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  • PTAB · May 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01178 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Bio-Rad’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because the petition relied on Saxonov material not shown to be prior art and could not be supplemented on rehearing.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Such an approach is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s statements that in an inter partes review, “the petitioner is master of its complaint,” and “the petition [is] the centerpiece of the proceeding.” SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 363, 369 (2020). “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). In contravention of these principles, Petitioner’s approach improperly shifts the onus to Patent Owner or the Board to identify and parse out erroneous, and purportedly non-essential, citations to Saxonov and piece together an argument based on the remaining citations. As we stated in the Decision, we decline to assume this task. See Dec. 20. Finally, in the Request, Petitioner attempts to “show[] how Ground 6 is fully supported by undisputed prior art material.” Req. 6. This attempt is improper. Petitioner cannot use the Request as a means to supplement the Petition to identify purportedly essential citations and disavow erroneous or non-essential citations.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “In the Decision, we determined that Petitioner had not shown that all of the portions of Saxonov that Petitioner relied on in its unpatentability arguments qualify as prior art to the challenged claims. See Dec. 17–24. On this basis, we found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’170 patent.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,770,170
  • PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01360 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Cargill’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1, 6–9, and 11–24 because the petition did not show a reason to combine the selected prior-art data without hindsight.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Upon request for rehearing, we assess a decision on institution “for an abuse of discretion” (37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2020)), which occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law,” “clearly erroneous factual findings,” or “a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2020). The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence. We have reviewed Petitioner’s Rehearing Request and carefully considered all the arguments presented. For the following reasons, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “As discussed in the Decision, “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). No matter the result of combining the allegedly “readily available and well-known” information taken from particular examples from the “documentary evidence” with Petrauskaite’s disclosure, a POSITA had to have been motivated to do so at the time the invention was made.1 What is missing from the Petition is the “why.” The only motivating force in this case appears to be hindsight spurring Petitioner on to choose particular examples of palm stearin disclosed in Deffense and the soybean oil in Neff in order to justify its assertion that Petrauskaite discloses the claimed wt% ranges of triglyceride classes.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). No matter the result of combining the allegedly “readily available and well-known” information taken from particular examples from the “documentary evidence” with Petrauskaite’s disclosure, a POSITA had to have been motivated to do so at the time the invention was made.1 What is missing from the Petition is the “why.” The only motivating force in this case appears to be hindsight spurring Petitioner on to choose particular examples of palm stearin disclosed in Deffense and the soybean oil in Neff in order to justify its assertion that Petrauskaite discloses the claimed wt% ranges of triglyceride classes.” slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner’s. We find no instance in the Petition in which “motivation” and “iodine value” are discussed together or linked in any way. The same can be said of Dr. Marangoni’s declaration. And, as noted in the Decision, it was not until the Preliminary Reply that Petitioner argued that specific data on fatty acid wt% used for the conversion calculations were selected to represent “knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art” due to similarity of the iodine value (“IV”) of the palm stearin (and soybean oil) disclosed in Petrauskaite. See Prelim. Reply 2–3. New evidence or argument in the Preliminary Reply that could have presented earlier is not permitted. On this record, we find Petitioner relies its Rehearing Request on arguments about a motivation to combine, stemming from the significance of iodine values, that were not raised in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to support that the Decision misapprehended or overlooked arguments in the Petition about the significance of iodine values.” slip op. at 8

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,645,473
  • PTAB · Aug 26, 2021 · IPR2019-01603 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied EnergySource’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked or misapprehended arguments or evidence that warranted changing the final written decision on claims 1–18.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “In that regard, Petitioner contends that Christopher’s “aging process resulted in a reduction in ‘at least one elemental component’ (i.e., silica).” Pet. Reply 5–6 (emphasis added). However, this is not buttressed with any evidence. Petitioner has not presented any evidence showing Christopher’s “aging” process reduces “the concentration of at least one … elemental component” to support its contention that Christopher’s brine of Table 1 is a “treated” brine as claimed. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner has not shown that the “treated” brine of the claims reads on Christopher’s “aged” brine by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable

