- Google LLC / Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Ericsson ABAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00003 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 10, 12, 14, and 16–20 are unpatentable under § 103; the Board denied Patent Owner’s revised motion to amend.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[W]ould have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and 2–3 years of practical engineering experience relating to information security systems that employ cryptographic keys to encrypt/decrypt digital data. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s expert regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. RMTA 19. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Villasenor, notes that “obviousness must be viewed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the field of information security using cryptographic keys for encryption and decryption of digital data, and my opinions are rendered on the basis of the definition of the ordinary artisan set forth in the Petition in view of that further clarification.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 19. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’178 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyOther
“In reply, Patent Owner substantially repeats its arguments against Petitioner’s reliance on Peterka for the claim 1 content encryption key identifiers requirements. Reply RMTA 8–9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 121; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 89, 93–95); see RMTA 14–15. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons discussed in Section III.D.2.e)(2) above.” slip op. at 65
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that there was no motivation to combine Peterka with Suzuki because Petitioner has argued that “Peterka can already identify content keys by using the allegedly unique sequence numbers or time stamps assigned to each message carrying a single content key.” PO Resp. 41–42 (citing Pet. 25). Patent Owner also challenges motivation to combine Suzuki because it “is not directed to a pay-by-time, pay-per-view, or subscription distribution model, in which a content key grants access to content that different clients must individually decide to purchase in discrete units or increments.” Id. at 36–37. Petitioner responds that, because Peterka disclosed alternative embodiments that did not use sequence numbers or time stamps to identify EMM/ECM messages, one of ordinary skill would have been motivated specifically assign identifications to individual keys as taught in Suzuki. Reply 22 (citing Pet. 26). Petitioner also argues that whether Suzuki was directed to unpurchased content was irrelevant, because Suzuki is cited to show multiple key responses were conventional. Id. at 19–20. Patent Owner does not otherwise specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Peterka, Suzuki, and Bocharov. See generally PO Resp. Nonetheless the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Peterka, Suzuki, and Bocharov as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 45
- ScopeMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“We agree with Petitioner that the substitute claims are broadening. Because the amended wording only requires the key request to be made “in response to detecting” the boundary, rather than “ahead of” the boundary, the request can occur before or after the boundary. This is not a fanciful or unlikely possibility — such delayed requests are specifically contemplated by the ’178 patent: [I]f the packager 104 is unable to obtain a new content encryption key from the WFM 102 prior to the expiration of the current content encryption key, the packager 104 will continue to use the current content encryption key until such time as it is able to obtain a new key from the WFM 102. Ex. 1001, 6:32–37. It should be noted that the fixed period duration for key rotation may be viewed as a "target" period, as the packager 104 may not expire a key on the exact boundary. Ex. 1001, 8:9–11. The key expiration time from the WFM 102 may be viewed as a "suggested" expiration time, as the packager 104 may not be able to expire the key at the exact specified time.” slip op. at 56
Patent outcomesUS 9,313,178 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,313,178 - Google LLC / Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Ericsson ABAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00004 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9, 11–17, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; the revised motion to amend proposing substitute claims 21–36 is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Board first must determine whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019) (precedential). Accordingly, a patent owner must provide a claim listing reproducing each proposed substitute claim, and must make an initial showing to demonstrate the following: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the proposed claims are supported in the original disclosure (and any earlier filed disclosure for which the benefit of the earlier filing date is sought); (3) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; and (4) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 326(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” slip op. at 60
- Expert testimonyOther
“Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner’s contentions regarding the” slip op. at 28
- Skill levelOther
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 11,122,313 unpatentableNonecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,122,313 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · PGR2025-00059 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted post-grant review of claims 1–4 on all four asserted grounds, finding a sufficient preliminary showing of obviousness and lack of enablement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“V. CONCLUSION Petitioner has, at this stage, established that it will more likely than not prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. This determination is, however, based on a preliminary record and is not final on any issues of patentability. We will make a final determination on the patentability of the challenged claims, as necessary and applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, based on a fully developed record through trial. VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) post grant review of claims 1–4 of the ’233 patent is hereby instituted on the grounds set forth in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; and” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not proffer a description of a POSA. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this decision, on the record at this time, we find that Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record, and apply it herein. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We invite the parties to further address the definition of a POSA during trial should they find it necessary.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“In addition, the opinion stated in the Pomper Declaration that “the term of ‘low molecular weight’ is well accepted in the chemical arts” and the declarant “recognize[s] that low molecular weight compounds would have a molecular weight of typically from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons” is offered by a co-inventor. We, as factfinder, have discretion to weigh the credibility of expert witnesses and to give each item of evidence such weight as appropriate. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). In this case, we find that the published references on metabolites do not support the opinion. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1368 (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”) US-121, of which Dr. Pomper is lead inventor, also uses the term “low molecular weight”—without further characterization of the term—and is uninformative as to the meaning of the term. See Ex. 1006, ¶ 12. In addition, Patent Owner’s definition does not appear to apply to all compounds claimed in US-121.5” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“limited to Patent Owner’s proposed “from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons.” The cited evidence relied on in the Pomper Declaration to define “low molecular weight” as a term well accepted in the chemical arts relates to metabolomics and metabolites. See Ex. 1002, 169, (specifically, ¶ 17 of Dr. Pomper’s declaration). Patent Owner admits that Dr. Pomper’s testimony is about molecules that differ from the claimed imaging and radiotherapeutic agents targeting FAP-α, but argues that the testimony is still relevant for purposes of explanation. Prelim Resp. 21. While it may be relevant, the testimony is not persuasive in light of the Specification. We find the uncontested fact that several of the B moieties alone—without the A moiety or L linker—specifically identified in the ’233 patent fall outside of Patent Owner’s proposed definition persuasive, as we normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes examples disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting proposed claim interpretation that would exclude disclosed examples in the specification). The cases cited by Patent Owner supporting that a claim term may be construed to exclude embodiments where the prosecution history supports such construction are factually distinguishable from the instant case as they regard instances of specific prosecution history disclaimer, clear prosecution disavowal, or relate to a specific definition of the terms in the Specification for the term being construed. Here, “low molecular weight” is not defined in the Specification, but, as Petitioner argues (see Pet. 21–25) is characterized as “demonstrat[ing] faster pharmacokinetics and a higher specific signal within clinically convenient times after administration” and that it “can be synthesized in radiolabeled form more easily.” Ex.1001, 13:33–50, 14:56– 16:14, 17:9–20. We are persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Zeglis, Petitioner’s declarant, that compounds weighing over 1500 Da may share those same behaviors, along with certain identified B moieties disclosed as embodiments. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 83.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,115,233 - Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00894 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Yeo and TS36 render at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art stating that “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’767 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached
“under 112(f) pointing out the respective functions and structure disclosed in the ’767 patent specification. Pet. 18–20. Patent Owner does not dispute the construction of these terms, stating only “that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Pet. 18–20). Where there is no dispute and our Decision does not turn on any particular construction of these terms, we need not decide at this point whether “receiver module” and “transmitter module” invoke means-plus-function under 112(f). Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. And, because there is no dispute, we conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the” slip op. at 10
- BurdenInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1889, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,462,767 - Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00895 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted challenges after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had at least [a bachelor’s degree in] electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks. Additional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background. . . . A POSITA would also have familiarity with the 3GPP LTE standards, and would have understood how to search through the available Technical Specifications for implementing RAN technologies. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–53). Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage, with a proposed modification to insert “a bachelor’s degree in” to Petitioner’s statement. Prelim. Resp. 12–13; id. at 12, n.1. We have inserted this proposed modification in brackets in the above block quotation. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal, as modified by Patent Owner, is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’113 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s skill definition at this stage.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties do not propose any claim constructions. See Pet. 11–12; Prelim. Resp. 8. As no terms are in dispute, we determine that no terms require construction at this stage.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges as to at least one challenged claim. At this preliminary stage, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of the challenged claims or any underlying factual and legal issues. V. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’113 patent is instituted with respect to all challenges of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial commencing on the entry date of this Decision.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“measurement value, as Jover teaches.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 39–40; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Among other reasons, Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine “to improve the accuracy and reliability of the beam failure determination.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Petitioner further contends that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success because “it would have been straightforward for a POSITA to implement Jover’s triggering condition in Xia’s method.” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). After considering Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below, we agree with Petitioner at this stage that the combination of Xia and Jover renders obvious limitation [1e]. Patent Owner first argues that Jover “does not cure the deficiencies of Xia because Jover’s threshold condition for an increase in BER is not used for triggering a transmission of the first and second radio signal.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Just like Xia, Patent Owner contends, Jover discloses no “causality between the threshold being exceeded and transmitting the first and second radio signal.” Id. at 21. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s showing at this stage because Petitioner relies on Xia, not Jover, for the claimed “triggering the transmission,” or “causality,” as Patent Owner calls it. See Pet. 36–38. That is, Petitioner relies on Jover for the triggering condition and on Xia for the actual triggering. See id. Patent Owner’s argument attacking the references individually is unpersuasive. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of refences.”). Patent Owner next contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Xia and Jover “since Jover is directed to the opposite objective of the ’113 Patent or Xia.” Prelim. Resp. 21. That is, Patent Owner asserts, Jover teaches away from the disclosed methods. Id. at 22. Patent Owner explains, “Jover provides no attempt to improve the beam strength, but rather ignores it through beam sweeping or nullif[ies] it, in contrast to the purpose of the ’113 Patent.” Id. at 22–23. At this stage, Patent Owner’s argument is insufficient to undermine” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,568,113 - Synaffix B.V. v. Hangzhou Dac Biotech Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24, 26, and 29–31 are unpatentable; claims 25 and 32–34 were not shown unpatentable, and the motion to exclude was dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- RemandOther
“review of claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”), 1, 3. Patent Owner, Hangzhou DAC Biotech Co., Ltd., filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”). We initially determined that the information presented in the Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17. Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel (“DRP”). Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Delegated Review Panel vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised claim construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”). On August 30, 2024, we instituted an inter partes review after remand from the Director. Paper 25 (“Inst. Dec.”). Patent Owner subsequently filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 31, “Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 36, “Reply”), Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 44, “Sur-reply”), and Petitioner filed a Sur-sur-reply (Paper 48, “Sur-sur-reply”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther
“I. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1089 and 1090. Paper 50. As we did not rely on either of Exhibits 1089 or 1090 in deciding this matter, Patent Owner’s motion is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 96
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableMixed
“For these reasons, Patent Owner’s arguments and cited evidence also” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“function as R2, and the ethyl group may function as R4, which can be a linear alkyl having 1–6 carbon atoms. We note that claim 3 permits R5 and R6 to be absent. For these reasons, the arguments presented in the Petition demonstrate that claim 3 would have been obvious over Singh’s Compound 3 when modified in view of Harris.” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 10,131,682 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,131,682 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00477 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by and obvious over Komata; the Board did not reach the Tsuji or Rosenberg grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user. . . . Also, a person could have qualified as a [POSITA] with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa. PO Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 17). Although these level of skill definitions are not the same, the differences are minor, and Patent Owner does not argue that its level of skill definition is dispositive. To the contrary, Patent Owner asserts that “[i]n any event, the challenged claims of the ’260 Patent are patentable under either . . . definition.” Id. at 18. We apply Petitioner’s level of skill but would have reached the same result had we applied Patent Owner’s.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“As we explained in our Institution Decision, we disagreed then, and still disagree, “that the second pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected (or that the third pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected) simply because the second pressure is greater than the first pressure (and the third pressure is greater than the second pressure).” Dec. 27. As we explained there, “[t]he claimed relative magnitudes of the first, second, and third pressures do not define any temporal relationships regarding the detection of the pressures.