• Adlens USA, Inc. / Adlens, Ltd. v. Superfocus Holdings LLC, Superfocus, LLC, Insolvency Services Group, Inc., And Dr. Stephen KurtinAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01824 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Kurtin ’532 and Kurtin ’629 in view of Gordon and/or Cronin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “manually adjustable” (claim 1) Patent Owner contends that this term should be construed to mean “capable of being manually adjusted by a wearer of the spectacles.” PO Resp. 7. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner’s proposed construction improperly incorporates an extraneous limitation—by a wearer—into the claims. Pet. Reply 6. We agree with Petitioner. Claim 1 of the ’797 Patent expressly recites “by a wearer” (Ex. 1002, 4:46), but there is no such limitation in either of claims 1 or 4 of the ’487 Patent. Patent Owner identifies various specification passages discussing adjustment by a wearer or user. PO Resp. 7–8. None of these passages amounts to an express definition or disclaimer requiring that “by a wearer” be read into the claims not reciting that phrase. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325 (“[T]his court counsels the PTO to avoid the temptation to limit broad claim terms solely on the basis of specification passages.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “Our reviewing court instructs that “merely because an element does not include the word ‘means’ does not automatically prevent that element from being construed as a means-plus-function element.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed.Cir.1996)). “Generic terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means’ because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.” Id. at 1350. We agree with Patent Owner that the term, “adjustable connector” (claims 1 and 4), should be construed as a means-plus-function term. The word “connector” is “tantamount to using the word ‘means’” because it is a generic description that does not connote a definite structure. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Dr. Savidis agrees that the term, “adjustable connector,” is a generic term that does not define a particular structure. Ex. 2003, 82:15–84:8. Accordingly, we construe this term in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art We determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent education and one to two years of experience with optics. Our determination is supported 3 The parties dispute whether the corresponding structure disclosed in the ’487 Patent Specification includes a flexure. PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:34–37); Pet. Reply 7 n.2. It is not necessary for us to resolve this dispute because a flexure is not relevant to any ground of unpatentability raised in the Petition. by the testimony of Dr. Plummer (Ex. 2002 ¶ 49), as well as the testimony of Dr. Savidis (Ex. 2003, 66:24–67:7, 67:16–20, 69:14–20). We also rely on Petitioner’s asserted references as establishing the level of skill in the art at the relevant time. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Based upon their stated qualifications, we consider both Dr. Savidis and Dr. Plummer qualified to opine from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the art regarding the subject matter of the ’487 Patent. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 5–11, Appendix A (Savidis CV); Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 9–22, Attachment A (Plummer CV).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason or motivation to modify the spectacles of Kurtin ’532 to provide independent adjustability of each lens. Our finding is supported by the undisputed testimony of Dr. Savidis that “the desirability of having independently and manually adjustable, liquid filled, variable focus lenses was known in the art well prior to 2010.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 77. Our finding is further supported by Dr. Savidis’ testimony that both Gordon (Ex. 1007) and Cronin (Ex. 1006) describe adjustable, liquid filled, variable focus eyeglasses in which each eye’s lens can be manually adjustable independently of the other eye’s lens. Id. Dr. Savidis’ testimony (and our finding) is further supported by Gordon, which discloses that the focus of each lens can be independently adjusted by turning a screw. Ex. 1007, Figs. I–IV, 1:67–80, 1:87–100, 2:5– 22; see also Ex. 1011, 75:9–13 (Plummer agrees that Gordon’s screws are independently adjustable.). Dr. Savidis’ testimony (and our finding) is also supported by Cronin, which discloses left and right calibration screws for allowing independent adjustment of the focal length of the left and right lenses, respectively. Ex. 1006, 4:27–32, 5:16–22, 5:66–6:2, Figs. 2 and 4. We also rely on Cronin’s disclosure of the purpose and advantage of the independent adjustment feature: According to Cronin, it allows the focal lengths of the left and right lens assemblies to be matched or related to each other in a pre-determined manner to compensate for unusual visual disorders, thereby avoiding visual discomfort by focusing each of the user’s eyes at sensibly the same object distance. Id. at 5:9–16. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that one way suggested by the prior art to provide independent adjustability of each eye’s lens would have been to replace the non-adjustable connector (leaf hinge 23) of Kurtin ’532 with an adjustable connector, such as the nut, screw, and tab arrangement of Kurtin ’629. See PO Resp. 15 (describing Petitioner’s first proposed modification); Tr. 14:16–20 (Petitioner is relying on modifications 1 and 3.). Our finding is supported by Dr. Savidis’ testimony that, in order to have independent adjustability of each lens unit, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to seek a suitable adjuster structure to replace the non-adjustable connector of Kurtin ’532. Ex. 1003 ¶ 77. Our finding is also supported by Dr. Savidis’ testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have exercised no more than routine skill in the art to implement this substitution by utilizing existing seal 21 of Kurtin ’532 shown in Figure 3 and by attaching tabs to or creating tabs for Kurtin’s ’532 front and rear rings to accommodate Kurtin’s ’629 screw and nut.” Id. ¶ 81. Our finding is further supported by Kurtin ’532 Figure 5, which shows leaf hinge 23 connecting the front and rear rings, and Kurtin ’532 Figure 3, which shows elastomeric bellows 21 allowing the rear ring to move with respect to the front ring. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 32, 33, Figs. 3, 5. Our finding is further supported by Kurtin ’629, which discloses adjustable spectacles including nut 20, screw 21, and actuating tabs 19, where nut 20 can be turned by the wearer to adjust the optical power of the lenses. Ex. 1009, Abstract, Figs. 1–3, 3:50–4:9.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 8,708,487 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,708,487
