- Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2016 · IPR2016-00277 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and maintained its denial of institution for claims 1–18 because the petition did not show Lewis disclosed or rendered obvious the supporting limitations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“and the “specific records in the Petition and the Phillips Declaration (Ex. 1105) have been overlooked by the Board.” Reh’g Req. 3. For the “supporting” limitations, Petitioner proceeds to discuss excerpts from Lewis and the Phillips Declaration that Petitioner discussed on pages 24 and 25 of the Petition, i.e., Ex. 1102, 5:12–21, 9:7–13; and Ex. 1105 ¶¶ 61, 62. Id. at 5–7. But these are virtually the same excerpts from the record that we noted in the Decision. Dec. 9–10. Thus, Petitioner has not identified any aspect of the record that we overlooked. Moreover, the Petition discussed these excerpts from Lewis and the Phillips Declaration in the context of the asserted anticipation ground, not with respect to any of the obviousness grounds. Pet. 24–25; see also Dec. 12 (stating “Petitioner does not, however, contend that the ‘supporting’ limitations would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill”). The Rehearing Request does not identify any assertion or discussion in the Petition that Lewis would have suggested the “supporting” limitations to a person of ordinary skill in the art, or that the “supporting” limitations would otherwise have been obvious to a skilled artisan in view of Lewis. Nor have we found any such discussion. Instead, in discussing claim 1, the Petition’s obviousness discussion focused on the “flexible resilient ring” limitation, asserting that “[t]he cited portions of Lewis . . . establish . . . that the sealing ring in Lewis is both flexible and resilient.” Pet. 36. Accordingly, we decline to rehear our decision on the basis of an argument raised for the first time in a rehearing request.2” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“11. We noted that Petitioner did not identify any express disclosure in Lewis of the “supporting” limitations, and that, on the contrary, Lewis “can be read to disclose the opposite, i.e., that the housing supports the ring.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102, 4:24–26). We also determined that Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that Lewis inherently discloses a ring that supports the coupling segments in a preassembled state. Id. Petitioner had argued that “Lewis discloses that the housing and the sealing ring have a matching geometry . . . and therefor mutually support one another as the pipes are inserted into the pre-assembled coupling.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1102, 5:15–21, 15:17–20, Fig. 1). Petitioner also contended that “[w]hen the housing includes multiple segments and multiple fastening elements that are loosely positioned in a preassembled state . . . the sealing ring’s outer diameter supports the housing segments that are positioned on, and surround the ring.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102, 5:12–14). We determined, however, that “merely because Lewis’ housing and sealing ring have a ‘matching geometry’ does not necessarily mean that they ‘mutually support one another.’” Dec. 12. Having determined that Petitioner had not shown that Lewis discloses, either expressly or inherently, the “supporting” limitations, we noted that Petitioner did not argue that the “supporting” limitations would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in light of Lewis. Id. Thus, we determined that Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness grounds. Dec. 12–13.” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“11. We noted that Petitioner did not identify any express disclosure in Lewis of the “supporting” limitations, and that, on the contrary, Lewis “can be read to disclose the opposite, i.e., that the housing supports the ring.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102, 4:24–26). We also determined that Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that Lewis inherently discloses a ring that supports the coupling segments in a preassembled state. Id. Petitioner had argued that “Lewis discloses that the housing and the sealing ring have a matching geometry . . . and therefor mutually support one another as the pipes are inserted into the pre-assembled coupling.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1102, 5:15–21, 15:17–20, Fig. 1). Petitioner also contended that “[w]hen the housing includes multiple segments and multiple fastening elements that are loosely positioned in a preassembled state . . . the sealing ring’s outer diameter supports the housing segments that are positioned on, and surround the ring.” Id. (citing Ex. 1102, 5:12–14). We determined, however, that “merely because Lewis’ housing and sealing ring have a ‘matching geometry’ does not necessarily mean that they ‘mutually support one another.’” Dec. 12.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Having determined that Petitioner had not shown that Lewis discloses, either expressly or inherently, the “supporting” limitations, we noted that Petitioner did not argue that the “supporting” limitations would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in light of Lewis. Id. Thus, we determined that Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness grounds. Dec. 12–13.” slip op. at 3
