- Dolby Laboratories, Inc. v. Intertrust Technologies CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 8, 2020 · IPR2020-00663 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1 and 2 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that either claim would have been obvious over Griswold or England.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the submitted evidence and argument, we conclude the information presented does not show there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’603 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the ’603 patent was filed (a “POSITA”) would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, mathematics, or a related field, and approximately two years of relevant experience or equivalent study in electronic data protection, electronic content protection, or digital rights management. Pet. 16. Petitioner further states that additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 47–48). Patent Owner sets forth a similar definition, stating that a POSITA would have a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science, and three years of work or research experience in the fields of secure transactions and encryption, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science and two years of work or research experience in related fields. Prelim. Resp. 19. Patent Owner states that the positions set forth in its Preliminary Response would be the same under either parties’ proposal. Id. The parties’ proposals do not differ in any meaningful way to the issues in dispute. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, except that we delete the qualifier “a minimum” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound, i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond, and thus does not meaningfully indicate the level of ordinary skill in the art. This definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Madisetti and is commensurate with the level of ordinary skill as reflected in the prior art and the ’603 patent. We note, however, that our analysis would be the same under either parties’ definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“should be construed to mean “conditions or characteristics determined in advance against which to check the structure and/or behavior of one or more software modules.” Pet. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–72). To support this proposed construction, Petitioner states that the ’603 patent describes “inspector modules that ‘are operable to check the structure and/or behavior of drivers, software, and/or hardware against predefined criteria.’” Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 15:36–62); see also id. (citing Ex. 1001, 16:25–34, 23:63–24:4). Patent Owner contends that the term “predetermined criteria” does not require construction and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 21. Patent Owner further asserts that construction of this term is not necessary to resolve the matters presently in dispute. Id. We agree that no explicit construction of this phrase is necessary for our decision on whether to institute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“With respect to Petitioner’s first argument, Petitioner contends that “a POSITA would have understood that in the embodiment where the software is separate from the content[,] the monitor at the licensee’s site must first identify the software in order for the software to be used together with the content . . . .” Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 93), id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). Petitioner, however, does not provide sufficient evidence to support its contention. Although Petitioner cites to the declaration testimony of Dr. Madisetti to support its argument, Dr. Madisetti’s testimony merely repeats verbatim what is stated in the Petition and provides no additional persuasive facts or objective evidence to support his conclusion. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 93; see also id. at ¶¶ 77–82. To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, 829 F.3d at 1380; see also In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value). We are also not persuaded by Petitioner’s second argument that “a POSITA would have understood that in the embodiment where the software is separate from the content[,] the monitor at the licensee’s site must first identify the software . . . so that information identifying the software can be transmitted in the license datagram for evaluation at the licensor’s site.” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1006, 5:44–45, 6:37–51; Ex. 1002 ¶ 93). Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence or argument either that the license datagram provides information about the software (as opposed to the licensed product itself) or a reason why a POSITA would have understood information about the software would be provided in the datagram for evaluation at the licensor’s site. To support this second argument, Petitioner states Griswold’s license check system involves sending a “request datagram” or a “license datagram” to the licensor’s site in order to obtain approval to use the licensed product. Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:62–4:5, 5:44–52). Petitioner contends Griswold’s “license datagram 3 describes information related to the use of licensed product 1, including an identification of product 1 (i.e., the software).” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1006, 5:44–45, 6:37–51); see also id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1006, 5:44–45, 6:37–51; Ex. 1002 ¶ 93). Griswold, however, does not state that license datagram 3 identifies the software separately from the product. Rather, Griswold sates that datagram 3 contains a number of fields, including product model number 24 that identifies product 1. Ex. 1006, 6:45–48. Thus, we disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that license datagram 3 identifies the software separately from the product. Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have understood that, in the embodiment where the software is separate from the content, the monitor must first identify the software so that information identifying the software can be transmitted in the license datagram for evaluation at the licensors site, is conclusory and unsupported. See Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 93). Thus, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Griswold teaches the” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,406,603 - Renesas Electronics Corporation v. Broadcom CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 12, 2020 · IPR2019-01040 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious; the motion to amend is denied for substitute claim 15 and granted for substitute claims 16–19.