• Adlens USA, Inc. / Adlens, Ltd. v. Superfocus Holdings LLC, Superfocus, LLC, Insolvency Services Group, Inc., And Dr. Stephen KurtinAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01821 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 and 14–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Kurtin ’532 and Kurtin ’629 in view of Gordon and/or Cronin; anticipation by Cronin was not shown for claims 3–12 and 14–17.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Absent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification . . . when [it] expressly disclaim[s] the broader definition.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Although an inventor is indeed free to define the specific terms used to describe his or her invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We construe claim terms only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “Our reviewing court instructs that “merely because an element does not include the word ‘means’ does not automatically prevent that element from being construed as a means-plus-function element.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed.Cir.1996)). “Generic terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means’ because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.” Id. at 1350. We agree with Patent Owner that the terms, “adjustable element” (claim 3) and “controllable spacing member” (claim 15), should be construed as means-plus-function terms. The words “element” and “member” are the same as or similar to the words the Federal Circuit indicated are “tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Dr. Savidis agrees that the terms, “adjustable element” and “controllable spacing member,” do not define a particular structure. Ex. 2003, 76:4–21, 77:1–7, 80:8–17. Accordingly, we construe these terms in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. We first identify the claimed function, and then we determine what structure disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351; In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art We determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent education and one to two years of experience with optics. Our determination is supported by the testimony of Dr. Plummer (Ex. 2002 ¶ 49), as well as the testimony of Dr. Savidis (Ex. 2003, 66:24–67:7, 67:16–20, 69:14–20). We also rely on Petitioner’s asserted references as establishing the level of skill in the art at the relevant time. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “Dr. Plummer testifies that “assembly of Gordon’s spectacles would have to be performed by a skilled technician.” Ex. 2002 ¶ 165 (emphasis added). That testimony does not persuasively support Patent Owner’s argument, PO Resp. 45, that Gordon’s adjustment can only be performed by a skilled technician. To the extent that Dr. Plummer’s testimony could be read to support Patent Owner’s argument, we give greater weight to Dr. Savidis’ testimony, which is consistent with Gordon’s disclosure of an adjustment that can be performed “quickly and readily.” Ex. 1013, 1:14, 1:18.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,967,797 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,967,797
• Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb CompanyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2015-01537 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Cohen, Shire, and Carpenter because Petitioner did not establish a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “suggests a trial-and-error approach to protein formulation. See Ex. 2011 (“Very often, proteins have to be evaluated individually and stabilized on a trial-and-error basis.”). Thus, we credit Dr. Staples’s testimony regarding the use of trial-and-error optimization because it appears that this was a known approach for formulating proteins. We do not agree that because the approach was known, it was necessarily expected to be successful. Petitioner cites to the statement in Carpenter that the authors were “quite confident” the generalized high throughput formulation procedure they describe “can be coupled successfully with high throughput screening strategies of protein drugs and facilitate drug development within the inherent time and resource constraints of the pharmaceutical industry.” Ex. 1004, 195. We note that, although in isolation Carpenter’s proclamation of being “quite confident” appears to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of success, when considered in context it refers to a general trend in the industry, not to the ability to formulate specific proteins. The full statement does not indicate that there was confidence that any particular drug could be successfully formulated as a liquid. Thus, this evidence is not persuasive.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation foundNot shown unpatentable

    “parties, we determine, on balance, that Petitioner has not established sufficiently that an ordinary artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in formulating CTLA4Ig as a stable liquid formulation as recited in the challenged claims. Specifically, in the challenge to Patent Owner’s claims, Petitioner relies on Carpenter to show that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known how to prepare a stable liquid formulation of CTLA4Ig for subcutaneous administration. Pet. 33–40. The statements in Carpenter are the most significant evidence of whether there would have been an expectation of success in achieving the claimed formulation. But Carpenter expressly states that “[i]t [could] be assumed that most proteins will not exhibit sufficient stability in aqueous solution to allow a liquid formulation to be developed.” Ex. 1004, 188; PO Resp. 16. Carpenter also states that although a stable liquid formulation is desirable, “for most proteins maintaining physical and chemical stabilities in aqueous solution for an extended period of time is extremely difficult.” Ex. 1004, 184. These statements indicate that there would not have been a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed formulations. Dr. Staples’s testimony about routine trial-and-error optimization does not overcome these statements. Petitioner’s citation to Paborji (Ex. 1016) does not persuade us otherwise. Even though Paborji states that CTLA4Ig in phosphate buffer is “relatively stable,” without testimony to explain how this would be interpreted by a skilled artisan, the strong doubt about success expressed in Carpenter is not overcome.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,476,239 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,476,239
