• Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Eyesmatch Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00297 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed distance-based variation in the rate of image-processing steps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Putting aside the controversy over alleged impropriety and sandbagging in connection with the District Court’s Order, which we address infra in connection with Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike, we find the District Court’s “mirror-mimicking” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:46–51, 15:41–47). Petitioner does not dispute that the ’109 patent discloses these aspects of “mirror-mimicking,” or even that the District Court’s claim construction is incorrect. Instead, Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe ‘mirror mimicking’ [beyond plain meaning] since the prior art expressly discloses mimicking a mirror.” Pet. Reply 6. Further. Petitioner characterizes the claim construction order as “a report and recommendation” by a magistrate judge that “the district court judge has not evaluated or adopted.” Id. at 6 n.2.9 We address infra whether the prior art “expressly” discloses “mirror- mimicking” as construed by the District Court. We, however, disagree with Petitioner that we should not construe this term. Given the controversy over whether Petitioner has argued for a different construction in the District Court, we cannot agree that an explicit construction of “mirror-mimicking” is an unnecessary step toward resolving this controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803. We therefore adopt the District Court’s construction for “mirror-” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill would have combined these references “to reduce distortion and provide a realistic mirror image.” Pet. 14–17; Haram Decl. ¶¶ 110–117. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that by specifically disclosing “flipping” the image, Rosenberg is discouraging or teaching away from performing other transformations to achieve its objective of “replicat[ing] the performance of a standard household mirror.” See PO Resp. 32–33 (Patent Owner asserting lack of motivation to combine the references). A reference may be said to “teach away” “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Lab'ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed. Id. Further, when conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference “not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). We are not convinced that the references before us “teach away” from performing the other transformations.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

  Patent outcomesUS 8,982,109 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,109
• Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Eyesmatch Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00856 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not teach or suggest varying the rate of the claimed image-processing steps according to user distance.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner states that it “applies Petitioners’ proposed level of skill for purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Forsyth Decl. ¶¶ 62– 63). For this Decision, we adopt the formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner as consistent with the prior art before us in this proceeding.7” slip op. at 13

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Putting aside the controversy over alleged impropriety and sandbagging in connection with the District Court’s Order, which we address infra in connection with Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike, we find the District Court’s “mirror-mimicking” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:46–51, 15:41–47). Petitioner does not dispute that the ’109 patent discloses these aspects of “mirror-mimicking,” or even that the District Court’s claim construction is incorrect. Instead, Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe ‘mirror mimicking’ [beyond plain meaning] since the prior art expressly discloses mimicking a mirror.” Pet. Reply 6. Further. Petitioner characterizes the claim construction order as “a report and recommendation” by a magistrate judge that “the district court judge has not evaluated or adopted.” Id. at 6 n.2.9 We address infra whether the prior art “expressly” discloses “mirror- mimicking” as construed by the District Court. We, however, disagree with Petitioner that we should not construe this term. Given the controversy over whether Petitioner has argued for a different construction in the District Court, we cannot agree that an explicit construction of “mirror-mimicking” is an unnecessary step toward resolving this controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803. We therefore adopt the District Court’s construction for “mirror-” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill would have combined these references “to reduce distortion and provide a realistic mirror image.” Pet. 14–17; Haram Decl. ¶¶ 110–117. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that by specifically disclosing “flipping” the image, Rosenberg is discouraging or teaching away from performing other transformations to achieve its objective of “replicat[ing] the performance of a standard household mirror.” See PO Resp. 32–33 (Patent Owner asserting lack of motivation to combine the references). A reference may be said to “teach away” “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Lab'ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed. Id. Further, when conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference “not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). We are not convinced that the references before us “teach away” from performing the other transformations.