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“§ 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1 and 9–14. Paper 9 (“Institution Dec.”). In the Institution Decision, we determined that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail as to the challenged claims, and we instituted trial on all challenged claims and all grounds in the Petition. Institution Dec. 35.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that “a person of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Accordingly, we construe “configurable” in this context to mean” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Accordingly, based on our review of the record and the parties’ submissions, we determine that the record establishes that each of Video Processor 280, H.221/BCH decoder 240, and Huffman decoder 260 disclosed in Fandrianto ’459 are hardware accelerators as claimed, and that Fandrianto ’459 would have taught the second limitation of claim 1. d) Claim 1 Summary In sum, based on our review of the record and the parties’ submissions, we determine that the record establishes that RISC microprocessor 220 disclosed in Fandrianto ’459 is a “processor,” as required by claim 1, and each of Video Processor 280, H.221/BCH decoder 240, and Huffman decoder 260 disclosed in Fandrianto ’459 are hardware accelerators as required by that claim. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 of the ’844 patent would have been obvious in light of Fandrianto ’459.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,284,844 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 8,284,844 - ZTE (USA), Inc. / LG Electronics Inc. v. Cywee Group Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 4, 2020 · IPR2019-01203 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied CyWee’s rehearing request, leaving intact its decision allowing joined petitioner LGE to oppose CyWee’s revised motion to amend.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsDecided for petitioner
“In our Rehearing Decision, we determined that “the adversarial system is better served if we allow a Petitioner to raise [statutory, regulatory, or patentability] issues in response to CyWee’s Revised Motion to Amend.” Reh’g Dec. 8. Therefore, we held that LGE may present arguments and evidence, independently from ZTE, in response to CyWee’s Revised Motion to Amend, and that LGE may request an oral hearing limited solely to the issues raised in the Revised Motion to Amend. Id. at 9.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,441,438 - ZTE (USA), Inc. / LG Electronics Inc. v. Cywee Group Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 4, 2020 · IPR2019-00143 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied CyWee’s rehearing request, leaving in place its decision allowing joined petitioner LGE to oppose the Revised Motion to Amend.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,441,438 - Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2020 · IPR2019-01584 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution of review of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 39, and 41 under its General Plastic analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for patent owner
“petitions are only relevant if Petitioner was a party to the prior proceedings, or had a relationship with the prior petitioners. Reh’g Req. 7. But a review of the cited precedential decision does not reflect Petitioner’s suggestion. See General Plastic, Paper No. 19 at 15−19 (“Our intent in formulating the factors was to take undue inequities and prejudices to Patent Owner into account.”). General Plastic does not proscribe panels of the Board from considering whether a subsequent petitioner knew of the prior art cited in the subsequent petition at the time of filing of the first petition, per the second factor. Similarly, we are not barred, under General Plastic, from considering the length of time that elapsed between when a petitioner learned of the art and when the petition, based on that art, was filed, or whether petitioner provides an adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions, per the fourth and fifth factors. Additionally, we are not persuaded that the factors enumerated in General Plastic, as viewed through the lens of Valve Corp., must all be limited by any possible relationship between the multiple petitioners. Although the discussion of the first factor in Valve Corp. makes clear that “any relationship between those petitioners when weighing the General Plastic factors” must be considered, the remaining factors take into account the knowledge of the second petitioner irrespective of a specific relationship. See Valve Corp., Paper 11 at 9−15. As such, the relationship between the different petitioners certainly has some bearing on what the second petitioner knew, when they knew it, and when they acted upon it, but the consideration of the second through seventh factors does not require a showing of a specific relationship between the petitioners to consider those factors.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,519,005 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd v. Uusi, LLC D/B/A NartronSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 17, 2020 · IPR2016-00908 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Remand
