• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; Petitioner did not show claims 6, 9, 10, 13–18, and 20 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does 5 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 100; PO. Resp. circuit design. PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶ 35). Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Campbell considers the obviousness of the claims to turn on the precise definition of the level or ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10; Ex. 2021 ¶ 35. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “C. Claim Construction Neither party proposes any express claim construction. Pet. 27 (stating claims should receive their “plain and ordinary meaning”); PO Resp. 10 (stating that Petitioner’s challenges fail “under any reasonable construction”). In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We determine no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that such a configuration would be neither inoperable nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,581,322 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,581,322
• Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01358 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7–11, 15–19, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4–6, 12–14, and 20–22 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not teach the claimed received-signal feedback and transmitter-model update.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that: Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and at least two years of experience working with of radio communication systems and machine learning. Additional work or research experience can substitute for less or different education, and vice-versa. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Patent Owner does not appear to challenge this level of skill. We use Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision because it appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and ’704 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “parameters “associated with the base station.” PO Resp. 31–32. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Id. at 31. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner offers no reason to believe that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Pet. Reply 4–5; see also id. at 3–6 (entire argument). A plain reading of a “model associated with a base station” would encompass a model that operates in a base station. We do not see anything in the ’704 specification that would indicate “associated with” has any special meaning, or has a meaning contrary to our understanding of the plain meaning. We do not see the word “associated” outside the claims, whereas we see the word “implement” throughout the specification, generally in reference to an actual use of a model (consistent with our plain reading). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:35–39, 6:3–17, 10:55–11:3 (discussing “implementations” where the model or some other feature of the system is used in a particular way). Accordingly, we construe a model “implemented in a base station” to be “associated with the base station.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “scenarios” (see PO Resp. 16–21), Patent Owner argues that “Jüschke does not disclose any association of the weight or bias parameters, . . . to any deployment scenario, and . . . base station” (id. at 19). For the reasons explained in our claim construction section above, we construe “deployment scenarios” to include “inline mode” models located within a base station, according to the list of deployment scenarios set out in the ’704 patent. See Ex. 1001, 2:38–65. The in-line deployment scenario depicted in Figure 6A of the ’704 patent bears a striking resemblance to the arrangement depicted in Figure 1 of Jüschke. In both figures, the analog radio signal is fed directly into the model and then the model directly outputs the signal to the amplifier. Compare Ex. 1001, Fig. 6A, with Ex. 1005, Fig. 1. As construed, the “deployment scenarios” represent the physical configurations of the device in which the model is found, such as “in-line.” Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Jüschke’s similar in-line configuration is a “deployment scenario” as claimed because it teaches an inline model for a cellular system transmitter (i.e., base station). Pet. 26–29 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 6, 59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–147); see also Ex. 1001, 2:37–41 (stating that “[t]he particular deployment scenario[] may be . . . sending a radio transmission from a cellular base station that includes the . . . model . . . in an inline mode”).” slip op. at 26

