points to Saliba,6 which describes using a stylus-type profilometer, under identical conditions to those used in Ishikawa, to measure the surface characteristics (including peak-to-valley roughness) of the backcoating of magnetic tape. Ex. 1027, 7:28–40, 57–60. Petitioner further points to Ohno,7 which also describes using “a stylus type 3D profilometer in accordance with JIS B0601” to measure the surface roughness characteristics of magnetic tape. Ex. 1028 ¶ 36; see also Ex. 1015 ¶ 45 (Ishikawa explaining that surface roughness characteristics were measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”); Ex. 1027, 7:28–39 (Saliba explaining that surface roughness characteristics where measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”). Accordingly, we are persuaded that the 6 US Patent No. 6,558,774 B1, issued May 6, 2003 (Ex. 1027). 7 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. US 2005/0175866 A1, published Aug. 11, 2005 (Ex. 1028). evidence establishes that a stylus-type profilometer is a suitable device for measuring the surface characteristics of magnetic tape.” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that Ishikawa teaches “peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15. Pet. 24–25; Reply 5–8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 216. In particular, Ishikawa teaches a backcoating layer of a magnetic tape that has a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 44. Ishikawa provides five example embodiments of its magnetic tape, and reports the measurements of a number of characteristics of the backcoat layer for each example, including peak-to-valley roughness Rz. Id. ¶¶ 120–134, Table 1. Ishikawa discloses that peak-to-valley roughness Rz was measured using a stylus-type profilometer under the following conditions: Stylus: diameter: 1.5 to 2.5 μm; curvature: 60º Contact pressure: 50 to 300 μN Cut-off length: 80 μm Sampling length: 80 μm Assessment length: 400 μm Id. ¶¶ 45, 49. The reported peak-to-valley roughness Rz values for the five examples ranged from 58 to 87 nm, as shown in the annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 from the Petition, reproduced below: Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1015, Table 1). The annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 shows the results for the measured characteristics of the backcoat layer of Examples 1–5, with the peak-to-valley roughness Rz values highlighted by a red box. Id. Because Ishikawa teaches that the backcoating layer of its magnetic tape should have a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm,” and because Ishikawa presents examples of magnetic tape with backside surfaces having a peak-to-valley roughness of 87 nm or less, Ishikawa discloses “a peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 7,029,774 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,029,774 - Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 22, 2018 · IPR2017-01267 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–13 and 15–20 not shown unpatentable over Law and Sasaki because the evidence did not establish the claimed surface properties.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“degree in materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience” in industry or academic research relating to magnetic tape, or “a master’s degree or higher” in the same fields and at least three years of experience relating to magnetic tape. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response, and Dr. Talke agrees that it “is reasonable.” Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which [the claims] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (May 2, 2016); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of the Institution Decision, we determined that, based on the record at that time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed during trial. C.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“The evidence, however, does not establish that a backside surface having a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0 necessarily results from reducing the size and prevalence of the protrusions on the backside surface of Law’s magnetic tape. As Petitioner agrees, Law and Sasaki do not discuss skew and kurtosis values. See Pet. 29 (stating that Law does not expressly disclose skew or kurtosis values); Reply 23 (recognizing that neither Law nor Sasaki contain express disclosures of skew and kurtosis); Tr. 18:22–23 (Petitioner’s counsel noting that there are no reported skew and kurtosis values in Law or Sasaki). Thus, Petitioner relies on Mr. Isobe’s testimony to establish that reducing the protrusions on Law’s backside surface would result in a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0. See Pet. 45–49; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–81, 170–174. In that regard, Mr. Isobe testified as follows:” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“At best, the evidence establishes that reducing protrusions in Law’s backside coating may result in the surface approaching a Gaussian distribution (namely, a skew of 0 and a kurtosis of 3). See Ex. 1003 ¶ 171 (“By reducing the number of peaks the overall surface may become closer to a Gaussian distribution, which by definition has a skew of zero.” (emphasis added)), ¶ 174 (“As the frequency of large protrusions is reduced, the skew of the backcoat surface approaches 0 and the kurtosis becomes closer to 3.” (emphases added)). There is no evidence of record, however, that establishes the skew and kurtosis values of Law’s backside coating before reducing the protrusions as Petitioner proposes. While it is possible that reducing Law’s protrusions could result in skew and kurtosis values within the claimed range, it is also possible that reducing the protrusions could result in a surface that approaches a Gaussian distribution but still has a skew above 0.5 and a kurtosis above 4.0. See Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 36–60, 77–83, 90; see also PAR Pharm., 773 F.3d at 1195 (Inherency “may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.”). Thus, even if reducing the protrusions on Law’s backside coating caused the surface to approach a Gaussian distribution, that is not sufficient to establish that it necessarily results in a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0 as claimed. The skew and kurtosis values recited in claims 1 and 20 are not simply properties possessed by any backside coating that otherwise satisfies the structural limitations. Instead, they are recited as limitations on which magnetic recording media fall within the scope of the claims. The evidence of record does not establish that reducing the protrusions in Law’s backside coating, as taught by Sasaki, “would have naturally led to a backside surface having a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0” as Petitioner contends. Pet. 45. Accordingly, on the record before us, we find that Petitioner has not established that claims 1 and 20 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Law and Sasaki.