- PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00084 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–12 under § 314(a), finding that holistic Fintiv balancing favored denial because of the early district court trial and substantial investment.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv at 5–6. “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. (citing Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (November 2019), 58).5” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,219,000 - Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00252 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 8–23 obvious over any asserted combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024); Paper 8 (referral to panel after no discretionary denial briefing under the Interim Processes memorandum). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 78–82). Patent Owner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have [had] a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21 (citing Ex. 2001 § IV.C). The differences between the parties’ definitions are minor, as recognized by Dr. Rubin (see Ex. 2001 ¶ 104), and we do not discern any meaningful differences based on the preliminary record. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’088 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“obviousness contentions based on Ellis and Spivey rely expressly on the use of a “known webserver” to perform the “transmitting first instructions” limitations excerpted above. See Pet. 28–34. Yet Petitioner does not specify how such a webserver would be integrated with the other elements from Ellis and Spivey cited by Petitioner. At best, Petitioner provides a background section on the known use of webservers (see id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 49–53, 127–134)), but this does not provide a rationale for integrating a webserver in the Ellis–Spivey combination. We also have considered Petitioner’s cited testimony from Dr. Wicker supporting this background section. The first cited portion, which is located at paragraphs 49–53 of Dr. Wicker’s declaration, supports the premises in the background section, but does not include a rationale for adding a webserver to the Ellis– Spivey combination. See Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 49–53. The second cited portion, which is located at paragraphs 127–134 of Dr. Wicker’s declaration, includes a rationale for modifying the Ellis–Spivey combination to include a webserver.3 See Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 127–134. But that rationale is completely 3 The cited rationale in Dr. Wicker’s declaration appears to be tailored to support Petitioner’s obviousness contentions in IPR2025-00251, where unaddressed in the Petition. We decline to assume that Petitioner adopts Dr. Wicker’s testimony about the rationale as its position, because that would amount to improper incorporation by reference under 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide at 35–36 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (citing Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (Paper 12) (informative)) (stating that “parties that incorporate expert testimony by reference in their petitions, motions, or replies without providing explanation of such testimony risk having the testimony not considered by the Board”).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,871,088 - Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00251 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because neither asserted obviousness combination showed a reasonable likelihood of success, chiefly due to unsupported webserver teachings and motivation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“c. Analysis We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s rationale for adding a facilitator- type webserver to the Ellis–Spivey combination based on “POSA’s Knowledge.” First, Petitioner’s combination of Spivey with Ellis is already allegedly based on improving latency issues via the incorporation of Spivey’s LDSD and MQSD in Ellis’s system. See Pet. 22–24. Petitioner touts that this modification would result in reduced latency to a time period “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 96). But the Petition does not establish whether this latency improvement would or could be maintained when adding a separate webserver, as it has proposed. And Dr. Rubin testifies that the inclusion of an additional webserver—an additional component—is likely to create latency insofar as it must receive, process, and/or handle data. Ex. 2001 ¶ 305. We are persuaded by Dr. Rubin’s testimony, and we find that adding a webserver to Petitioner’s existing Ellis– Spivey combination tends to undermine Petitioner’s foundational rationale for combining these references, which is the reduction of latency. See Pet. 23.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Third, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 49) that Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have added a facilitator-type webserver to the Ellis–Spivey combination when neither reference teaches or suggests a webserver for facilitating communication between a client and a socket server. Dr. Wicker’s supporting testimony stresses that “webservers were well-known components in streaming systems that were useful for facilitating communication between client devices and socket servers, and client devices and media sources.” Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 128–132. But “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner fails to provide any persuasive reason with a rational underpinning why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to add a webserver to the existing Ellis–Spivey combination.” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The differences between the parties’ definitions are minor, as recognized by Dr. Rubin (see Ex. 2001 ¶ 104), and we do not discern any meaningful differences based on the preliminary record. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’088 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 8. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known that a “socket” is “a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server where first event information is provided to a VCD [viewer client device].” Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 163). Thus, Petitioner argues that a “first event socket corresponding to the first event information” is “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to VCDs.” Id. Patent Owner states that “[e]xcept for the ‘socket’ term for which Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s construction . . . for purposes of [its] preliminary response, Patent Owner agrees that no terms require construction and construes all other terms consistent with their plain and ordinary meaning.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,871,088 - Charter Communications, Inc. / Plume Design, Inc. v. Adaptive Spectrum And Signal Alignment, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00087 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–20, exercising § 314(a) discretion based on the Fintiv factors.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Accordingly, based on the current record, we disagree with Petitioner that Factor 2 is neutral. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that Factor 2 favors discretionary denial.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,477,108 - PTAB · Apr 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00013 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–23 under § 314(a), relying on the Fintiv factors and its holistic assessment of the parallel litigation and petition merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). Prelim. Resp. 34–41. Fintiv identifies a non-exclusive list of factors we consider when addressing whether a related, parallel district court action provides a basis for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5–16. These factors include: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons discussed below, we exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,770,313 - PTAB · Apr 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00012 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–25 under § 314(a), citing the parallel trial schedule, investment, transfer ruling, and not particularly strong merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. at 5–6. We take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Id. at 6.