• Valeo North America, Inc. / Valeo S.A. et al. v. Magna Electronics Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2015-01414 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–12, 14, 15, 17, 19–52, 54–67, 69–79, and 81–86 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the 17 combinations listed in the order.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The fact that other parts of the claims recite locations of the image capture devices and the overlap zones does not mean that anything more should be read into the “without duplication of objects” clause, which appears clear on its face. Further, the claims do not say anything about parallax or require that the problem of parallax be solved for the synthesized image. Indeed, parallax is not the same as the duplication of objects. See Ex. 1066 ¶ 11 (“Duplication . . . is different from parallax. For example, when each of the cameras have a common center of projection, there will be little or no parallax, but given their overlapping fields of view, the cameras may nonetheless capture the same objects multiple times resulting in duplication.” (citation omitted)). Thus, we are not persuaded that reading in any language pertaining to parallax effects would be appropriate based on the language of the claims.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Neither party explains in detail why their proposed level of ordinary skill in the art should be adopted. After reviewing the evidence, including the cited prior art, however, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s definition is substantially correct. The ’724 patent describes “rearview vision systems which provide the vehicle operator with scenic information in the direction rearward of the vehicle” using “image capture devices, such as CMOS [(complementary metal-oxide semiconductor)] imaging arrays and the like.” Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 22–27. “Camera-based rearview vision systems” had been proposed at the time, but had not “obtained commercial acceptance” and suffered from various problems according to the ’724 patent. Id. at col. 1, l. 60–col. 2, l. 55. The ’724 patent further acknowledges that various aspects of the disclosed systems, such as, for example, CMOS and charge-coupled device (CCD) imaging arrays, optical correction systems, various types of image filtering, backlit liquid-crystal displays (LCDs), and systems for measuring the distance of an object behind the vehicle, were known at the time. See, e.g., id. at col. 11, ll. 60–64, col. 12, ll. 33–37, col. 13, ll. 26–41, col. 17, ll. 48–62, col. 20, ll. 42–53, col. 22, ll. 3–19, 44–55. Drs. Wolberg and Wilhelm further testify as to the development and state of the art by the time of the ’724 patent, which we find helpful in assessing what background knowledge would have been available to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 27–39; Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 20–27. As a whole, the evidence indicates a higher level of ordinary skill than what Patent Owner proposes, and suggests, for example, that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least some understanding of ways in which images from multiple cameras could be combined. See, e.g., Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 28–38; Ex. 1003, 3, 6; Ex. 1005, 3–6. Accordingly, based on our review of the ’724 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’724 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of the parties’ declarants, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s or master’s degree in engineering, computer science, or physics (or equivalent work experience), with some familiarity with how cameras may be used in vehicles and a working understanding of combining image data from multiple cameras and microprocessor-driven controls for displays, actuators, and elementary decision making. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive for three reasons. First, as explained above, to establish an earlier constructive reduction to practice, Patent Owner must show that the ’527 application provides sufficient written description support for the challenged claims. Patent Owner states that “each limitation of [the set of claims listed above] is supported in the ’935 patent disclosure,” but includes no substantive arguments in its Response explaining why. See id. Rather, Patent Owner cites 46 paragraphs of Dr. Etienne-Cummings’s declaration and a “Constructive Reduction to Practice Chart” spanning 43 pages. Id. (citing Ex. 2001; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 54–99). Any arguments contained in these materials cannot be incorporated by reference into the Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”).12 Consequently, we do not consider information presented in the declaration or claim chart but not discussed sufficiently in the Response. Second, even if Dr. Etienne-Cummings’s analysis and the claim chart are considered, they are not sufficient. The claim chart provides only block 12 See also Paper 8, 3 (“The patent owner is cautioned that any arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be deemed waived.”); Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., Case CBM2014-00013, 8 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2015) (Paper 37) (“Arguments that are not developed and presented in the Patent Owner Response, itself, are not entitled to consideration.”), reversed-in-part on other grounds, No. 2015-1703, -- F.3d --, 2016 WL 6958650 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 29, 2016); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, Case IPR2014-00454, 7–10 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (Paper 12) (informative) (noting that “[o]ne purpose of the prohibition against incorporation by reference is to eliminate abuses” of the page limits established for the parties’ substantive papers, and that citing “large portions of another document, without sufficient explanation of those portions, amounts to incorporation by reference”). quotes and figures from the ’935 patent,13 but does not explain in any detail why they provide support for the various limitations of the challenged claims. See Ex. 2001. Likewise, the majority of Dr. Etienne-Cummings’s declaration merely states that “the features of [the respective claim] are disclosed” at the block-quoted portions of the ’935 patent, without explanation. See, e.g., Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 56–61, 64, 65, 67–74, 76–99. Third, we agree with Petitioner that the ’935 patent does not provide sufficient written description support for the independent claims of the ’724 patent (claims 1, 49, 65, and 78), each of which recites that the “synthesized image is displayed by a single display screen of a reconfigurable display device that is viewable by a driver of the equipped vehicle when normally operating the equipped vehicle.” See Reply 13–15. As explained above, we interpret “reconfigurable display” to mean a display in which a portion of the display upon which the driver views the synthesized image is used as a high-information content display to selectively display various types of auxiliary information. See supra Section II.A.4. Patent Owner cites various excerpts from the ’935 patent describing display 20, but these portions do not call the display device “reconfigurable” or disclose that it is used to selectively display information. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 5–6 (citing Ex. 2002, col. 3, l. 61–col. 4, l. 5, col. 5, ll. 48–50, col. 6, ll. 5–12, 22–39); Ex. 2004 ¶ 56. Indeed, the ’724 patent Specification 13 It is unclear why Patent Owner attempts to map the disclosure of the ’935 patent, rather than the ’527 application, to the challenged claims. The ’935 patent issued on September 23, 1997 (after Yamamoto published), from the ’527 application filed on May 22, 1995 (before Yamamoto published). Patent Owner does not provide a copy of the ’527 application in the record to show that the written description is the same as that of the issued ’935 patent.” slip op. at 26