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that step 1(h) is taught or suggested by the references cited by Petitioner or the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Karam. We agree, instead, with Patent Owner’s argument that “a [person of ordinary skill] would regard the disclosures in Rosenberg relating to proximity detection to be in connection with turning on or off various display modes and not in connection with varying the rate of one or more steps that are performed to transform a series of captured images of a user.” PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex.1005, ¶¶ 25, 32, 56, 69, 114). This distinction was explored during the final hearing. Petitioner’s counsel confirmed that in Rosenberg’s mirror mode, the rate of performing the processing steps does not vary: [THE BOARD]: It’s true that when the -- when Rosenberg is acting in the mirror mode, it’s always at the same rate, correct? It’s always performing those three processing steps at the same rate? [COUNSEL]: Correct. Hearing Tr. 34:13–16. We conclude that Rosenberg fails to disclose or suggest step 1(h) for the reasons given by Patent Owner and summarized above. We agree with Patent Owner’s analysis that in Rosenberg, when the mirror is off the processing steps are not performed, and when the mirror is on, the steps are performed “at an invariant rate.” PO Sur-reply 18–19.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 8,982,109 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,109
• AT&T Mobility LLC / AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Daingean Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00402 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board granted Patent Owner’s revised non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–4 and substituting claims 7 and 8, which Petitioner did not prove unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019) (precedential). A “patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motion to amend complies” with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(d)(1). Specifically, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent; and (4) the amendment does not introduce new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)–(b). For the reasons explained below, Patent Owner satisfies its burden of persuasion to show that the amendments comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Both parties rely on expert testimony for their respective positions relating to the number of years of experience needed to attain ordinary skill, but neither expert cites supporting evidence for their testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 2002 ¶ 15. Our decision is the same regardless of whether the length of experience is two years or three. We find Patent Owner’s proposed “wireless communications” is more consistent with the ’958 patent than Petitioner’s proposed “telecommunication,” which encompasses a variety of technologies including, e.g., landline and wireless telephones, cable, and satellite. See Ex. 1001, 1:11–62 (describing the invention in terms of wireless communications). Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, substituting “wireless communications” for “telecommunication.” Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the recited second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. The plain meaning of “first type” and “second type” indicates that the first type and second type are different in kind. RMTA 22 (App. A). Our interpretation is consistent with the Specification, which explains that second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. As Patent Owner points out, the ’958 patent discloses “first type of system information (1TYP SIB) is . . . essential . . . for initial system access” and “second type of system information (2TYP SIB) is nonessential system information . . . defined as all other types of information, and thus excludes the [] information required for initial access.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:34– 46); see also Ex. 1001, Abstract (interchangeably using the terms second type and non-essential). Despite Petitioner’s argument that this disclosure is non-limiting and directed to a disclaimed example embodiment (Opp. 8–9), Petitioner could not identify any embodiment, among the approximately forty disclosed embodiments, describing something other than the first type SIB being essential information and the second type SIB being non-essential information. Tr. 22:18–26. Even the Petition acknowledges that “the ’958 Patent further classifies a second type of system information, the ‘non-essential’ SI, which is defined as all other types of information excluding that first type of information required for initial access.” Pet. 5. Furthermore, the prior art of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill would have understood second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 48 (describing two categories of system information, “essential SI” and “Other SI”). Patent Owner’s expert also understood the recited first and second type SIBs as being mutually exclusive. See Ex. 1011, 49:10–13. For the above reasons, we do not agree with Petitioner that the recited second type SIB lacks any requirements, nor do we interpret claims 7 and 8 such that the first type SIB could be a second type SIB.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “(d) Limitation 7h: Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments with respect to limitation 7h are insufficient because they fail to address the limitation as written and improperly incorporate previous arguments by reference. For example, Petitioner did not map the recited “group identifier” when opposing Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend. See Opp. 16–17. In its Sur-reply, Petitioner contends that limitation 7h’s requirement of transmitting the group identifier was previously “set out in Patent Owner’s prior papers,” but does not refer to any specific papers or exhibits. Pet. Surreply 11–12. We decline to search for and piece together Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to develop a persuasive theory of unpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. section 42.6(a)(3). Petitioner similarly failed to address adequately where Lee discloses or suggests the recited “compressed format” and “plural parameters.” See Opp. 16–17. Aside from the above concerns, we