- Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. Optronic Sciences LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01134 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Patent Owner’s termination request and granted adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent, leaving no claims in the trial.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. “Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner’s disclaimer of the entire term of the ’733 patent leaves no claims remaining in the trial. Although Patent Owner argues that entry of adverse judgment “has negative effects that would discourage Patent Owner from making efforts to streamline the issues” (PO Sur-reply 1–2), we deem such argument not a persuasive reason as to why we should not apply § 42.73(b)(2), or why termination is more appropriate. Therefore, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2), we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment, which we grant.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,406,733 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. Optronic Sciences LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01315 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Patent Owner’s termination request and entered adverse judgment after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims, leaving no claims in the trial.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. “Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner’s disclaimer of claims 1 and 3 of the ’477 patent leaves no claims remaining in the trial. Although Patent Owner argues that entry of adverse judgment “has negative effects that would discourage Patent Owner from making efforts to streamline the issues” (PO Sur-reply 1–2), we deem such argument not a persuasive reason as to why we should not apply § 42.73(b)(2), or why termination is more appropriate. Therefore, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2), we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment, which we grant.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,158,477 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · PGR2025-00002 · APJ Frederick C Laney · PGR · Adverse judgment
After Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–78, the Board granted its motion for adverse judgment and terminated the post-grant review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” which includes “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“there is no claim remaining for trial . . . when, as here, all of the challenged claims have been cancelled”). Thus, actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include cancellation of patent claims such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,134,952 - Lumi Legend Corporation v. Manehu Product Alliance, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · PGR2024-00014 · APJ Barry L Grossman · PGR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment against itself and held claims 33–36 unpatentable.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“October 25, 2024, from counsel for Patent Owner, Patent Owner requested authorization to file “a request for adverse judgment against itself under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b).” Ex. 3003 (emphases added). Our Rule 42.73(b) states “A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” The Board granted Patent Owner’s request. Ex. 3003. Patent Owner then filed its “Request for Adverse Judgment Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b).” Paper 11 (Request for Adverse Judgment). This Request, however, stated, in error, that Patent Owner requested “adverse judgment against Petitioner on claims 33-36, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4).” Id. (emphases added). Our Rule 42.73(b)(4) concerns “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) (emphasis added). Subsection (b)(4) states one of the actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment is “[a]bandonment of the contest.” Id. The actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment, however, are never reached when a party states unequivocally that it requests “judgment against itself.” that the Request for Adverse Judgement is seeking adverse judgment against itself, not Petitioner. Id. As stated in the title of Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment, we consider this request under our Rule 42.73(b). As corrected, the Request seeks a “final adverse judgment against [Patent Owner] on claims 33-36,” which are all the challenged claims. Thus, claims 33–36 are held to be unpatentable. 1” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,781,703 - Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00958 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted and IPR instituted on claims 1–28 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Linnarsson, McCloskey, and ordinary skill.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. WHETHER REHEARING IS WARRANTED Petitioner argues that we misconstrued the claims “as requiring one to add tags in a way that can provide a distinction based on a ‘polynucleotide sequence.’” Req. 6 (quoting Dec. 14 (Petitioner’s emphasis)). Petitioner is correct. More specifically, we implicitly construed the claim language reciting “a second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell,” as requiring said “distinguishing” to be based on the sequences of the sample polynucleotides. See, e.g., Dec. 14 (“[E]ach strand of cDNA that is tagged in Linnarsson is tagged regardless of the polynucleotide sequence of the cDNA or its corresponding mRNA. Thus, Linnarsson’s tags do not distinguish between ‘sample polynucleotides,’ whether cDNA or mRNA, of different sequences.”). Based on that misunderstanding, we erroneously determined that the proposed modification could not achieve the claim language, stating the following: Petitioner’s proposal appears to defeat satisfaction of another portion of claim 1, namely a “second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell.” Ex. 1001, 30:62–64. For if the second tag is “added to the CDS or TSO after extension,” as opposed to the sample polynucleotide, as Petitioner argues (Pet. 39 (emphasis added)), it would appear that the second tag would be incapable of distinguishing any sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides. Rather, the second tag would be ligated to each and every extension product bearing a CDS or TSO without regard to the sequence of any sample polynucleotide. Dec. 16. We now reconsider whether to institute.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Cited”). Because we find that the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, we proceed to part two of the analysis. 2. Advanced Bionics Part Two Patent Owner argues that the Petition “fails to show any error in the Examiner’s application during prosecution of the prior art teachings Petitioner now purports to invoke from . . . McCloskey.” Prelim Resp. 23; see also id. at 24–25 (“Revisiting the same art and arguments already overcome during prosecution is a waste of the Board’s limited resources and would unfairly burden PO.”). However, Petitioner argued that “the Examiner committed major error in Examination by erroneously stating that the prior art fails to teach a dual tagging approach when, in fact, this approach is plainly taught in both McCloskey and McCloskey II.” Pet. 67. The record supports Petitioner’s position, and we agree that the error was material to patentability. See Ex. 1005, 131 (Notice of Allowance). Accordingly, and having considered all of the Becton, Dickinson factors, we do not exercise discretionary denial.