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Id. (citation omitted). We first summarize the evidence presented regarding Wang’s alleged public accessibility. Wang is a publication of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and has a copyright notation of “TH0367-3/91/0000/0100$01.00 © 1991 IEEE” on the first page. See Ex. 1009, 1. Petitioner contends that the document was published “on May 27–31, 1991,” citing the testimony of Dr. Wolberg. Pet. 7. Dr. Wolberg testifies that “[a]s a person who regularly reviews scholarly articles, including IEEE publications such as the Wang article, and as someone who regularly attends conferences such as the IEEE conference in which the Wang paper was presented,” he believes that Wang was published in May 1991. Ex. 1020 ¶ 84. Dr. Wolberg also discusses two publications (Exhibits 1040 and 1042) that cite Wang prior to the effective filing date of the ’724 patent (May 22, 1996), “which further indicates to [Dr. Wolberg] that Wang was publicly accessible.” Id.; see Ex. 1040, 12 (cited reference 16); Ex. 1042, 3 (cited reference 4). Finally, he cites the University of Edinburgh website, which “states that the authors of the Wang article began work on CMOS imaging sensors as early as 1986, and began publishing articles reporting the results of their work that led to the incorporation of a CMOS chip in a video camera in 1989.” Ex. 1020 ¶ 84 (citing Ex. 1044). Petitioner presents additional evidence with its Reply that allegedly confirms Wang’s public accessibility prior to May 22, 1996. Reply 11–12. First, Petitioner submits a declaration from Gerard P. Grenier, the Senior Director of Publishing Technologies for the IEEE.17 Ex. 1055. Mr. Grenier states that Wang “was published and presented as part of [the] Euro [A]SIC ’91 [conference] which occurred May 27–31, 1991.” Id. ¶ 9. According to Mr. Grenier, “[t]he Article was published by IEEE as part of the conference proceedings on the date of the conference. Copies of the conference proceedings were made available to attendees of the conference.” Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Grenier also testifies that “IEEE maintains records of the dates on which articles were first made available for public download,” “[t]hese records are maintained as part of the ordinary course of business of the IEEE [and] are updated regularly as articles are published,” and he has “personal knowledge of the records.” Id. ¶ 7. Second, Petitioner submits a copy of Wang, with a “EURO ASIC ’91” cover page and table of contents, “[s]helved” at the Linda Hall Library in Kansas City, Missouri in 1991. Ex. 1046. Third, Petitioner submits a certified copy of Wang from the Library of Congress, with the same cover page and table of contents and a date stamp of June 5, 1992. Ex. 1060. Fourth, Petitioner notes that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Board decision finding similar claims with a priority date of February 26, 1993, unpatentable based in part on Wang in 17 Petitioner submitted a substantially similar version of the declaration, dated approximately one month earlier, with its Petition, but did not discuss the declaration in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1039, with Ex. 1055. Our analysis applies equally to both versions of the declaration. In re Magna Elecs., Inc., 611 F. App’x 969, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (Ex. 1045). Reply 11. Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence of” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,643,724 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,643,724
• Valeo North America, Inc. / Valeo S.A. et al. v. Magna Electronics Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2015-01410 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–12, 14, 15, 17, 19–52, 54–67, 69–79, and 81–86 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combinations listed in the Order.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “On December 28, 2015, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1, 3–12, 14, 15, 17, 19–52, 54–67, 69–79, and 81–86 on 17 grounds of unpatentability and consolidated Case IPR2015-01414 with Case IPR2015-01410 (Paper 7, “Dec. on Inst.”). Patent Owner Magna Electronics Inc. filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 14, “PO Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 17, “Reply”). The parties did not request oral argument, and no hearing was held. See Paper 22.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive for three reasons. First, as explained above, to establish an earlier constructive reduction to practice, Patent Owner must show that the ’527 application provides sufficient written description support for the challenged claims. Patent Owner states that “each limitation of [the set of claims listed above] is supported in the ’935 patent disclosure,” but includes no substantive arguments in its Response explaining why. See id. Rather, Patent Owner cites 46 paragraphs of Dr. Etienne-Cummings’s declaration and a “Constructive Reduction to Practice Chart” spanning 43 pages. Id. (citing Ex. 2001; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 54–99). Any arguments contained in these materials cannot be incorporated by reference into the Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”).12 Consequently, we do not consider information presented in the declaration or claim chart but not discussed sufficiently in the Response. Second, even if Dr. Etienne-Cummings’s analysis and the claim chart are considered, they are not sufficient. The claim chart provides only block 12 See also Paper 8, 3 (“The patent owner is cautioned that any arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be deemed waived.”); Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., Case CBM2014-00013, 8 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2015) (Paper 37) (“Arguments that are not developed and presented in the Patent Owner Response, itself, are not entitled to consideration.”), reversed-in-part on other grounds, No. 2015-1703, -- F.3d --, 2016 WL 6958650 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 29, 2016); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, Case IPR2014-00454, 7–10 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (Paper 12) (informative) (noting that “[o]ne purpose of the prohibition against incorporation by