also do not see sufficient explanation with respect to limitation 7h’s requirement that the transmitting by broadcast be based on a comparison of the value tag. Petitioner argues that, because Patent Owner does not dispute limitation 7g, “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to use the same value tag[] to determine the system information broadcast in Lee’s compressed format embodiment.” Pet. Sur-reply 12. This conclusory statement is not supported by any citations to evidence and was improperly introduced in the Sur-reply. Moreover, whether it was obvious to determine what system information is broadcast is not commensurate with the claim scope because limitation 7h requires that the broadcasting (not the broadcast content) be based on a comparison of the value tag. See supra III.B.4 and IV.B. Further, we are not persuaded that Lee’s transmitting by broadcast is” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 10,841,958 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,841,958
• Inergy Technology, Inc. v. Force Mos Technology Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted references did not establish the claimed epitaxial layer or the required coverage of the trench sidewalls.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner defines a person of ordinary skill in the art as having “a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, and at least two years of relevant work experience in the field of integrated circuit design and manufacturing.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–37, 57). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 6. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by unopposed declaration testimony and appears to be consistent with the disclosures of the ’634 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Ex. 1001, 1:6–2:33 (describing the invention and related art in terms of integrated circuit design and fabrication); see also Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1–6 (Hirler); Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1–37 (Kobayashi); Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 2–29 (Shiraishi). Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that “the sidewalls of said trenches in said base layer are covered” should be construed to mean that “the entire sidewalls of” those trenches are covered. Pet. 18–19. We refer to this as “the sidewall limitation.” Petitioner shows persuasively that the disclosure and file history of the ’634 patent support its position on the sidewall limitation. Id. Patent Owner, for its part, observes that, after the filing of the Petition. two District Courts adopted the construction proposed by Petitioner.” PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2010, 6–9; Ex. 2011, 23). Patent Owner also agrees to apply Petitioner’s construction for purposes of this proceeding. Id. We agree with Patent Owner that an express construction of the sidewall limitation is necessary to this Decision, id., and adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition because it is supported by the record. No other claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “On this record, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that any claim is unpatentable under any ground asserted in the Petition. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 of the ’634 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 34

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Alternatively, even if we set aside that timing issue, Dr. Liu’s bare opinion, advanced for the first time during cross-examination, that an epitaxial layer is “obvious” from Hirler’s disclosure is inadequate to support the challenges. Id. at 24–25. We accord little weight to Dr. Liu’s opinion because it is conclusory. See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In any event, Petitioner does not meet, on this record, the “high standard” required to establish an inherent disclosure of an epitaxial layer in Hirler. PO Resp. 24.6 Dr. Liu opined for the first time during cross-examination “that it would have been impossible to create Hirler’s more lightly doped n- drift zone layer on top of its more heavily doped n+ substrate layer other than via epitaxy.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 2014, 164:16– 165:20). But Patent Owner effectively refutes that proposition with evidence that such a layer “could be created by counter-doping,” even if, as Dr. Liu contends, counter-doping may have been less ideal due to “disadvantageous mobility.” Id. (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 133; Ex. 2014, 166:15–167:8).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,629,634 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,629,634
• Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. NEC CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01239 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 14–18, 20–23, and 25–29 were not determined unpatentable because the asserted obviousness grounds failed to establish the claimed code-rate determination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner, supported by the testimony of Dr. Reader, argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer science, a related field, and 2–3 years’ experience researching, designing, or developing content delivery systems and related hardware, software, and firmware, or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 67–69). Petitioner further argues “[o]ne having less education but more practical experience, or more education and less experience, might also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition or offer an alternative level or skill in the art. PO Resp. 12 (citing Pet. 14; Ex. 2012). Instead, “[f]or the purposes of this PO Response only, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of POSITA.” Id. Thus, on this record, the parties agree upon the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, and this level is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’101 patent and the prior art references that disclose content delivery systems. For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “the gap between the playback deadline and the target schedule, (td(n) − tT(n)), is the target buffer duration, i.e., ‘the desired client buffer duration (in client time).’” Id. at 22–23 (quoting Chou ¶ 74). Petitioner also argues that “in efforts to match upper bound tb(n) to target schedule tT(n), Chou takes into consideration the time duration between target schedule tT(n) and the playback deadline td(n).” Thus, it appears Petitioner assembles three separate and distinct time intervals from Chou’s timing diagrams and equations to construct one contiguous time interval equivalent to claim 1’s remaining time. However, Chou does not recognize the time interval that Petitioner posits, and Petitioner has not persuasively shown that this combined time interval exists as a teaching in the prior art and is used as part of any step or decision involved in determining the code rate. As admitted by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Reader, Petitioner’s analysis “used the claims as a road map to find limitations in the prior art.” Ex. 2015, 76:4–9 (Reader Deposition Transcript). See also Tr. 28:20–31:2 (Petitioner’s response to whether identification of and integration of separate time ranges described by Chou is hindsight reconstruction, Petitioner argues Chou’s device operates such that code rate is based on remaining time). Under the circumstances, this is improper because Petitioner and Dr. Reader do not justify this combination of separately identified time ranges except based solely on hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. However, even if that were not the case, we are not persuaded that Chou or the other asserted prior art references suggest using the combined time interval td(n) − ta(n) as the basis for any decision related to determining the code rate.” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “d) Analysis In our Institution Decision, although expressing some uncertainty with respect to certain of Patent Owner’s arguments on the preliminary record then before us, “we [were] not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions that [(1)] Wang teaches [1d]’s code rate” (Dec. 53 (citing Pet. 62–65) or (2) “a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Chou and Wang” (id. at 54 (citing Pet. 74)). Petitioner does not dispute those determinations in its Reply or otherwise. Furthermore, Petitioner does not address or otherwise dispute Patent Owner’s arguments challenging the asserted obviousness of claims 1, 4–6, 10–16, and 19–26 over the combined teachings of Chou and Wang. Thus, for at least the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to show that (1) one skilled in the art would have combined the teachings of Chou and Wang or (2) the combined teaching of Chou and Wang renders limitation 1(d) obvious. e) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 1 is unpatentable over the combination of Chou and Wang.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 8,752,101 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,752,101
• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Daedalus Prime LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-01343 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 13–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Bose and White, alone or in the asserted combinations, failed to teach claimed workload comparisons or workload monitoring.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded and find for the reasons given that Petitioner fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that White teaches or suggests “receiving a bus workload for a communication bus and a first processing element workload for a first processing element based on an integrated circuit reaching a limit.” Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Brogioli testifies that “[t]he workload is a function of the demands imposed by, e.g., applications running on the system, and may or may not be subject to direct control, whereas the conditions under which that workload is processed are controlled directly.” Brogioli Decl. ¶ 66. We agree with Dr. Brogioli and find that White’s frequency and voltage monitoring and adjustments do not result in the power management logic receiving the bus workload as recited in claim element 4[a]. Id. ¶¶ 64–66. We find the testimony of Mr. Wyatt on this issue unconvincing. Wyatt Decl. ¶ 103. In support of his opinion that “monitoring the operating voltages and frequencies of the logic core 120A and common logic bridge 110 is monitoring the workload of those components,” he states: “It was well understood that operating frequency and voltage of a component reflect the activity and use, or workload, of that component.” Id. However, he does not provide any evidentiary support for this statement. We, therefore, give it little weight. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 40 (Nov. 2019)5 (“Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little or no weight.”) (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “response. Paper 9. At the institution stage, therefore, Patent Owner did not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art or provide its own description. We regarded Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Institution Dec. 12–13. In its Response, Patent Owner states that it “uses this definition” in its analysis. PO Resp. 15 (citing Brogioli Decl. ¶ 25). In view of the foregoing, for this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’494 patent and the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Mr. Wyatt. See Wyatt Decl. ¶ 21.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionGranted