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We are persuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Linnarsson and McCloskey with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to obtain the claimed subject matter. 8. Conclusion as to Claim 1 There is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in proving that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“the three references is analogous art to the ’013 patent as opposed to each other. Prelim. Resp. 46 (citing Pet. 35; Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). As Sanofi- Aventis holds, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, the Petition should not be denied for failing to state explicitly that the cited prior art references are analogous art to the ’013 patent. Rather, as Sanofi-Aventis further held: “A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to ‘respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.’” Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23). Accordingly, we need not address this issue for purposes of deciding whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,697,013 - Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00955 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing granted and IPR instituted on claims 1–26; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Linnarsson and McCloskey.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. WHETHER REHEARING IS WARRANTED Petitioner argues that we misconstrued the claims “as requiring one to add tags in a way that can ‘provide a distinction based on a polynucleotide’s sequence.’” Req. 6 (quoting Dec. 15 (Petitioner’s emphasis)). Petitioner is correct. More specifically, we implicitly construed the claim language reciting “a second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell,” as requiring said “distinguishing” to be based on the sequences of the sample polynucleotides. See, e.g., Dec. 14 (“[E]ach strand of cDNA that is tagged in Linnarsson is tagged regardless of the polynucleotide sequence of the cDNA or its corresponding mRNA. Thus, Linnarsson’s tags do not distinguish between ‘sample polynucleotides,’ whether cDNA or mRNA, of different sequences.”). Based on that misunderstanding, we denied the Petition because “adding a second tag sequence to Linnarsson’s CDS and/or TSO would do nothing to achieve such a distinction,” i.e., “a distinction based on a polynucleotide’s sequence.” Id. at 15. That was error. We now reconsider whether to institute.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“the ’197 patent. See Ex. 1001, code (56) (listing McCloskey II under “References Cited”). Because we find that the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, we proceed to part two of the analysis.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We are persuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Linnarsson and McCloskey to obtain the claimed subject matter. 6. Conclusion as to Claim 1 There is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in proving that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). As Sanofi-Aventis holds, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, the Petition should not be denied for failing to state explicitly that the cited prior art references are analogous art to the ’197 patent. Rather, as Sanofi-Aventis further held: “A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to ‘respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.’” Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23). Accordingly, we need not address this issue for purposes of deciding whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,240,197 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00031 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request by authorizing a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision finding claims 1–9 unpatentable under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,246,093 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,618,707 - Tetra Tech Canada Inc. v. Georgetown Rail Equipment CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 25, 2020 · IPR2019-00662 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 21–29 are unpatentable under §103 over Holmes, Bostrom, Kanade, and Davis; Ground 1 over Davis, Kowalski, Bostrom, and Kanade was not further addressed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and at least four years of experience (or the academic equivalent) in the field of computer or machine vision.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 42). Patent Owner states that, for purposes of its Response, “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 1. Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of one of ordinary skill in the art. In light of the record now before us, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be an individual with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and at least four years of experience (or the academic equivalent) in the field of computer or machine vision. Ex. 1004 ¶ 42. The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the references themselves. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.’”); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences did not err in concluding that the level of ordinary skill in the art was best determined by the references of record). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes constructions for “misaligned” and “image,” and states that the Board should construe “determining,” “crosstie contour,” and “tie plate contour” according to their plain and ordinary meanings. Pet. 20– 23. Patent Owner proposes constructions for “misaligned,” “tie plate is . . . sunken,” “across,” and “image,” and agrees with Petitioner that the Board should construe “determining,” “crosstie contour,” and “tie plate contour” according to their plain and ordinary meanings. PO Resp. 1–7. On the full record now before us, we determine it is not necessary to construe any claim term expressly to resolve the parties’ dispute. Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803 (“Only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
Patent outcomesUS 9,441,956 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,441,956 - Tetra Tech Canada Inc. v. Georgetown Rail Equipment CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 25, 2020 · IPR2019-00619 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 16, 23, 38, 44, 46, 62, 68, and 70 are unpatentable as obvious over each of two combinations: Davis/Kowalski/Bostrom/Trosino/Kanade and Holmes/Bostrom/Trosino/Kanade/Davis.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“2. Obviousness A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsDecided for petitioner
“5. Objective Indicia Before we make a final obviousness determination, we must consider” slip op. at 91
- Exclude
“According to Petitioner, GREX relies on Exhibits 2006 and 2007 to show the alleged “accuracy of GPS” in 2004. Response, 45; Ex-2003, ¶¶167-170; Sur-Reply, 6-10. In response to Petitioner’s objections, GREX served a purported authenticity certification declaration from its expert, Dr. Bovik. Ex-2023 (served only). But the declaration fails to properly authenticate Exhibits 2006 and 2007, which are not otherwise self-authenticating under FRE 902. Accordingly, the Board should exclude Exhibits 2006 and 2007.” slip op. at 109
Patent outcomesUS 7,616,329 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,616,329
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.