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,733,799 - Eastman Kodak Co. / Agfa Corp. et al. v. CTP Innovations, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 21, 2016 · IPR2014-00790 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving claims 1–3 not shown unpatentable because the petition did not establish that a plate-ready file was RIPed at the central service facility.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“(d) Rehearing. . . . The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“contrary, we understood that Petitioner relied on Jebens and Dorfman to teach the separate end user, central service, and printing company facilities. Final Dec. 23–24, 31. We noted, however, that neither Jebens nor Dorfman teaches generating a plate-ready file as we construed the term above, i.e., a file that has gone through prepress processing and that has been RIPed. Id. at 26, 32. We further noted that although Apogee teaches generating a plateready file from a PDF file, “Petitioner does not assert, much less point us to any evidence, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Jebens and Apogee in such a way that a plate-ready file would have been produced at Jebens’ host facility . . . rather than at its printing facility.” Id. at 27–28; see also id. at 32. Recognizing that neither Jebens nor Dorfman discloses teaches generating a plate-ready file, we understand Petitioner’s argument to be that, to meet the claim language, Petitioner only needed to show that its proposed combinations teach generating at a central service facility files of any type. This is incorrect. It is not sufficient that the proposed combination generates any file, e.g., a PDF file that has not been RIPed, at a central service facility. RIPing is the final, and necessary, step in creating a plate-ready file. Thus, Petitioner needed to establish that the file alleged to be the plate-ready file generated at a central service facility had been RIPed at the central service facility. Petitioner relied on Apogee to teach RIPing a file to create a plate-ready file, not to teach that RIPing occurred someplace other than at the printer. That is why we determined that Petitioner’s showing was insufficient. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended Petitioner’s obviousness grounds.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,611,349 - Eastman Kodak Co. / Agfa Corp. et al. v. CTP Innovations, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 21, 2016 · IPR2014-00791 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that claims 10–14 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Petitioner had the burden to identify and explain the specific evidence that supports its arguments in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Thus, the Petition needed to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable,” and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner’s Rehearing Request relies on evidence—Apogee Excerpt 2—and argument—that Apogee teaches providing a plate-ready file to a remote printer—that were not presented in the Petition. In the Petition, Petitioner consistently relied on Apogee to teach generation of a plate-ready file. Pet. 27‒28, 39, 40‒41, 48‒49, 53, 57. In doing so, it relied on Apogee Excerpt 1. Petitioner did not, however, in either its Petition or Reply, argue that Apogee teaches providing a plate-ready file to a remote printer. Instead, it relied on Jebens or Dorfman to teach this limitation. Id. at 41, 57. Moreover, Petitioner failed to refer us to Apogee Excerpt 2, even after Patent Owner expressly disputed that Apogee teaches generating a plate-ready file anywhere other than “at a printing company facility.” PO Resp. 32. Accordingly, we are not persuaded to grant Petitioner’s Rehearing Request on the basis of this newly cited evidence and new argument.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“example, we expressly characterized Petitioner’s position regarding Jebens and Apogee to be that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Apogee into the Jebens printing system to allow for a printing facility to produce a printing plate for offset printing.” Final Dec. 26 (citing Pet. 29). We noted, however, that Jebens does not teach generating a plate-ready file as we construed the term above, i.e., a file that has gone through prepress processing and that has been RIPed. Id. at 25.5 We further noted that although Apogee teaches generating a plate-ready file from a PDF file, “Petitioner does not point us to any evidence—in Jebens, Apogee, or otherwise—that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Jebens and Apogee in such a way that a plate-ready file would have been produced at Jebens’ host facilities or end user facility rather than at its printing facility.” Id. at 26; see also id. at 30 (“Petitioner has not shown that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to produce the plate-ready file anywhere other than at Dorfman’s production printing system”). We understand Petitioner’s argument to be that it only needed to show that the proposed combinations provide files of any type to a printer in order to meet the step of “providing a plate-ready file to the 5 We applied the same reasoning to the Dorfman/Apogee ground. Id. at 30. printing company facility.” This is incorrect. It is not sufficient that the proposed combinations provide any file, e.g., a PDF file that has not been RIPed, to a printer. RIPing is the final, and necessary, step in creating a plate-ready file. Thus, Petitioner needed to establish that the file that the proposed combinations provided to the printer had been RIPed before transmission. Neither Jebens nor Dorfman alone teaches this; further Petitioner relied on Apogee to teach RIPing a file to create a plate-ready file, not to teach that RIPing occurred someplace other than at the printer. That is why we determined that Petitioner’s showing was insufficient. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended Petitioner’s obviousness grounds.