- PTAB · Aug 30, 2024 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 on all grounds stated in the Petition.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewOther
“Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17 (“Inst. Dec.”). Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel. Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Director Review Panel (“DRP”) vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect (2018). Upon reconsideration of the briefing and the evidence of record in light of the DRP’s claim construction, we conclude that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we grant institution of inter partes review of claims 1–17, 20–21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We find that Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in the prior consideration of Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, Singh, and Lees. For instance, under the second prong of Advanced Bionics, we consider “(c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during “(e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art.” Becton, Dickinson, 17–18. We agree with Petitioner that the Office overlooked Morales- Sanfrutos’ and Singh’s teachings during examination and reexamination. Pet. 79. Although Morales-Sanfrutos, Straus, and Singh were listed on an IDS, they were not the subject of a rejection during examination or reexamination. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below at this stage with regard to Petitioner’s grounds over Morales-Sanfrutos, as evidenced by Straus, and over Singh, Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that the Office materially erred in overlooking Morales-Sanfrutos’s and Singh’s teachings regarding their linker structures. Id. Further, to the extent the Lees’ teachings were considered during examination and reexamination, Lees’ disclosure of a homobifunctional sulfone linker was overlooked. Lees’ homobifunctional linker, which Patent Owner argues is substantially similar to Harris’ homobifunctional linker, which Petitioner chiefly relies upon in Grounds 2–5, was not the subject of a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Prelim. Resp. 25–26. We agree with Petitioner that only Lees’ heterobifunctional linker was applied in a rejection during examination. Pet. Resp. Brief 1; Ex. 1018, 42–43, 62. 4. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 27
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the information presented, we find that the asserted prior art itself is sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). To the extent a more precise definition is required, we apply Petitioner’s unopposed definition for purposes of determining whether to institute review because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,131,682 - PTAB · Oct 31, 2023 · PGR2022-00040 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · PGR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled claims 1–17 and denied substitute claims 18–30 for lack of written-description support; it did not reach the remaining grounds against the substitute claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“For the reasons discussed below, on the full trial record, we find that Patent Owner has not carried its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed substitute claims introduce no new matter relative to the original disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(d)(1); see also Paper 58, 2 (Patent Owner acknowledging that it “bears the burden to meet the regulatory and statutory requirements” for a motion to amend, including demonstrating that the substitute claims do not “introduce new matter”). Importantly, we note that Patent Owner fails to explain how the material cited in the claim chart supports the claims. See Mot. 15–16. Instead, Patent Owner provides only a claim chart with bare citations, leaving it to the panel to discern how the cited material supports the claim limitations. See id. Patent Owner’s failure to explain the citations constitutes a fatal error, as we have reviewed the passages cited by Patent Owner and are unable to discern where support is found for several of the substitute claim limitations. Where, as here, “the Board is unable to determine how the specification and drawings support the proposed substitute claims, the motion to amend may be denied.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) (“TPG”),6 71.” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“Petitioner persuades us that the ’418 Application lacks adequate written description support for the formulation limitations of proposed substitute claim 18 [limitations 18a–8c]. As outlined by Petitioner and its declarants, the ’418 Application, including the Abstract, Field of the Invention, Summary of the Invention, and Detailed Description of the Invention sections, uniformly focuses on phosphate prodrugs of levodopa and carbidopa. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 (Sloan Decl.) ¶¶ 38–55, 64–69; Ex. 1003 (LeWitt Decl.) ¶¶ 89–97; Ex. 1047 (Forrest Decl.) ¶¶ 40–74, 80–92; Opp. 6– 10; Pet. 23–26, 49–55. We agree with Petitioner that “nothing in the specification suggests that the invention includes methods of subcutaneous infusion with anything other than the carbidopa prodrugs and L-dopa prodrugs of Formulas (I) and (II), respectively, or teaches how to get sufficient amounts of either L-dopa or carbidopa into solution, or achieve particular L-dopa plasma levels, without those particular prodrugs.” Pet. 27. Petitioner persuades us that the ’418 Application fails to contain “[so] much as a single generic sentence, anywhere in the application, suggesting the inventors possessed the claimed formulations.” Sur-reply 3. Additionally, the ’418 Application contains no example teaching administration of an aqueous formulation comprising carbidopa itself with levodopa itself or one of the three claimed levodopa prodrugs, let alone one that is suitable for continuous subcutaneous administration. See Ex. 1047 (Forrest Decl.) ¶¶ 61–72, 82–92. Patent Owner is correct that to establish written description support, neither “an actual reduction to practice,” nor a verbatim recitation of the claims is required. Sur-reply 4. Nevertheless, “[a]lthough examples are not always required to satisfy the written description requirement, the lack of any disclosure of examples may be considered when determining whether the claimed invention is adequately described.” Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, the lack of an actual reduction to practice or verbatim description of a formulation that falls within the scope of the claims is relevant, because we also see no other description or material in the ’418 Application that suggests the claimed methods extend to continuous subcutaneous administration of a composition comprising levodopa or one of the three claimed levodopa prodrugs, together with carbidopa, in an aqueous carrier.” slip op. at 28