reference is to eliminate abuses” of the page limits established for the parties’ substantive papers, and that citing “large portions of another document, without sufficient explanation of those portions, amounts to incorporation by reference”). quotes and figures from the ’935 patent,13 but does not explain in any detail why they provide support for the various limitations of the challenged claims. See Ex. 2001. Likewise, the majority of Dr. Etienne-Cummings’s declaration merely states that “the features of [the respective claim] are disclosed” at the block-quoted portions of the ’935 patent, without explanation. See, e.g., Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 56–61, 64, 65, 67–74, 76–99. Third, we agree with Petitioner that the ’935 patent does not provide sufficient written description support for the independent claims of the ’724 patent (claims 1, 49, 65, and 78), each of which recites that the “synthesized image is displayed by a single display screen of a reconfigurable display device that is viewable by a driver of the equipped vehicle when normally operating the equipped vehicle.” See Reply 13–15. As explained above, we interpret “reconfigurable display” to mean a display in which a portion of the display upon which the driver views the synthesized image is used as a high-information content display to selectively display various types of auxiliary information. See supra Section II.A.4. Patent Owner cites various excerpts from the ’935 patent describing display 20, but these portions do not call the display device “reconfigurable” or disclose that it is used to selectively display information. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 5–6 (citing Ex. 2002, col. 3, l. 61–col. 4, l. 5, col. 5, ll. 48–50, col. 6, ll. 5–12, 22–39); Ex. 2004 ¶ 56. Indeed, the ’724 patent Specification 13 It is unclear why Patent Owner attempts to map the disclosure of the ’935 patent, rather than the ’527 application, to the challenged claims. The ’935 patent issued on September 23, 1997 (after Yamamoto published), from the ’527 application filed on May 22, 1995 (before Yamamoto published). Patent Owner does not provide a copy of the ’527 application in the record to show that the written description is the same as that of the issued ’935 patent.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “parallax or require that the problem of parallax be solved for the synthesized image. See supra Sections II.A.2–3. Rather, we interpret “synthesized image is generated without duplication of objects” to mean the synthesized image is generated with minimal multiple exposure of objects appearing in the overlap zones, and interpret “synthesized image approximates a view as would be seen by a virtual camera at a single location exterior of the equipped vehicle” to mean the synthesized image is a nearly exact representation of what would be seen by a virtual camera at a single location exterior of the vehicle. Id. Thus, the claims allow for a “minimal” level of multiple exposure and only require a “nearly exact” representation of what the virtual camera would see. We are not persuaded that any parallax effects that might remain when the pattern recognition techniques of Mitsubishi are used in Yamamoto’s system, as Petitioner asserts, would cause more than “minimal” multiple exposure or prevent the resulting image from being a “nearly exact” representation. See Ex. 1020 ¶ 110; Ex. 1066 ¶ 25. Moreover, even if the resulting image in the combined system would suffer from some parallax effects, we do not see how that contradicts Petitioner’s asserted reason for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Yamamoto’s system, or why parallax concerns would have outweighed the advantage of improved image processing, such that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have abandoned the three camera arrangement of Yamamoto. See Reply 15–17; Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”). In that respect, we find Dr. Wolberg’s analysis of how and why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references’ teachings compelling. See Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 101–15; Ex. 1066 ¶¶ 22–37.” slip op. at 32

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “public accessibility. PO Resp. 17–21. Based on all of the evidence of record,18 however, we are persuaded that Wang was disseminated or otherwise made available prior to May 22, 1996, to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence could have located it. Most probative are the Library of Congress certification and Linda Hall Library documentation, which show that Wang was catalogued and readily available through these libraries. See Exs. 1046, 1060. Mr. Grenier further testifies that copies of the article were made available to attendees of the EURO ASIC ’91 conference, which was an IEEE academic conference pertaining to ASICs. See Ex. 1039; Ex. 1055; Ex. 1060, 2–13 (stating that the conference “includes reports on ASIC design experiences, advances in design methods and tools, and on the evolution of ASIC technology,” and is “the definitive place . . . for the academic community to exchange ideas”; listing numerous papers to be 18 We are persuaded that all of Petitioner’s evidence should be considered, including the evidence introduced with the Reply, under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Further, during a conference call with the parties on May 26, 2016, Patent Owner sought authorization to file a motion to “strike” Petitioner’s new evidence and portions of Petitioner’s Reply. See Paper 20. We determined that a motion to strike was not appropriate at that time, but stated that “[s]hould either party request a hearing in this proceeding, . . . the parties may address the propriety of the exhibits and Petitioner’s Reply during oral argument. If the parties choose not to request a hearing, Patent Owner may request another conference call and we will determine whether additional briefing or any other action may be appropriate at that time.” Id. at 3; Ex. 1071, 20:14–22:18. Patent Owner did not request oral argument, and did not request another conference call to address the issue. presented relating to, for example, digital signal processing ASICs, chip architecture, and graphic application and image processing ASICs). Given the level of ordinary skill in the art of the ’724 patent set forth above, see supra Section II.B, we are persuaded that the EURO ASIC ’91 conference is the type of conference that ordinarily skilled artisans would have been interested in and likely attended. The dates and documentation for the conference also are consistent with the other submitted evidence, including the copyright notation of Wang itself, which states in part “© 1991 IEEE.” See Ex. 1009, 1. Finally, as Petitioner correctly points out, the first article cited by Dr. Wolberg shows that Wang in fact was accessed by some other individuals working in the field of image sensors. See Reply 12; Ex. 1040. Based on the record presented, we are persuaded that Wang is a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 8,643,724 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,643,724