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on our claim construction analysis of claim 4, above, we agree with Patent Owner that claim 4 requires an actually transmitted signal and an update of the transmitter’s model. This claim construction eliminates Petitioner’s position regarding Holt teaching a modeled signal. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 17–23. We then turn to Petitioner’s argument that Holt teaches updating a model using an actually transmitted signal. See Pet. 59–60. There, Petitioner relies on a disclosure in Holt of an “actual communication channel 302 used to train the channel model 208.” Ex. 1006, 18:1–2. This is depicted in Figure 6 of Holt, in connection with a “fourth loss function” which is used to “train the decoder model.” Id. at 18:42–48; see generally id. at 17:58–18:51 (describing Figure 6). Whether training the channel model or the decoder model, Holt here does not disclose using the actual communication channel to train the encoder, i.e., transmitter. In sum, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “obtaining a received radio signal,” and even if it did, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “updating the value of the model parameters” in the manner required by claim 4. Claims 12 and 20 are nearly identical to claim 4, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons. See Pet. 76. Claims 5, 6, 13, 14, 21 and 22 depend from claims 4, 12, and 20, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons as those claims. See id. at 77–80.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,018,704 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,018,704
• Kia Corp. / Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01167 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 7–21 are unpatentable over Kleve-based grounds; claim 6 was not shown unpatentable because the record did not support obviousness of key sharing.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Here, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, automotive engineering, or a closely related field and at least two years of experience in the field of access control systems, vehicle electronics, and/or cryptography.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 85). Dr. Almeroth supports Petitioner’s position and further testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 85. Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention and appears to apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See PO Resp. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Malek, explicitly adopts Dr. Almeroth’s level of skill in the art but states that his opinions would be applicable under any reasonable definition for an ordinarily skilled artisan at the critical time. See Ex. 2021 ¶ 38. For the purposes of this Decision, we too adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’659 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts Kleve. See PO Resp. 27–29. Rather, as discussed previously, we find that Kleve’s vehicle owner can set a restriction, such as the rental start period, prior to step 214 in Kleve’s Figure 2 and that such restrictions can be associated with the e-key. We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that (1) Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts his deposition testimony or that (2) Dr. Almeroth “admitted his testimony was wrong.” See PO Sur-Reply 7 (citing PO Resp. 47–48 (citing Ex. 2022, 27:5–10, 27:21–28:1; Ex. 2021 ¶ 96)). In a particular embodiment to which Dr. Almeroth was citing, he noted that the e-key is always generated after the rental agreement. See Ex. 2022, 26:14– 20. Then the following exchange occurs: Q. So you use typically and always. So always does not refer to all of the embodiments of Kleve, is that fair? A. I think a person of skill in the art could read Kleve and understand that there are probably multiple ways in which the flow of actions among the parties could occur. And I think thinking about a real world scenario, in most cases you have an agreement before you would generate an eKey, but maybe, maybe not. I don’t -- I don’t know that the real world is necessarily cut and dry. So reading -- a person reading Kleve would understand it’s describing embodiments where it’s scenario, but I don’t know that it would necessarily be a hard and fast rule in every embodiment or in the understanding a person of skill in the art would have. Id. at 28:3–20. There is nothing in the deposition testimony by Dr. Almeroth that appears inconsistent with his declaration testimony nor does there appear to be the kind of admission touted by Patent Owner. Instead, it is Dr. Malek who takes an overly narrow view of Kleve that appears inconsistent with Kleve’s disclosure when read as a whole. See, e.g., Ex. 2021 ¶¶ 82–88. Therefore, we do not credit or agree with Dr. Malek’s testimony that Kleve fails to teach the concept of a virtual key created with the agreed-upon rental period as a restriction. See id. ¶ 57. Thus, based on the entire trial record, we find that Petitioner has” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “After review of the arguments and evidence, we agree with Petitioner’s position. Specifically, we agree that (1) both Kleve and Hatton are directed to use of electronic key systems for vehicles (see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7– 9, 39, 63; Ex. 1008, 1:48–52, 1:61–2:2, 5:25–34) and (2) encrypted communications would have been understood to be effective in preventing unauthorized access to the vehicle, something that is taught explicitly by Hatton (see Ex. 1008, 9:50–63). Given these disclosures by Kleve and Hatton, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a at the challenged claims. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Kleve with that of Hatton.” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s argument appears to be purely hindsight analysis based on the teachings of the ’659 patent and the limitations of challenged claim 6 because there is insufficient evidence or teachings in the cited prior art to suggest the sharing of virtual keys. Petitioner’s argument that having “rental microbusiness” implemented as a “smart phone application” that enables sharing virtual keys is insufficient to show obviousness, because, as noted by Patent Owner, certain embodiments in Kleve appear to discourage or even hinder the sharing of virtual keys. These embodiments require the use of credentials associated with the virtual key, where the credentials can be “facial recognition, voice print recognition, matrix barcode (ex. two-dimensional code), code word or phrase for speech recognition, temporary mobile web login IDs and password, or other types service.” See Ex. 1005 ¶ 37. Dr. Almeroth testifies that multiple people could be authorized on the same vehicle if they collectively rent a vehicle and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would “have been motivated to enable each user to share the virtual key with other authorized users associated with the same rental request.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 55. But given Kleve’s disclosure that the system handles key generation and distribution (Ex. 1005 ¶ 39), the evidence does not show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have wanted to give this control to each authorized user who has received an e-key. “It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or ‘template’ to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious.” Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Kleve’s teachings undermine Petitioner’s position, and do not support a finding of obviousness. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Kleve alone or in combination with Hatton would have rendered dependent claim 6 obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 11,738,659 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,738,659
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00790 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; claims 4 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (“We review the patent’s written description and drawings to confirm that the patentee’s own use of the disputed term is consistent with the meaning given to it by the court.”). The ’031 patent teaches that dielectric pairs of different tiers are etched to form staircases extending along the x-y plane. Ex. 1001, 13:27–28. As described above (§ I.D, supra), dielectric filling structure 311 is formed by depositing a dielectric filling material to fill the space remaining after portions of dielectric stack 203 are removed to form staircase structure 303. Id. at 13:36–41; see also id. at 22:63–65 (“Memory structure 1200 can be formed by forming dielectric filling structure 1201 to fill the space formed by the removal of portions of dielectric stack 1003.”) The ’031 patent then teaches that excess dielectric filling material overlying the topmost surface of staircase structure 303 is removed using a suitable planarization method. Id. at 13:41–44; see also 22:67–23:5 (performing a planarization process to remove excess dielectric filling structure 1201 over the top surface of memory structure 1200). According to the ’031 patent, the portion of the deposited dielectric filling material that remains “over staircase structure 303 and isolation layer 109” forms “dielectric filling structure 311 that surrounds staircase structure 303.” Id. at 13:44–48 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1:56–58 (stating in “some embodiments, the memory device also includes a filling structure surrounding the multiple-stack staircase structure”). structure is etched along the x-, y-, and z-axes, and the dielectric filling structure fills the spaces in the x-, y-, and z-directions created when the staircase structure is etched. Because the excess portion of the dielectric filling structure overlying the top of the staircase structure is removed, what remains is dielectric filling structure in the spaces around the staircase structure in the x-, y-, and z-planes. In this way, the ’031 patent teaches that the dielectric filling structure surrounds, i.e., is all around or encircles, the staircase structure.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline” with “2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices,” or “an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 22–23. Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–44). Patent Owner states that it does not object to the definition of a POSITA proffered by Petitioner. PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Pet. 22). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’031 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed

    “Dr. Banerjee adequately explains why a POSITA would have been motivated to make dummy structures DS with a conductive core as Petitioner proposes. In an obviousness analysis, some kind of reason must be shown as to why a POSITA would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that pillar support structures comprising electrically conductive material were known in the art, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s dummy structures. Pet. 55–56; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Banerjee’s testimony with respect to the modification of Kim leaves an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core as the pillar-support material recited in claim 4. Instead, Petitioner attempts to imbue a POSITA with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference, references of record, or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Petitioner’s argument that a POSITA would have modified Kim in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’031 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain sufficiently what invention to consider modifying Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core. Petitioner fails to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the thenaccepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Banerjee adequately explains why a POSITA would have been motivated to make dummy structures DS with a conductive core as Petitioner proposes. In an obviousness analysis, some kind of reason must be shown as to why a POSITA would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that pillar support structures comprising electrically conductive material were known in the art, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s dummy structures. Pet. 55–56; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Banerjee’s testimony with respect to the modification of Kim leaves an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core as the pillar-support material recited in claim 4. Instead, Petitioner attempts to imbue a POSITA with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference, references of record, or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Petitioner’s argument that a POSITA would have modified Kim in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’031 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain sufficiently what invention to consider modifying Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core. Petitioner fails to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the thenaccepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 10,868,031 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,868,031
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00794 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 6 are unpatentable over Park; claims 2–5 and 7–11 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not object to this assessment, arguing that its claims are valid regardless of the precise definition. PO 3 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’623 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “the Petition, Petitioner’s approach to Shibata’s drive circuit and Park’s dummy channel/open region teachings results in a deficiency in its showing of reasonable expectation of success for its expressed combination of extending Park’s insulative trenches to replace some of its common source lines. Petitioner relies solely on the fact that the references are capable of performing the relied-upon functions or could possess the relied-upon structure. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 19–20 (stating, “If Shibata accommodates this type of trench . . . there is no reason Park cannot as well,” and “Park itself already presents a variety of ways to minimize any etching problem that may be encountered when using wet etching”). But Park does not describe its dummy channel or open region teachings as generally applicable to all of its embodiments. And Petitioner needs to show a reason why the application of Shibata would be reasonably expected to have been successfully applied in Park, not merely state that there is “no reason” to expect that it would not be successful. See DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that even where two structures have “the same physical structure,” applying the teachings of one structure to the other requires “additional, reasoned analysis.”). The knowledge of one skilled in the art cannot bridge this gap, because these are inventive features of Park and Shibata. Furthermore, Petitioner also has not sufficiently explained, for any of its proposed augmentations, how metal gate deposition would occur sufficiently in the most remote regions of the long, parallel insulating layers in Petitioner’s Park-Shibata combination of such regions to avoid the risk of incomplete gate electrode layers in the final memory device that Patent Owner argues would result in a significant trade-off in memory device accuracy, and device scalability. PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 145). For example, Dr. Lee addresses only etching issues, not deposition issues. Ex. 1025, ¶¶ 32–47.” slip op. at 46

