- Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00958 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted and IPR instituted on claims 1–28 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Linnarsson, McCloskey, and ordinary skill.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. WHETHER REHEARING IS WARRANTED Petitioner argues that we misconstrued the claims “as requiring one to add tags in a way that can provide a distinction based on a ‘polynucleotide sequence.’” Req. 6 (quoting Dec. 14 (Petitioner’s emphasis)). Petitioner is correct. More specifically, we implicitly construed the claim language reciting “a second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell,” as requiring said “distinguishing” to be based on the sequences of the sample polynucleotides. See, e.g., Dec. 14 (“[E]ach strand of cDNA that is tagged in Linnarsson is tagged regardless of the polynucleotide sequence of the cDNA or its corresponding mRNA. Thus, Linnarsson’s tags do not distinguish between ‘sample polynucleotides,’ whether cDNA or mRNA, of different sequences.”). Based on that misunderstanding, we erroneously determined that the proposed modification could not achieve the claim language, stating the following: Petitioner’s proposal appears to defeat satisfaction of another portion of claim 1, namely a “second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell.” Ex. 1001, 30:62–64. For if the second tag is “added to the CDS or TSO after extension,” as opposed to the sample polynucleotide, as Petitioner argues (Pet. 39 (emphasis added)), it would appear that the second tag would be incapable of distinguishing any sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides. Rather, the second tag would be ligated to each and every extension product bearing a CDS or TSO without regard to the sequence of any sample polynucleotide. Dec. 16. We now reconsider whether to institute.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Cited”). Because we find that the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, we proceed to part two of the analysis. 2. Advanced Bionics Part Two Patent Owner argues that the Petition “fails to show any error in the Examiner’s application during prosecution of the prior art teachings Petitioner now purports to invoke from . . . McCloskey.” Prelim Resp. 23; see also id. at 24–25 (“Revisiting the same art and arguments already overcome during prosecution is a waste of the Board’s limited resources and would unfairly burden PO.”). However, Petitioner argued that “the Examiner committed major error in Examination by erroneously stating that the prior art fails to teach a dual tagging approach when, in fact, this approach is plainly taught in both McCloskey and McCloskey II.” Pet. 67. The record supports Petitioner’s position, and we agree that the error was material to patentability. See Ex. 1005, 131 (Notice of Allowance). Accordingly, and having considered all of the Becton, Dickinson factors, we do not exercise discretionary denial.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We are persuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Linnarsson and McCloskey with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to obtain the claimed subject matter. 8. Conclusion as to Claim 1 There is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in proving that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“the three references is analogous art to the ’013 patent as opposed to each other. Prelim. Resp. 46 (citing Pet. 35; Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). As Sanofi- Aventis holds, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, the Petition should not be denied for failing to state explicitly that the cited prior art references are analogous art to the ’013 patent. Rather, as Sanofi-Aventis further held: “A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to ‘respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.’” Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23). Accordingly, we need not address this issue for purposes of deciding whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,697,013 - Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00955 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing granted and IPR instituted on claims 1–26; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Linnarsson and McCloskey.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. WHETHER REHEARING IS WARRANTED Petitioner argues that we misconstrued the claims “as requiring one to add tags in a way that can ‘provide a distinction based on a polynucleotide’s sequence.’” Req. 6 (quoting Dec. 15 (Petitioner’s emphasis)). Petitioner is correct. More specifically, we implicitly construed the claim language reciting “a second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell,” as requiring said “distinguishing” to be based on the sequences of the sample polynucleotides. See, e.g., Dec. 14 (“[E]ach strand of cDNA that is tagged in Linnarsson is tagged regardless of the polynucleotide sequence of the cDNA or its corresponding mRNA. Thus, Linnarsson’s tags do not distinguish between ‘sample polynucleotides,’ whether cDNA or mRNA, of different sequences.”). Based on that misunderstanding, we denied the Petition because “adding a second tag sequence to Linnarsson’s CDS and/or TSO would do nothing to achieve such a distinction,” i.e., “a distinction based on a polynucleotide’s sequence.” Id. at 15. That was error. We now reconsider whether to institute.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“the ’197 patent. See Ex. 1001, code (56) (listing McCloskey II under “References Cited”). Because we find that the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, we proceed to part two of the analysis.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We are persuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Linnarsson and McCloskey to obtain the claimed subject matter. 6. Conclusion as to Claim 1 There is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in proving that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). As Sanofi-Aventis holds, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, the Petition should not be denied for failing to state explicitly that the cited prior art references are analogous art to the ’197 patent. Rather, as Sanofi-Aventis further held: “A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to ‘respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.’” Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23). Accordingly, we need not address this issue for purposes of deciding whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,240,197 - PTAB · Nov 14, 2017 · IPR2015-01802 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Rehearing