      “The Petition discusses Grounds I and II on pages 27–30 of the Petition. Ground I challenges the patentability of claims 1–20 as anticipated by Christopher and Ground II challenges the patentability of claims 1–20 as anticipated and/or obvious over Christopher. Reading pages 27–30 it is plainly evident that it is focused on making the case that Christopher discloses all that is claimed. It is devoid of any reasoning with respect to the obviousness of the claims over Christopher. The Graham factors are not addressed. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The differences between the claimed invention and Christopher are not identified and no rationale as to why one of ordinary skill would have been led to modify Christopher to reach the claimed subject matter is provided. Rather, the entire discussion goes to explaining why, in fact, Christopher discloses all that is claimed. The Board was consistent with that position. Petitioner cites page 12–14 of the Reply as evidence that an obviousness challenge was presented. We disagree. The Reply does not add anything significant to the obviousness challenge presented in the Petition. The Reply is likewise devoid of any reasoning with respect to the obviousness of the claims over Christopher. It repeats that “Christopher teaches using air oxidation and pH modification to selectively precipitate silica, iron, and other heavy metals from a Salton Sea geothermal brine” (Reply 13, emphasis added), where “a POSITA could readily ‘tune’ these parameters to produce the desired results if such were not obtained immediately.” Id. The Board addressed that argument. See Dec. 17.” slip op. at 14

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “Petitioner cites footnote 3 [sic. 1] in the Petition but it merely states “mg/kg=(g/L*1000)/1.18kg/L due to the density of Salton Sea geothermal brines.” There is no evidence cited to support it. Petitioner cites “Reply, 3; Ex. 2025, 337:5-9” and “337:5-13” (Req. 6) but the Reply does not cite to those lines in Dr. Gallup’s Declaration. See Pet. Reply 3 (“Ex. 2025, 336:3-5-337:2”). We were unable to locate these lines of testimony in the Reply. The Board could not have misapprehended or overlooked evidence demonstrating Petitioner’s 1.18 kg/L density that was not before it.” slip op. at 11

    § 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,644,126
  • PTAB · Aug 26, 2021 · IPR2019-01602 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied EnergySource Minerals’ rehearing request, leaving undisturbed the final written decision that claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable on any asserted ground.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “to ppm by weight” (Req. 8) was not before us, therefore, we could not have overlooked it. Nevertheless, even if we take account of this new argument, the discussion on page 4 of the Reply does not support Petitioner’s position that one ordinary skill in the art reading Christopher would have no other choice but to understand “1.0” “PPM” (Ex. 1006, 42) to mean parts–per– weight. This is so because Petitioner concedes that “ppm can generally be reported as either by weight or by volume.” Req. 8. This is consistent with Dr. Gallup’s testimony. See Dec. 18: According to Patent Owner, “Dr. Gallup explained [that] ppm may be reported as ppm by weight or ppm by volume. (Ex. 2025, 119:16-25; Ex. 2002, ¶64).” Id. [PO Resp. 20] Because we are directed to no evidence contradicting it, we credit Dr. Gallup’s testimony that ppm can be reported by weight or by volume. Given this, one of ordinary skill in the art reading that iron is at a concentration of “1.0 ppm” for stream 3 in Figure 20 may understand it to refer to ppm by volume. Notwithstanding the discussion on page 4 of the Reply that the “general convention” for ppm is that it is weight based, the evidence before us showed, as Petitioner concedes, that ppm can “generally be reported” (Req. 8) by weight or volume. Thus, as we determined, it is possible that one of ordinary skill in the art may understand “ppm” in Figure 20 to “refer to ppm by volume” (Dec. 18).” slip op. at 12

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther

      “Regarding Petitioner’s assertion that “[d]uring these proceedings, Petitioner has submitted that when Christopher reduces silica, it necessarily also reduces the elemental components of silicon (Si) and oxygen (O2)” (Req. Sur–Reply 1), this is not a position that Petitioner had previously taken. Rather, Petitioner’s position was only that “Christopher states the silica concentration is reduced.” Pet. 23; cf. Pet. Reply 8–9. A rehearing request is not an opportunity to raise new arguments. We could not have overlooked or misapprehended an argument not raised prior to our decision.” slip op. at 6

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “brine (Pet. 22; Dec. 7), Petitioner had to show that “the brine of Table 1 must ‘have been processed such that the concentration of at least one metal or elemental component has been reduced in the brine.’ Ex. 1001, 7:18–21.” Dec. 9 (emphasis added). As noted in our Decision: In that regard, Petitioner contends that Christopher’s “aging process resulted in a reduction in ‘at least one elemental component’ (i.e., silica).” Pet. Reply 6 (emphasis added). However, this is not buttressed with any evidence. Petitioner has not presented any evidence showing Christopher’s “aging” process reduces “the concentration of at least one … elemental component” to support its contention that Christopher’s brine of Table 1 is a “treated” brine as claimed. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner has not shown that the “treated” brine of the claims reads on Christopher’s “aged” brine by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 5