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Petitioner had the burden to identify and explain the specific evidence that supports its arguments in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Thus, the Petition needed to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable,” and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner’s Rehearing Request relies on evidence—Apogee Excerpt 2—and argument—that Apogee teaches providing a plate-ready file to a remote printer—that were not presented in the Petition. In the Petition, Petitioner consistently relied on Apogee to teach generation of a plate-ready file. Pet. 27‒28, 39, 40‒41, 48‒49, 53, 57. In doing so, it relied on Apogee Excerpt 1. Petitioner did not, however, in either its Petition or Reply, argue that Apogee teaches providing a plate-ready file to a remote printer. Instead, it relied on Jebens or Dorfman to teach this limitation. Id. at 41, 57. Moreover, Petitioner failed to refer us to Apogee Excerpt 2, even after Patent Owner expressly disputed that Apogee teaches generating a plate-ready file anywhere other than “at a printing company facility.” PO Resp. 32. Accordingly, we are not persuaded to grant Petitioner’s Rehearing Request on the basis of this newly cited evidence and new argument.” slip op. at 7
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,611,349 - PTAB · Jul 5, 2016 · IPR2016-00434 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the sole claim would be unpatentable under the proposed obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“On this record, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with regard to any of the proposed grounds of unpatentability. III. CONCLUSION Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, we are not persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one alleged ground of unpatentability with respect to the claim of the ’132 patent. IV.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“In addition, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that, even if properly considered secondary references, a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have used these references to modify the Lotus Carat such that the result would be the patented design. Prelim. Resp. 10–13. Petitioner appears to have selectively chosen certain design features of the secondary references (the mixing of stones of different cuts) while deliberately ignoring other design features of those references just so the claimed design would result. For example, Petitioner does not explain the other clear differences between the Heritage Art Deco Ring, which appears to have a square center stone sitting at a higher plane than the surrounding peripheral stones, and the patented design. See Ex. 1015, 4. This selective use of the design characteristics of the prior art suggests that it is driven by a hindsight reconstruction of the invention rather than the objective teachings of the references. There is nothing on this record to suggest that an ordinary jewelry designer would have considered the use of single-cut periphery stones without the corresponding change in height difference and shape relative to the center stone. Moreover, Petitioner does not address any of the other differences between the Lotus Carat and the patented design, as discussed above. In summary, we agree with Patent Owner that there is no evidence, aside from Petitioner’s conclusory attorney argument, that the selective combination of design features of the applied references is driven by the teachings of the references, as opposed to an effort to reconstruct the claimed invention using the ’132 patent’s own disclosure.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner
“considered secondary references, a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have used these references to modify the Lotus Carat such that the result would be the patented design. Prelim. Resp. 10–13. Petitioner appears to have selectively chosen certain design features of the secondary references (the mixing of stones of different cuts) while deliberately ignoring other design features of those references just so the claimed design would result. For example, Petitioner does not explain the other clear differences between the Heritage Art Deco Ring, which appears to have a square center stone sitting at a higher plane than the surrounding peripheral stones, and the patented design. See Ex. 1015, 4. This selective use of the design characteristics of the prior art suggests that it is driven by a hindsight reconstruction of the invention rather than the objective teachings of the references. There is nothing on this record to suggest that an ordinary jewelry designer would have considered the use of single-cut periphery stones without the corresponding change in height difference and shape relative to the center stone. Moreover, Petitioner does not address any of the other differences between the Lotus Carat and the patented design, as discussed above. In summary, we agree with Patent Owner that there is no evidence, aside from Petitioner’s conclusory attorney argument, that the selective combination of design features of the applied references is driven by the teachings of the references, as opposed to an effort to reconstruct the claimed invention using the ’132 patent’s own disclosure.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“We, like the District Court (id. at 30–31), determine that there is no need to provide at this time a verbal description of the claimed design. The parties’ description may be helpful in analyzing some aspects of the ’132 patent. However, the description is not a complete construction of the ’132 patent’s claim. The description focuses on only a portion of the design shown in Figures 1 and 2. Id. For example, there is no discussion of height of the stones relative to each other, as shown in Figure 2 of the ’132 patent. Id. In addition, as a construction, this description would improperly focus on the design concept of the ’132 patent rather than the overall visual appearance. See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 104 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For purposes of this Decision, we conclude that it is unnecessary to construe the claim of the ’132 patent in words and instead rely on the drawings