• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2024-01137 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 9–23 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the asserted combinations failed to teach the claimed mouthpiece movement or bite-actuated compression.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Trove contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products” and that “[m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). While CamelBak offers a “slightly different” level of skill in the art, it nonetheless “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the 2 JP 2002-211613, published July 31, 2002 (Ex. 1004, “Nakajima”). 3 US 6,070,767, issued June 6, 2000 (Ex. 1005, “Gardner”). 4 WO 2004/063042, published July 29, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Ribarits”). 5 US 4,485,963, issued Dec. 4, 1984 (Ex. 1007, “Panicci”). 6 US 6,523,711 B1, issued Feb. 25, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Hughes”). Board’s decision on the patentability of the ’255 patent.” PO Resp. 14–15. That being the case, we adopt Trove’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it is reasonable and consistent with what is reflected in the asserted prior art and the specification of the ’255 patent. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “not move in a circular path that maintains a constant radius about the axis of rotation defined by McDonough’s axle 30, but instead engages in up-and-down translational motion (red arrows) relative to axle 30. Thus, we understand CamelBak’s arguments during reexamination to have distinguished the purely rotational (i.e., circular) motion of the claimed mouthpiece from a mouthpiece that moves with a translational component relative to the pivotal axis. In sum, this reexamination history shows that, by distinguishing over the translational motion of McDonough’s mouthpiece, CamelBak limited the claimed mouthpiece to one that (1) maintains a circular path of constant radius about the pivotal mount’s axis of rotation, and (2) does not include a path that has a translational component relative to the pivotal axis. See Fenner Investments, Ltd. v. Cellco Partnership, 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 & 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Any explanation, elaboration, or qualification presented by the inventor during patent examination is relevant, for the role of claim construction is to capture the scope of the actual invention that is disclosed, described, and patented.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]hrough statements made during prosecution or reexamination an applicant for a patent or a patent owner, as the case may be, may commit to a particular meaning for a patent term, which meaning is then binding in litigation.”) (emphasis added); see also Univ. of Massachusetts v. L’Oreal S.A., 36 F.4th 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The prosecution history, in particular, may be critical in interpreting disputed claim terms, and even where prosecution history statements do not rise to the level of unmistakable disavowal, they do inform the claim construction.”) (internal quotations omitted).” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Those detailed descriptions demonstrate that “adapted to,” as recited in claims 1 and 20, means that the resilient mouthpiece is specifically designed and configured to dispense fluid as a result of a user biting the mouthpiece, rather than merely being “capable of” being compressed. See Giannelli, 739 F.3d at 1379–80. Indeed, as disclosed, a distinct benefit of the resilient mouthpiece being bite-actuated “is that a user may position the drink bottle (and mouthpiece) to a desired drinking orientation, and even a partially or completely inverted orientation, without drink fluid being dispensed from the mouthpiece” until the user bites upon the mouthpiece to commence fluid flow through self-sealing valve to the user. Id. at 10:9–19. Thus, the intrinsic evidence, i.e., the specification and figures of the ’255 patent, confirm that the phrase “adapted to” means “designed or configured to” and is not satisfied by mere hypothetical capability. That is, as claimed, the resilient mouthpiece is designed or configured to compress based on actual forces applied by a user’s teeth, as opposed to merely being capable of compression based on the inherent nature of the mouthpiece’s material. C. Obviousness” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Trove that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in up-and-down movement relative to the pivot axis identified in Trove’s annotated figures, we disagree that Nakajima’s mouthpiece is “pivotal about an axis defined by the pair of lateral projections as [they] rotate within the pair of sockets,” as required by claim 1. As discussed above, the proper construction of this claim limitation requires that the mouthpiece moves with rotational motion in a circular path of constant radius about the pivotal axis defined by the pair of lateral projections. See supra § II.B.1. Nakajima, on the other hand, discloses that its mouthpiece moves with translational motion, i.e., up-and-down movement, relative to the pivotal axis defined by lateral projections 19 of Nakajima’s lid 4—“[T]he mouthpiece moves up and down in conjunction with the opening and closing of the lid.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 3 (emphasis added); see also id., Abstract (“[T]he mouthpiece 2 moves up and down in conjunction with the opening and closing of the lid 4.”). Indeed, although Trove relies exclusively on Nakajima’s disclosure of up-and-down movement for the mouthpiece, Trove never explains how such up-and-down movement equates to rotational motion required by the disputed limitation of claim 1. Nor can it.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,676,255 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,676,255