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,029,774 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,029,774 - PTAB · Oct 18, 2018 · IPR2018-00701 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left institution denied for claims 1–9 and 12 because the petition did not sufficiently establish motivation to combine Barratt and Calderbank.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U. S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R § 42.71(d); accord Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must, in relevant part, “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“a combination of Barratt and Calderbank. See DDI 5, 7. Petitioner argued motivation to combine on page 34 of the Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) which stated, “while Barratt does not disclose the specific mathematical operations that are performed on the orthogonal training sequences to calculate a remote terminal’s spatial signature in Barratt’s ‘calibration mode,’ a POSA would have recognized that this spatial signature should be calculated using well-known cross-correlation techniques, such as those described in Calderbank.” Pet. 34. In response to this argument, Patent Owner asserted, “the premise of Petition’s motivation to combine—that Barratt requires calculating spatial signatures from orthogonal training sequences but does not explain how to do so—is not supported by the Petition’s allegations and is instead false.” Paper 8 (Preliminary Response), 15–16. Barratt does not use “orthogonal training sequences to calculate a remote terminal’s spatial signature in Barratt’s ‘calibration mode.’” See Ex. 1003, 16:31–17:67 (discussing calibration mode using “predetermined calibration signals”); see also id. at 18:50–67 (discussing use of orthogonal training sequences in another “closed loop” embodiment). Barratt does disclose the specific mathematical operations that are used to calculate a remote terminal’s spatial signature in Barratt’s “calibration mode.” See id. at 16:60–17:32. Thus, as we determined in the Decision Denying Institution, the purported gap in the teachings of Barratt that Petitioner relies on as the basis for providing the motivation to combine Calderbank with Barratt does not exist. DDI 10. Institution was denied because we determined Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish a motivation to combine the relevant teachings of the” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“a combination of Barratt and Calderbank. See DDI 5, 7. Petitioner argued motivation to combine on page 34 of the Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) which stated, “while Barratt does not disclose the specific mathematical operations that are performed on the orthogonal training sequences to calculate a remote terminal’s spatial signature in Barratt’s ‘calibration mode,’ a POSA would have recognized that this spatial signature should be calculated using well-known cross-correlation techniques, such as those described in Calderbank.” Pet. 34. In response to this argument, Patent Owner asserted, “the premise of Petition’s motivation to combine—that Barratt requires calculating spatial signatures from orthogonal training sequences but does not explain how to do so—is not supported by the Petition’s allegations and is instead false.” Paper 8 (Preliminary Response), 15–16. Barratt does not use “orthogonal training sequences to calculate a remote terminal’s spatial signature in Barratt’s ‘calibration mode.’” See Ex. 1003, 16:31–17:67 (discussing calibration mode using “predetermined calibration signals”); see also id. at 18:50–67 (discussing use of orthogonal training sequences in another “closed loop” embodiment). Barratt does disclose the specific mathematical operations that are used to calculate a remote terminal’s spatial signature in Barratt’s “calibration mode.” See id. at 16:60–17:32. Thus, as we determined in the Decision Denying Institution, the purported gap in the teachings of Barratt that Petitioner relies on as the basis for providing the motivation to combine Calderbank with Barratt does not exist. DDI 10. Institution was denied because we determined Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish a motivation to combine the relevant teachings of the” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,611,231 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Prisua Engineering Corp.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 27, 2018 · IPR2017-01188 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request and authorized it to re-file its Sur-Reply by September 28, 2018.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“reply “as a matter of right,” and does not address explicitly whether a Patent Owner may file a sur-reply in a case that was instituted prior to the Trial Practice Guide Update. Because the Trial Practice Guide Update did not authorize Patent Owner to file its Sur-Reply “as a matter of right,” we are not persuaded that we erred in determining that Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply was unauthorized.” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentGranted