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. As pointed out by Patent Owner, the “trenches formed in the BSG” language of claim 1 reflects specific description of the gate-first method of manufacturing, but not the gate-last method of manufacturing. Ex. 1001, 7:17–19 (“referring to Fig. 1A, one or more first dielectric trenches . . . are formed in the one or more BSGs”). However, as Petitioner points out, the claims are to a memory “device,” not to a method of manufacturing or a device produced by specific manufacturing steps. Pet. Reply 1. During prosecution of the application that matured into the ’623 patent, the Examiner determined that the device of claim 1 was distinct from a separately claimed method of manufacturing and The Examiner’s requirement stated that the memory device of claim 1 is not limited by the disclosed process of manufacture because “the process claims require . . . deposition steps of polysilicon whereas the product claims do not require any polysilicon.” Id. Applicant agreed “without traverse” with the Examiner’s determination and selected to pursue only the “device” claims. Id. at 596 (“Applicant elects, without traverse, Invention I, Claims 1–11, drawn to a device”).4 The distinctiveness is also supported by the discussion in the ’623 patent of “formed in the BSG” that describes its device separately from its method of formation. The ’623 patent describes that “[i]n the disclosed memory device, one or more first dielectric trenches are formed in the BSG and extend in a length direction of the substrate to separate the BSG into a plurality of sub-BSGs.” Ex. 1001, 2:25–28. This description precedes, and is separate from, its description of an aspect of a process for manufacturing a memory device in which the BSG layer is formed and then “dielectric trenches are formed” that may “pass through the BSG layer” so that the “BSG layer is separated by the one or more first dielectric trenches into a plurality of sub-BSG layers.” Id. at 3:30–45. The description of the device having trenches formed in the BSG, which is not limited to a particular manufacturing process, further supports Petitioner’s contention that the “formed in the BSG” language is not limited to a particular manufacturing embodiment.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We do not agree that such arguments support Patent Owner’s conclusion. Patent Owner acknowledges that two portions of a BSG that are connected at a small opening are not separated because both portions remain electrically connected to each other. Id. at 17 (stating, “common source regions 52a is merely in the middle of a single sub-BSG 2 (‘SUB-BLK2’) and does not divide it into further sub-BSGs because there is an H-cut 72 that connects the two sides of the common source region such that both regions are part of the same sub-BSG”) (citing Ex. 1001, 9:15–19, 9:41–44) (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1026, 34:4–15, 41:23–42:16 (Dr. Kuhn attesting that common source regions may isolate adjacent BSGs). Patent Owner considers other portions of the BSG to be separated into sub-BSGs because there is no such connection between the sub-BSG portions. Id. at 17–18 (annotating Ex. 1001, Fig. 1B). Under such reasoning, the addition of a trench closing a gap between two neighboring BSG portions, thereby breaking the electrical connection therebetween, would “separate” the two BSG portions into further sub-BSGs. In its obviousness assertions, Petitioner argues for such an interpretation of the claim. See Pet. Reply 10 (“Park’s layers 111 electrically separate its BSG”). Based on the above, we determine that the phrase “dielectric trenches formed in the BSG and extending in a length direction of the substrate to perform electrical separation between sub-BSGs, but does not require that the trenches act alone, extending from one end of the device to the other across the entire BSG. Similarly, the trenches need not have any particular length, and need only to have some length that performs that separation.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 10,950,623 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,950,623
• Synaffix B.V. v. Hangzhou Dac Biotech Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24, 26, and 29–31 are unpatentable; claims 25 and 32–34 were not shown unpatentable, and the motion to exclude was dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • RemandOther