• Hilti, Inc. / Snap-On Incorporated v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2016-00343 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Takano and Yanai because the proposed combinations and calculations lacked adequate support and relied on hindsight.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Takano, however, discloses a battery having a plurality of cells connected in series. Ex. 1072 ¶¶ 4, 11, 26. Although we do not question that connecting battery cells in series and/or parallel is known generally in the art, Petitioner does not provide adequate specific reasoning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Takano to connect cells in parallel when Takano clearly discloses a series connection. Dr. Abraham’s testimony that the type of connection would be chosen “as needed to provide whatever target voltage and amperage is desired for a particular application,” by itself, does not provide a sufficient reason to modify Takano’s series connection. Petitioner does not explain how the prior art discloses a desired voltage or amperage that would cause one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takano in the manner proposed. In this case, the only teaching of a desired amperage comes from the ’290 patent itself. Furthermore, Dr. Abraham’s reliance on the disclosure at column 5, lines 57–61, of the ’290 patent as supporting the alleged obviousness of combining two cells in parallel is improper. This passage of the ’290 patent describes alternative configurations of the patentees’ own invention; it is not describing prior art. Relying on knowledge gleaned only from the challenged patent’s disclosure is impermissible hindsight. Cf. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (As long as a judgment on obviousness “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Furthermore, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on (1) selecting an 18650-size or 26650-size cell; (2) estimating the positive electrode surface area to be 540 cm2; (3) selecting a foil thickness of 15 micrometers; (4) selecting an average discharge voltage of 3.6 volts; and (5) for 18650-size cells, connecting two in parallel. Petitioner fails to point out how the prior art indicates that using all of these particular values in combination would be desirable for a lithium-based battery pack when several other possible values could have been selected. Where “‘the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful,’ courts should reject ‘hindsight claims of obviousness.’” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 20

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Third, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s argument that “three Yanai-based 18650 cells in parallel” would satisfy the 20 Amp Limitation is a new argument. Paper 60, 2. In our view, this argument does more than merely address Patent Owner’s argument regarding Dr. Abraham’s addition error. Rather, by relying on three cells instead of two, Petitioner attempts to provide a new theory as to why the combination of Takano and Yanai renders the challenged claims obvious that was not set forth clearly in the Petition. Because Petitioner waited until the Reply to make this argument, Patent Owner did not have an opportunity to respond to Petitioner’s new argument. We thus decline to consider Petitioner’s new argument as it is an improper reply. Furthermore, Petitioner’s assertion that Patent Owner made no attempt to explain why using three cells would have been just as obvious as using two cells is an improper attempt to shift the burden of proof with respect to obviousness to Patent Owner.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

  Patent outcomesUS 7,554,290 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,554,290
• Hilti, Inc. / Snap-On Incorporated v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2016-00344 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable over Takano and Yanai under §103 because Petitioner’s evidence did not establish the 20 Amp Limitation without unsupported assumptions and hindsight.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Takano, however, discloses a battery having a plurality of cells connected in series. Ex. 1072 ¶¶ 4, 11, 26. Although we do not question that connecting battery cells in series and/or parallel is known generally in the art, Petitioner does not provide adequate specific reasoning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Takano to connect cells in parallel when Takano clearly discloses a series connection. Dr. Abraham’s testimony that the type of connection would be chosen “as needed to provide whatever target voltage and amperage is desired for a particular application,” by itself, does not provide a sufficient reason to modify Takano’s series connection. Petitioner does not explain how the prior art discloses a desired voltage or amperage that would cause one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takano in the manner proposed. In this case, the only teaching of a desired amperage comes from the ’173 patent itself. Furthermore, Dr. Abraham’s reliance on the disclosure at column 5, lines 59–63, of the ’173 patent as supporting the alleged obviousness of combining two cells in parallel is improper. This passage of the ’173 patent describes alternative configurations of the patentees’ own invention; it is not describing prior art. Relying on knowledge gleaned only from the challenged patent’s disclosure is impermissible hindsight. Cf. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (As long as a judgment on obviousness “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “18650-size and 26650-size cells is flawed and thus fails to support Petitioner’s assertion that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Takano and Yanai. Furthermore, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on (1) selecting an 18650-size or 26650-size cell; (2) estimating the positive electrode surface area to be 540 cm2; (3) selecting a foil thickness of 15 micrometers; (4) selecting an average discharge voltage of 3.6 volts; and (5) for 18650-size cells, connecting two in parallel. Petitioner fails to point out how the prior art indicates that using all of these particular values in combination would be desirable for a lithium-based battery pack when several other possible values could have been selected. Where “‘the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful,’ courts should reject ‘hindsight claims of obviousness.’” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

    “e) Secondary Considerations Patent Owner argues that “[n]umerous secondary considerations strongly favor the patentability of the challenged claims.” PO Resp. 26–59. Because we are not persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that the combination of Takano and Yanai render claim 1 obvious, we need not reach Patent Owner’s assertions regarding secondary considerations.” slip op. at 23