shown in Figures 1 and 2 for our analysis below. D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness - Zhongshan Broad-Ocean Motor Co. Ltd. v. Nidec Motor CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2016 · IPR2015-00465 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 7, and 18 are unpatentable as anticipated by Mullin and Pant; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable, and the motion to amend was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“the ‘first sensing circuit’ and the ‘second sensing circuit’ sense power simultaneously,” and further argues “[n]or does Patent Owner present any argument with reference to, e.g., the 459 Patent specification or prosecution history as to why this additional limitation should be read into this claim.” Pet. Reply 23. Petitioner’s reply, however, fails to recognize that Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that Mullin anticipates the claim, including providing sufficient evidence and argument in support of its proposed claim interpretation. The Petition fails to provide a sufficient explanation to support that “when both” should be construed in the manner asserted by Petitioner, particularly when the more natural reading of the claim language conveys that two sensing circuits sense power at the same time. Although Petitioner provided a second declaration from Mr. McAlexander in reply to Patent Owner’s response, neither that declaration nor Mr. McAlexander’s first declaration provides sufficient support for how claim 2 would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill to show that it is anticipated by Mullin. See Exs. 1007 and 1011. Because Petitioner failed to persuasively prove that claim 2 requires only that one of two sensors senses power for the motor controller to determine that power is applied to the second input, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 of the ’459 patent is anticipated by Mullin.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Mot. 15. Patent Owner’s attorney argument, which cites no evidence, does not support the contention that the proposed amended claim would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually when unpatentability is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Even if each prior art reference is “missing at least two of the required limitations,” that has limited bearing on whether a combination of those references renders the claim obvious. Similarly, Patent Owner provides insufficient support for its implicit argument that one would not combine the references because, individually, they provide a “complete solution” to the problem they intend to address. Where “a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Thus, Patent Owner’s suggestion that there “is no reason one of skill would engage in mixing and matching,” fails to adequately address whether the combination would have been obvious. See Mot. 15.” slip op. at 28
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We agree with Petitioner that, for Mullin to anticipate claim 1, Mullin need not disclose power sensed at COM. See Pet. Reply 19–22. The claim language does not require power to be sensed at any specific location, only that one sensing circuit senses “power applied to” the first and second inputs, and the other senses “power applied to” the second and third inputs. Patent Owner does not direct us to any persuasive disclosure in the ’459 patent to support its contention that claim 1 requires that power be sensed at the second input. See PO Resp. 21–26. Similarly, although Dr. Horenstein states that “the Mullin circuit is incapable of providing unique information that power has been connected to COM,” a point not in dispute, Dr. Horenstein provides only conclusory assertions and no persuasive explanation for why claim 1 would be understood to require such “unique information” for the second input. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 56, 63. Moreover, in Mullin, when a sensor detects power at either P2 or P3, power is necessarily applied to COM (neutral) to complete the circuit, even if the sensor does not directly detect power at COM. As Dr. Horenstein explained, “at least two inputs from the source of AC power – generally line and neutral – would have to be connected in order to complete the circuit and enable the flow of power to the motor.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 53. Mr. McAlexander similarly explained that by the very nature of alternating current, “the flow of electric charge periodically reverses direction.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 12. Thus, when alternating current is applied to Mullin’s input P2 and COM it will “be input from the input P2 and return by way of the COM, and at other times it will be input from the COM and return by way of the input P2.” Id. ¶ 13. The same is true of P3 and COM. See id. As shown by Petitioner, Dr. Horenstein confirmed during cross-examination that, when AC power, as referred to in Mullin, is applied to the power input P2 and common input COM as shown above, the opto-isolator ISO1 senses this power and outputs a corresponding signal, [and] when Mullin’s AC power is applied to the power input P3 and common input COM as shown above, the opto-isolator ISO2 senses this power and outputs a corresponding signal. Pet. Reply 22; see also Ex. 1010, 68:24–69:19. Accordingly, the testimony of Mr. McAlexander and Dr. Horenstein supports our determination that Mullin discloses a first sensing circuits that “senses power applied to the first and second inputs” and a second sensing circuit that “senses power applied to the second and third inputs,” as well as a motor controller that is “operable for determining that power is applied to the first input when the first sensing circuit senses power,” as required by claim 1.