    “review of claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”), 1, 3. Patent Owner, Hangzhou DAC Biotech Co., Ltd., filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”). We initially determined that the information presented in the Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17. Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel (“DRP”). Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Delegated Review Panel vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised claim construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”). On August 30, 2024, we instituted an inter partes review after remand from the Director. Paper 25 (“Inst. Dec.”). Patent Owner subsequently filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 31, “Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 36, “Reply”), Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 44, “Sur-reply”), and Petitioner filed a Sur-sur-reply (Paper 48, “Sur-sur-reply”).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther

    “I. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1089 and 1090. Paper 50. As we did not rely on either of Exhibits 1089 or 1090 in deciding this matter, Patent Owner’s motion is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 96

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableMixed

    “For these reasons, Patent Owner’s arguments and cited evidence also” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “function as R2, and the ethyl group may function as R4, which can be a linear alkyl having 1–6 carbon atoms. We note that claim 3 permits R5 and R6 to be absent. For these reasons, the arguments presented in the Petition demonstrate that claim 3 would have been obvious over Singh’s Compound 3 when modified in view of Harris.” slip op. at 73

  Patent outcomesUS 10,131,682 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,131,682
• PLR Worldwide Sales Ltd. v. Flip Phone Games, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00209 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 and 13–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Ho and Aoki; claims 12 and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Jiau and Aoki or Jiau and Kim.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues for a slightly different level of ordinary skill in the art: “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with one to two years of experience developing or programming video games or video game systems, or similar types of computer systems.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). Patent Owner further argues that the person having ordinary skill in the art “may have additional education that might substitute for some of the experience, and additional experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Id. (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s proposal does not require experience in programming video games. Id. at 3. However, Patent Owner states, “[t]his difference does not materially affect the analysis presented below.” Id. We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s marginally more specific proposal. Additionally, because we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal, we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of “downloading” excludes “real-time fetching of data by a client from a server system.” PO Resp. 34; see also PO Sur-reply 16–17; Tr. 32:22–34:7. Because we need not expressly construe any claim terms, we do not construe any terms of the ’662 patent. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “date of the ’662 patent, Ho is not a “printed publication” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). PO Resp. 30–33; PO Sur-reply 15–16. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that: a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application. And, by virtue of § 102(e)(1), a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts permissible grounds of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Ho, which is a prior art printed publication, and either Aoki or Kim.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Aoki’s teaching of using user-identification information as part of the request for an advertisement with Ho’s system, which also teaches a client device sending information to a server to request hot spot information, such as advertisements. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–107, 111, 114, 117. Because both Ho and Aoki are directed to improvements in game design and monetization from using advertisements (id. ¶ 106; Ex. 1004, 1:26–28; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6–8), a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked at both Ho and Aoki and combined the relevant features with a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103, 106, 117). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that using Aoki’s teaching of sending user-identification information with Ho, which includes sending information with a request for information relating to interactive information elements (hot spots), allows for targeted advertisements, which was a known advantage in advertising. Id. ¶ 117; Ex. 10089 ¶¶ 54–55 (describing advantages of targeted advertising).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 9,427,662 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,427,662
• Life Spine, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2022-01434 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 and 15 are unpatentable over Chung and Olmos-based obviousness grounds; claims 10–14 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references did not teach the claimed complementary relationship.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “improperly incorporates-by-reference 12 pages of expert testimony via a single sentence.” PO Sur-reply 16 n.2 (citing Pet. Reply 17, which in turn cites Ex. 1026 (Hatch Decl.) ¶¶ 49–66). We find that many of the paragraphs within the cited range (i.e., Hatch Declaration paragraphs 49–66) appear to have a tenuous connection to the proposition for which Petitioner cites these paragraphs. See Pet. Reply 17. That said, we find that paragraphs 53–55 directly relate to Petitioner’s proposition in the Reply, i.e., that “Petitioner’s experts explain why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would rely on a cross-sectional view over a perspective view for making the determination in question, because only the cross-sections provide the needed side view directly orthogonal to the positions of the yellow expansion portion and the end of the dovetail.” Id. Accordingly, we find that paragraphs 53–55—the only paragraphs we cite from Petitioner’s range in reaching our conclusion—are not improperly incorporated by reference into Petitioner’s Reply.” slip op. at 66