“Notwithstanding all of the above, and out of an abundance of fairness to Patent Owner, Patent Owner is authorized to re-file its Sur-Reply no later than Friday, September 28, 2018.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 8,650,591 - Unified Patents Inc. v. Kamatani Cloud, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 19, 2018 · IPR2017-01370 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 2, 5, 7–13, 15–18, 21, 23–28, 30–32, 34, 35, and 38–41 not shown unpatentable under the three § 103 grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“d) Conclusion—“detecting whether the measurement data are capable of being measured” Based on the entire trial record before us, for the reasons given, we are persuaded that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the ’940 Patent Specification. See Ex. 1001, 5:40–54, 6:3–13, 7:1–4, Figs. 3, 4. Accordingly we determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of detecting if data are “capable of being [measured/processed]” or “can be processed” is detecting “if any instrument has the functional ability to measure measurement data,” as proposed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 14– 21.15 We determine no further express construction is necessary for the detecting recitations in the independent claims.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or computer engineering, or equivalent experience, and at least two years of experience in remote monitoring and control systems. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 16). At the preliminary stage, Patent Owner agreed with Petitioner’s proposal (Prelim. Resp. 8) and Patent Owner has not subsequently disputed Petitioner’s proposal or offered an alternative (see generally PO Resp.). Because we find Petitioner’s statement of the level of skill in the art (Pet. 7; Ex. 1007 ¶ 16) consistent with the level of skill implied by the prior art of record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Mr. Zatarain testifies “[i]n my opinion, detecting the off-on status of an instrument satisfies a PHOSITA’s understanding of the term ‘capable’ as well as relevant dictionary definitions for that term.” Ex. 1030 ¶ 84. Mr. Zatarain’s testimony then repeats the aforementioned definitions (id.), which we find are consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Mr Zatarain also testifies that an instrument that is not powered on “lacks the ability to perform any of its general functions.” Id. ¶ 85. But Mr. Zatarain’s testimony does not provide sufficient explanation as to why the meaning of the words “capable” and “available” overlap, as Petitioner contends (Pet. Reply 22–26). Additionally, Mr. Zatarain’s testimony is conclusory. See Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 84–85. We, instead, credit the testimony of Dr. Zavadsky that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 28, 30–36.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s contentions are premised on its claim construction contentions, which we did not adopt. More specifically, for the reasons discussed supra in Section II.A.2, we are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of detecting if data are “capable of being [measured/processed]” is detecting “if any instrument has the functional ability to measure measurement data,” as proposed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 14–21. Petitioner relies on two paragraphs of Miyajima describing determining whether an instrument is powered on and, if so, if it is processing another client’s data. Pet. 38–45 (citing e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47, 55). This description, however, merely is of detecting the instrument’s availability. We do not find that Miyajima’s description of determining whether an instrument is powered on and, if so, if it is processing another client’s data (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47, 55) teaches “detecting whether the measurement data are capable of being measured by any measurement means in the said server apparatus” (emphasis added) in accordance with our construction, i.e., we do not find Miyajima teaches detecting “if any instrument has the functional ability to measure measurement data.”” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 6,873,940 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,873,940 - Dexcom, Inc. v. Waveform Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 12, 2018 · IPR2017-01051 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4–12, and 15–19 were held unpatentable as obvious over Hagiwara; claims 2, 3, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable. The motion to amend was granted in part.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“j. Conclusion Regarding Obviousness Based on Hagiwara (Proposed Substitute Claims) We conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 20, 22, 23, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara. We conclude that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 21, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara. 2. Remaining Grounds of Unpatentability Asserted by Petitioner (Proposed Substitute Claims) In view of our determination that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 20, 22, 23, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara, we do not reach Petitioner’s remaining grounds of unpatentability as to these claims. Regarding proposed substitute claims 24 and 25, Petitioner’s contentions regarding the Handbook, Wilson, and Say do not remedy the deficiencies in Petitioner’s contentions regarding Hagiwara, as discussed above. Accordingly, we conclude that a preponderance of the evidence does not show that proposed substitute claims 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious based on Hagiwara in view of the Handbook, Wilson, or Say. H.” slip op. at 71
- ExcludeOther
“As discussed above, we do not reach the Wilson-Based Grounds with respect to claims 1, 4–12, and 15–19 of the ’574 patent. As for claims 2, 3, 13, and 14, we determine that Petitioner has not shown unpatentability based on the Wilson-Based Grounds, even if Exhibit 1037 and the corresponding portions of Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 37) are not excluded, because Petitioner does not offer Exhibit 1037 to cure the deficiency we noted in Wilson. See Section II.F, supra. For this reason, we dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion.” slip op. at 72
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“sensor would not have been a motivation to combine Hagiwara’s embodiments” because Hagiwara’s catheter prevents damage to the sensor during insertion and because a sensor with a side sensor window creates a greater risk of damage and vascular injury and reduces exposure to blood, as compared with a sensor with an end sensor window. PO Resp. 20–25. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has established a motivation to combine, notwithstanding the conflicting expert testimony regarding the disadvantages of a side sensor window versus an end sensor window. Neither of the expert opinions on this topic is supported by objective facts or data. Ex. 1006 ¶ 155;13 Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 54–57, 87–95; Ex. 2009, 92:8–97:12. For this reason, we give little or no weight to either side’s expert testimony 13 Dr. Vachon cites “WO 01/13102, Vadgama” (Ex. 1006 ¶ 155), however, this reference was not submitted as an exhibit in this proceeding. on this topic. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence or Federal Circuit jurisprudence requires the fact finder to credit unsupported assertions of an expert witness). As discussed above, however, there is no disagreement that a side sensor window was a known alternative to an end sensor window. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 73, 155; Tr. 43:22–44:3. That undisputed fact, together with Petitioner’s other evidence, is sufficient to establish a motivation to combine.” slip op. at 42