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,650,555
  • PTAB · Jun 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00013 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, finding its new arguments untimely and unpersuasive as to the aerosol outlet limitation for claims 1–19.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in a petition. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked matters or arguments that were not asserted in the Petition. We deny the Rehearing Request because it is based on new arguments that Petitioner did not present in the Petition. B. Petitioner’s Arguments Are Unpersuasive Alternatively, even if we consider the new arguments raised for the first time in the Rehearing Request, we find none persuasive to show reversible error in the Decision. The ’767 patent describes and claims “a cap assembly” that is characterized by three distinct structures, namely, “a cap, a venturi insert, and a base attached together without welds or separate fasteners to define . . . an air outlet chamber” that is “partitioned from the interior of the receptacle by the base.” Ex. 1001, 15:6–13 (claim 1) (emphasis added); see id. at 3:30–43, 9:45–62 (written description).” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

      “The Petition advances three grounds, each of which is based on obviousness and asserts Benalikhoudja1 as a prior art reference. Pet. 5. We found in the Decision, and Petitioner does not dispute in the Rehearing Request, that each ground “depends on Petitioner’s assertion that Benalikhoudja discloses or suggests ‘an aerosol outlet chamber partitioned 1 We refer to US 2006/0237090 A1, published Oct. 26, 2006 (Ex. 1004). from the interior of the receptacle by the base.’” Dec. 5–6. As we did in the Decision, we refer herein to that feature of the claimed invention as “the aerosol outlet limitation.” Id. at 6. Based on the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determined Petitioner did not show sufficiently, for purposes of trial institution, that Benalikhoudja discloses the aerosol outlet limitation. Id. at 9–10. Petitioner argues we erred on that point. Req. Reh’g 1–6.” slip op. at 3

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,480,767
  • PTAB · Mar 4, 2021 · IPR2020-01074 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the follow-on petition under General Plastic.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “When resolving a rehearing request, the Board reviews a decision on institution “for an abuse of discretion” (37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019)), which occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law,” “clearly erroneous factual findings,” or “a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Applying that standard, we deny the Rehearing Request.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for patent owner

      “Accordingly, the Board found, “Standing alone, the sheer number of petitions (five), taken together with Petitioner’s unexplained and significant delay in filing the four follow-on petitions, supports an exercise of our discretionary denial powers.” Dec. 4. The Board supported that finding by an analysis of the factors that bear on the discretionary denial inquiry as set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential) (“General Plastic”). Dec. 4–10 (applying the General Plastic factors).” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,690,330
  • PTAB · Feb 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00911 · APJ Amber L Hagy · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution on claims 1–20 because the petition did not sufficiently show the asserted combinations taught or suggested the claimed limitations.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id. Upon a request for rehearing, the 1 Huber et al., U.S. Patent No. 7,414,779 B2, issued August 19, 2008 (Ex. 1008, “Huber”). 2 Everett et al., U.S. Patent No. 7,365,856 B2, issued April 29, 2008 (Ex. 1009, “Everett”). 3 F. Lexer, C.K. Hitzenberger, A.F. Fercher, M. Kulhavy, “Wavelength-tuning interferometry of intraocular distances,” Appl. Optics, vol. 36, pp. 6548–6553 (Sept. 1, 1997) (Ex. 1006, “Lexer”). 4 W. Drexler and J. Fujimoto, eds., Optical Coherence Tomography – Technology and Applications, ISBN 978-3-540-77549-2, Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (2008) (Ex. 1010, “Drexler”). decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “added). The Decision did not, however, fault Petitioner in this manner. Rather, in the Decision, we appropriately focused on the crux of Petitioner’s argument; namely that, although Huber does not disclose an output power (which Petitioner converts to the claimed photon flux) within the claimed range, one of ordinary skill would have been motivated by Everett to use Huber’s laser on eyes, and that such use would have motivated the ordinarily skilled artisan to (in Petitioner’s words) “reduce the photon flux of the Huber laser” to achieve the claimed range “or any other ranges needed to prevent tissue damage and optimize signal strength.” Decision 20 (quoting Pet. 42). As we also noted in the Decision, the only support provided in the Petition for these assertions is a blanket citation to nearly a dozen paragraphs (spanning six pages) primarily consisting of background technical discussion from Dr. Brennan’s Declaration. Decision 20; see Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 76–85, 185). In that technical background, Dr. Brennan purportedly explains how and why “optimal optical power” may be set and selected generally in systems employing lasers. See Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 76–85. But, as we pointed out in the Decision, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Brennan tied any of this analysis to the prior art of record or otherwise explained the conclusory assertion made in the Petition (and echoed by Dr. Brennan) that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of Huber, Everett, and Lexer to apply photon flux within the claimed range for measurement of eyes. Decision 20; see Pet. 41–42; Ex. 1012 ¶ 185.” slip op. at 6

