- Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00097 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted EcoFactor’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed claims 1–18 and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party before the Board “may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial” constitutes a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). As all claims of the ’394 Patent have been disclaimed, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted, and the proceeding is terminated.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,835,394 - AT&T Mobility LLC / AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Daingean Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00402 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted Patent Owner’s revised non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–4 and substituting claims 7 and 8, which Petitioner did not prove unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019) (precedential). A “patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motion to amend complies” with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(d)(1). Specifically, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent; and (4) the amendment does not introduce new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)–(b). For the reasons explained below, Patent Owner satisfies its burden of persuasion to show that the amendments comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Both parties rely on expert testimony for their respective positions relating to the number of years of experience needed to attain ordinary skill, but neither expert cites supporting evidence for their testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 2002 ¶ 15. Our decision is the same regardless of whether the length of experience is two years or three. We find Patent Owner’s proposed “wireless communications” is more consistent with the ’958 patent than Petitioner’s proposed “telecommunication,” which encompasses a variety of technologies including, e.g., landline and wireless telephones, cable, and satellite. See Ex. 1001, 1:11–62 (describing the invention in terms of wireless communications). Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, substituting “wireless communications” for “telecommunication.” Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the recited second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. The plain meaning of “first type” and “second type” indicates that the first type and second type are different in kind. RMTA 22 (App. A). Our interpretation is consistent with the Specification, which explains that second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. As Patent Owner points out, the ’958 patent discloses “first type of system information (1TYP SIB) is . . . essential . . . for initial system access” and “second type of system information (2TYP SIB) is nonessential system information . . . defined as all other types of information, and thus excludes the [] information required for initial access.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:34– 46); see also Ex. 1001, Abstract (interchangeably using the terms second type and non-essential). Despite Petitioner’s argument that this disclosure is non-limiting and directed to a disclaimed example embodiment (Opp. 8–9), Petitioner could not identify any embodiment, among the approximately forty disclosed embodiments, describing something other than the first type SIB being essential information and the second type SIB being non-essential information. Tr. 22:18–26. Even the Petition acknowledges that “the ’958 Patent further classifies a second type of system information, the ‘non-essential’ SI, which is defined as all other types of information excluding that first type of information required for initial access.” Pet. 5. Furthermore, the prior art of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill would have understood second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 48 (describing two categories of system information, “essential SI” and “Other SI”). Patent Owner’s expert also understood the recited first and second type SIBs as being mutually exclusive. See Ex. 1011, 49:10–13. For the above reasons, we do not agree with Petitioner that the recited second type SIB lacks any requirements, nor do we interpret claims 7 and 8 such that the first type SIB could be a second type SIB.” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“(d) Limitation 7h: Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments with respect to limitation 7h are insufficient because they fail to address the limitation as written and improperly incorporate previous arguments by reference. For example, Petitioner did not map the recited “group identifier” when opposing Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend. See Opp. 16–17. In its Sur-reply, Petitioner contends that limitation 7h’s requirement of transmitting the group identifier was previously “set out in Patent Owner’s prior papers,” but does not refer to any specific papers or exhibits. Pet. Surreply 11–12. We decline to search for and piece together Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to develop a persuasive theory of unpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. section 42.6(a)(3). Petitioner similarly failed to address adequately where Lee discloses or suggests the recited “compressed format” and “plural parameters.” See Opp. 16–17. Aside from the above concerns, we also do not see sufficient explanation with respect to limitation 7h’s requirement that the transmitting by broadcast be based on a comparison of the value tag. Petitioner argues that, because Patent Owner does not dispute limitation 7g, “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to use the same value tag[] to determine the system information broadcast in Lee’s compressed format embodiment.” Pet. Sur-reply 12. This conclusory statement is not supported by any citations to evidence and was improperly introduced in the Sur-reply. Moreover, whether it was obvious to determine what system information is broadcast is not commensurate with the claim scope because limitation 7h requires that the broadcasting (not the broadcast content) be based on a comparison of the value tag. See supra III.B.4 and IV.B. Further, we are not persuaded that Lee’s transmitting by broadcast is” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,841,958 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,841,958 - Abbott Laboratories v. Newtonoid Technologies, L.L.C.Adverse judgmentPTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00932 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, terminated the trial, and cancelled claims 1 and 4–20.