• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00117 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–9, 11–16, 18, and 19 as obvious over Kim; claims 10 and 17 as obvious over Kim and Fang, Park, and Park and Fang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 7. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed 4 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 103; PO Resp. the ’711 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that “on a surface” should be interpreted in line with the definition of “on” set forth in the ’711 patent. Ex. 1001, 4:1–6. We particularly note that the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ . . . should be interpreted in the broadest manner” and that “on” is not limited to “directly on.” Id. Instead, the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ also includes the meaning of ‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Id. Patent Owner agrees that this definition controls the “standalone ‘on’” term such that A may be on B even if there is an intervening layer between them. Tr. 55:8–11 (“The standalone ‘on,’ we agree in the context of the patent, you can have intervening layers. I think the patent is clear about that.”). Claim 14 recites that the etch-stop layer is “on” something; i.e., “on a side surface and a top surface of each step.” Ex. 1001, 16:20–22. Patent Owner agrees that a surface is a “something.” Tr. 56:5–8 (“surface obviously is a something”). Substituting the “a “‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween” results in claim 14 reading as, “on a surface with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Unlike “directly on,” which specifies the relation between two things, “a surface” may merely indicate the thing that something is “on,” particularly when “on” is “interpreted in the broadest manner” as expressly required by the ’711 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Although Dr. Campbell testified in his deposition in response to Petitioner’s counsel that “on the surface” requires direct contact with the surface, his interpretation was based on “embodiments of” the patent rather than a general understanding of a person skilled in the art confronted with that term. Ex. 1027, 122:6–25, 124:6–23 (“I’m not sure if there are other sources for that, but it was on the ’711, so I’ve taken it there.”). Dr. Campbell, upon questioning from Patent Owner’s counsel, later stated that “an expert in semiconductor fabrication” would understand “on the surface” to mean “contact between one layer and another . . . with nothing in between.” Id. at 146:25–147:6. However, Dr. Campbell did not explain why such an interpretation is particular to the semiconductor fabrication art, or provide other explanation or support for this statement, which is in tension with the definition of “on” in the ’711 patent. Accordingly, we significantly discount the weight accorded to that statement. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (stating, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court. Similarly, a court should discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and patent.’”). On balance, Dr. Campbell’s testimony is best understood as a description of certain Figures of the ’711 patent rather than a representation of an ordinarily skilled person’s understanding of the term “on the surface.” See Ex. 2009 ¶ 47 (describing Figs. 1, 3, and 4 as depicting layers in contact with the underlying layer or substrate). For example, Dr. Campbell describes Figure 9A as having a barrier layer “on and directly contacting the top and side surfaces of each step.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added) (citing inter alia Ex. 1001, 7:6–67). Dr. Campbell does not explain why, beyond the fact that many Figures show layers as adjacent and in contact, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would understand those Figures to limit the claim language rather than illustrating particular embodiments that fall within a broader scope of claims 14 and 15. See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specifications into the claims.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Kim’s first and second section are described as compatible, not mutually exclusive, embodiments. Kim’s second section builds further layers upon the structure of its first section, and states: In these embodiments, the same elements as in the embodiments previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B will be denoted by the same reference numbers therein, and for concise description, overlapping description of elements previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B may be omitted. Ex. 1005 ¶ 184 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that only the embodiments in Figures 17A–22B describe an etch-stop layer and a barrier layer (as claimed), and that the language cited for a gate-stack-on-top configuration (e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 90, 91, and 240) is “conspicuously absent from the description of Figures 17A–22B.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 36). However, Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4 through 15 embodiments. While Figures 17A–22B show a gate-stack-on-bottom configuration, this merely continues the gate-stack-on-bottom illustrations that were used in all of the previous Figures, even for those in which it is undisputed that a gate-stack-on-top configuration is a described alternative. The Figures exemplify rather than limit the description of the gate-stack-on-bottom view in Figures 4–15 and do not exclude the gate-stack on bottom description of the embodiments exemplified by those figures.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,672,711 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,672,711