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“All of the exhibits that are the subject of Patent Owner’s motion to exclude relate to the prior-art status and/or authenticity of Yacoby-Zeevi and ancillary related documents underlying Petitioner’s prior art-based challenges to the proposed substitute claims. See generally MTE. Because we deny Patent Owner’s request to enter proposed substitute claims 18–30 based on lack of written description support and do not reach Petitioner’s prior-art based challenges to the patentability of these claims, we do not rely on Exhibits 1005, 1007, 1040–1044, 1046, or 1048–1050 in this Decision. Accordingly we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 49
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied
“On the other hand, Petitioner shows that Patent Owner took positions in its Motion to Amend that it only later sought to support with technical declarations. For example, in the Motion to Amend, Patent Owner elected to assert “that levodopa and carbidopa could be ‘interchanged’ in a formulation with their prodrugs, and that a skilled artisan could ‘perform a pharmacokinetic analysis to predict steady state levodopa plasma levels’ using the ‘parent compounds’ based on Example 24.” MTS 2 (citing Mot. 12–13). Patent Owner, however, “chose to forgo any expert support” on these issues at the time it filed its Motion to Amend, and instead waited until the Reply to submit technical declarations in support of these arguments. Id. We agree with Petitioner that although Patent Owner “was not required to anticipate the arguments that [Petitioner] would make in its Opposition” to the Motion to Amend, if Patent Owner “wanted to provide expert testimony to support the positions it actually took” in that Motion, “the TPG required [Patent Owner] to do so at that time, instead of waiting until [Petitioner] had limited ability to respond.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that in this respect at least some portions of Patent Owner’s Declarations are untimely, because it is “improper for a reply to present new evidence (including new expert testimony) that could have been presented in a prior filing.” TPG 74. Nevertheless, an order striking arguments and evidence in their entirety is an “exceptional remedy,” particularly under the circumstances here, where some portions of the Declarations are proper, while other portions are untimely. TPG 80. Moreover, “there is a strong public policy for making all information filed in an administrative proceeding available to the public.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012- 00010, Paper 59 at 40 (PTAB Feb. 24, 2014). Under the facts of this case, Patent Owner was permitted to file evidence to respond to Petitioner’s unpatentability claims, but also belatedly supported positions it made in earlier attorney argument. Petitioner’s Motion to Strike, however, challenges all of Patent Owner’s evidence, without acknowledging that some portions constitute proper reply. Although “[t]he Board is not required to attempt to sort proper from improper portions of the reply” (TPG 74, emphasis added), under the circumstances here, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s lack of specificity as to what it seeks to strike is fatal to Petitioner’s motion. Accordingly, we decline to strike the Declarations in their entirety as untimely.” slip op. at 46
§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,091,507 - PTAB · Mar 17, 2023 · IPR2022-01242 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board declined Fintiv denial and instituted review of claims 1–20 on all seven asserted obviousness grounds, finding a compelling challenge to claim 1 under Ground 1.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“denial, and Fintiv Factor 1 is neutral. Collectively, the first five Fintiv Factors favor discretionary denial.” slip op. at 60
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“that Petitioner will prevail in its challenge to claim 1 under Ground 1. Thus, Petitioner has set forth a compelling, meritorious challenge that plainly leads to the conclusion that at least one claim is unpatentable (based on the current record).” slip op. at 74
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“that RF carriers, CDMA codes, TDMA time slots or other information defining and describing the way data is being transmitted do not include underlying data that is transmitted. In isolation, the phrase “not including underlying data that is being transmitted” could be subject to different interpretations. It could simply mean that data being transmitted by itself is not a radio resource, but the RF carrier transmitting the data could be a radio resource. Patent Owner makes clear, however, that this interpretation is not the intent of its construction by arguing that, under its construction, Hettstedt’s RF carriers are not radio resources because they have data modulated on them. Prelim. Resp. 24–27. Similarly, Patent Owner argues that Wu’s carriers are not radio resources because they have payload data encapsulated in them. Id. at 34; see also id. at 35. Patent Owner, however, cites nothing from the Specification that indicates RF carriers, CDMA codes, or TDMA time slots cease to be radio resources merely because data is modulated or encapsulated on them. Prelim. Resp. 12–18. Further, we see no such teaching in the Specification.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Wellington’s teachings to Hettstedt’s system to obviate the need for a human user to perform the load balancing (i.e., improve the system by making it automatic) as a threshold-based trigger avoids the need for the system to wait for user inputs. Ex. 1003 ¶ 130. Further, an ordinarily skilled artisan would naturally use a threshold for the trigger as taught by Wellington because a threshold is readily programmable and machine executable. Id. In addition, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to implement Wellington’s teaching to improve the adaptability of Hettstedt’s system. Id. A benefit of a threshold-based trigger is that it allows a system to fine-tune the load balancing by adjusting the threshold. Id. Further, there is no need to reprogram significant software when using a threshold-based trigger. Id.” slip op. at 72