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Our rules provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). We understand Patent Owner’s May 19, 2025 email as a request for judgment against itself. Accordingly, on the record before us, we enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) and terminate the trial pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s May 19, 2025 email request for adverse judgment pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) is granted;” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,392,818 - Google LLC v. Buffalo Patents, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-01387 · APJ Mahshid D Saadat · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed all challenged claims 1–16 and 19.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“II. Discussion Per 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Also, actions which are construed to be a request for adverse judgement include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. at § 42.73(b)(2). With the filing by Patent Owner of a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 1–16 and 19 in this proceeding, there are no remaining claims in this trial.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,204,737 - Google LLC v. Buffalo Patents, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-01386 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed all challenged claims 1–12 and did not respond to the show-cause order.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“at any time during a proceeding. Also, actions which are construed to be a request for adverse judgement include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. at § 42.73(b)(2). With the filing by Patent Owner of a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 1–12 in this proceeding, there are no remaining claims in this trial. Because Patent Owner did not respond to the Show Cause Order, we construe Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 1–12 as a request for entry of adverse judgment against Patent Owner. The request is granted.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,904,405 - PTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00461 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 28 and 29 on all petitioned grounds and granted Nokia’s motion to join IPR2023-00978 as an understudy petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Patent Owner argues that we should discretionarily deny the Petition because “[t]he Board and the Federal Circuit have already conducted inter partes review of Claims 28 and 29 of the ’931 Patent based on the Vornefeld reference and confirmed the patentability of the claims,” and, “while Nokia now cites additional prior art references, those new references add nothing of significance to Vornefeld and the other prior art references previously considered by the Board and the Federal Circuit.” Prelim. Resp. 45.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“could find that Nokia is or was an indemnitor to Sprint, Patent Owner is left with the allegation that Nokia and Sprint have a pertinent relationship with each other because current Petitioner Nokia was a supplier of prior petitioner Sprint at the time of the Sprint IPR and Sprint Litigation. See Prelim. Resp. 54–55. Patent Owner does not direct our attention to any evidence indicating the substance of that relationship. See id. Without more, we cannot discern whether there was a standard customer-manufacturer relationship or whether there was, as Patent Owner alleges, a “significant relationship.” Prelim. Resp. 55. We determine, on the record in this case, that the mere existence of a supplier-customer relationship does not tend to show that Nokia is a real party in interest or privy of Sprint as argued by Patent Owner. See, e.g., WesternGeco LLC, 889 F.3d at 1321 (“a contractual and fairly standard customer-manufacturer relationship regarding the accused product” does not necessarily establish privity); Wi-Fi One, LLC, 887 F.3d at 1340–41 (affirming the Board’s determination that there was an inadequate showing of privity or of a real party in interest relationship even though the “evidence showed that Broadcom’s interests as to the issue of infringement were generally aligned with those of its customers”).” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to both of the challenged claims of the ’931 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider: (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Trial Practice Guide9 at 76. Petitioner contends that “joinder with the Verizon IPR is appropriate because Nokia’s Petition includes identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing Verizon IPR proceeding (i.e., challenges the same claims of the same patent, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art submitted in the Verizon Petition).” Mot. 5. According to Petitioner, “good cause exists for joining Nokia to the Verizon IPR proceeding so that the Board can efficiently ‘secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution’ of Nokia’s and Verizon’s petitions in a single proceeding.” Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b)). Petitioner also represents that it will act as an “understudy,” and that it “agrees to adhere to all applicable deadlines set forth in the Verizon IPR Scheduling Order,” and contends that, accordingly, the trial schedule should not be adversely impacted by the joinder. Id. at 2, 6. Petitioner further asserts that, because no new issues are being introduced by the requested joinder, “Patent Owner will . . . not be required to provide any additional analysis or arguments beyond what it will already provide in” slip op. at 24
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,230,931 - PTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00392 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 28 and 29 of the ’931 patent on all petition grounds and granted Ericsson’s motion to join IPR2023-00978 as an understudy petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for petitioner