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00186 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chang and Jin; the Board found the combination disclosed the claimed isolation portion and supported the challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp; Sur-reply. In light of the complete trial record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’104 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’104 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, we give claim terms “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 23. And, Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that an express claim construction is not necessary for us to render a decision in this matter, we do not construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “edge and offers little explanation of why the skilled artisan would apply Jin’s gap- T isolation region to both of Feldmann’s polysilicon and tunnel oxide layers. As noted above, Petitioner states that the skilled artisan would have included Jin’s gap-T isolation region in order to prevent shorting. Pet. 25. Petitioner’s reasoning is questionable—supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Banerjee. Dr. Banerjee’s testimony offers no more evidentiary support than provided in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 113, with Pet. 25. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. We acknowledge Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that the combination of Jin’s gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 113 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (referring to Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 149–151). Moreover, Dr. Peckerar testifies that “Dr. Banerjee also appears to be arguing that incorporation of impurities into the oxide will produce a MOSFET-like structure, with the contaminated oxide acting as a MOS gate leading to enhanced leakage,” but, for that to occur, “the source and drain areas would need to be of the same type.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Here however, “the tunnel oxide layer is located between an n-type polysilicon layer and p-type frontside emitter layer” so “[n]o MOSFET-like structure can form because the source and drain are of different types.” Ex. 2001” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight. “The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.” Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on a combination of elements disclosed in the prior art, the [Petitioner] must articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention.” Id. Impermissible hindsight is inferred when the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art that would motivate one (with no knowledge of the claimed invention) to make the proposed combination has not been explained. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,722,104 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,722,104
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01451 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable: Larson did not establish the claimed detection in a single sample volume, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the deficiencies.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR proceeding, PO does not contest Petitioner’s description of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) set forth [above].” PO Resp. 23. In view of the above, and because Petitioner’s uncontested description of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’921 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this Decision, except that we replace the phrase “at least a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection” with “around a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added).13” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We begin with “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim,” which can be “highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 recites that the claimed assay is “capable of unambiguously detecting the presence or absence of each of said at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, in a single sample volume, . . . wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample 15 In this regard, we note that Petitioner’s claim construction position is not predicated on the collection of droplets being reconstituted into its original, pre-partition form prior to amplification; rather, the droplets remain compartmentalized from each other in the PCR thermal cycling tube. Tr. 65:21–66:9 (Petitioner’s counsel explaining that the droplets do not combine in the PCR thermal cycling tube but, rather, are “suspended in an immiscible fluid and analyzed en masse”). indicates that the first instance of single sample volume, i.e., the single sample volume in which the presence or absence of each M analytes are to be detected, is the antecedent basis for the second instance of “single sample volume,” i.e., the single sample volume in which the analytes are amplified. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, the single sample volume in which amplification takes places must be the same single sample volume in which the presence or absence of analytes are to be detected. We are not persuaded that, when accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a single sample volume divided into a collection of droplets would be considered the “same” single sample volume prior to its partition.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “With respect to the limitation, “wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample volume,” Petitioner asserts that “Larson discloses PCR assays that amplify target polynucleotide in a single sample volume, specifically a portion of the reaction mixture that is subsequently partitioned into droplets.” Pet. 31 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the amplification of the analytes in Larson occurs in the droplets. Larson ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that “[d]igital PCR (dPCR) is an alternative quantitation method in which dilute sample are divided into many separate reactions” and that “[t]he template is amplified in the droplet for detection”) (emphasis added). Because the claims require that amplification of the analytes be in the same sample volume in which the at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, is unambiguously detected, and because the pre-partition single sample volume is not the same single sample volume as the collection of droplets after partition under our claim construction set forth above, we find Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–10 and 13–19 are anticipated by Larson.17 Tr. 68:12–69:14 (Petitioner’s counsel” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Petitioner that Larson contemplates scenarios in which droplets may contain more than one target molecule and does not require the exclusion of such multiple occupancy droplets in all embodiments, we are nevertheless not persuaded Petitioner has shown, based on a preponderance of evidence, that Larson renders obvious an assay capable of unambiguously detecting, in such multiple occupancy droplets, the presence or absence of each of at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, when M is greater than F and F is at least 2.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,827,921 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,827,921
• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-01296 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–46 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Chang, Fang, Yuen, Khalil, Park, and Chen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that before the effective filing date of the claimed invention a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment” and that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s cited testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “[parent application to the application that matured into the ’380 patent], the Examiner construed the term ‘self-contained, in-bra wearable device’ to mean ‘complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290) (emphasis omitted). According to Petitioner, “PO did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner also states that “[o]ther terms of the Challenged Claims should receive their plain and ordinary meaning, and no formal claim constructions are necessary in this proceeding because ‘claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Id. (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 69–70). Again, because Patent Owner did not file a Response, we exercise our discretion and look to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. We note that in the Preliminary Response Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, no claim terms require construction to resolve the prior art grounds raised in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 19. According to specific construction, any such terms should be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning in light of the specification.” Id. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). There are no claim terms in controversy. Accordingly, we need not construe any terms for our analysis.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner contends (Pet. 17) that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to implement Chang’s breast pump device as suggested by Fang” to achieve four benefits: (1) “to facilitate convenient cleaning and maintenance” (Pet. 19 (citing Ex, 1003 ¶ 102)); (2) “to facilitate more rapid assembly and disassembly (e.g., during use)” (id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 105)); (3) “as a particularly effective and suitable option to generate negative” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “a breast pump device having “a diaphragm pump that generates negative air pressure.” Pet. 33; see also id. at 38. Petitioner explains Chang’s pump “generates suction by cyclical compression and decompression of a conduit or flex-tube, and expressly notes that other configurations were known and suitable.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 25, 28, 68, 79, 84–86). Chang, however, does not mention, specifically, that Chang’s pump is a “diaphragm” pump. We note, however, that this claim clause does not state or require any specific type of pump. It merely requires a “pump.” Clause 1[e]/29[e], discussed below, however, does require a “diaphragm” pump. Petitioner here merely lays the foundation for this later clause by asserting that “Fang provides a straightforward suggestion of a diaphragm pump including a diaphragm housing component formed in a wall of the pump housing.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 24–25, Fig. 7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 97). Thus, Petitioner asserts, Fang teaches “an ‘air pump’ in pneumatic connection with the diaphragm that serves to generate negative air pressure,” and Chang teaches “the location of pump components (e.g., ‘motor’ [46]).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 72, 80, Fig, 6A; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 19, 24). Petitioner then asserts that “the ‘air pump’ components of the combined device are positioned within the pump housing,” and the air pump is powered by Chang’s rechargeable battery. Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 72, 80).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 11,413,380 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,413,380
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00911 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 10 was not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Toyama because the challenge did not remedy the deficiencies in its nonobvious base claim 8.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’806 patent, and we adopt it for purposes definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In our Decision on Institution, we noted that the parties disputed construction of “each local contact” found in dependent claim 10, and “dielectric structure” recited in independent claim 8. Inst. Dec. 8–9. We determine that no express construction of “each local contact” recited in claim 10, or any other claim term, is required to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “independent claim 8 would have been obvious for the reasons set forth in its petition in the 791-IPR. See id. at 1 (stating the present Petition maintains the same grounds set forth in IPR2024-00791). As explained in our Final Written Decision (Ex. 3001) in the 791-IPR issued concurrently, Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 8 would have been obvious over Toyama under any of Petitioner’s three alternative arguments. None of Petitioner’s arguments set forth in the present Petition, including the arguments directed to claim 10, remedy the deficiencies regarding its base claim 8. See Pet. 53–31, 98–101, 124–125; see also Reply. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Final Written Decision in the 791-IPR issued concurrently, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 8, and therefore dependent claim 10, would have been obvious over Toyama. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Dependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”); Ex. 3001.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyNot reached