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “provide Petitioner an opportunity to respond under the new construction, and decline to strike Petitioner’s relevant argument and evidence. Cf. Axonics, 75 F.4th at 1383 (“[W]hen the Board adopts a new claim construction following institution, an IPR petitioner must have adequate notice and an opportunity to respond under the new construction.”). Like in Axonics, in its new arguments on Reply, Petitioner here relies on the same embodiment from the same prior art reference that it relies on in the Petition to support the same legal argument, i.e., that Olmos’s Figure 16 embodiment discloses the “complementary with one another” limitation of challenged claims 10– 14. See Axonics, 75 F.4th at 1384; see also Apple Inc. v. Andrea Elecs. Corp., 949 F.3d 697, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (permitting petitioner to elaborate in reply on an unpatentability theory presented in the petition). Moreover, we permitted Patent Owner to file (and it indeed did file) a sur-reply brief and expert declaration that addressed Petitioner’s new obviousness theories. Accordingly, both parties had adequate notice of our preliminary construction and an opportunity to respond under that new construction. For these reasons, we deny Patent Owner’s motion to strike.” slip op. at 124

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “from the expansion portion. We agree with Patent Owner that the wording of this limitation as a whole requires that the “extension necessarily must protrude beyond a longitudinal end of the expansion portion.” Id. at 11. We also agree with Patent Owner that “[u]nder Petitioner’s tenuous theory, an extension in any direction except 90 or 180 degrees would satisfy the claim language since any such direction has a so-called ‘longitudinal component.’” Id. at 13. For these reasons, we disagree with Petitioner’s argument that the purported “longitudinal component” of Chung’s extension satisfies limitation 1[h].” slip op. at 55

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “would have been motivated to add an extension to the Figure 16 embodiment because “an integrally-formed extension advantageously requires fewer parts, which facilitates both manufacturing and use.” Pet. 118. We agree with Patent Owner that this argument is unavailing. PO Resp. 50. Petitioner’s combination entails adding an extension (from Figure 8) to an embodiment lacking one (Figure 16). We agree with Patent Owner that adding a new component (whether separately or integrally) can in some instances complicate manufacturing/assembly and increase costs. See id. (citing Ex. 2013 (Culbert Decl.) ¶ 115). Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that the proposed combination in this instance would reduce complexity or facilitate the manufacturing process. Accordingly, we do not rely on this argument offered by Petitioner.” slip op. at 106

  Patent outcomesUS 8,845,731 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,845,731
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 3, 2022 · IPR2020-01624 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Gauthier, Groen, and Shumarayev, with Huang for certain dependent claims; claim 17 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “speed links, or equivalent academic experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). At institution, we applied Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound. Inst. Dec. 8. During the trial, Patent Owner stated that it does not object to this level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 7. Based on the parties’ agreement on this issue, we maintain our determination from the Institution Decision and apply that level of ordinary skill in the analysis below.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The parties dispute the scope of “independent.” Petitioner argues that using separate current setting signals for separate devices describes the “independent” aspect of these claims. Pet. 31–35; see also Pet. Reply 3–9 (setting forth claim construction arguments). Patent Owner argues that the ’132 patent does not set forth a special definition for “independent” and, therefore, that the plain meaning applies—“not determined or influenced by someone or something else.” PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2005). Thus, Patent Owner argues that “independent of” means “not determined or influenced by.” PO Resp. 8–17; PO Sur-reply 2–7. As discussed below, we conclude that Petitioner has proven obviousness of the subject matter in claims 1–16 and 18 under Patent Owner’s proposed construction, and the deficiencies in Petitioner’s contentions for claim 17 are not related to the definition of “independent.” Thus, we need not resolve this claim construction dispute to issue a final written decision on all claims. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