    “Post-institution, Patent Owner proposes a construction for the term “workload.” PO Resp. 15–16. Patent Owner contends that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that in the ’494 patent, the term ‘workload’ means ‘an amount of activity over a quantum or period of time.’” Id. at 15. Dr. Brogioli’s testimony supports this construction, as does Mr. Wyatt’s. Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 36–38; Wyatt Dep. 34:14–36:9. The ’494 patent also supports this construction. Ex. 1001, 8:20–22, 9:60–63. Petitioner does not dispute this proposed construction in its Reply. For the reasons given, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction for “workload.”” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Nowhere does Petitioner or its expert point to an explicit disclosure in Bose of making a comparison of the claimed “bus workload and a bus workload threshold.” Instead, Petitioner relies on its expert’s opinion as to what a person of ordinary skill might have known, without any additional supporting evidence. See, e.g., Pet. 26 (“[A person of ordinary skill] would have understood global PMCU compares a workload threshold as exemplified by the predicted power and performance of each power mode and the monitored workload to select and adjust the power mode of a component” (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 54–55)). This opinion is not supported by the record. The only disclosure of a comparison in Bose that we have been shown is the comparison of PowerTotal to PowerMax in step 303 of Figure 3, which Petitioner does not rely on to meet the “comparison” limitation in the claim. Hearing Tr. 17:16–20. Also without proper support is Petitioner’s assertion that “a [person of ordinary skill] would have understood that in Bose, selecting or adjusting power mode for a component entails comparing a workload threshold, such as predicted power and performance associated with each power mode with real time statistics, such as the monitored workload of a component.” Pet. 26 (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 55–56). We determine that for the reasons given, Petitioner fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed comparison element 1[g] of claim 1 is taught or suggested by Bose. We find, therefore, that Petitioner has not demonstrated that claim 1 is anticipated by Bose, nor has Petitioner demonstrated that to a person of ordinary skill, claim 1 would have been obvious in light of Bose.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,898,494 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,898,494
• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-00839 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the evidence did not establish the claimed LAG use between MPLS switches or explain how the references would be combined.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Consistent with our Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, apart from the phrase “at least” modifying the number of years of professional experience. See Dec. 17–18. As we previously explained, inclusion of such qualifiers renders the articulation vague by being open-ended thus encompassing the level of experience of an expert, someone with more than ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 18. Petitioner’s articulation otherwise appears consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 4; PO Resp. 3. Based on the parties’ arguments, we see no need to expressly construe any terms to resolve the dispute before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Pet. Reply 10–11. Despite Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated by knowledge of Rabie to combine the teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz at the time of the invention of the ’602 patent. First, the ’602 patent claims a priority date of May 6, 2005, which is not challenged by Petitioner (see Pet. 3), whereas Rabie was published more than two months later. Ex. 1021, code (65). Moreover, the question is not whether it may have been known at the time of the invention that a LAG could be used between switches, but rather whether the combined teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to utilize a LAG between switches, as claimed, when neither RFC 3209 nor Raz teaches such usage or suggests the existence of a problem that such usage would solve. We are not persuaded that they would.” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot reached

    “Pet. Reply 10–11. Despite Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated by knowledge of Rabie to combine the teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz at the time of the invention of the ’602 patent. First, the ’602 patent claims a priority date of May 6, 2005, which is not challenged by Petitioner (see Pet. 3), whereas Rabie was published more than two months later. Ex. 1021, code (65). Moreover, the question is not whether it may have been known at the time of the invention that a LAG could be used between switches, but rather whether the combined teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to utilize a LAG between switches, as claimed, when neither RFC 3209 nor Raz teaches such usage or suggests the existence of a problem that such usage would solve. We are not persuaded that they would.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,118,602 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,118,602
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00447 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 were not shown unpatentable because the Petition did not establish the claimed port assignment and packet labeling under Raz or adequately explain the Raz–Ferguson combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “packet-switched networking, MPLS and LAG.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 57–58). Petitioner also states that a lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 57). Patent Owner “uses the same definition.” PO Resp. 4. We apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, which is undisputed and is consistent with the level reflected by the ’602 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claims using the principles set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 6–7; see PO Resp. 4. To the extent that the parties dispute the meaning of certain claim terms, we address those issues below, but we determine it is unnecessary to expressly construe any terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that the cited portions of Raz do not disclose a LAG between two switches. PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner acknowledges this; as stated in Petitioner’s Reply, “Petitioner has always acknowledged that Raz addresses the use of subports within an LSR, but a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have found it obvious from Raz to use Ethernet physical data ports of a router or switch in an Ethernet LAG to communicate high-speed packet streams in [an] MPLS network.