    “Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Jack C. Lee, Ph. D. (Ex. 1003) and the Reply Declaration of Jack C. Lee, Ph.D. (Ex. 1043) in support of its 2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), revised 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’806 patent has an effective filing date after March 16, 2013 (Ex. 1001, codes (22), (63)), we refer to the AIA version of Sections 102 and 103. 3 Toyama, US Pub. No. 2017/0179026 A1, published June 22, 2017 (Ex. 1005). 4 Petitioner characterizes its alternative arguments of unpatentability of claim 10 as based on three “grounds.” See Pet. 15. Because each of Petitioner’s arguments are based on the same reference, albeit different embodiments, we characterize Petitioner’s challenges as three alternative arguments based on a single ground because each argument relies on the same reference. Ph.D. (Ex. 2005). Transcripts of the depositions of Dr. Lee (Exs. 2006, 2010) and of Dr. Yang (Ex. 1044) have also been submitted into the record.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,937,806 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,937,806
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00909 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Toyama, based on the First Exemplary Structure and, for some limitations, the Second Modification.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND 2 We apply AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 to the ’378 patent because it was filed after, and never claimed the benefit of an effective filing date before, March 16, 2013. Petitioner also applies AIA §§ 102 and 103. See Pet. 2, 24–26. 3 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 104; PO Resp. experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about semiconductor manufacturing and 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not object to such a definition. PO Resp. 13. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the Specification of the ’378 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner asserts that only the term “a staircase structure in the alternating layer” should be construed, and that the term should be construed as “a staircase structure in the alternating layer stack.” Pet. 32–33. Patent Owner does not dispute this construction, and our determination would be unaffected by Petitioner’s proposed construction. Therefore, we need not provide an express construction of this term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Petitioner asserted that all other terms should receive their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 33.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither the language of claim 15 nor the Specification indicates a narrower meaning, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning. Patent Owner argues that the plain meaning of “with” is “having” or “inclusive of.” PO Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1038, 8). Citing the same dictionary, Petitioner argues that the plain meaning of “with” includes objects that are separate. Pet. Reply 3 (stating, “In the sentence ‘Alice went to school with Bob,’ it would be nonsensical to interpret that to mean that Bob is part of Alice.”) (citing Ex. 1038, 7). The cited definition of “with” states that it may indicate “accompaniment,” such as “went there [with] her,” as well as combination (“milk [with] honey”). Ex. 1038, 7. Based on the evidence and arguments presented, we determine that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning, which includes accompaniment (A is accompanied by B) as well as combination (A is part of B, or A and B are a part of C).4” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the lower volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the isolation structure and the upper volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the dielectric structure. First, the structure may be the same material; i.e., SiO2. Ex. 1001, 10:37–40 (isolation structure 233 filled with SiO2), 10:46–47 (dielectric structure can include SiO2, and can include the same material as dielectric layer 230), 10:12–14 (dielectric layer 230 is formed of SiO2). Second, the ’378 patent indicates that the dielectric structure may be “aligned to” and “in contact with” the isolation structure. Id. at 10:30–36. Thus, the two structures of the ’378 patent may appear as two aligned and contacting structures; e.g., a single column of the same material. Third, the ’378 patent specification describes that the dielectric structure and a top portion of the isolation structure may be formed in the same deposition step. When etching the opening 600 that is to be filled with dielectric structure 232, “opening 600 may extend partially into STI structure 233;” i.e., “the etch process used to form opening 600 may also remove (recess) portion of the top surface of STI structure 233.” Id. at 15:12–20; Fig. 6. Then, “opening 600 can be filled with a dielectric layer 702,” which may be the same SiO2 material as the isolation structure, and “[a]s a result, dielectric structure 232 is formed.” Id. at 15:42–54. Thus, the ’378 patent describes a dielectric structure that partially replaces or re-forms, with the same material, its isolation structure. The ’378 patent does not mention whether this results in a dielectric structure that extends into the isolation structure or an isolation structure re-filled to its original height, and it would not appear to matter because both structures may be composed of the same material. The ’378 patent’s indifference to the exact boundary between dielectric structure 232 and isolation structure 233 during formation from the same material indicates that these structures need not be taught by distinct elements. applicable only if the ’378 patent describes that the isolation region and dielectric structure were formed as a single unitary structure. PO Resp. 51; PO Sur-reply 16–18. Retractable Techs. focuses on whether the two elements at issue “could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance,” not whether they were formed integrally. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304 (“The specifications further disclose a method to couple the two structures . . . to allow some diffusion or insipient melting to occur where they touch . . . . This passage suggests that [the structures] could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance”). Retractable Techs. looks to whether the specification suggests that the claim terms require separate structures. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Patent Owner’s focus on whether the claimed structures were disclosed as being separately formed disregards the issue of whether the separately claimed structures require specific methods of forming those structures. Here, as in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the Specification does not indicate any particular structure or function for the structures that results from their separate steps of deposition. Thus, as held in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the two portions of Toyama “need not be two separate parts” to teach two separate claim limitations. Retractable Techs., 635 F.3d at 1303–04. Consequently, we determine that the claim language does not support a requirement that these structures be separate and distinct. Patent Owner’s further arguments are not availing. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, in our “Third” point, supra, we do not state that the isolation structure and the dielectric structure are formed in the same deposition step. PO Resp. 52–53; PO Sur-reply 18; Supra at 34. We only” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,658,378 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,658,378