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “‘output-power is greater than 10 mW,” which Petitioner converted to a photon flux of “a photon flux of 6.6 * 1016 photons per second.”). Both the Petition and the Request are based on a theory of overlapping ranges, but fail to show the factual basis for the application of that theory. The Decision correctly determined that the Petition fails to show that Huber discloses a range of photon flux that overlaps the claimed range.” slip op. at 5

    • Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner

      “added). The Decision did not, however, fault Petitioner in this manner. Rather, in the Decision, we appropriately focused on the crux of Petitioner’s argument; namely that, although Huber does not disclose an output power (which Petitioner converts to the claimed photon flux) within the claimed range, one of ordinary skill would have been motivated by Everett to use Huber’s laser on eyes, and that such use would have motivated the ordinarily skilled artisan to (in Petitioner’s words) “reduce the photon flux of the Huber laser” to achieve the claimed range “or any other ranges needed to prevent tissue damage and optimize signal strength.” Decision 20 (quoting Pet. 42). As we also noted in the Decision, the only support provided in the Petition for these assertions is a blanket citation to nearly a dozen paragraphs (spanning six pages) primarily consisting of background technical discussion from Dr. Brennan’s Declaration. Decision 20; see Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 76–85, 185). In that technical background, Dr. Brennan purportedly explains how and why “optimal optical power” may be set and selected generally in systems employing lasers. See Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 76–85. But, as we pointed out in the Decision, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Brennan tied any of this analysis to the prior art of record or otherwise explained the conclusory assertion made in the Petition (and echoed by Dr. Brennan) that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of Huber, Everett, and Lexer to apply photon flux within the claimed range for measurement of eyes. Decision 20; see Pet. 41–42; Ex. 1012 ¶ 185.” slip op. at 6

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,044,164
  • PTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2019-00003 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that claims 1–14 are unpatentable.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “public accessibility, . . . . which involves examining the evidence for proof that each non-patent reference was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Req. Reh’g 3 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We do not agree. On the contrary, we addressed with particularity the substantial evidence tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 12. Specifically, in our Decision, we properly credited indicia on the face of Petitioner’s References, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Using Varenna 2012 as an example, those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including the statement “Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 15–16 (quoting Ex. 1005). In the same manner, the totality of evidence supports our finding that each of Petitioner’s References was publicly available prior to the critical date of the invention. Id. at 15– 18.” slip op. at 3

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “public accessibility, . . . . which involves examining the evidence for proof that each non-patent reference was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Req. Reh’g 3 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We do not agree. On the contrary, we addressed with particularity the substantial evidence tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 12. Specifically, in our Decision, we properly credited indicia on the face of Petitioner’s References, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Using Varenna 2012 as an example, those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including the statement “Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 15–16 (quoting Ex. 1005). In the same manner, the totality of evidence supports our finding that each of Petitioner’s References was publicly available prior to the critical date of the invention. Id. at 15– 18.” slip op. at 3

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,867,839
  • PTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2018-00092 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving unpatentable claims 1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-18, 23-25, and 27-29 based on Varenna 2012 anticipation.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “acknowledged Acceleration Bay and addressed with particularity the evidence of record tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 15. Specifically, in our Decision, we credited indicia on the face of Verrena 2012, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including “the statement ‘Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,’” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 17 (quoting Ex. 1005). Patent Owner advanced no” slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