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00858 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–7 and 16–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 102 or § 103 because the cited references failed to disclose the claimed closure retention mechanism.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. “closure retention mechanism” Trove proposes that “closure retention mechanism” should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Pet. 18–19; Pet. Reply 1. CamelBak agrees. See PO Resp. 8. Indeed, subsequent to our institution decision, the district court in the parallel action held that the “closure retention mechanism” is a means-plus-function term governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Ex. 2010, at 5–6. We see no reason to depart from that holding and adopt the district court’s reasoning in that regard as our own. See id. at 6–8.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with CamelBak that the plain language of the claim imposes a temporal condition on when the closure is received by the closure retention mechanism, namely, only after it is removed from the drink spout. In other words, the closure cannot be in engagement with, i.e., “received by,” the closure retention mechanism while it remains on the drink spout. This interpretation is consistent with the specification, which repeatedly states that spaced-apart tabs 56 “engage” the closure when it is removed from the spout and moved to the stowed position. Ex. 1001, 8:58–60 (“tabs 56 . . . are configured to selectively engage and retain, or otherwise grip, the closure in the stowed position”); 9:32–39 (“when the closure is positioned between and/or otherwise in engagement with the tabs, the tabs engage the closure across the maximum width, such as with the tabs resiliently deflecting, bending, or compressing to accommodate the greater width of the closure”); 11:36–39 (“the closure retention mechanism 54 may be configured to engage . . . the closure to operatively retain the closure in its stowed configuration.”); 13:26–31 (“When the closure is operatively positioned within the closed perimeter of the handle into its stowed position . . . such closure is compressed slightly.”) (emphases added). Moreover, the specification describes this engagement as occurring by means of a “friction-fit” or “snap-fit” arrangement (id. at 8:50–52, 14:33– 36), which confirms that the closure is not permanently engaged with the tabs, but rather moved into engagement with the tabs, i.e., “received by the closure retention mechanism” per the plain language of the claim. Thus, the intrinsic evidence—the claim language and the specification—supports a construction that imposes a temporal condition on the recited function of the claimed “closure retention mechanism” such that it receives the closure only after the closure has been removed from the drink spout, meaning the closure is not engaged with the closure retention mechanism before it is selectively removed from the drink spout.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “3. “retain the closure in a stowed position” CamelBak contends that this limitation should be construed to mean “to hold or keep the closure in a position removed from the drink spout.” PO Resp. 13–14; PO Sur-Reply 4. Although Trove contends that CamelBak’s construction “impermissibly rewrites” the claim language, Trove nonetheless “does not disagree that it encompasses ‘hold or keep the Indeed, the claim language itself already contemplates just such a construction by expressly reciting that the closure retention mechanism “selectively retain[s] the closure in a stowed position relative to the handle when the closure is selectively removed from the drink spout.” Ex. 1001, 18:63–66 (emphasis added). As such, we determine that further construction of this limitation is not necessary to resolve the present dispute.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Trove proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had— an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products . . . [and that] [m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 25–30). 2 US 9,272,822 B2, issued Mar. 1, 2016 (Ex. 1004, “Samartgis”). 3 EP 2 177 447 A1, published Apr. 21, 2010 (Ex. 1011, “Gorskey”). 4 US 2006/0006578 A1, published Jan. 12, 2006 (Ex. 1012, “Johnson”). 5 US 7,753,240 B2, issued July 13, 2010 (Ex. 1005, “Leoncavallo”). 6 US D586,184 S, issued Feb. 10, 2009 (Ex. 1006, “Miller”). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. See PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 61–68). Because CamelBak simply paraphrases Trove’s slightly more detailed definition of the level of skill in the art, we adopt Trove’s definition, as it appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’252 patent.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 8,905,252 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,905,252