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Third, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s argument that “three Yanai-based 18650 cells in parallel” would satisfy the 20 Amp Limitation is a new argument. Paper 62, 2. In our view, this argument does more than merely address Patent Owner’s argument regarding Dr. Abraham’s addition error. Rather, by relying on three cells instead of two, Petitioner attempts to provide a new theory as to why the combination of Takano and Yanai renders the challenged claims obvious that was not set forth clearly in the Petition. Because Petitioner waited until the Reply to make this argument, Patent Owner did not have an opportunity to respond to Petitioner’s new argument. We thus decline to consider Petitioner’s new argument as it is an improper reply. Furthermore, Petitioner’s assertion that Patent Owner made no attempt to explain why using three cells would have been just as obvious as using two cells is an improper attempt to shift the burden of proof with respect to obviousness to Patent Owner.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,944,173 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,944,173
• Hilti, Inc. / Snap-On Incorporated v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2016-00345 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Takano and Yanai because Petitioner’s evidence did not establish the 20 Amp Limitation without unsupported assumptions and hindsight.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “example 2 is described as having a positive electrode surface area of 6,700 cm2 (id. ¶ 40). This wide variance in the surface areas disclosed by Adachi suggests that the working examples are specific embodiments and not indicative of “common knowledge” in the field. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the range of 400– 680 cm2 is an industry standard surface area for 18650-size cells or that one of ordinary skill in the art necessarily would consider a value in this range to be a typical or likely choice of surface area for any 18650-size cell. Accordingly, the only basis to assert that it would have been obvious to select a positive electrode surface area of 540 cm2 for Yanai’s cell 1-4 would be to rely on the disclosure of Adachi; that is, to assert that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the combination of Takano and Yanai with the teaching of Adachi. Petitioner, however, has repeatedly argued that this is not what it proposes. Reply 3; Tr. 22:22–23:4. Furthermore, we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not provide an adequate reason to combine Adachi with Takano and Yanai.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Takano, however, discloses a battery having a plurality of cells connected in series. Ex. 1072 ¶¶ 4, 11, 26. Although we do not question that connecting battery cells in series and/or parallel is known generally in the art, Petitioner does not provide adequate specific reasoning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Takano to connect cells in parallel when Takano clearly discloses a series connection. Dr. Abraham’s testimony that the type of connection would be chosen “as needed to provide whatever target voltage and amperage is desired for a particular application,” by itself, does not provide a sufficient reason to modify Takano’s series connection. Petitioner does not explain how the prior art discloses a desired voltage or amperage that would cause one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takano in the manner proposed. In this case, the only teaching of a desired amperage comes from the ’510 patent itself. Furthermore, Dr. Abraham’s reliance on the disclosure at column 5, lines 61–65, of the ’510 patent as supporting the alleged obviousness of combining two cells in parallel is improper. This passage of the ’510 patent describes alternative configurations of the patentees’ own invention; it is not describing prior art. Relying on knowledge gleaned only from the challenged patent’s disclosure is impermissible hindsight. Cf. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (As long as a judgment on obviousness “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Furthermore, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on (1) selecting an 18650-size or 26650-size cell; (2) estimating the positive electrode surface area to be 540 cm2; (3) selecting a foil thickness of 15 micrometers; (4) selecting an average discharge voltage of 3.6 volts; and (5) for 18650-size cells, connecting two in parallel. Petitioner fails to point out how the prior art indicates that using all of these particular values in combination would be desirable for a lithium-based battery pack when several other possible values could have been selected. Where “‘the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful,’ courts should reject ‘hindsight claims of obviousness.’” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 20

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Third, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s argument that “three Yanai-based 18650 cells in parallel” would satisfy the 20 Amp Limitation is a new argument. Paper 59, 2. In our view, this argument does more than merely address Patent Owner’s argument regarding Dr. Abraham’s addition error. Rather, by relying on three cells instead of two, Petitioner attempts to provide a new theory as to why the combination of Takano and Yanai renders the challenged claims obvious that was not set forth clearly in the Petition. Because Petitioner waited until the Reply to make this argument, Patent Owner did not have an opportunity to respond to Petitioner’s new argument. We thus decline to consider Petitioner’s new argument as it is an improper reply. Furthermore, Petitioner’s assertion that Patent Owner made no attempt to explain why using three cells would have been just as obvious as using two cells is an improper attempt to shift the burden of proof with respect to obviousness to Patent Owner.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,999,510 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,999,510