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 104–105. Thus, Dr. Horenstein contends there is a lack of a motivation to combine the references because opto-couplers are simpler and require fewer parts than the current based sensor of Nordby. In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of its “teaching, suggestion, motivation” test in favor of an expansive and flexible approach. 550 U.S. at 415. The Supreme Court noted that often, it will be necessary: to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. Id. at 418. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has explained that: an implicit motivation to combine exists not only when a suggestion may be gleaned from the prior art as a whole, but when the “improvement” is technology-independent and the combination of references results in a product or process that is more desirable for example because it is stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient. Because the desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal – and even common-sensical – we have held that there exists in these situations a motivation to combine prior art references even absent any hint of suggestion in the references themselves. In such situations, the proper question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and skills rendering him capable of combining the prior art references. Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In this case, Patent Owner’s contention that there is no motivation to substitute one sensor for another is not supported by anything beyond conclusory statements. Moreover, contrary to the assertion that voltage and current sensors are “not substitutable,” Nordby expressly states that “[v]oltage (potential) sensing may be used, or alternately, current (flow) sensing may be used. Since the sensing scheme is used only to detect the presence or absence of voltage or current on the sensed line and does not require any significant accuracy, the cost of either type of sense circuitry can be made very low.” Ex. 1004, 4:43–48. In light of the evidence that current and voltage sensors were known to be interchangeable, Patent Owner’s contention that there was “no reason one of skill would have sought to replace those voltage based opto-isolator systems with the bulky current transformer and attendant circuitry of Nordby,” is insufficient to demonstrate the combination of references was not obvious. See Mot. 16.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 8,049,459 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,049,459 - Google Inc. / Apple Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · CBM2015-00040 · APJ Michael R Zecher · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Stefik and obvious over Stefik with ordinary skill; the motion to amend is granted for substitute claim 37.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“claims of the ’280 patent at issue in this proceeding based on the same grounds of unpatentability. The Petition in Case CBM2015-00160 was accompanied by a Motion for Joinder that requests we join Apple as a party to this proceeding. Pursuant to § 324 and § 18(a) of the AIA, we instituted another covered business method patent review proceeding as to claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent, and then granted Apple’s Motion for Joinder. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. Instead, the relevant inquiry here is whether Petitioners have set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. When describing examples of what may constitute a sufficient rationale to combine, the Court held that, “[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and 50 there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Upon considering the record in its entirety, we are satisfied that Petitioners’ rationale for modifying Stefik by allowing a NSOR to be exercised at a different time from a usage right suffices as an articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings that justifies the legal conclusion of obviousness. We first address whether a design need or market pressure existed to solve a particular problem, and then we turn to whether there were a finite number of identified, predictable solutions. As to the first inquiry, both the Background of the Invention of the ’280 patent and Stefik serve as evidence that there was a need to address particular problems associated with exercising and enforcing the rights of content owners during the distribution and use of their digital works in a multi-level distribution scheme. Ex. 1001, 1:29–61; Ex. 1002, 1:23–2:48.” slip op. at 50
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“’280 patent provides an explicit definition for the claim term “meta-right.” Dec. on Inst. 16. In particular, the specification discloses that “[m]eta-rights are the rights that one has to generate, manipulate, modify, dispose of or otherwise derive other rights.” Ex. 1001, 5:47–49. By using the verb “are” following “meta-rights,” the specification sets forth an explicit definition for this claim term with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. See Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. Notably, nothing in the specification contradicts this definition of the claim term “meta-right” or suggests another definition for this claim term. We, therefore, do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that this cited disclosure in the specification is only one of many fundamental characteristics pertaining to a meta-right. PO Resp. 23. Although we agree with Patent Owner that it is proper to consult the entire specification of the ’280 patent to interpret what the patentee meant by the claim term “meta-right” (PO Resp. 19–22), we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the specification further defines the claim term “meta-right” to import a negative limitation into the claims—namely, “a right that . . . is not itself a usage right because exercising a meta-right does not result in action to content” (id. at 23–25). For convenience, the relevant portion of the specification relied upon by Patent Owner is reproduced below:” slip op. at 27