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00788 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Toyama, Mushiga, and Mushiga with Makala.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further asserts March 16, 2013. Petitioner also applies AIA §§ 102 and 103. See Pet. 2, 24–26. 3 Neither party presented evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness during trial. knowledgeable about semiconductor manufacturing and 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not object to this assessment. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’378 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s construction, asserting that its grounds render obvious this limitation under Patent Owner’s construction propose construction of the term “through array contact,” which was at issue in the Preliminary Response and in the parallel district court proceeding. Id. Nor have the parties indicated, in response to Board inquiry, that any relevant construction has occurred. See Paper 34. with Petitioner that Patent Owner does not dispute this aspect of the “a dielectric structure on the isolation structure” limitation in Petitioner’s assertions based on Toyama. PO Sur-reply 20–21. Patent Owner does dispute that Mushiga’s insulating spacer 586 is “on” the isolation structure. PO Resp. 70–72. However, because Petitioner relies upon a dielectric structure that includes other portions of Mushiga that Patent Owner does not dispute to be on the asserted isolation structure, the dispute is whether Petitioner is correct to include multiple components as part of a single dielectric structure, and not whether spacer 586 is on an isolation structure. Id. Because Petitioner’s assertions and our determination would be unaffected by its proposed construction, we need not construe this term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s citations to the Specification do not support its proposed construction. Patent Owner relies on multiple embodiments, only one of which describes a substrate “with” an isolation structure. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 22:27–28). For example, one of Patent Owner’s cited embodiments recites “on” an isolation region, but Patent Owner specifically argues that the “on” embodiment does not apply to the claimed “with” embodiment. Id. at 22 (denying that “the ‘with’ relationship encompasse[s] the ‘on’ relationship”). Only one of the embodiments cited is clearly within the scope of the “with” claim language, and that embodiment describes no more than the claim language itself. Ex. 1001, 22:27–28. Moreover, Figure 2, cited by Patent Owner, is an illustration “according to some embodiments,” but is not described as depicting all embodiments. Ex. 1001, 3:35–36. These other embodiments need not be included in claim 15’s “with” language because other claims (not at issue in this proceeding) specifically recite language from other embodiments. Ex. 1001, 23:20–21 (“a dielectric structure on an isolation region of the substrate”), 23:58 (“forming an isolation structure on a substrate”). Thus, the specification of the ’378 patent does not limit “a substrate with an isolation structure” in claim 15 to “part of” an isolation structure, such as in a shallow region or other partial-depth portion of the substrate. Because neither the language of claim 15 nor the Specification indicates a narrower meaning, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “a Patent Owner argues that the plain meaning of “with” is “having” or “inclusive of.” PO Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1038, 7). Citing the same dictionary, Petitioner argues that the plain meaning of “with” includes objects that are separate. Pet. Reply 3 (stating, “In the sentence ‘Alice went to school with Bob,’ it would be nonsensical to interpret that to mean that Bob is part of Alice.”) (citing Ex. 1038, 7). The cited definition of “with” states that it may indicate “accompaniment,” such as “went there [with] her,” as well as combination (“milk [with] honey”). Ex. 1038, 7. Based on the evidence and arguments presented, we determine that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning, which includes accompaniment (A is accompanied by B) as well as combination (A is part of B, or A and B are a part of C).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the lower volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the isolation structure and the upper volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the dielectric structure. First, the ’378 patent indicates that both the dielectric structure and the isolation structure may be the same material; i.e., SiO2. Ex. 1001, 10:37–40 (isolation structure 233 filled with SiO2), 10:46–47 (dielectric structure can include SiO2, and can include the same material as dielectric layer 230), 10:12–14 (dielectric layer 230 is formed of SiO2). Second, the ’378 patent indicates that the dielectric structure may be “aligned to” and “in contact with” the isolation structure. Id. at 10:30–36. Thus, the two structures of the ’378 patent may appear as two aligned and contacting structures; e.g., a single column, of the same material. Third, the ’378 patent specification describes that the dielectric structure and a top portion of the isolation structure may be formed in the same deposition step. When etching the opening 600 that is to be filled with dielectric structure 232, “opening 600 may extend partially into STI structure 233;” i.e., “the etch process used to form opening 600 may also remove (recess) portion of the top surface of STI structure 233.” Id. at 15:12–20. Then, “opening 600 can be filled with a dielectric layer 702,” which may be the same SiO2 material as the isolation structure, and “[a]s a