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,026,232 - PTAB · Oct 7, 2022 · IPR2021-00680 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7, 9–11, 14–16, 19, 21, 32–37, 39, 47, and 49–57 are unpatentable as obvious; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
Nonecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,469,934 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2017 · IPR2016-00320 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 8–10 are unpatentable based on the instituted obviousness grounds after the Board reconsidered the record on rehearing.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“be heard regarding the allegedly new circuits set forth in specific paragraphs of the Baker Reply Declaration. No more was required. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion is denied. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“With no Board denial of concrete, focused requests before us, we are not prepared to find that [the appellant] was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond.”)24; Opp. 15 (“Patent” slip op. at 68
- RehearingOther
“Subsequently, Patent Owner filed a Request for Rehearing. Paper 41 (“Rehearing Request” or “Reh’g Req.”). Based on the Rehearing Request, the Board withdrew the First Final Written Decision as set forth in the Decision on Rehearing. Paper 42 (Withdrawal of Final Written Decision and Authorization of Sur-Reply) (“Rehearing Decision” or “Reh’g Dec.”). As set forth in the Rehearing Decision, we granted Patent Owner’s request for additional briefing in the form of a Sur-Reply (Paper 43). See Reh’g Dec. 5–6; Sur-Reply.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,169,503 - PTAB · Sep 23, 2014 · IPR2014-01007 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated each proceeding as to both parties without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions, we determine that terminating each of the proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. Based on the facts of these cases, it is appropriate to enter judgment in each case without rendering a final written decision.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,635,583 - PTAB · Sep 23, 2014 · IPR2014-01001 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions to terminate all four proceedings and terminated each as to both parties, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner. Id. at 2–4. The parties submit that termination is appropriate because each “proceeding is in its infancy.” Id. at 4. Issues raised during the trial have not been briefed fully and the Board has not yet decided the merits of each proceeding. Id. Petitioner indicates that it will no longer participate even if the Board does not terminate the respective proceeding. Id. According to the parties, Congress and federal courts have expressed a strong interest in encouraging settlement in litigation. Id. at 3. In exercising our independent determination, we generally expect that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions, we determine that terminating each of the proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. Based on the facts of these cases, it is appropriate to enter judgment in each case without rendering a final written decision.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,258,547 - PTAB · Sep 23, 2014 · IPR2014-00999 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated all four proceedings as to both parties without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties urge the Board to terminate each of these instant proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner. Id. at 2–4. The parties submit that termination is appropriate because each “proceeding is in its infancy.” Id. at 4. Issues raised during the trial have not been briefed fully and the Board has not yet decided the merits of each proceeding. Id. Petitioner indicates that it will no longer participate even if the Board does not terminate the respective proceeding. Id. According to the parties, Congress and federal courts have expressed a strong interest in encouraging settlement in litigation. Id. at 3. In exercising our independent determination, we generally expect that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions, we determine that terminating each of the proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. Based on the facts of these cases, it is appropriate to enter judgment in each case without rendering a final written decision.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,264,049 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2014 · IPR2014-00268 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion, terminated IPR2014-00268 without a final written decision, and ordered the settlement agreement treated as business confidential.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“termination of the proceeding and that termination is proper because the proceeding is at a preliminary stage. See Paper 26. As the motion notes, we instituted trial on May 19, 2014. Id.; Paper 17. At this preliminary stage in the proceeding, the record lacks full briefing on the trial issues.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,921,139 - PTAB · Aug 4, 2014 · CBM2014-00089 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding after settlement, before institution and without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“The parties have moved to terminate this proceeding in view of their settlement of their underlying litigation. A decision by the Board to institute a trial has not yet been entered. Thus, this matter was in the preliminary stages at the time the parties moved to terminate. U.S. Patent 8,346,894 B2, which is the subject of this proceeding, is also the subject of CBM2014-00097, CBM2014- 00101, IPR2014-00413 and IPR2014-00414. Those proceedings will not be affected by the termination of this covered business method patent review. Under these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment1 and terminate the trial without rendering a final written decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the joint motion to terminate the proceeding is GRANTED and the proceeding is hereby terminated;” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,346,894
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.