- Evenflo Company, Inc. v. Baby Jogger II, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01122 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Liao or Liao and Cheng; Rolicki is not prior art, and the challenge over Offord ’341 and Offord ’797 fails.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Baby Jogger does not dispute Evenflo’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is that a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter, “one skilled in the art”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field (e.g., mechanical engineering or industrial design) and at least two years of product design experience and/or industry experience with juvenile products” and that “[m]ore education can replace product design experience, and vice versa.” Pet 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 31–33); PO Resp. generally. We apply that definition here, as it accords with the problems addressed in the prior art and the specification of the ’682 patent.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“At the outset, we note that the claim language requires only that “the first seat and the second seat” be arranged in an inline descending configuration, not that the seat’s mounting points or other physical connections be so arranged. Ex. 1010, 17:31–33. Baby Jogger improperly reads “seats” out of the claim and substitutes the seat’s “mounting points” on the frame. A proper reading of the claim language focuses on what happens when both seats are connected to the frame, not where they are so connected. In other words, “when connected to the frame” simply emphasizes that both seats must be connected to the frame to form the inline descending configuration, as opposed to the single stroller embodiment of Figure 1, where there cannot be an inline descending configuration because only one seat is connected to the frame and the other seat is removed, i.e., not connected to the frame. That reading is supported by the specification of the ’682 patent,” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“We find that testimony persuasive, for it shows what one skilled in the art would have recognized the 2008 Provisional as necessarily disclosing. The relevant inquiry is whether the disclosure of the prior application “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the inventor was in possession of the invention.” PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). “While a prior application need not contain precisely the same words as are found in the asserted claims, . . . the prior application must indicate to a person skilled in the art that the inventor was ‘in possession’ of the invention as later claimed.” Id. In other words, “to satisfy the written description requirement, ‘the missing descriptive matter must necessarily be present in the [original] application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a disclosure.’”7 Id. (quoting Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). “This requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element.” Id. at 1306–07. Moreover, a drawing may supply written description for the arrangement it depicts even though the text describes that arrangement in different terms. See Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1319–23 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Instead, Evenflo’s argument rests on isolating the statement—“A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]”—from the remainder of the passage in which that statement appears in order to arrive at a reason to incorporate the reversibility teaching of Offord ’797. However, when that statement is read in the context of the full passage in which it appears, nowhere does that passage suggest reversibility as the reason for referencing Offord ’797. More accurately, it suggests a different reason that relates to a curved lug 108 by which sub-frame 100 rests on the stroller’s main frame 4 to carry the weight of the stroller’s two occupants— When the interface components 100 are attached to the frame assembly 4 they form a sub-frame of the frame assembly 4, and when the child-carrying units are mounted thereon, one behind the other, they are in a compact echelon formation, one of the connector sockets 106 of each component 100 being at a higher level in relation to the ground than the other connector sockets 106. The higher connector socket 106 and further connecting leg 102 are both connected to the respective opposite ends of an upper mounting piece 107. In addition, on the inner side of the lower connector sockets 106 there is a downwardly curved lug 108 which serves to rest upon a part of the basket frame 44, such that the weight of two infants is fully supported by the frame assembly 4. A similar sub-frame arrangement is disclosed in [Offord ’797]. Ex. 1051, 9:23–36 (emphasis added). That passage shows that, rather than reversibility of the sub-frame, the reference to Offord ’797 is more aptly directing the reader to the arrangement and details of a similarly curved lug structure in the stroller sub-frame of Offord ’797. Indeed, Figures 5 and 6 of Offord ’797, reproduced below, disclose just such a curved lug in the context of “corner pieces 20” having “channel 21.” Ex. 1054, 4:10–23.” slip op. at 53
Patent outcomesUS 11,731,682 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,731,682 - Allstate Insurance Company v. Atos, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 30, 2026 · IPR2021-01449 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand
Claims 3–5 are unpatentable; claims 1 and 2 are not shown unpatentable. Claims 3 and 4 are obvious over the applied grounds under the remand construction of “movement vector.”