“[The inquiry into whether a party is in privity with another] is grounded in due process concerns for both the petitioner . . . and the opposing party . . . . In other words, the inquiry has a dual-focus on preventing the petitioner from now lodging a successive attack for which it already had a first bite, thus, protecting the defending party from an unwarranted second attack, while also ensuring that the petitioner is not unfairly limited in its ability to lodge its challenges if it has not had a full and fair opportunity to do so already. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Facebook Inc., 989 F.3d 1018, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “the reach of privity cannot extend beyond the limits of due process.” WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “[A] person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that suit.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894). “Because nonparty preclusion risks binding those who have not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, the Supreme Court has cautioned that there is a general rule against nonparty preclusion, subject to certain exceptions.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892–93). The Supreme Court in Taylor identified considerations where nonparty preclusion would be justified, including:” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“Section 315(b) provides: An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c). The referenced subsection (c) of section 315 is the provision under which Petitioner has filed its Motion for Joinder. Mot. 1. Patent Owner reiterates its argument that prior petitioner Sprint is Petitioner’s privy, and argues that, therefore, Petitioner is time-barred under § 315(b) because Sprint was served with a complaint more than a year prior to the filing of the Petition in the present case. See Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Patent Owner relies again, as the basis for the privity argument, on the determinations made in the Regents IPR and argues that “Ericsson must similarly be time-barred.” Id. We do not agree with Patent Owner. The statute provides that “[t]he time limitation set forth in [§ 315(b)] shall not apply to a request for joinder under [§ 315(c)].” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Because Petitioner’s Motion is a request for joinder under § 315(c), the statutory one-year time-bar does not apply.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Patent Owner argues that we should discretionarily deny the Petition because “[t]he Board and the Federal Circuit have already conducted inter partes review of Claims 28 and 29 of the ’931 Patent based on the Vornefeld reference and confirmed the patentability of the claims,” and, “while Ericsson now cites additional prior art references, those new references add nothing of significance to Vornefeld and the other prior art references previously considered by the Board and the Federal Circuit.” Prelim. Resp. 49. 12 Patent Owner, in the Introduction section of the Preliminary Response, argues that “strong grounds exist here for the Board to exercise its discretion to deny the petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and Fintiv.” Prelim. Resp. 2–3. Although the Preliminary Response contains sections arguing for discretionary denial under § 325(d) and General Plastic, it does not contain a section discussing Fintiv. See, e.g., id. at ii–iii (Table of Contents, heading G). We understand the Fintiv reference to be an inadvertent holdover from Patent Owner’s very similar preliminary response filed in the Verizon IPR. We, in the Verizon IPR, instituted an inter partes review of the ’931 patent on both challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. IPR2023-00978, Paper 20 at 54–55. In the Verizon IPR, we addressed Patent Owner’s arguments that we should exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d), and we declined to deny institution on that basis. Id. at 22–27. Petitioner here represents that “[t]he instant Petition is substantially identical to the Verizon Petition; it involves the same claims of the same patent, the same grounds of unpatentability, and the same supporting evidence.” Mot. 1. Patent Owner’s § 325(d) arguments in the case currently before us appear to be substantively identical to those made in the preliminary response in the Verizon IPR, with the substitution of “Ericsson” for “Verizon.” Compare Prelim. Resp. 49–55 with IPR2023- 00978, Paper 15 at 46–53. For the same reasons set forth in our Institution Decision in the Verizon IPR, we decline to discretionarily deny institution under § 325(d) in the current case brought by Petitioner Ericsson. IPR2023- 00978, Paper 20 at 22–27.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“On the record before us, no real party in interest, privity, or otherwise legally significant relationship has been shown to exist between current Petitioner Ericsson and prior petitioner Sprint that might warrant denying a follow-on petition by a different petitioner. As such, General Plastic factor 1 weighs against denying institution. “[W]here, as here, the first and second petitioners are neither the same party, nor possess a significant relationship under Valve, General Plastic factor one necessarily outweighs the other General Plastic factors.” Videndum Prod. Sols., Inc. v. Rotolight Ltd., IPR2023-01218, Paper 12 at 5– 6 (Vidal Apr. 19, 2024); see id. (“Under USPTO policy and precedent, General Plastic has not been extended to any cases in which the first and second petitioners do not have a significant relationship.”); see also Alcatel- Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, IPR2017-02146, Paper 12 at 12 (PTAB Feb. 28, 2018) (non-precedential) (“Once resolution of factor 1 indicates that Petitioner had not previously filed a petition against the same patent, factors 2–5 bear little relevance unless there is evidence in the record of extenuating circumstances such as a showing that there was a previous petitioner who challenged the same patent and that the previous petitioner and the current petitioner planned the staggered petitions.”).” slip op. at 24