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 recites quantitative relationships for the pressures, not temporal relationships. Reply 4. For example, claim 1 requires “the second pressure greater than the first pressure” but says nothing about when the second pressure must be greater than the first pressure. A key misconception undergirding Patent Owner’s argument is its statement that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” PO Resp. 27 (emphasis added). The claim does not require detecting that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure. Limitation [1c] simply says, “detect a second pressure on the first input device, the second pressure greater than the first pressure.” In other words, all the detection that this limitation requires is detecting a second pressure. The claim then observes that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure but does not require detecting this. Limitation [1e] similarly detects pressure but not the comparison: “detect a third pressure on the first input device, the third pressure greater than the second pressure.” Thus, it does not follow that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” See id. Accordingly, we determine that Patent Owner’s analysis of the claim language is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Our decision here does not depend on the meaning of this term. Patent Owner only argues the phrase “tactile sensation” for Petitioner’s challenge over Rosenberg, which we do not reach because Petitioner’s challenge over Komata is dispositive. See PO Resp. 63–66. Accordingly, we do not construe this term.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Instead, Patent Owner disputes that Komata discloses the order of all the steps of claim 1, based on its construction requiring the steps to be performed in order. PO Resp. 50–54; Reply 17 (observing that Patent Owner “does not dispute that Ground 1 demonstrates how Komata anticipates or renders obvious claims 1–7 if [Patent Owner’s] ordered-steps argument is rejected”); Sur-reply 12–14 (not disputing the Reply’s observation). As Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction we have not adopted, Patent Owner fails to undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing.7 To the extent, as we note above, that the claims may require a partial ordering (i.e., limitation [1a] preceding limitation [1b] and limitation [1c] preceding limitation [1d], see supra Section I.A.1.a), Petitioner has persuasively shown that Komata discloses such ordering. a. Summary as to Claim 1 For the above reasons, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata. 3. Dependent Claims 2–7 Petitioner also contends that claims 2–7 would have been obvious over Komata. Pet. 28–35. Patent Owner does not dispute these dependent claims. Petitioner provides detailed explanations indicating where Komata teaches or suggests the limitations of claims 2–7, supported by Mr. Ward’s testimony. Id. We determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2–7 are anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,336,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,336,260 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable because Petitioner proved that Rosenberg I anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” PO Resp. 28; Sur-reply 3. Petitioner “does not explicitly disagree” that a virtual detent is “vibrotactile feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” Reply 2. Petitioner asserts that “[i]f there is a dispute, it is whether Rosenberg I’s vibrotactile feedback ‘simulates a mechanical detent’ because [Patent Owner] says such simulation requires a sense of mechanical resistance and Rosenberg I allegedly lacks such simulated resistance.” Id. (citing PO Resp. 58–59).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner urges us to require virtual detents to vary on a system or application basis, we do not find this interpretation required by the claims or specification either. Although the claims refer to “a plurality of systems,” they do not recite different detent profiles for each of those systems. Claim 1, for example, recites “receiving a detent profile associated with one of the systems.” The other claims are similar. Patent Owner’s reliance on non-limiting specification language is also unavailing. E.g., Ex. 1001, 8:38–46 (“can” and “may”), 4:30–44 (“embodiment” and “may”).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“supports its proposed construction. See PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that claim 15 recites a “system comprising” “an input device configured to control one of a plurality of systems,” and hence “the recited plurality of systems are subsystems in addition to the containing system.” Id. We question how this point supports Patent Owner’s proposal because this does not address why each system must “provide[] context for virtual detents.” But regardless, we find it unpersuasive because claim 15’s preamble is not limiting (merely reciting “A system comprising”). See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]reamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.”); see also Tr. 80:4– 8 (Patent Owner conceding that the preamble is non-limiting). Nor is there any explicit language in claim 15 that would exclude any particular system, such as the system recited in the preamble, from the recited “plurality of systems.”” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 9,430,042 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,430,042 - Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. The Johns Hopkins UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00240 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–42 are unpatentable: claims 1–42 are anticipated by the MSR, and the Board also finds the challenged claims obvious over the MSR and cited combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“claims a method of treating a human patient with colorectal cancer having certain characteristics using pembrolizumab and the main prior art reference cited by Petitioner discloses testing pembrolizumab to treat human patients. (See Ex. 1001, 25:40–50, Ex. 1005; see Decision 8–9.) Accordingly, the relevant field of Patent Owner’s claims is treating human patients, as well as testing existing compounds. Neither party directs us to evidence of the level of skill in the art beyond what we considered for institution of trial. In the Decision to institute trial, we determined that the level of skill in the art relevant to the claims of the ’393 patent is not limited to knowledge of and experience with conducting research relating to oncology or developing and conducting clinical trials. (See Dec. 8–9.) We determined that the level of skill also includes knowledge of and experience with treating colorectal cancer patients with immunotherapy compounds, identifying the conditions these patients may have, and understanding the literature regarding clinical trials for such colorectal cancers and the associated conditions and immunotherapy. (See id.) Because the parties do not present additional evidence or argument, we maintain that determination.