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art For purposes of our Institution Decision, we accepted the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) provided by Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Vachon. Dec. 11 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 28). That definition is: a person having a bachelor’s degree or the equivalent training or experience in mechanical engineering, bioengineering, or related field and at least three years of experience relating to biosensor research and development, or a master’s degree or the equivalent training or experience in mechanical engineering, bioengineering, or related field, and at least one year of experience relating to biosensor research and development. Id. Patent (https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_motions_ to_amend_11_2017.pdf); Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Matal, 878 F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Iancu, Order on Petition for Panel Rehearing, No. 2015-1928 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2018). Owner’s declarant accepts and applies this definition of a POSITA for purposes of his opinions. Ex. 2008 ¶ 30. Neither party’s declarant indicates that any proffered opinion would change depending on the level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, consistent with our Institution Decision, we adopt Dr. Vachon’s definition of a POSITA. Ex. 1006 ¶ 28. We also rely on the cited prior art references as reflecting the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,529,574 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,529,574 - Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd. v. United Technologies CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00966 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 8–13, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because SEI did not establish a sufficient reason to combine the references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingNo construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. As the Federal Circuit has observed, “[a] preamble is not a claim limitation if the claim body ‘defines a structurally complete invention . . . and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Georgetown Rail, 867 F.3d at 1236 (citing Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The fact that the claims were amended to include storage tanks and recirculation loops actually cuts against UTC’s position, as the claim as amended describes a structurally complete invention and reliance on the preamble for this structure is unnecessary. UTC also points to the fact that the Examiner amended the preamble during prosecution, from merely reciting a “flow battery” to a “redox flow battery.” PO Resp. 15. While “clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art” (Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 809) may be a reason to view the preamble as limiting, UTC directs us to no evidence here that the Examiner intended the amendment to distinguish the claims from the prior art. Indeed, as UTC acknowledges in its Response, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’243 patent to use “‘redox flow battery’ and ‘flow battery’ to mean the same thing.” PO Resp. 13 (emphasis added). If, as UTC concedes, the Examiner’s amendment merely substituted one synonym for another, the amendment could not have changed the scope of the claim or distinguished over the prior art. For these reasons, we conclude that the preamble of the claims is not limiting, and, therefore, we need not construe the term redox flow battery.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“SEI contends that the person of ordinary skill should not be limited to only a degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, because the claimed features of the flow batteries are not directed to chemistry. Pet. Reply 7. We agree, and adopt SEI’s definition of the relevant educational background. While the parties differ as to the number of years of experience in working with flow batteries, we do not consider the difference (one versus two years) to be significant. We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would be a person with a degree in chemistry, physics, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, or mechanical engineering, who has at least one year of experience designing or testing flow batteries so as to obtain functional knowledge of their structure and operation. We have reviewed the level of skill reflected in the prior art and consider it consistent with this definition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 15
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“evidence. Our Rule 42.64 provides that a motion to exclude is necessary to preserve any objection, and refers to those objections as “objections to the admissibility” of evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a), (c). The Board’s Trial Practice Guide further explains that a motion to exclude “must explain why the evidence is not admissible.” See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767. In other words, objections to the timing of late-arising evidence or procedural infirmities are not proper for a motion to exclude. For this reason, the objections raised in UTC’s motion to exclude are improper. First, UTC argues that Exhibit 1066 is untimely under 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b), which requires a translation of a foreign-language document to be filed with the document. Mot. 5. By UTC’s reasoning, because the Supplemental Declaration revisits Mr. Yagaeshi’s prior translation, but was not submitted with the foreign-language document, it violates the Board’s rules. Id. As this is clearly a procedural objection to the timing of the evidence, as opposed to its admissibility, we deny the motion to exclude on this basis. In any event, even if it were procedurally proper, we would not exclude the Supplemental Declaration on this basis. The Board’s Rule requires only that the original foreign-language document be accompanied by a translation, and there is no dispute that is what happened here. We see nothing in Rule 42.63(b) that prohibits a party to revisit, or even modify, its translation at a later date, given sufficient notice and opportunity to respond by the opposing party. Here, we granted UTC the opportunity to submit its own responsive declaration and address the translation issue at the oral hearing, and UTC did so.