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“was incorrect, vacated the Final Written Decision as to claims 3 and 4, and remanded the case to the Board to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” and decide the outcome for claims 3 and 4 in accordance with that meaning. Atos, LLC v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2025 WL 1482404, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2025); Paper 35 (“Federal Circuit Remand,” “Remand,” or “Fed. Cir. Remand”). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s instructions, the Board authorized the” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“considered individually and together, have well-understood, common meanings to ordinarily skilled artisans as of the invention date, reflected by the ’174 patent’s specification and other evidence of record noted above. Accordingly, we determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” is “a vector indicating movement of an object.” 3) “operation indicator” Petitioner” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Dr. Kanellakopoulos’s explanation that angular momentum is not inherent to an object, and its computation requires an arbitrary choice of a point of origin that has no physical meaning in the context of vehicle motion, also supports Patent Owner’s position. Id. ¶ 71 (citing Ex. 2004, 262). Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument, that angular momentum cannot be used to detect a vehicle turning, is persuasive. Id. We also find persuasive, as Dr. Kanellakopoulos explains, that Petitioner’s argument regarding the figure on Kleppner 234 is based on misinterpretation of the vectors in that figure. Id. ¶ 67 (explaining that Kleppner 233–234 does not depict a gravity vector).” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Kleppner does not disclose a rotation vector, a person of ordinary skill would have used the knowledge of a rotation vector (because it is a term of art) alongside Kleppner’s teaching, to arrive at claim 1. See Pet. Reply 11. This argument does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Petitioner does not explain which teaching of Kleppner a person of ordinary skill would have selected and combined with their knowledge of a rotation vector to yield the method of claim 1, or explain why a person of ordinary skill would have recognized based on Kleppner that estimating the angle between a rotation vector and gravity vector could be used to detect a vehicle turning. Nor does Petitioner respond to Patent Owner’s assertion that Kleppner provides no rationale for estimating an angle of alignment between a rotation vector and gravity vector as a way of detecting a vehicle turning. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 65.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 9,846,174 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,846,174 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00055 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion, entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–42 after statutory disclaimer, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under the Rules, actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Here, Patent Owner has disclaimed, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321, claims 1–42 of the ’407 patent, which constitute all challenged claims involved in this trial. See Ex. 2031. We thus construe the statutory disclaimer as a request for entry of adverse judgment. Having reviewed the statutory disclaimer, we determine that adverse judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–42 of the ’407 patent is appropriate.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,486,407 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00054 · APJ John G New · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed motion and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 1–16 after statutory disclaimer.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include … [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1). We find that good cause exists to grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment and to terminate this proceeding. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate and Request for Adverse Judgment. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,246,828 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00052 · APJ John G New · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed motion and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 1–17 following statutory disclaimer of all claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include … [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1). We find that good cause exists to grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment and to terminate this proceeding. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate and Request for Adverse Judgment. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,632,069 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00056 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–30 after it statutorily disclaimed all claims, and terminated the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1). We find good cause exists to grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgement and to terminate this proceeding. Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate and Request for Adverse Judgment. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,260,061 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · PGR2025-00059 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted post-grant review of claims 1–4 on all four asserted grounds, finding a sufficient preliminary showing of obviousness and lack of enablement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“V. CONCLUSION Petitioner has, at this stage, established that it will more likely than not prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. This determination is, however, based on a preliminary record and is not final on any issues of patentability. We will make a final determination on the patentability of the challenged claims, as necessary and applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, based on a fully developed record through trial. VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) post grant review of claims 1–4 of the ’233 patent is hereby instituted on the grounds set forth in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; and” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not proffer a description of a POSA. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this decision, on the record at this time, we find that Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record, and apply it herein. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We invite the parties to further address the definition of a POSA during trial should they find it necessary.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“In addition, the opinion stated in the Pomper Declaration that “the term of ‘low molecular weight’ is well accepted in the chemical arts” and the declarant “recognize[s] that low molecular weight compounds would have a molecular weight of typically from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons” is offered by a co-inventor. We, as factfinder, have discretion to weigh the credibility of expert witnesses and to give each item of evidence such weight as appropriate. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). In this case, we find that the published references on metabolites do not support the opinion. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1368 (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”) US-121, of which Dr. Pomper is lead inventor, also uses the term “low molecular weight”—without further characterization of the term—and is uninformative as to the meaning of the term. See Ex. 1006, ¶ 12. In addition, Patent Owner’s definition does not appear to apply to all compounds claimed in US-121.5” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“limited to Patent Owner’s proposed “from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons.” The cited evidence relied on in the Pomper Declaration to define “low molecular weight” as a term well accepted in the chemical arts relates to metabolomics and metabolites. See Ex. 1002, 169, (specifically, ¶ 17 of Dr. Pomper’s declaration). Patent Owner admits that Dr. Pomper’s testimony is about molecules that differ from the claimed imaging and radiotherapeutic agents targeting FAP-α, but argues that the testimony is still relevant for purposes of explanation. Prelim Resp. 21. While it may be relevant, the testimony is not persuasive in light of the Specification. We find the uncontested fact that several of the B moieties alone—without the A moiety or L linker—specifically identified in the ’233 patent fall outside of Patent Owner’s proposed definition persuasive, as we normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes examples disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting proposed claim interpretation that would exclude disclosed examples in the specification). The cases cited by Patent Owner supporting that a claim term may be construed to exclude embodiments where the prosecution history supports such construction are factually distinguishable from the instant case as they regard instances of specific prosecution history disclaimer, clear prosecution disavowal, or relate to a specific definition of the terms in the Specification for the term being construed. Here, “low molecular weight” is not defined in the Specification, but, as Petitioner argues (see Pet. 21–25) is characterized as “demonstrat[ing] faster pharmacokinetics and a higher specific signal within clinically convenient times after administration” and that it “can be synthesized in radiolabeled form more easily.” Ex.1001, 13:33–50, 14:56– 16:14, 17:9–20. We are persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Zeglis, Petitioner’s declarant, that compounds weighing over 1500 Da may share those same behaviors, along with certain identified B moieties disclosed as embodiments. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 83.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,115,233 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. v. Bayer Pharma AktiengesellschaftAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2022-01513 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Petitioners’ withdrawal and entered adverse judgment against them on remanded claims 5–8; claims 1–4 remained affirmed as unpatentable.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b)(4). We find good cause exists to grant Petitioners’ request to withdraw from the proceedings, which is a request for adverse judgement (with respect to challenged claims 5–8). slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,828,310 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. v. Bayer Pharma AktiengesellschaftAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2022-01515 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Petitioners’ withdrawal request and entered adverse judgment against them as to claims 5–8; claims 1–4 remained affirmed as unpatentable.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b)(4). We find good cause exists to grant Petitioners’ request to withdraw from the proceedings, which is a request for adverse judgement (with respect to challenged claims 5–8). slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,828,310 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. v. Bayer Pharma AktiengesellschaftAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2022-00517 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Petitioners’ withdrawal request and entered adverse judgment against them as to claims 5–8 after remand.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b)(4). We find good cause exists to grant Petitioners’ request to withdraw from the proceedings, which is a request for adverse judgement (with respect to challenged claims 5–8). slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,828,310
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.