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the claim must be shown in a single prior reference, arranged as in the claim.” Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[A] reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles stated above in mind.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 7,774,280 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,774,280 - Google Inc. / Apple Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · CBM2015-00160 · APJ Michael R Zecher · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Stefik and obvious over Stefik with ordinary skill knowledge; the contingent motion to substitute claim 37 is granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“claims of the ’280 patent at issue in this proceeding based on the same grounds of unpatentability. The Petition in Case CBM2015-00160 was accompanied by a Motion for Joinder that requests we join Apple as a party to this proceeding. Pursuant to § 324 and § 18(a) of the AIA, we instituted another covered business method patent review proceeding as to claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent, and then granted Apple’s Motion for Joinder. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“transitional program for covered business method patents of claims 1, 5, 11, 12, and 22 of U.S. Patent No. 7,774,280 B2 (“the ’280 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented in the Preliminary Response, we determined that the information presented in the Petition establishes that claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent are more likely than not unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103(a). We, however, determined that the information presented in the Petition did not establish that claims 12 and 22 of the ’280 patent are more likely than not unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324 and § 18(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011) (“AIA”),2 we instituted this covered business method patent review proceeding on June 24, 2015, only as to claims 1, 5, and 11 of the ’280 patent. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“2. Level of Skill in the Art There is sufficient evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge level of a person with ordinary skill in the art. Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Goldberg, attests that a person with ordinary skill in the art in the relevant time frame would be an individual who (1) possesses a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field; and (2) has at least two years of experience with digital content distribution and/or computer security. Ex. 1014 ¶ 10. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Martin, agrees with Dr. Goldberg’s assessment. Compare Ex. 1014 ¶ 10, with Ex. 2009 ¶ 16. In addition, we note that the prior art of record in this proceeding—namely, Stefik—is indicative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 48
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“8. Summary For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed, substitute independent claim 37 satisfies the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.221 and is patentable over the prior art. Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s request to cancel independent claim 1 of the ’280 patent and replace it with proposed, substitute independent claim 37.” slip op. at 72
Patent outcomesUS 7,774,280 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,774,280 - Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 13, 2016 · IPR2016-00277 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Lewis, alone or with the other references, disclosed or rendered obvious the supporting limitations of claims 1–18.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the . . . claim.” Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989). We have examined the record, and in particular those portions of the record relied upon by Petitioner, and are not persuaded that Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that Lewis anticipates any of claims 1–5 and 18. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that Lewis discloses, either expressly or inherently, the “supporting” limitations. First, Petitioner does not identify, and we do not find, any express disclosure in Lewis that the sealing ring supports either the one-piece or two-piece housing when the coupling is in the claimed preassembled state. On the contrary, as Patent Owner points out, Lewis’ Specification can be read to disclose the opposite, i.e., that the housing supports the ring. For example, Lewis discloses “an annular sealing gasket located within the housing and supported by the inner peripheral wall thereof.” Ex. 1102, 4:24–26. Second, we do not find evidence sufficient to establish that these limitations are inherent in Lewis. “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with Patent Owner that merely because Lewis’ housing and sealing ring have a “matching geometry” does not necessarily mean that they “mutually support one another.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“limitations are inherent in Lewis. “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with Patent Owner that merely because Lewis’ housing and sealing ring have a “matching geometry” does not necessarily mean that they “mutually support one another.”” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“C. Claims 1–5 and 18— Obviousness over Lewis Petitioner contends that “[t]o the extent that the relied upon sections of Lewis describe the claim limitations with a slightly different language than what is recited in the challenged claims, in the presence of such differences, the claimed subject matter as a whole is rendered obvious by teachings and suggestions in Lewis.” Pet. 35–36. Petitioner does not, however, contend that the “supporting” limitations would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill. As discussed above, we are not persuaded that Lewis discloses the “supporting” limitations. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the challenged claims would have been obvious over Lewis. D. Claims 6, 12, and 16—Obviousness over Lewis and Blakely Claims 6, 12, and 16 depend from claim 1, and, inter alia, additionally require that the sealing member have a tongue. Petitioner contends that these claims would have been obvious over Lewis and Blakely. Pet. 42–47. But Petitioner does not rely on Blakely to teach the “supporting” limitations. Therefore, Blakely cannot cure the defect noted above with respect to Lewis. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to this proposed ground. E. Claims 7–11 and 13–15—Obviousness over Lewis, Blakely, and Wolfsdorf Claims 7–11 and 13–15 depend from claim 1, and recite additional limitations concerning the claimed sealing member. Petitioner contends that these claims would have been obvious over Lewis, Blakely, and Wolfsdorf. Pet. 47–53. But Petitioner does not rely on either Blakely or Wolfsdorf to teach the “supporting” limitations. Therefore, neither of these references can cure the defect noted in Lewis noted above. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to this proposed ground.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,733,799 - Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 13, 2016 · IPR2016-00276 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Vieregge anticipated or rendered obvious any challenged claim, particularly as to the supporting limitations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the . . . claim.” Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). We have examined the record, in particular those portions of the record relied upon by Petitioner, and are not persuaded that Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that Vieregge anticipates any of claims 1, 3–7, 9, 12, 13, and 16–18. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that Vieregge discloses, either expressly or inherently, the “supporting” limitations. slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the . . . claim.” Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). We have examined the record, in particular those portions of the record relied upon by Petitioner, and are not persuaded that Petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that Vieregge anticipates any of claims 1, 3–7, 9, 12, 13, and 16–18. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that Vieregge discloses, either expressly or inherently, the “supporting” limitations. First, Petitioner does not identify, and we do not find, any express disclosure in Vieregge that the sealing ring supports either the one-piece or two-piece housing when the coupling is in the claimed preassembled state. On the contrary, as Patent Owner points out, Vieregge’s Specification can be read to disclose the opposite, i.e., that the housing supports the ring. For example, Vieregge teaches that “[i]rrespective of whether the housing is of one-, two- or multi-part design . . . the seal is supported circumferentially on the housing” when the housing is closed. Ex. 1003, 6:4:14. See also id. at 13:27–30 (“The seal 32, which is designed as a ring seal, extends in a first annular chamber 40, which is closed both at the bottom and circumferentially, giving support for the seal 32 over the surface thereof.”). slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We have also reviewed the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Samuel R. Phillips, P.E., and do not find it persuasive that Vieregge either expressly or inherently discloses the “supporting” limitations. Mr. Phillips testifies in relevant part that Vieregge’s housing segments are described as being “low weight” and including “receptacles with a geometry that matches the sealing ring’s geometry.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 68. Mr. Phillips concludes that “Vieregge’s sealing ring that is made of rubber has the dimensions, material properties and requisite stiffness to support the light-weight housing segments.” Id. This testimony merely restates what is in the Petition, and is conclusory.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“C. Claims 1 and 3–18, Obviousness over Vieregge Petitioner contends that “[t]o the extent that the relied upon sections of Vieregge describe the claim limitations with a slightly different language than what is recited in the challenged claims, in the presence of such differences, the claimed subject matter as a whole is rendered obvious by teachings and suggestions in Vieregge.” Pet. 41. Petitioner does not, however, contend that the “supporting” limitations would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill. As discussed above, we are not persuaded that Vieregge discloses the “supporting” limitations. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the challenged claims would have been obvious over Vieregge. D. Claims 2, Obviousness over Vieregge and either Katis, Tribe, or McLennan Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and additionally recites “wherein at least one of said pipe elements has a circumferential groove in an outer surface thereof, said groove being positioned in spaced relation to an end of said at least one pipe element, at least one of said surfaces on each of said segments being engageable with said groove.” Petitioner contends that claim 2 would have been obvious over Vieregge and either Katis, Tribe, or McLennan. But Petitioner does not rely on any of Katis, Tribe, or McLennan to teach the supporting limitations. Therefore, none of these references can cure the defect noted above.” slip op. at 12