• Hilti, Inc. / Snap-On Incorporated v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01166 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Takano and Yanai because the proposed combination relied on unsupported assumptions and impermissible hindsight.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “After institution, Snap-On Incorporated (“Snap-On”) filed a Petition and a Motion for Joinder to this proceeding. IPR2016-00345, Papers 2, 3. We granted the Motion for Joinder, and IPR2016-00345 was joined with IPR2015-01166 and terminated. Paper 24, 6. Consequently, Hilti and Snap-On (collectively, “Petitioner”) are joined in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We construed three claim terms in our Decision to Institute: (1) “hand held power tool,” (2) “battery cells being capable of producing an average discharge current greater than or equal to approximately 20 amps,” and (3) “nominal voltage.” Inst. Dec. 6–12. Neither party has indicated that the interpretations for those phrases were improper, and we do not perceive any reason or evidence that now compels any deviation from our initial determinations. Accordingly, the following interpretations are not in dispute and apply to this Decision:” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “select a positive electrode surface area of 540 cm2 for Yanai’s cell 1-4 would be to rely on the disclosure of Adachi; that is, to assert that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the combination of Takano and Yanai with the teaching of Adachi. Petitioner, however, has repeatedly argued that this is not what it proposes. Reply 3; Tr. 22:22–23:4. Furthermore, we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not provide an adequate reason to combine Adachi with Takano and Yanai.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

    “Furthermore, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on (1) selecting an 18650-size or 26650-size cell; (2) estimating the positive electrode surface area to be 540 cm2; (3) selecting a foil thickness of 15 micrometers; (4) selecting an average discharge voltage of 3.6 volts; and (5) for 18650-size cells, connecting two in parallel. Petitioner fails to point out how the prior art indicates that using all of these particular values in combination would be desirable for a lithium-based battery pack when several other possible values could have been selected. Where “‘the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful,’ courts should reject ‘hindsight claims of obviousness.’” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,999,510 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,999,510
• Hilti, Inc. / Snap-On Incorporated v. Milwaukee Electric Tool CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01165 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable over Takano and Yanai because the obviousness analysis relied on unsupported assumptions and impermissible hindsight.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “We construed three claim terms in our Decision to Institute: (1) “hand held power tool,” (2) “battery cells being capable of producing an average battery pack discharge current greater than or equal to approximately 20 amps,” and (3) “nominal voltage.” Inst. Dec. 5–7. Neither party has indicated that the interpretations for those phrases were improper, and we do not perceive any reason or evidence that now compels any deviation from our initial determinations. Accordingly, the following interpretations are not in dispute and apply to this Decision:” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelOther

    “15 micrometers has been a common foil thickness.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 228. Patent Owner argues that using a 15-micrometer thickness for the aluminum foil current carrier is not found in either Takano or Yanai, and the selection of this value is hindsight. PO Resp. 24. Petitioner counters that there is no hindsight because Dr. Blomgren acknowledges that foil thickness is a design element “well within the skill level of a person having ordinary skill in the art and could be selected/determined by those skilled in the art without undue experimentation.” Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1119 ¶¶ 21–27, 31–33, 39, 41; Ex. 1118, 72:5–8, 94:25– 95:15, 127:25–129:14, 130:8–19; Ex. 1113 ¶¶ 12, 13, 24–27). Dr. Abraham’s statement regarding 15 micrometers having been a common foil thickness, however, is not supported adequately. Furthermore, Dr. Blomgren’s testimony that Dr. Abraham picked “a known foil thickness, maybe not the most common one, but a known foil thickness” (Ex. 1118, 72:5–8) and “[g]iven cell chemistry, cell geometry, and cell size, all other individual cell design considerations would be well within the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art” (id. at 94:25–95:15) does not establish that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a reason to choose a foil thickness of 15 micrometers for Yanai’s cell 1-4. Therefore, we are not persuaded that a sufficient rationale is given for why one of ordinary skill in the art would select this value for Yanai’s cell 1-4.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Takano, however, discloses a battery having a plurality of cells connected in series. Ex. 1072 ¶¶ 4, 11, 26. Although we do not question that connecting battery cells in series and/or parallel is known generally in the art, Petitioner does not provide adequate specific reasoning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Takano to connect cells in parallel when Takano clearly discloses a series connection. Dr. Abraham’s testimony that the type of connection would be chosen “as needed to provide whatever target voltage and amperage is desired for a particular application,” by itself, does not provide a sufficient reason to modify Takano’s series connection. Petitioner does not explain how the prior art discloses a desired voltage or amperage that would cause one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takano in the manner proposed. In this case, the only teaching of a desired amperage comes from the ’173 patent itself. Furthermore, Dr. Abraham’s reliance on the disclosure at column 5, lines 59–63, of the ’173 patent as supporting the alleged obviousness of combining two cells in parallel is improper. This passage of the ’173 patent describes alternative configurations of the patentees’ own invention; it is not describing prior art. Relying on knowledge gleaned only from the challenged patent’s disclosure is impermissible hindsight. Cf. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (As long as a judgment on obviousness “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

    “vii. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Dr. Abraham’s analysis of the proposed 18650-size and 26650-size cells is flawed and thus fails to support Petitioner’s assertion that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Takano and Yanai. Furthermore, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on (1) selecting an 18650-size or 26650-size cell; (2) estimating the positive electrode surface area to be 540 cm2; (3) selecting a foil thickness of 15 micrometers; (4) selecting an average discharge voltage of 3.6 volts; and (5) for 18650-size cells, connecting two in parallel. Petitioner fails to point out how the prior art indicates that using all of these particular values in combination would be desirable for a lithium-based battery pack when several other possible values could have been selected. Where “‘the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful,’ courts should reject ‘hindsight claims of obviousness.’” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,944,173 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,944,173

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