    “At institution, we preliminarily agreed with Petitioner that these phrases are means-plus-function. Inst. Dec. 13–15. Patent Owner argues that these phrases are not means-plus-function limitations and that “[e]ach claimed ‘current selection module’ is simply a circuit or collection of circuit[r]y that selects current, with additional structural limitations provided by the surrounding claim language.” PO Resp. 17–21. Patent Owner, however, also states that “[t]he Board need not construe the ‘current selection module’ terms because analysis of the prior art does not turn on claim construction.” PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner states it “is not disputing that the prior art discloses ‘current selection modules,’ per se, regardless of which claim construction the Board adopts”; rather, Patent Owner contends “that the current selection modules in the prior art fail to satisfy other claim requirements.” PO Resp. 18. Because there is no dispute between the parties the resolution of which turns on whether the “current selection module” phrases of claims 1 and 12 invoke § 112 ¶ 6, we need not resolve this issue to decide the patentability challenges before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1368.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “for the combination and that “Petitioner cites no disclosure from any of the references or background materials suggesting that the cited current supplies were known, interchangeable alternatives.” PO Resp. 60–61. We disagree. As discussed above, Shumarayev discloses separate and independent programmable current supplies for the main driver and the pre-emphasis driver. Ex. 1007, 6:10–17, 6:24–27, Fig. 6. This is an alternative to Groen’s disclosure of separately controlled current select modules (DACs 400 and 402) where DAC 402’s input reference current is the current that is output from DAC 400. Ex. 1004, 5:4–8, Fig. 4. Patent Owner also argues that making a control circuit programmable is more complex than making a non-programmable circuit because “a designer would need to add means to store what is programmed, thus involving more than simple PMOS and NMOS transistors” and requiring additional fabrication steps. PO Resp. 62–63 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 70). Both Groen and Shumarayev, however, disclose programmable current sources for pre-emphasis and drive circuitry. Groen’s DAC 400 produces a reference current based on a 5-bit code, and Groen’s DAC 402 produces an emphasis current based on a 3-bit code. Ex. 1004, 4:51–58, Fig. 4. Shumarayev’s driver 44a includes programmable current supplies 56a and 56b, and pre-emphasis driver 44b includes current supplies 58a and 58b that produce an “amount of current that . . . may be controlled by programming how Petitioner’s reliance on Shumarayev’s teachings of separate and independent current sources for main and pre-emphasis drivers introduces any complexity due to the need to make the current sources programmable. Patent Owner also points to Shumarayev’s statement that “there may be consequences of providing too much programmable circuitry” (Ex. 1007, 8:3–4) as suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Shumarayev’s teachings with Groen and Gauthier. PO Resp. 64 (quoting Ex. 1007, 8:3–4). According to Patent Owner, Shumarayev’s statement “suggests that the inventors of the ’132 patent, who were able to build successful circuits with independently programmable primary and pre-emphasis current levels, had to overcome various design challenges.” PO Resp. 64 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 72). We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Groen discloses programmability to address “a need in the art for a driver circuit that can select from numerous possible data communication operating modes.” Ex. 1004, 1:32–38. The whole purpose of Groen is to accommodate different driver modes by controlling the drive and emphasis currents. Ex. 1004, 3:50–59 (Table 1), 4:1–13 (Table 2), 5:55–67. Shumarayev, similarly, teaches programmable circuitry to accommodate different “I/O standards such as LVPECL, LVDS, PCML, etc.” Ex. 1007, 6:20–23, 7:57–67. Shumarayev then teaches a simplifying alternative, namely, “replac[ing] some or all of the programmable circuitry in I/O circuits 16 with hardwired circuitry.” Ex. 1007, 8:4–7. Thus, we hardly see why a person of ordinary skill in the art would be discouraged from the combination by the alleged complexities of programmability when both Groen and Shumarayev are expressly directed to such programmability.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 6,975,132 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,975,132
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 13, 2022 · IPR2020-01596 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–12, and 15–17 are unpatentable as obvious over OneChip and ORT8850; claims 6, 7, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because QL80FC was excluded.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Dr. Nelson’s opinion that a person skilled in the art would have had at least the education and experience indicated necessarily encompasses persons having the minimum level of education and experience. It is axiomatic that something that was known or would have been obvious to a person having a minimum level of education and experience would necessarily have been known or obvious to a person having the same or a higher level of education or experience. As we indicated in our Institution Decision, “the level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention.” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In our analysis below, we consider all evidence as if viewed by a person having the minimum level of education and experience identified by Dr. Nelson, i.e., having “the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or related field and 3-5 years of professional experience in computer systems design, circuit design, or equivalent academic experience.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “the parties, we find Petitioner has failed to authenticate Exhibit 1008, and that the dates printed on the faces of Exhibit 1008 and Exhibit A of the Rosenberg declaration are hearsay. Exhibit A of the Rosenberg declaration contains two archived versions, dated September 3, 2000 and October 23, 2000, of the webpage www.quicklogic.com/devices/QuickFC/Default.html. Ex. 1019, Ex. A. The “second page” of the archived webpage contains a link entitled “QuickFC Device DataSheet.” Id. However, as Patent Owner correctly argues, “the Rosenberg Affidavit only purports to ‘attest[] to the authenticity of the archived and dated QuickFC webpages’—not the purportedly linked to [QL80FC] exhibits” and “[t]he Rosenberg Affidavit neither references QL80FC nor makes any assertion of a connection between QL80FC and the webpages shown in the printouts.” PO Resp. 53–54. Petitioner offers no testimony from a custodian of records for the QL80FC product, as they did for the ORT8850 product, to support a finding that Exhibit 1008 is what Petitioner purports it to be. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). Moreover, we disagree with Petitioner’s contentions that FREs 703, 901(b)(4) or 902(7) authenticate or provide a basis to forego excluding Exhibit 1008. FRE 703 allows an expert to base his or her opinion on facts or data an expert in the field would reasonably rely on, even if they are not themselves admissible. Id. 703. They do not prohibit the exclusion of inadmissible evidence or allow for the admission of otherwise excludable evidence. Although FRE 901(b)(4) does allow evidence to be admitted based on its “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,” Petitioner has not shown that Exhibit 1008 contains sufficient distinctive characteristics to authenticate it. The only characteristic of Exhibit 1008 that tends to show that it is a QuickLogic datasheet for the QL80FC product is the appearance of QuickLogic’s name and logo on the datasheet. See Ex, 1008. But Petitioner fails to present authenticated versions of other QuickLogic data sheets to demonstrate how the structure, format, and appearance of QL80FC is consistent with their structure, format, and appearance. See Pet. Reply 22–23; Opp. 14–15. Finally, FRE 902(7) does not authenticate Exhibit 1008, it only authenticates any “inscription[s], sign[s], tag[s], or label[s]” affixed to Exhibit 1008. See Fed.R.Evid. 902(7). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find Petitioner has failed to authenticate Exhibit 1008, and we exclude Exhibit 1008 from this proceeding.” slip op. at 22