• Bowmar Archery LLC v. Matthew FuttereNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00401 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15, and 17 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted anticipation or obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. For purposes of this decision and based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. Also, we note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. Ferrule Petitioner argues that the ’177 patent “defines ‘ferrule’ as a ‘generally cylindrical body,’” which interpretation Petitioner asserts “is consistent with the ordinary meaning to [an ordinarily skilled artisan].” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:53–55; Ex. 1019 ¶ 61). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of this claim term. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested interpretation of “ferrule.” 2. Blade Member Patent Owner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As discussed in section II.C.2 above, we interpret a “blade member” to have a cutting surface. Petitioner does not support adequately its assertion that Lint’s barbs 19 have a cutting surface. Petitioner acknowledges that Lint discloses “barb 19,” but Petitioner merely labels the barbs as blade members in annotated versions of Lint Figure 2. Pet. 21–22, 24. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Kuhn, provides substantially identical testimony, also failing to explain how Lint’s barbs have a cutting surface or perform a cutting function. See Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 68, 70. Such conclusory assertions fail to satisfy Petitioner’s burden of persuasion. To the contrary of Petitioner’s assertions, Lint discloses that its barbs do not perform a cutting function. Lint discloses that its barbs retract to the closed position upon impact with an animal. Ex. 1002, 2:62–67. Only when the arrowhead has “completely penetrated the flesh of an animal” does the spring urge the barbs into the extended position “to retain the arrowhead within the animal.” Id. at 2:67–70.6 Lint discloses that its barbs provide 6 During the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel argued that Lint’s disclosure of its barbs deploying “[a]fter the arrowhead 10 has completely penetrated the flesh of an animal” means the spring urges the barbs forward after the resistance to the removal of the arrow from an animal (id. at 1:53–57, 2:67–70), but Lint does not disclose its barbs as performing any cutting function. Thus, Lint’s barbs are not blade members with a cutting surface as we have interpreted the term above. Petitioner has failed to explain adequately how Lint discloses first and second blade members as recited in independent claims 1 and 11.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “A claimed modification to the prior art may be an obvious design choice if the claimed structure performs the same function as in the prior art and it presents no novel or unexpected result over the prior art. See In re Kuhle, 526 F.2d 553, 555 (CCPA 1975) (finding that the use of the claimed feature “would be an obvious matter of design choice” when it “solves no stated problem” and “presents no novel or unexpected result” over the disclosed alternatives); Ex parte Maeda, Appeal No. 2010-009814, at 6–7 (PTAB Oct. 23, 2012) (informative) (“‘design choice’ may be appropriate where the applicant fails to set forth any reasons why the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art would result in a different function or give unexpected results” (citing In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298–99 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). The ’177 patent explains that the purpose of the recited blade members is to maximize the cutting surface of the arrowhead through an animal’s soft flesh to increase the likelihood of a successful kill and minimize undue suffering of the animal. Ex. 1001, 1:26–30, 4:8–10, 4:21–24. The purpose of Lint’s barbs, on the other hand, is to resist removal of the arrow from an animal. Ex. 1002, 2:67–70. Indeed, Lint discloses that only when the arrowhead has “completely penetrated the flesh of an animal” does the spring urge the barbs into the extended position. Id. Thus, contrary to the conclusory assertions of Petitioner and Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Kuhn (see Pet. 49–51; Ex. 1019 ¶ 119), the recited blade members and Lint’s barbs perform vastly different functions. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Kuhn explains adequately how the proposed modification to Lint’s barbs would be a mere matter of design choice. For at least the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s first alternative” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 8,043,177 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,043,177
• Intelligent Wellhead Systems, Inc. v. Downing Wellhead Equipment, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00300 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–38 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish Krupa as prior art and failed to show the claimed fluid-triggered valve sequence in Carr or Tolman.