result, dielectric structure 232 is formed.” Id. at 15:42–54. Thus, the ’378 patent describes a dielectric structure that partially replaces or re-forms, with the same material, its isolation structure. The ’378 patent does not mention whether this results in a dielectric structure that extends into the isolation structure or an isolation structure re-filled to its original height, and it would material. The ’378 patent’s indifference to the exact boundary between dielectric structure 232 and isolation structure 233 during formation from the same material indicates that these need not be taught by distinct elements. We do not agree with Patent Owner that Retractable Techs. is applicable only if the ’378 patent describes that the isolation region and dielectric structure were formed as a single unitary structure. PO Resp. 50; PO Sur-reply 9. Retractable Techs. focuses on whether the two elements at issue “could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance,” not whether they were formed integrally. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304. (“The specifications further disclose a method to couple the two structures . . . to allow some diffusion or insipient melting to occur where they touch . . . . This passage suggests that [the structures] could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance”). Retractable Techs. looks to whether the specification suggests that the claim terms require separate structures. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Patent Owner’s focus on whether the claimed structures were disclosed as being separately formed disregards the issue of whether the separately claimed structures require specific methods of forming those structures. Here, as in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the Specification does not indicate any particular structure or function for the structures that results from their separate steps of deposition. Thus, as held in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the two portions of Toyama “need not be two separate parts” to teach two separate claim limitations. Retractable Techs., 635 F.3d at 1303– 04. Consequently, we determine that the claim language does not support a requirement that these structures be separate and distinct.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,658,378 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,658,378
• Advancell Pty Ltd. v. Sciencons As And Artbio, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · PGR2025-00040 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35–38 on all petition grounds, finding it more likely than not that Hassfjell-Hoff anticipates at least claim 1.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’437 patent is eligible for post-grant review and that it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’437 patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all challenged claims of the ’437 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 of the ’437 patent. Ex. 2001; Prelim. Resp. 43. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and the Office’s public records, we find that the disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claims 10 and 34 as having never been part of the ’437 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 10 and 34 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35– 38, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted

    “Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’437 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review review of the ’437 patent. See Paper 3. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’437 patent and is responsible for defending the ’437 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, radiopharmaceutical chemistry, nuclear medicine, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1019 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,249,437
• Advancell Pty Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · PGR2025-00029 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–6 and 8–20 on all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “After reviewing the parties’ briefs and supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Hassfjell-Hoff discloses each element of claim 1. As such, Petitioner’s argument and evidence as set forth above and further discussed below, sufficiently shows that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by Hassfjell-Hoff, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, also addressed below.” slip op. at 16

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 7 of the ’603 patent. Ex. 2001. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office public records, we find that the disclaimer of claim 7 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claim 7 as having never been part of the ’603 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claim 7 is outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–6 and 8– 20, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted

    “Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’603 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1; Paper 7, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review proceeding of the ’603 patent. See Papers 3, 4, 7, 8. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’603 patent and is responsible for defending the ’603 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, chemical engineering, physics, nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1017 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition.” slip op. at 10

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,125,603