Granted rehearing and held claims 2, 4, and 6 unpatentable as obvious over Rabinovich because the wireless-network limitation encompasses a connection through a wireless hub.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub. Because we determine that the “wireless network” recited in dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 need not be an ad hoc network, Patent Owner’s argument that Rabinovich’s replication method would have been unsuitable for use over an ad hoc network does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s showing. Having considered the arguments and evidence of both parties, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Rabinovich.” slip op. at 7
- ExcludeNot reached
“We decline to assess the merits of Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude. Even without excluding the identified evidence, we have concluded that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,904,680 - Prime Focus Creative Services Canada Inc. v. Legend3d, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · May 16, 2017 · IPR2016-01491 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19 as obvious over Sandrew alone; other proposed grounds remained unauthorized.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Id. “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“clearly presented, we nonetheless overlooked Petitioner’s alternative reliance on Sandrew alone in as teaching or suggesting the claimed copying, particularly when taken in context of the anticipation ground based on Sandrew for which we instituted review. As stated in our Decision, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19 as anticipated by Sandrew. Dec. on Inst. 14. Petitioner’s anticipation challenge based on Sandrew, therefore, identified where it contends each element of claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19 of the ’941 patent is disclosed by Sandrew. Pet. 15–25. Petitioner’s obviousness challenge based on Sandrew alone relies upon these same contentions. Id. at 25–26. As such and based on the foregoing discussion, we find that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relying on Sandrew alone shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing only as to claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“Petitioner fails to explain in the record before us how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the teachings of Sandrew, Yuille, and various other references to arrive at the elements recited in claims 4, 11– 13, and 24. For instance, the Petition asserts, and the Request repeats, the following: “Yuille discloses express mathematical algorithms that can almost be cut and copied into the method of Sandrew to yield the invention of the ‘941 Patent.” Reh’g Req. 3 (quoting Pet. 36) (emphasis omitted). As Petitioner recognizes in the Request, this argument is directed to the copying of claim 1, and specifically to meeting an allegation that Sandrew and Yuille together teach automated copying, assuming automation is required by claim 1. Id. at 3–5. Setting aside whether claim 1 actually requires automated copying, as well as whether the alleged combination teaches or suggests automated copying, Petitioner’s articulated rationale to combine the teachings of Sandrew and Yuille does not address how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine their respective teachings not directed to automated copying. For instance, Petitioner fails to address why one would combine the teachings of Yuille with Sandrew to account for the following limitations: (1) the reshaping recited in claims 4, 6–10, and 24; (2) the moving and reshaping of a second mask comprising a polygon, curve, or both recited in claim 11; and (3) the polygon and Bezier curve animation recited in claims 12 and 13. See Pet. 27–34, 42–45. Because Petitioner’s articulated rationale is divorced from the specific limitations required by the claims, we determine Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that each of claims 4, 6–13, and 24 are obvious over the combination of Sandrew, Yuille, and various other references.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,286,941 - Plaid Technologies, Inc. v. Yodlee, Inc. And Yodlee.Com, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Aug 12, 2016 · IPR2016-00275 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Plaid’s rehearing request and maintained denial of institution because Plaid failed to show good cause to excuse late service and an incomplete, time-barred petition.
RulingsRehearing decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDenied
“treatment of the service issue. Our regulations state that a filing date will not be accorded to a Petition until, among other things, service is effected. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.105(a), 42.106(a). The undisputed evidence put forth by Plaid indicates that it did not attempt to serve Yodlee with the Petition and supporting evidence until December 3, 2015. See Req. Reh’g 2; Ex. 1022 ¶ 9. In our Decision, we applied the regulations to the particular facts of this case and “determine[d] that December 3, 201[5], is the earliest date by which Plaid satisfied the service requirement for according the Petition a filing date.” Dec. 7 (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.105(a), 42.106(a)). Therefore, we maintained the initial filing date accorded to the Petition, which was one day after the statutory deadline under § 315(b), and we termed Plaid’s service activities to be “late service.”1 Dec. 6–7. Indeed, Plaid would have had no reason to file a motion to change the filing date had its actions not been “late.” Moreover, our Decision expressly stated that we did not need to “address whether, under appropriate circumstances, we have authority to grant an earlier filing date.” Dec. 8. Rather, our Decision focused on whether Plaid had shown good cause to waive the service requirements imposed by 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.105(a) and 42.106(a). Id. at 8–10. Irrespective of the interplay among the relevant regulations and statutory deadline under § 315(b), we found that Plaid had not shown good cause and that it was not in the interests of justice to excuse Plaid’s late service under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) and (c)(3). See id. Among other reasons, we were not persuaded that waiting for potential changes from a declarant constituted good cause for Plaid to delay its filing and eventual service of the Petition and supporting evidence. See Dec. 8–9. We also weighed the potential” slip op. at 3
- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,199,077
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.