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“what one of ordinary skill in the art would have known and understood at the relevant time. Specifically, Petitioner relies on the testimony of Alfred L. Neugut, M.D., Ph.D., M.P.H.3 (Ex. 1003) and Paul E. Oberstein, M.D. (Ex. 1150). Patent Owner relies on the testimony of Nils Lonberg, Ph.D. (Ex. 2001) and Richard Goldberg, M.D. (Ex. 2090).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1 requires a causal relationship wherein the patient must be tested for MSI-H and, if he or she is determined to be MSI-H or dMMR, then the patient is treated with 10 mg/kg of pembrolizumab every 14 days. We further agree that this relationship is different than the use of the term “after” in claims 7, 20, and 27, wherein patients must be treated with a different cancer therapy, and wherein the cancer must have later progressed for the treatment to be within the scope of these claims. (Ex. 1001, 25:66–7, 26:44–46, 26:63–64.) In claim 1, a biological sample from the patient must be tested to determine if the cancer is MSI-H and, if so, the patient is treated with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab. For this reason, if the prior art teaches the limitations of 1) testing a biological sample obtained from a patient having colorectal cancer to determine that the patient’s colorectal cancer is microsatellite instability high or mismatch repair deficient, and 2) treating the patient with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab if the patient’s colorectal cancer is determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, the art anticipates claim 1. We are not persuaded that claim 1 requires or excludes anything else because nothing else is recited in the claim.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Microsatellite Unstable (MSI) Tumors.” (Ex. 1005, 2.) The parties’ witnesses agree that MK-3475 is pembrolizumab, the compound recited in claim 1. (See Neugut Decl., Ex. 1003 ¶ 37; see Lonberg Decl., Ex. 2001, ¶ 65.) Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertion that the MSR was published on a government web site on June 10, 2013, more than two years before the priority date of the ’393 patent on July 10, 2015. (See Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1005, 3, Ex. 1003 ¶ 35).)” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,591,393 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,591,393 - Inductev, Inc. v. Witricity CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00105 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over the stated Fells-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had . . . a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, microelectronics, or equivalent, and . . . two to three years of industry or research experience,” and “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner “does not disagree with Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art,” but “does not believe that resolution of the Petition depends on the precise definition of the level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 12. Petitioner’s proposed articulation is supported by testimonial evidence and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’184 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:53. As it is uncontested, we adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that the terms of the contested claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning, but neither party argues that we should construe any claim terms explicitly. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62– 63); PO Resp. 12. We agree with the parties that, for this decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). However, the meaning of certain terms are contested, including most notably “magnetic field sensor,” and we discuss those terms below in the context of the prior art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached
“Petitioner argues that, to the extent the preamble is limiting, Fells discloses the recited wireless energy transfer system, and that the system includes facilities to detect FOD. Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–71, 96–101). Patent Owner does not specifically contest Petitioner’s arguments. See PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner’s argument that Fells discloses the preamble; thus, we need not decide whether the preamble is limiting. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that the ordinary and customary meaning of “magnetic field sensor” refers to a device that measures only external magnetic fields. There is nothing in the claim language to suggest such a limitation: the plain language simply refers to a “magnetic field sensor,” without regard to how the sensor works or where it senses magnetic fields from. Ex. 1001, 12:16. In fact, the claim does not explicitly require sensing anything at all using the magnetic field sensor, merely reciting a “foreign object debris detection system” comprising the sensor and that the “foreign object debris detection system is configured to verify” the presence of FOD. The very general nature of how the magnetic field sensor is recited, without any explicit recitation of how its output may be used, undermines Patent Owner’s overly restrictive interpretation. Although the ’184 patent specification includes examples of measuring external magnetic fields to detect FOD, Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the specification indicating an intent to restrict the term “magnetic field sensor” to only those sensors that measure external magnetic fields. Nor is there intrinsic evidence that an “eddy-current sensor” would not also be a magnetic field sensor, given that it senses magnetic fields. Indeed, as Petitioner persuasively argues, an eddy-current sensor still measures external magnetic fields—albeit magnetic fields generated within FOD through interaction with a powered sensor. Pet. 6–7; Ex. 1037 ¶¶ 14– 16, 25–29.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,027,184 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,027,184
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.