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Although we agree with Petitioner that the plain meaning of limitation 1.2 does not require the recited determination to occur at the first well, it does require the determination to be about the condition(s) of the fluid communicated to the first well by the manifold, regardless of where or how the information is gathered to make that determination. Limitation 1.2 recites plainly that the “determining” step is specifically about whether “the fluid communicated via the manifold has satisfied one or more conditions.” Ex. 1001, 22:38–39 (emphasis added). Considering the antecedents for “the fluid” and “the manifold”––i.e., “communicating fluid to a first well via a manifold” (id. at 22:35, limitation 1.1)––limitation 1.2 expressly identifies the fluid which “the manifold” has “communicated” to the first well to be exactly the fluid used for “determining” whether “one or more conditions” are “satisfied” to trigger the recited responses. Id. This is because “the fluid” refers to a fluid passing to a first well by way of a manifold and the past tense of “communicated via the manifold” indicates, more specifically, that it is the fluid passed by the manifold which must satisfy a condition(s). The Specification of ’770 patent illustrates this by checking the “frac rate” of the fluid discharged by a manifold to a first well to make the determination about whether to permit a regular swap or a continuous pumping swap (“CP swap”). Ex. 1001, 13:30–54, Fig. 12. Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s representation that limitation 1.2 does not “requir[e] the fluid used for ‘determining’ to have been communicated to the first well” (Pet. Reply 3), the plain meaning of limitation 1.2 does require the fluid used” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, Krupa necessarily requires Krupa to be first qualified as prior art. See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (party’s burden to prove anticipation of a patent includes initial burden of going forward with evidence that there is anticipating prior art). Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)— the subsection under which Petitioner contends Krupa qualifies as prior art—when the reference patent document’s actual filing date is before the challenged patent’s filing date, a petitioner need only refer to the filing dates appearing on the challenged patent and reference patent document to make prima facie showing that the reference is prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)(1) (“For purposes of determining whether a patent or application for patent is prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2), such patent or application shall be considered to have been effectively filed, with respect to any subject matter described in the patent or application—(1) if paragraph (2) does not apply, as of the actual filing date of the patent or the application for patent.”).” slip op. at 16

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We determine that the Petition did not adequately present Petitioner’s contention that Tolman discloses or suggests a “master valve” that a skilled artisan would understand to be the claimed “first valve,” which is first introduced in the Reply. The issue is whether Petitioner’s identification of Tolman’s “tree valve” for the claimed first valve was particular enough to allow Petitioner to rely specifically on the “master valve” in the well tree to show Tolman discloses the first valve. We find that it is not. It is undisputed that a well tree include several different valves: (1) valves for communicating fluid to a well (e.g., for treatment or stimulation); (2) valves for communicating fluid from a well (e.g., for flowback); and (3) valves for communicating fluid both to and from a well (e.g., master valve). See Reply 19–20; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 542–545; Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 33–34, 38–42; Tr. 33:12–18, 34:3–12, 36:8–37:18, 39:4–17; Ex. 2013, 85:4–86:19, 87:1–12, 89:2–11. And the opening/closing of these different valves are controlled independently of the other valves based on different parameters. Id. identifying a tree valve, generally, does not provide the particularity necessary to provide notice that the master valve is the particular valve being relied upon. Further compounding this problem is the fact that the Petition repeatedly refers to a plurality of valves, rather than a singular “master valve.” The variability of possible valves suggested by simply referring to a tree valve fails to provide a level of particularity that clearly identifies which specific structure is being relied upon to perform which part of the recited procedure. Ultimately, we agree with Patent Owner that because the Petition does not specifically identify the master valve in the Petition, which the Petitioner’s Reply suggest was the intention all along, Patent Owner was put at a disadvantage because its ability to fully develop a response was impeded. Therefore, Petitioner’s reliance particularly on the “master valve” of the well tree, and the newly introduced evidence associated therewith, was improper and may not be considered. Nevertheless, as discussed below, even if Petitioner were allowed to rely on the master valve, we still find the Tolman Grounds to be deficient.” slip op. at 56

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “However, Carr does not disclose or suggest: relying on the condition(s) of the fluid communicated by first isolated manifold path 122 to first well 140 to be the determinative factor for causing first and second valves 470 and 472 to perform a sequenced response that includes–– (1) opening second valve 472, (2) communicating fluid to second well 142 through second valve 472, and (3) after opening second valve 472, closing first valve 150 from communicating fluid to first well 140. At the time of the invention, when a first well is being operated individually using high pressure pumping, we find that skilled artisans would have considered concurrent operation of the second well’s valves to be hazardous and activities that can not occur. See Ex. 1031, 4 (“specifically identified activities that were