Claims 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 48, 61–67, 69, 83–86, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, and 102 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 37–39 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which vacated our Decision and remanded the matter to us. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. UUSI, LLC, 775 F. App’x 692 (Fed. Cir. 2019). As to the earlier instituted claims, the Court instructed that we should consider “whether Samsung has shown that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teaching of Gerpheide with the teachings of Ingraham [I]/Caldwell to arrive at the claimed invention.” Id. at 697. The Court further instructed us to “consider the patentability of claims 37, 38, and 39” (id.) because, on April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s instruction in this case and in light of SAS Inst., Inc., we modified our Decision on Institution to institute review of claims 37–39 of the ’183 patent as obvious over Ingraham I, Caldwell, and Gerpheide. Paper 40. We further held a teleconference on August 15, 2019, with respective counsel for the parties, to hear their proposals on how to proceed with this trial. Paper 41, 2. Having considered the parties’ proposals, we authorized the parties to submit concurrent briefs and subsequent responses addressing the following issues (id. at 6):” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a minimum of: (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or equivalent thereof; and (2) “two to three years of experience in the relevant field, which includes touch systems technology.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 19). Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Cairns, opines that a person of ordinary skill “in the art of capacitive touch sensors would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in physics or electrical engineering or equivalent industry experience in the field.” Ex. 2002 ¶ 14. In our Final Written Decision, we noted that the levels of ordinary skill proposed by the parties do not differ significantly, but adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition as more representative, indicating that our analysis would be the same under either definition. Paper 35, 9–10. On remand, neither party disputes the definition adopted in the Final Written Decision. Furthermore, no argument presented by the parties on remand would be affected by adopting one of the proposed definitions over the other. We maintain here the definition adopted in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“transition term[s]” should be considered in determining the meaning of a claim term, but asserts without further support that the presence of a semicolon after “supply voltage” and the use of the transition term “wherein” do not compel the preliminary construction. Id. As we addressed in denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, claim 37 employs the open-ended transition term “comprising” followed by a colon to indicate that a list elements follows, and employs semicolons to separate the elements of that list. Paper 17, 5. The first element of the list, element 37a, describes an oscillator and includes the supply voltage limitation preceded by a comma and the transition term “wherein.” Id. Element 37a then ends with a semicolon and the claim proceeds to element 37b, which recites a microcontroller. Id. Petitioner thus nominally acknowledges consideration of punctuation, but advances a construction that asks us to disregard punctuation affirmatively recited in the claim. To do so would be “inconsistent with the punctuation [patentee] chose for this claim.” In re Pelz, 379 F. App’x 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Likewise, as to Petitioner’s assertion that we read an additional limitation into the claim (Pet. Br. 10), we observe that, if the claim is limited to a particular exemplary embodiment, such a limitation results from the claim being drafted to cover only that embodiment. While we confirmed in the Decision on Institution that the use of the term supply voltage is consistent with its use in the Specification (Dec. on Inst. 9), the limitation of the claim to the oscillator is based on the language of the claim, not on definition or disavowal. Therefore, even accepting, for the sake of argument, that there is no disavowal or definition in the Specification of “supply voltage,” the term refers in independent claim 37 to supply voltage of the oscillator.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyOther
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments because they are not responsive to the combination of teachings at issue in the references before us. Patent Owner focuses on particular features of Gerpheide that it alleges either “would not work . . . in the proposed Caldwell-Ingraham system” or “can only work” in the presence of a component Patent Owner argues that “neither Ingraham nor Caldwell uses.” PO Br. 1–2, 12–13. These arguments are based on a mistaken premise that one or more components or physical configurations of Gerpheide must be incorporated into the combination of Ingraham I and Caldwell in order to show a reasonable likelihood of success. Under the Federal Circuit’s construction of the “selectively providing” limitation, the combination of Ingraham I, Caldwell, and Gerpheide need not incorporate the specific features of Gerpheide identified by Patent Owner. Petitioner asserts, supported by evidence from Dr. Subramanian, that the Ingraham I-Caldwell combination would have been modified based on Gerpheide “to provide features that adjust[] the oscillator signal frequency provided to the input portions 13 to negate the effect of interference on the input portions 13 and touch sensing circuits.” Pet. 26–27. This modification would not require any of the particular components or configurations of Gerpheide highlighted by Patent Owner. Thus, even if one or more of Patent Owner’s arguments as to the infeasibility of incorporating particular aspects of Gerpheide were correct, Patent Owner’s arguments do not address Gerpheide’s particular teaching of adjusting oscillator signal frequency to negate the effect of interference, and therefore, Patent Owner’s arguments are not responsive to the proposed combination and evidence relied upon by Petitioner. In view of the above, we find that Petitioner has shown that the skilled artisan would have combined Gerpheide with Ingraham/Caldwell as proposed with a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed subject matter.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 5,796,183 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 5,796,183 - Flex Logix Technologies, Inc. v. Venkat KondaRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2020-00261 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, leaving institution of review of claims 1–7, 11, 15–18, 20–22, 32, and 47 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Decisions, has the burden of showing that the Decisions should be modified. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“in our Decision on Institution. In the Decision, we directly addressed Patent Owner’s arguments that Dr. Baker is not qualified to testify in this proceeding because he is neither a person of ordinary skill in the art, nor an expert in the relevant art. See Dec. 7–8. In particular, we explained that there is no requirement “that the expert’s experience perfectly match the relevant field, or that the expert is a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 7. We also explained that Dr. Baker testifies as to his education and qualifications and provides his curriculum vitae. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–12; Ex. 1003. At this preliminary stage, we cannot say that Dr. Baker’s scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge will not be helpful in understanding the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). On this record, we are not persuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony should be disregarded. Id. at 8. Therefore, even if Dr. Baker were not a person of ordinary skill in the art as Patent Owner contends, it does not follow that he is unqualified to testify in these proceedings. Nothing was misapprehended or overlooked in considering Dr. Baker’s testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(Ex. 2001). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner cited the Konda Declaration when discussing the experience and qualifications of the named inventor of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. The education level of the inventor, however, is just one of several factors that we may consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (enumerating six factors that “may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” (quoting Evt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). And, as Patent Owner noted in the Preliminary Response, “these factors are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (citing Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256). In any event, in the Decision we also considered Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, noted the differences between them, and stated that “[o]ur determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions.” Dec. 7. Therefore, our evaluation of Petitioner’s challenges and Dr. Baker’s testimony in support thereof would have been the same under Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See id. (“[W]e note that our conclusions would be same under either definition.”).” slip op. at 7
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot reached
“Moreover, in the Decision, we directly addressed Patent Owner’s argument with respect to whether the ’394 provisional and ’605 PCT provided support for the claim limitation “said routing network comprising a plurality of stages y, in each sub-integrated circuit block, starting from the lowest stage of 1 to the highest stage of y, where y≧1” when y=1. Dec. 14. In particular, we found that Patent Owner’s arguments, as we understand them, are directed only to the disclosure of a network with only one stage (y=1). [Prelim. Resp.] at 15–39. Patent Owner does not address the other limitations of claim 1, and does not point to any disclosures in the priority applications that describe a sub-integrated circuit block with only one stage that also comprises pluralities of forward connecting links and backward connecting links as required by claim 1. Id. Thus, we did not overlook Patent Owner’s arguments, but rather evaluated the disclosures in the ’394 provisional and ’605 PCT and determined, on the record at this stage of the proceeding, that they do not provide sufficient written description support for the challenged claims. The parties will have the opportunity to further develop the record on these issues during trial, and the Board will evaluate the fully-developed record at the close of the evidence. D. Public Availability of the ’394 provisional” slip op. at 9
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,269,523 - Flex Logix Technologies, Inc. v. Venkat KondaRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2020-00260 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, leaving institution in place for claims 1–7, 11, 15–18, 20–22, 32, and 47.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Decisions, has the burden of showing that the Decisions should be modified. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 90. The Consolidated Trial Practice Guide goes on to state that “[a]bsent a showing of ‘good cause’ prior to filing the request for rehearing or in the request for rehearing itself, new evidence will not be admitted.” Id. (citing Huawei, Paper 19 at 4).” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Baker testifies as to his education and qualifications and provides his curriculum vitae. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–12; Ex. 1003. At this preliminary stage, we cannot say that Dr. Baker’s scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge will not be helpful in understanding the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). On this record, we are not persuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony should be disregarded. Id. at 8. Therefore, even if Dr. Baker were not a person of ordinary skill in the art as Patent Owner contends, it does not follow that he is unqualified to testify in these proceedings. Nothing was misapprehended or overlooked in considering Dr. Baker’s testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelOther
“(Ex. 2001). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner cited the Konda Declaration when discussing the experience and qualifications of the named inventor of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. The education level of the inventor, however, is just one of several factors that we may consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (enumerating six factors that “may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” (quoting Evt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). And, as Patent Owner noted in the Preliminary Response, “these factors are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (citing Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256). In any event, in the Decision we also considered Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, noted the differences between them, and stated that “[o]ur determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions.” Dec. 7. Therefore, our evaluation of Petitioner’s challenges and Dr. Baker’s testimony in support thereof would have been the same under Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See id. (“[W]e note that our conclusions would be same under either definition.”).” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,269,523 - PTAB · Sep 15, 2020 · IPR2020-00282 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“a party requests rehearing on a decision on whether to institute inter partes review, we “review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). There is an abuse of discretion if we have made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing [our] decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We disagree. Nowhere in the cited passages in the Petition does Samsung argue that we should construe the term “row wrap-around connections” according to the explicit construction that Samsung now suggests for the plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 10–11, 25–30. Rather, Samsung argued that “Petitioners do not believe any term requires explicit construction.” Pet. 10–11. In the Reply, Samsung argued that all of the terms in the challenged claims should be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See Reply 1, 4–5. However, apart from arguing that Samsung had proposed construing limitation 1C in the co-pending district court proceeding according to its plain and ordinary meaning,3 Samsung did not propose any specific construction for the phrase “row wrap-around connection,” or point to any evidence as to what the ordinary and customary meaning of that phrase was to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we decline to adopt Samsung’s new proposed construction on rehearing.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We determined that Samsung had not provided sufficient evidence of its proposed motivation to combine the two references. See Dec. 16 (“[N]either Samsung nor Dr. Wolfe supports this conclusion with any evidence on the preliminary record.” (citing In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3))). In particular, we found that “Dr. Wolfe does not explain how or why the combination of Barkan and Tagg would minimize RC delay or allow for the use of lengthier columns and rows of electrodes, or cite to any facts, data, or authorities to support that opinion.” Dec. 17. We stated that “there is no evidence in the record suggesting that RC delay was a recognized problem . . . or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a connection to both sides of a row of electrodes would be a solution to that problem.” Id. We also stated that Dr. Wolfe does not “provide any detail as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Barkan’s leads 160 to incorporate external connections such as those in Tagg.” Id. (citing Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,821,502 - Unified Patents Inc. v. Portal Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 22, 2020 · IPR2019-00513 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Junqua and Julia; the motion to amend is denied because proposed substitute claim 31 is unpatentable over the prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, relying on testimony of Mr. McNair, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement the database of Junqua using the well-known query language of SQL as taught by Julia, for the benefit of providing “a standard interactive and programming language for getting information from and updating a database” as taught by Julia. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1005, 8:56–64, 9:2–18; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28, 74). We determine for the reasons given that converting the text in searchable form to a database query as taught by Junqua, where the database query is written in the well-known query language of SQL as taught by Julia, does no more than yield the predictable result of getting information from a database using the standard programming language of (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Ordinary Skill in the Art Claim 31 depends from claim 21. The Petition has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 21 would have been obvious over the combination of Junqua and Julia, as discussed in our analysis above. Claim 31 recites “wherein the location/proximity module consists of a radio frequency identification reader.” Petitioner, relying on testimony of Mr. McNair, contends Amitay teaches this limitation. Opp. 12 (citing Ex. 1018, 6:17–19, 6:37–41; Ex. 1022 ¶ 58). Amitay discloses a location sensor which may be an RF reader. Ex. 1018, 6:17–19, 6:37–41. For the reasons given, we determine that Amitay teaches this limitation. Claim 31 recites “the location/proximity device consists of an art museum exhibit equipped with a radio frequency identification tag.” Petitioner contends that Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation. Opp. 12–14 (citing Ex. 1018, 6:27– 32, 7:32–33; Ex. 1027; Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 34, 58). Patent Owner contends that Amitay does not teach tagging art exhibits with RFID tags. Mot. 18. We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Amitay alone does not teach this limitation, because, as Petitioner demonstrates, Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation. Amitay discloses tagging an item with an RFID tag. Ex. 1018, 7:31–33. Mr. McNair testifies that tagging an art museum exhibit with an RFID tag was within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1022 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1026). Mr. McNair also testifies that using an” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelOther
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Amitay alone does not teach this limitation, because, as Petitioner demonstrates, Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation. Amitay discloses tagging an item with an RFID tag. Ex. 1018, 7:31–33. Mr. McNair testifies that tagging an art museum exhibit with an RFID tag was within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1022 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1026). Mr. McNair also testifies that using an guests about art museum exhibits was known in the art. Id. (citing Ex. 1027, 78–79, 84–87). Mr. McNair testifies that using the device of Junqua, Julia, and Amitay to provide information about art exhibits to museum guests yields the known benefit of reducing museum costs by providing virtual docents instead of human ones. Id. (citing Ex. 1027, 86). We rely on the testimony and supporting evidence of Mr. McNair to determine that Amitay combined with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,376,645 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,376,645
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.