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00795 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 and 11–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee or Zhao and Lee; the Board did not find claims unpatentable over Zhao or Yang alone.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not object to this assertion. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’822 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “1. Word line pre-pulse signal Patent Owner argues that such a signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa).” PO Resp. 13; PO Sur-Reply 1. Petitioner agrees with this construction. Pet. Reply. 3. Patent Owner further argues that the pre-pulse signal “prepares the word line before the programming step.” PO Resp. 13. We agree that Petitioner applies its teachings with the same understanding of “pre-pulse signal” as Patent Owner. See, e.g., Pet. 38–39 (asserting that Lee teaches, or that that Lee would make obvious, pre-bias signals applied as pulses). Because both parties agree that a pre-pulse signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa),” and apply this construction in their assertions and arguments, no dispute as to the meaning of this phrase exists in a manner that would affect the outcome of this decision. Therefore, we do not need to determine a particular construction. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “with the plain language of the claims, each claim states “disposed.” Patent Owner provides dictionary definitions for “disposed,” which is described as a verb. See, e.g., Ex. 2016, 3. When described as a verb in these definitions, “disposed” is the action of the actor; i.e., “the chief disposed his attendants in a circle” (Ex. 2019, 3); “She disposed of her estate among her heirs” (Ex. 2018, 3); “disposed of the matter efficiently” (Ex. 2017, 3); “troops disposed for withdrawal” (Ex. 2016, 3). Petitioner offers no contrary definition from either the Specification or any extrinsic source for that term. We agree with Patent Owner’s construction of “disposed” as “put in place” or “arranged in a particular position.” Nevertheless, the construction of “disposed” does not resolve the controversy over the language of claims 2, 3, 12, and 13. The claims recite “are disposed.” For example, claim 2 recites, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are disposed in an order of distance from the selected word line.” Under Patent Owner’s construction, this reads as, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are arranged in a particular position in an order of distance from the selected word line.” But claim 2 does not recite that the word lines are arranged “based on” the selected word line, or that the arrangement occurs only after a word line is selected, as argued by Patent Owner. We agree with Petitioner that the express language of claim 2 does not recite any limitation as to how or when the groups of word lines are disposed. Both parties point to the same language in the ’822 patent Specification in support of their position: “the word lines disposed between the selected word line and the top select gate TSG can be divided into multiple groups of the word lines.” PO Sur-Reply 2 (citing Pet. Reply 11 requires the recited arrangement to exist, at some point. But we determine that none of claims 2, 3, 12, or 13 require a step of arrangement, or an action to change the arrangement of grouped word lines.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “not based on the location of the source or bit lines. Instead, Petitioner relies upon the distance from the selected word line and the drain-side of the string. See Pet. 66 (“the channel length between the drain-side of the string and word line selected for programming would be quite long, resulting in a relatively high channel resistance” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 360)). Petitioner asserts that Lee’s application of higher pre-charge voltages to the drain-side word lines “offset the channel resistance effect.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 361). Lee and Zhao both admittedly have “typical memory strings, which are a ‘vertical column’ of memory cells arranged in series between a source side select transistor and a drain side transistor.” PO Resp. 53 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner asserts that applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb (sought by both Lee and Zhao) relies on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). Petitioner asserts that the application of voltage can be performed from either end of the channel so long as it targets the portion of the channel desired to be pre- charged. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 77–78; Ex. 1010, 17:16–23). Although Patent Owner points to Yang as showing different “biasing schemes” based upon whether the bit line, source line, or both are used for pre-charging, each of the cited Figures 8–10 of Yang indicates that Vbypass (Yang’s uncontested pre-pulse signal) is applied to at least some word lines between the selected word line and the drain-side SGD0. Ex. 1010, Figs. 8C, 9C, 10C; see PO Resp. 25–28 (“a ‘bypass voltage’ (‘Vbypass’) is applied to ‘not yet programmed’ memory cells during the ‘pre-charge phase’” (citing Fig. 8C) (emphasis omitted)). We do not discern in Patent Owner’s arguments, or in the evidence provided during trial, sufficient reasons why applying voltage from either source or bit line disturbs Petitioner’s asserted advantage of offsetting the resistance of the channel between a selected word line and the drain side of the string. Patent Owner further argues that Lee discusses a “wholly disparate approach” for mitigating program disturb than Zhao and that a POSITA would not have been motivated to apply Lee’s teaching to Zhao. PO Resp. 56–58. Patent Owner contends that because Zhao does not conduct current when applying its bypass voltage to equalize charges, but Lee does conduct current when doing so, Lee need only compensate for insufficient charge boosting due to the increased resistance component between source and drain and does not need to compensate for “resistance” effects creating voltage differences along the length of the memory string channel. Id. at 56. Dr. Przybylski’s supporting testimony is based upon such differences in the resistance components. See, e.g., Ex. 2011 ¶ 128. However, we have credited Dr. Liu’s testimony that a chain of transistors in both systems creates a resistance effect regardless of current flow in the steady state. Supra § II.F.1.b.2. We further agree with Petitioner that applying pre- on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). We further credit Dr. Liu’s testimony that Zhao’s use of the same pre-charge voltages to not-yet-programmed word lines presents an issue of inadequate pre-charging that Lee addresses. Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 55–56; Pet. Reply 22–23. Consequently, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the chain resistance effects in Zhao and Lee permit the application of Lee’s method of pre-charging to mitigate program disturb to be applicable and desirable in Zhao’s method of applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has shown persuasive motivation for its combination.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 11,501,822 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,501,822

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.