restricted from occurring at the same time (i.e., CAN NOT OCCUR activities). As an example, if the operations on a well involved high pressure pumping . . . then manipulating manifold well valves and wellhead trees valves on another well were not allowed to be performed concurrently”); Ex. 2012 ¶ 148. would have had a reasonable expectation of being able to successfully avoid the unacceptable hazards known to be associated with opening second valve 472 and communicating fluid to second well 142, while individually operating on first well 140 using high pressure pumping.10 Furthermore, Petitioner provides no persuasive evidence that a skilled artisan would have known that those unacceptable hazards could be avoided (or acceptably minimized) by using a condition(s) of the fluid communicated by first isolated manifold path 122 to first well 140 as a trigger for opening second valve 472 and communicating fluid to second well 142, while first well 140 is being individually operated.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 11,560,770 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,560,770
• Robert Bosch LLC / Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Westport Fuel Systems Canada Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00292 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 18–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations failed to establish the claimed substantially constant hydraulic-fluid thickness.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Westport does not dispute Bosch’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art. PO Resp. 4 (quoting Pet. 23). Based on our review, we see no reason not to adopt Bosch’s undisputed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the prior art and the specification of the ’829 patent.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Only those claim terms “that are in controversy” need be construed and “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here, there does not appear to be a dispute over the meaning of any claim terms. And, after reviewing the record, we do not perceive the need to expressly construe any particular claim term in order to determine patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In contrast, the testimony of Bosch’s expert ignores Klügl’s express teachings and is fraught with contradictions that undermine the weight of that testimony. While this case may be seen as a battle of the experts over their respective interpretations of Klügl, it is clear that Bosch’s expert loses given his inability to credibly explain his opinions during cross-examination. For instance, despite opining in his declaration that Klügl satisfies claim element 1(e) because “the fluid in chamber 5 is held in place by a membrane 6 and moves through a cylindrical space of constant width and unchanging shape” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 220 (emphasis added)), surprisingly, Bosch’s expert could not, or would not, provide his opinion when asked on cross-examination about the meaning of “flexible” and “membrane” in the context of Klügl’s disclosure— Q. [By Westport’s counsel] What’s your understanding what flexible means in the context of the Klugl reference? . . . A. [By Bosch’s expert] Again, I haven’t been asked to offer a formal opinion of what flexible means in light of this, but if you want to talk about a specific -- excuse me -- part of the document, I’d be happy to. Q. What is a membrane? A. Usually, it’s a thin sheet of material but I haven’t formed a formal opinion on it. Q. What is a flexible membrane? A. Again, I haven’t offered a formal opinion what a flexible membrane is.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Westport. That is because Bosch’s argument that Klügl’s hydraulic fluid maintains substantially constant thickness is premised on the erroneous belief that Klügl’s membrane 6 will not flex. But, as Westport correctly notes, Klügl expressly teaches that membrane 6 is “flexible.” See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 7:45–47 (“[F]lexible membranes 6, 8, 26 . . . have a progressive characteristic curve of the spring force in relation to the spring deflection.”), 7:68–9:31 (repeatedly referencing “first flexible element (6)” and “first flexible membrane (6)”). Consistent with this flexibility, Klügl explains that membrane 6 flexes to maintain contact with drive piston 3, stating specifically that “in the rest position without being actuated due to thermal influences or signs of aging, . . . the first membrane 6 is moved in the direction of the drive piston 3” or “is pushed in by the drive piston 3 so that the transmission medium is pressed through the throttle 10 into the compensation chamber 7.” Ex. 1006, 3:63–4:10 (emphases added). And because Klügl’s membrane 6 flexes when transmission module 2 is unactuated, it follows that membrane 6 will also flex when transmission module 2 is actuated.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 6,298,829 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,298,829