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Pet. 15, 19, 22–25; Ex. 1021 ¶ 13; Ex. 1006, 1:16–19, 2:23– 31, 7:7–29, 11:3–12, 13:16–19, 14:42–44, 15:56–58, 17:7–9). Petitioner argues that LAGs were well known and, “[w]hile PO argues that Raz teaches the use of a single high-speed link to communicate between LSRs, that is merely a design choice.” Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17; PO Resp. 8–9). Further, Petitioner argues “[i]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that high-speed packet streams could be communicated between switches or routers through a physical tunnel port of a LAG.” Pet. Resp. 3 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 15–17) (emphasis added). Among other problems, though, those arguments were not in the Petition; the Petition does not describe modifications of Raz’s teachings, much less establish those modifications as a “design choice.” See Pet. 25; see also PO Sur-reply 3. Further, we agree with Patent Owner that Raz is fundamentally different with its teachings of multiplexing the outputs of multiple slow- speed subports/processors into a single stream for transmission across a single high-speed link. PO Resp. 7–9, 12–13, 15–16; PO Sur-reply 4–5. As stated in Raz, “[t]he present invention provides a subport forwarding and provisioning mechanism whereby a plurality of subports comprising slower speed processors are used to perform the packet processing for a higher speed packet stream.” Ex. 1006, 6:24–27. Additionally, where Raz describes communication between two LSRs, Petitioner acknowledges that Raz teaches that its cited second LSR assigns the port on which it will receive a data packet. Pet. Reply 4; Ex. 1021 ¶ 20 (“in Raz, the second LSR chooses the subport that will be used to transmit the data packet from the first LSR and receive the data packet at the second LSR”). According to Petitioner, Raz teaches that “a first LSR generates a data packet label in which a port serial number is encoded and sends the label to a preceding LSR. Subsequently, the preceding LSR sends a data packet to the proper subport for processing. The process is then repeated in sending the data packet from the first LSR to a second LSR.” Pet. Reply 4 (citations omitted). “This technique just as easily could have been implemented to identify a single physical tunnel port through which a data packet in a first router or switch would be communicated to a second router or switch via a LAG.” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1006, 2:23–25, 7:7–16, 7:22–26, 11:3–29, Fig. 5; Ex. 1021 ¶ 18). Again, these arguments were not made in the Petition (see Pet. 22–25), and Petitioner’s assertions that Raz’s teachings “just as easily could have been implemented” in the manner claimed is improper hindsight and inconsistent with the fundamental differences between Raz’s multiplexing within an LSR and the claimed link aggregation and port assignment between MPLS/LAG switches.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “[c]laims 1–13, 15–24 and 26 set forth above in Ground 1.” Pet. 52. Further, Petitioner states that “[f]or independent [c]laims 1, 15, and 26, Ferguson builds on the previous analysis of Raz by disclosing a system for communicating packets between switches and routers in an MPLS network.” Pet. 52; see Pet. 52–55. Critically, though, Petitioner does not specifically explain how the combined teachings of Raz and Ferguson would satisfy individual claim elements. Among other problems with Petitioner’s proposed combination, Petitioner does not adequately explain how or why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references to include the claimed port assignment and packet labeling for transmission of a packet from a preceding node and then between a first and second MPLS switch. See Pet. 56–59. Instead, Petitioner generally advocates for the combination of Raz and Ferguson, arguing for example that “both Raz and Ferguson are directed to solving the problem of ensuring enough bandwidth is available to communicate high-speed packet streams through an MPLS network.” Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1006, 10:60–11:12, 14:33–41, 15:47–55, 17:1–9, Fig. 5; Ex. 1007, 1:28–42, 2:54–57, 4:55–60; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 247–249). Further, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill “would have understood from the disclosures in Ferguson that techniques for utilizing an Ethernet physical data port in a LAG to communication data packets between routers or switches in an MPLS network are also applicable to the use of subports transmitting the data packets within the routers or switches, and vice versa.” Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 250; Ex. 1007, 5:61–6:6); see Pet. 56–59; Pet. Reply 20. But Petitioner does not adequately explain how the proposed combination of Raz and Ferguson would cure the deficiencies addressed above in Petitioner’s analysis of Raz for Ground 1. Among other problems, none of Petitioner’s arguments adequately address port assignment and labeling in the proposed combination, much less adequately explain why the proposed combination would satisfy the challenged claims. See Pet. 55–56. As Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teachings of Raz and Ferguson might be combined to cure the deficiencies addressed above, we additionally determine Petitioner’s arguments and evidence advanced for the combination of Raz and Ferguson do not establish obviousness by a preponderance of the evidence for any of claims 1–26.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 9,118,602 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,118,602

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.