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,230,931 - Snap Inc. v. Playvuu, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00848 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and entered judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–11 after abandonment.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Judgment (Paper 14, “Request for Adverse Judgment”), which states “[p]ursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) Patent Owner makes this request for the Board to enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1-11” of the ’911 patent. Id. at 1. Patent Owner further states “Patent Owner makes this request because Patent Owner is not filing a Patent Owner Response and is abandoning this proceeding.” Id. Upon review of Patent Owner’s unopposed Request for Adverse Judgment, we grant the request for adverse judgment pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,931,911 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01197 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–8 on all petition grounds and joined Amazon to the Apple IPR, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability and no basis for discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied discretionary otherDecided for petitioner
“deny institution in the absence of a Sotera stipulation from Amazon. First, we find no unfairness or prejudice in the fact that Apple has submitted a Sotera stipulation but Amazon has not. In this proceeding, Fintiv factors 1– 5, as a whole, weigh heavily against discretionary denial even without Amazon offering a Sotera stipulation and without any showing of compelling merits. Most significantly, the Board will be deciding the patentability issues raised in the Petition well before the scheduled trial date in the parallel district court proceeding. Thus, even if Amazon had submitted a Sotera stipulation, this would not change our decision to institute an inter partes review and join this case to the Apple IPR. Although a petitioner has the option to submit a Sotera stipulation, no such stipulation is required where the Fintiv factors as a whole do not otherwise weigh in favor of discretionary denial. For the above reasons, we determine that the efficiency and integrity of the patent system are best served by instituting inter partes review, and we decline to deny institution discretionarily under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the issues presented in Amazon’s Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Amazon would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 1–8 is unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Apple IPR. See IPR2023-00037, Paper 10.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“discretion, when warranted, to join as a party to an instituted inter partes review any other party who properly files a petition, after the patent owner has had the opportunity to file a preliminary response. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). As the moving party, Amazon bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. According to Amazon, its “Petition is intentionally identical in substance to the Apple Petition.” Mot. 2; see also Mot. 4. Amazon also argues that the schedule of the joined cases “would be unaffected, no additional briefing or discovery would be required, and no additional burdens would be placed on [Zentian].” Mot. 3; see also Mot. 4. Further, Amazon “agree[s] to take an ‘understudy’ role as long as Apple remains a party to the Apple IPR,” and that it “will not make any substantive filings and shall be bound by the filings of Apple,” and will not pursue its own arguments, evidence, or discovery unless the matter of termination or settlement arises or there are issues involving only Amazon. Mot. 5–6. Thus, according to Amazon, Zentian would not suffer prejudice if the two proceedings are joined. Mot. 6. Apart from its arguments discussed above in the context of discretionary denial, Zentian does not dispute the above contentions by Amazon and does not point to any particular prejudice relating to joining the two proceedings. In light of these considerations, Amazon has shown that joinder to the Apple IPR is appropriate in this case. Therefore, we grant Amazon’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,971,140 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01194 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 on all petition grounds and granted Amazon Web Services, Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC’s motion to join the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“to Patent Owner, trial is scheduled for September 23, 2024. Opp. 1. However, a final written decision in the instituted Apple IPR (and in the combined proceeding after joinder) will be due on June 12, 2024, more than three months before the trial date in district court. Thus, factor 2 weighs heavily against discretionary denial. The other factors do not outweigh factor 2. As to factor 1, there is no evidence as to whether there will be a stay in the parallel case, so we regard this factor as neutral. As to factor 3, there has been some preliminary activity in the parallel case, but overall, the proceeding is in its early stages, so we do not regard this factor as weighing substantially in favor of discretionary denial. As to factor 4, the district court may ultimately consider Jiang, Nguyen, and Smyth, cited in the invalidity contentions (Ex. 2001, 24), but not Boike and Baumgartner, and not necessarily in the same combinations as asserted in the Petition. See Ex. 2001, 20–26. As such, factor 4 weighs somewhat but not heavily in favor of discretionary denial. As to factor 5, the parties in the parallel proceeding are not different from the parties here, so we regard this factor as neutral.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the issues presented in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 1–6 of the ’377 Patent is unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Apple IPR. See IPR2023-00035, Paper 10.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, Case IPR2013-00004, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013) (Paper 15); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf. Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 1–6.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,062,377
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.