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,733,799 - VSR Industries, Inc. v. Cole Kepro International, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 25, 2016 · IPR2015-00182 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are held unpatentable: claims 1–8 and 10–14 as obvious over Fraley and Okada, Runte, and Smith; claim 9 as obvious over Runte.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not identify any disclosure in the Specification disclaiming non-upright cabinets or indicating that only upright housings qualify as cabinets. See Tr. 31:1–32:17. The portion of the Specification on which Patent Owner relies simply describes that the cabinet has a front and back, which does not support Patent Owner’s proposal that a cabinet must be upright. See id. (citing Ex. 1001, 3:58–65); PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:3). In any event, the Specification makes clear that this description is of one embodiment (Ex. 1001, 3:55), and that “cabinet 22 need not have the specific configuration illustrated.” Id. at 4:14–15. Indeed, the Specification repeatedly emphasizes that the described embodiments are merely illustrative and non-limiting. See id. at 3:37–42, 10:62–67. Patent Owner’s arguments based on Fraley are also unpersuasive because the cited portion of Fraley merely refers to “a box-like cabinet or housing 10” that is shown in the figures as being taller than it is wide, but does not suggest that a housing must be taller than it is wide in order to qualify as a cabinet. See Ex. 1003, 3:4–5, Fig. 2. Accordingly, we do not accept Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “cabinet.” Having decided that a “cabinet” as recited in claims 1 and 8 need not be “upright,” we do not perceive that further explication of the meaning of “cabinet” is necessary. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Looking first at Patent Owner’s proposal, the intrinsic record does not support that the features included therein are necessary to the meaning of a gaming controller. Patent Owner’s construction is based primarily on the Specification’s disclosure of capabilities that the controller “may” have. For example, in support of the random number generator feature, Patent Owner cites the ’814 patent’s disclosure that “the controller may be arranged to generate a signal . . . based on a determined random outcome for the game.” Id. at 17 (quoting Ex. 1001, 5:43–45) (emphasis added). Similarly, Patent Owner’s proposal that the controller must operate a plurality of peripheral devices is based on the disclosure that the controller “may” be arranged to receive an input signal from a coin acceptor and bill acceptor and “may” also control other mechanisms associated with the device. See id. at 17–18; Ex. 1001, 5:31–56. We are not persuaded that a skilled artisan would understand these features, which are described as optional in the Specification, to inhere in the meaning of a gaming controller. With respect to providing data to the video display, we note that claims 1 and 8 expressly recite as a separate limitation that the gaming controller is “connected to said video display to provide game information for display by said video display.” It is, therefore, unnecessary to repeat this feature as part of the construction of “gaming controller.” Turning to Petitioner’s proposal, the Specification supports that the controller can include software, hardware, or both. See Ex. 1001, 5:63–65. Patent Owner argues that “a general purpose controller which ‘can be programmed to control game play’ is not encompassed by a BRI of this term” because the language of claims 1 and 8 indicates that the controller is configured to provide game information to the video display. See PO Resp. 16. We agree with Patent Owner that hardware or software that has not been programmed to control gaming but is capable of being so programmed is not yet a gaming controller. Therefore, we construe “gaming controller” to mean “hardware and/or software that is programmed to control game play.”” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the field of this invention would have had a diploma from a high school or vocational school and at least five years of relevant experience, or seven years of experience without a diploma. See Pet. 10. Patent Owner argues that five years of relevant experience is sufficient. See PO Resp. 11. We note that the difference in the parties’ proposals is fairly minor. Our analysis below, including the conclusions we reach, would be substantially the same under either party’s proposal. Nevertheless, after considering the evidence of record, we agree with Patent Owner that five years of experience designing or developing gaming machines is sufficient to qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art, regardless of whether the person also has a diploma. Thus, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“See Tr. 23:1–6. And, as Petitioner argues, substitution of one known component for another is likely to be obvious when doing so yields only predictable results. Reply 7; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (“[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.”). Patent Owner’s argument that Fraley’s disclosure does not motivate replacement of static panel with video display (see PO Resp. 28–29; Tr. 36:20–37:12) is not persuasive because it assumes that the motivation for a proposed modification must be provided by the cited prior art reference itself. The Supreme Court has rejected that approach to obviousness as overly rigid. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. Petitioner has articulated a reason why a skilled artisan would have substituted an LCD display for Fraley’s static display that is supported by rational underpinnings—namely, that the substitution would have enhanced Fraley’s device with the capability to display a video. See Reply 7–8.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 6,860,814 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,860,814
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.