      “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions and note that we addressed these same arguments in our Order denying Patent Owner’s motion to strike. Paper 24; see also Paper 13, 1 (Patent Owner contending that “Exhibit 1044 and related argument are new evidence and argument regarding the alleged accessibility of Varenna 2012 (Ex. 1005) that Petitioner could have submitted with the Petition, but chose not to.”). Rather than pointing out any matters that the panel misapprehended or overlooked, Patent Owner expresses disagreement with that decision, and attempts to offer additional reasoning and argument not advanced during trial. Req. Reh’g, 12–15. That effort is ineffective to establish reversible error. Furthermore, in our Final Written Decision, we noted that Even if we set aside Dr. Robinson’s Declaration, . . . we are persuaded that the indicia of publication on the face of Varenna 2012 are sufficient to establish that Varenna 2012 was “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” and “disseminated or otherwise made available” to the interested public before the critical date, and consequently, a printed publication. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Dec. 19 n.4. For that reason also, Patent Owner shows no reversible error in our Final Written Decision holding that Dr. Robinson’s testimony bolsters” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,820,999
  • PTAB · Nov 6, 2020 · IPR2019-01601 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and maintained denial of institution for claims 9–16, finding the petition insufficient on anticipation by Maimoni and Jost and related obviousness grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “the pH to an adjusted level of between 4.5 and 6.5. All that Dr. Gallup testifies to is that the “[g]iven the pH of the feed brine [i.e., between 5.2 and 6.1 (Table 1) or 5.6 (Table 2). EX 1004, at 9-10], pH values [as claimed] occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide.” Id. As we stated in the Decision, we do not see how this statement is anything but a “conclusory assertion[ ] backed up by no objective evidence, such as experimental results establishing the adjusted pH of Maimoni’s geothermal brine.” Dec. 24. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in our conclusion that “Petitioner insufficiently establishes that Maimoni anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim 9 step of ‘maintaining the pH of the geothermal brine solution at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5.’” (Dec. 26) based on reason (1); that is, Petitioner’s apparent inherency argument made in the Petition, as well as the Gallup Declaration upon which the argument relied, were inadequate (Dec. 21–25).” slip op. at 6

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “[u]nder these circumstances, where Jost raises the possibility of forming iron (III) hydroxide, while raising a doubt that iron (III) hydroxide even exists – we find that Jost does not describe, expressly or inherently, oxidizing to iron (III) hydroxide as claimed. At best, Jost is ambiguous about oxidizing to iron (III) hydroxide. But ambiguous references do not, as a matter of law, anticipate a claim See Wasica Finance GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (“Anticipation requires that a single reference ‘describe the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.’ Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). For this reason, it has long been understood that ambiguous references do not, as a matter of law, anticipate a claim. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (refusing to find claims anticipated when the prior art references were ‘unacceptably vague’); see also In re Hughes, 52 CCPA 1355, 345 F.2d 184, 188 (1965); In re Turlay, 49 CCPA 1288, 304 F.2d 893, 899 (1962) (‘It is well established that an anticipation rejection cannot be predicated on an ambiguous reference.’)”). Because Jost discloses only the possibility of iron (III) hydroxide and no other evidence has been provided to show that Jost nevertheless necessarily oxidizes to iron (III) hydroxide as claimed, based on the information, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Jost reference anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim step of “oxidizing the iron (II) salt to iron (III) hydroxide.” “Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “an explanation as to how “the Hazen process discussed by Maimoni describes a step of maintaining and controlling the pH of the geothermal brine at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5, as required by Claim 9” (Pet. 44). But “[t]here is no explanation” (Dec. 24). We reproduced ¶ 162 of the Gallup Declaration in the Decision (see Dec. 23–24), which states in full that The step in the Hazen process of sparging the brine with air (Stream 6) in the iron reactor will reduce the pH. The reduction of the pH is offset by the introduction of calcium hydroxide (Stream 5) to the iron reactor. In my opinion, the Hazen process discussed by Maimoni describes a step of maintaining and controlling the pH of the geothermal brine at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5. Given the pH of the feed brine, these pH values occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide. We did not and still do not see Dr. Gallup providing any meaningful explanation as to why the steps of sparging and the addition of calcium hydroxide per the Hazen process set forth in Maimoni necessarily maintains the pH to an adjusted level of between 4.5 and 6.5. All that Dr. Gallup testifies to is that the “[g]iven the pH of the feed brine [i.e., between 5.2 and 6.1 (Table 1) or 5.6 (Table 2). EX 1004, at 9-10], pH values [as claimed] occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide.” Id. As we stated in the Decision, we do not see how this statement is anything but a “conclusory assertion[ ] backed up by no objective evidence, such as experimental results establishing the adjusted pH of Maimoni’s geothermal brine.” Dec. 24. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in our conclusion that “Petitioner insufficiently establishes that Maimoni anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim 9 step of ‘maintaining the pH of the geothermal brine solution at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5.’” (Dec. 26) based on reason (1); that is, Petitioner’s apparent inherency argument made in the Petition, as well as the Gallup Declaration upon which the argument relied, were inadequate (Dec. 21–25).” slip op. at 5

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 9,051,827
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