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “1. Programmable Fabric / Programmable Fabric Circuitry Petitioner contends these terms “refer to user programmable circuitry capable of being programmed to implement arbitrary, as opposed to specific, logic functions.” Pet. 10. In our Institution Decision, we determined the precise meanings of these terms were not in dispute and, therefore, declined to expressly construe them. See Dec. Inst. 19–20 (citing Nidec Motor, 868 F.3d at 1017). Neither party disputes that finding, which we maintain here. See PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 3–30.” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “maintain our preliminary construction that the plain and ordinary meaning of the transceiver component limitation requires the LOS detector to be “a transceiver component having selectable values that is configured by the plurality of configuration memory cells.” The limitation requires “a plurality of transceivers containing respective components having selectable values,” wherein “said components [are] configured by . . . memory cells,” and wherein “one of said components is a loss of synchronization detector.” Ex. 1001, 6:32–36 (emphases added). Thus, the LOS detector is one of the transceiver components referred to earlier, i.e., one of “said components” “having selectable values” that is “configured by . . . memory cells.” Id. The Specification is consistent with this interpretation. It discloses a transceiver whose receiver side includes deserializer/comma detector 174, decoder 178, elastic buffer 182, CRC 186, and LOS 188.10 Id., Fig. 3. Each of these components is described as being configurable and having selectable values. Id. at 4:54–6:7. Moreover, our interpretation does not render superfluous the use of the term “configurable” in other limitations. To the contrary, the transceiver components limitation only requires transceiver components identified as “one of said components,” i.e., as one of the “respective components having selectable values” to be configurable. It does not require every transceiver component to be configurable because not every transceiver component has to be identified as “one of said components.” Thus, because the serializer and deserializer are not identified as “one of said components” in the “transceiver components” limitation, that limitation does not require that they be configurable. As a result, the claim’s later requirement of “a configurable serializer” and “a configurable deserializer” is not superfluous.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,187,709 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,187,709

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.