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“character as a minus sign, which is consistent with Mr. Yagaeshi’s original translation, makes more grammatical sense in the context of the sentence. We take note of the fact that SEI only changed its position on the translation—and asked Mr. Yagaeshi to correct his prior translation—once UTC made arguments based on the original translation that might be detrimental to SEI’s case. While it is conceivable that SEI only became aware of the alleged error once UTC called attention to it in the Response, we consider it fair to hold SEI to its original interpretation, especially given that that original interpretation is in agreement with Mr. Baldwin’s translation, which has remained consistent since at least 2016. For these reasons, we will interpret the disputed passage of JP228 to read “the potential was negative 0.4V.”” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,166,243 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,166,243 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon Digital Services, Inc. et al. v. Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 1, 2018 · IPR2017-00948 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 18–22, and 25 are unpatentable; claims 9–17, 23, and 24 are not unpatentable; substitute claims 26–28 are denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The “verify” limitation of claim 1 expressly recites a check based “at least in part on a device identity.” The specification describes such a check as occurring at steps 15 and 16, not step 13. Steps 15 and 16 check whether the device identity is on record and, in response to that check, allow a digital product to be used on a device (steps 17, 18) or start a process to authorize the device. Id. at 5:1–9, 5:13–18. Although steps 15 and 16 are not expressly described as a verification of validity, steps 15 and 16, not step 13, logically track and most closely align with the language of claim 1’s “verify” and “in response to” limitations. Thus, the specification supports Petitioner’s view that the “verify” limitation can encompass checking whether unique device information is reflected in a database as authorized for a license.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“claim 1 is limiting, with Patent Owner arguing that it is and Petitioner arguing that it is not. Id. at 12–13. Patent Owner now argues that “[t]he preambles [of claims 1 and 22] expressly state that the claimed system and method are both directed to ‘adjusting’ the license in terms of its allowed copy count, which the preambles expressly define.” PO Resp. 9. We explained in the Institution Decision, however, that even if the preamble is limiting (e.g., by virtue of it providing antecedent basis (“at least one allowed copy count”) for “set the allowed copy count”), the language “[a] system for adjusting a license for a digital product over time” constitutes a 2 The preamble of claim 25 is not similar to that of claims 1 and 22, and Patent Owner does not propose an “adjusting” limitation for the language “in response to the device identity not being on the record, set the allowed copy count to a first upper limit for a first time period after an initial authorization of the digital product,” as recited in claim 25. statement of intended purpose and does not purport to modify any particular claim language, such as “set the allowed copy count.” Dec. 13–14. Patent Owner argues that our preliminary construction would vitiate the purpose of the preamble language and that, instead, “the claim limitations must be understood in light of the ‘adjusting’ context introduced in the preamble.” PO Resp. 9. However, “the mere fact that a structural term in the preamble is part of the claim does not mean that the preamble’s statement of purpose or other description is also part of the claim.” Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Rather, the Federal Circuit has held that “a preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Thus, an intended purpose set forth in a claim preamble and the context that purpose might provide, without more, are not limiting. Moreover, as Petitioner points out, “the claimed invention could be used to adjust an allowed device limit, at least to a higher limit, thereby satisfying the intended purpose of the invention.” Reply 4.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“On the complete record, we find that DeMello’s authentication, which checks a Passport ID and machine ID against stored records to authenticate a device, discloses executable code for the processor to “verify that a license data associated with the digital product is valid based at least in part on a device identity generated by sampling physical parameters of the given device,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 22.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“The Federal Circuit has cautioned that “references to ‘common sense’—whether to supply a motivation to combine or a missing limitation—cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified.” Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That is not the case here. As explained above, both the ’960 patent and DeMello describe precise numbers of days as arbitrary and that their respective inventions contemplate other numbers. We find that it would have been reasonable for the skilled artisan to have selected six days, as recited in claim 6, in light of DeMello’s disclosure.” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 8,566,960 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Bilski · Berkheimer · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,566,960
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.