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons discussed below, we exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,848,398 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00036 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–18, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the parallel district court case favored efficient and timely resolution.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We are not swayed by Petitioner’s speculation as to the trial date for the parallel district court proceeding as well as arguments regarding trial dates for the other two district court proceedings. Due to the actual trial date of the parallel district court proceeding having been set to occur more than seven months before an expected final written decision in this proceeding, as well as a projected trial date based on time-to-trial statistics of more than six months before an expected final written decision, we determine that the considerations of the second Fintiv factor weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“factors. Because the analysis is fact-driven and we take a holistic view of the factors, no single factor is determinative of whether we exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314(a). The parallel district court trial date set more than six months before an expected final written decision and the significant investment by the court and parties in the parallel district court proceeding weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. Petitioner’s stipulation, however, allays to some extent concerns regarding duplication of efforts and the possibility of conflicting decisions and weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. Of the remaining factors, we find only that Petitioner and defendant being the same to weigh in favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. After careful consideration and holistically balancing all of the considerations of the Fintiv factors, on this record, we determine that the evidence before us warrants exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. III. CONCLUSION We exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 18
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,627,631 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, and 11, exercising discretion under § 314(a) based on the Fintiv factors.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“the parallel district court proceeding as well as arguments regarding potential trial dates for the other two district court proceedings. Due to the actual trial date of the parallel district court proceeding having been set to occur more than seven months before an expected final written decision in this proceeding, as well as a projected trial date based on time-to-trial statistics of more than six months before an expected final written decision, we determine that the considerations of the second Fintiv factor weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Accordingly, we determine that the evidence of record favors exercising our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of an inter partes review. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the evidence of record favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). IV. ORDER It is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 16
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,616,932 - PTAB · Apr 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01379 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claim 20, finding that the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial under § 314(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“(which we address in more detail below) turns on the determination of the meaning of the claim term “periodically.” We note that the District Court has construed the term “periodically monitor” to mean “monitor at regular intervals of time.” See Sec. II.C below. Given this construction, which we preliminarily agree with at this stage, we cannot agree with Petitioner that the Petition presents “a strong case for obviousness.” Thus, we find that Factor 6 weighs in favor of exercising discretionary denial.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“periodically” as it is used in claim 20, with Petitioner arguing that “periodically’ means “repeated . . . over time” and Patent Owner arguing that “periodically” means “at fixed intervals.” See Pet. 25; Prelim. Resp. 8. Our preliminary determination of the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “periodically” as it is used in claim 20 substantially impacts our view of the merits in this case as this issue is the principal one raised by Patent Owner in its Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. 5–22. slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears consistent with the subject matter of the ’996 patent. This is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 55–56. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision, with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” to keep the description from being vague and extending to a level reflecting that of an expert. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 18
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,809,996 - Tiktok Inc. v. Ntech Properties, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01343 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 2 were unpatentable under any of the three asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS A. Principles of Law Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability of the claims challenged in the Petition, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) if present, any objective evidence of obviousness or non-obviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ definitions are similar, although we observe that Patent Owner proposes that the person of ordinary skill would have a bachelor’s degree or professional experience, whereas Petitioner proposes that such a person would have both a degree and experience. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Cf. Ex. 2001 ¶ 17 (Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, stating that “[m]y opinions in this declaration would not change were I to adopt the definition of a POSITA offered by [Petitioner’s declarant] Dr. Almeroth.”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“dedicated to claim construction, but Patent Owner does address claim construction in its discussion of Petitioner’s challenges. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 21–23 (Patent Owner arguing: “Petitioner’s ‘Feed Selection Mapping 2’ should be rejected because it relies on rewriting the claim so that it encompasses a device other than the aggregator providing user information to the publisher. . . . Because Whitehead’s alleged aggregator does not provide profiles to the alleged publisher in a channel request responsive to that request, ‘Feed Selection Mapping 2’ does not even meet the plain reading of the aggregator providing to the publisher ‘the media feed selection’ with ‘user information’ included.” (emphasis added)). Because our decision does not turn on this proposed construction, we need not address it. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. The Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1 and 2 over Whitehead (Ground 1)” slip op. at 9
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“We find the Petition to be too confusing to follow. It is Petitioner’s burden to articulate a coherent and discernable case that is readily understandable by the Board and that places Patent Owner on notice of the basis of Petitioner’s case so that Patent Owner may have the opportunity to respond. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (“[T]he petition must set forth . . . a statement of the precise relief requested for each claim challenged,” including “specify[ing] where each element of the claim is found in the prior art.” (emphasis added)). In light of the above, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its Whitehead obviousness challenge.” slip op. at 16
Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,923,947
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.