• Robert Bosch LLC / Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Westport Fuel Systems Canada Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00293 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 13, 14, 17–21, and 26–28, 41 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed hydraulic link limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends: A POSITA in the technology field of the ’138 patent would have had a degree in mechanical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2 years of professional experience working with the design and development of fuel injection systems for internal combustion engines or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience. (See Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 37–39, 41.) This POSITA would be aware of and generally knowledgeable about how fuel injector valves are structured and operate, and how they are used to deliver fuel to an engine’s combustion chambers. (Id., ¶ 40.) Pet. 23. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition. See PO Resp. 4. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Based on the complete record, we do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted, alteration in original)).” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “mere fact” that Klügl labels the membrane as “flexible.” As discussed, Patent Owner explains Klügl teaches membrane 6 is flexible and that membrane 6 deflects and moves in response to fluid pressure in chamber 5 and contact with piston 3. PO Resp. 34 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:63–4:10). Additionally, Dr. Atkinson’s testimony is consistent with Klügl’s disclosure. Dr. Atkinson, explains that “[i]n all embodiments shown, Klügl only ever specifies and describes membrane 6 as a “flexible” membrane or element acknowledging that this flexibility is a necessary and desired feature of its intended purpose and behavior.” Ex. 2022 ¶ 80. With this underlying disclosure in mind, Dr. Atkinson further reasons that a flexible membrane will tend to deform longitudinally upward where it contacts the drive piston and bulge outward based on the structure disclosed in Figure 1. See id. ¶¶ 63, 66–67, 77–81, 87. In contrast, Dr. Quinlan’s testimony in many instances, including this one, is substantively incomplete and fraught with contradictions that undermine the weight of his testimony. For example, at his cross- examination deposition, he testified that he had seen and worked with membranes, but could not provide his opinion on the meaning of “flexible” or “membrane” as disclosed in Klügl. See Ex. 2025, 47:14–48:1. Dr. Quinlan was then directed to column 8 in Klügl, where Klügl teaches among other things that “the transmission module (2) has a pressure chamber (5), which is filled with a transmission medium and is delimited by a first flexible membrane (6).” See id. at 65:5–15; Ex. 1006, 8:44–46 (emphasis added). Provided below is the exchange between Patent Owner’s counsel and Dr. Quinlan regarding this express disclosure: slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Figure 1 of Klügl depicts an injection valve including housing 12 and piezoelectric actuator 1, which is arranged between upper stop 13 and transmission module 2. Ex. 1006, 1:47–51. We observe that transmission module 2 includes pressure chamber 5 that is at least partially filled with hydraulic fluid and is “delimited” by first membrane 6. Id. at 1:60–62, 1:68–2:2. Throttle or connecting bore 10 connects pressure chamber 5 to compensation chamber 7. Id. at 1:62–66. The connecting bore or throttle allows transmission fluid to flow between pressure chamber 5 and compensation chamber 7. Id. at 3:56–4:10. We further note that Klügl expressly teaches first membrane 6 is “flexible.” Ex. 1006, 7:45–47 (“[F]lexible membranes 6, 8, 26 . . . have a progressive characteristic curve of the spring force in relation to the spring deflection.”). Indeed, consistent with this flexibility, Klügl explains that membrane 6 “moves” to maintain contact with drive piston 3. Specifically, Klügl teaches: [i]f the piezoelectric actuator 1 shortens in the rest position without being actuated due to thermal influences or signs of aging in relation to the housing 12, the spring plate 8 pushes the transmission medium from the compensation chamber 7 via the throttle 10 into the pressure chamber 5, so that the first membrane 6 is moved in the direction of the drive piston 3 and, as a result, the drive piston 3 bears against the first membrane 6 despite the shortening of the piezoelectric actuator 1. However, if the distance between the piezoelectric actuator 1 and the drive piston 3 is reduced, the first membrane 6 is pushed in by the drive piston 3 so that the transmission medium is pressed through the throttle 10 into the compensation chamber 7 against the spring force of the spring plate 8. As a result, the drive piston 3 is always in contact with the first membrane 6 in this case as well. Id. at 3:63–4:10 (emphases added).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 6,575,138 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,575,138
• Candela Corporation v. Nikolai TankovichNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00234 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–28 not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish simultaneous delivery of overlapping and non-overlapping laser beams.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 19; Ex. 1002 ¶ 77. Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed level of skill, but offers that a “POSA may have alternatively held a degree in electrical engineering.” PO Resp. 10; Ex. 4–10, 13, 15–17. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, and also consider Patent Owner’s additional proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “In this case, the Specification is devoted to the teaching simultaneous delivery of multiple laser beams. The Specification begins by stating that “[t]here are no lasers or laser handpieces on the market today that can simultaneously deliver two or more wavelengths of laser energy in spacial, fractional form.” Ex. 1001, 1:12–14. The Specification explains that “laser treatment usually requires different modalities of energy in order [to] successfully treat the pathologies to which they are applied,” but that “the sequential application of multiple wavelengths of laser energy compromises the treatment.” Id. at 1:16–25. The Specification then continues to explain various problems associated with the sequential application of multiple wavelengths. Id. at 1:25–52. The Specification concludes its introduction as follows: What is needed in the art therefore is an effective laser therapy system that can simultaneously deliver multiple wavelengths of laser energy through the use of a single laser unit without producing interference between the wavelengths within the treated tissue.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “summarized above, we find Patent Owner to have the better position. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner that the combination of Hsia and Black fail to teach or suggest simultaneously delivering non-overlapping beams. The combination also fails to teach or suggest producing beam patterns that include both overlapping and non-overlapping beams. PO Resp. 34. To begin, while we recognize that Hsia discloses overlapping and non-overlapping treatment patterns, those patterns are achieved by the sequential delivery of laser beams as a user physically moves a single handpiece that delivers a single beam across the skin of a patient. Ex. 1004 ¶ 68, Figs. 8 and 9; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 73–74. Black does not cure that deficiency as Black does not disclose treatment with non-overlapping beams. Ex. 2001 ¶ 99. Black discloses using a “refractive optics, mirror-based optical delivery device” for the simultaneous delivery of multiple overlapping laser beams. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 12– 13. The beams align on an optical path and, using different laser beam parameters, deliver treatment at various depths within a combined beam path. Id. ¶¶ 54, 58–59. Thus, while Black may be characterized as creating overlapping beams, we do not find sufficient support for a finding that Black teaches or suggests creating non-overlapping beams for simultaneous delivery, and the claims require both. We also do not find sufficient support for Petitioner’s claim that a POSA would have found it obvious to combine Black and Hsia to simultaneously produce both overlapping beams and nonoverlapping beams, based on the disclosures in these references. See, e.g.,” slip op. at 31

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Claims Claims Not 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Claims Shown Shown Basis Unpatentable Unpatentable 1–28 103 Hsia, Black 1–28 Hsia, Black, 23 103 23 Negus Hsia, Black, 27, 28 103 27, 28 Altshuler Altshuler, 1–28 103 1–28 Black Altshuler, 23 103 23 Black, Negus Overall Outcome 1–28 IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–28 of the ’481 patent are unpatentable; and” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 10,675,481 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,675,481
• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00063 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–11, and 14–16 were not proven unpatentable because Hibi does not teach operating climate control based on battery level or determining available climate-control time from that level.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable

    “d) Analysis We agree with Petitioner that Hibi teaches operating its climate control system in an AUTO mode for a duration of time. That time can be up to and beyond the low battery abnormality condition. As explained above, the claim language at least requires instructions that operate the climate control mechanism based on the predetermined battery level in some manner. Patent Owner is correct that Hibi does not care about its battery level for operation of its climate control mechanism. See PO Resp. 42–44. Patent Owner is also correct that “in response to a low battery event, Hibi’s system simply turns on the engine and charges the battery.” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1008, Fig. 5). And as Patent Owner further notes, “if a user selects a climate control temperature in system setting mode of Hibi, that temperature is unchanged in response to a low battery event” and “[i]nstead, the temperature remains constant in response to the low battery, as Hibi’s vehicle simply turns the gas engine on and charges the battery.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 43, Fig. 5; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 91–94; Ex. 2005, 53:13–54:14). Because Hibi does not consider battery level for the operating instructions associated with its climate control system, Petitioner’s challenge to claim 1 fails. In its Reply Petitioner responds to Patent Owner’s contentions by addressing a scenario where limitation 1[h] requires ceasing the selected mode of operation. See Pet. Reply 19–20. As explained above, we do not read limitation 1[h] as requiring ceasing the selected mode of operation. And Petitioner’s explanation in its Reply does not address the issue with its challenge noted above. That is, even in its contentions regarding Hibi ceasing operation, Petitioner still relies on operation where Hibi’s climate control system is operated wholly independent of battery level considerations. See id. at 19 (discussing ceasing operation in Hibi based on a change from climate control with battery on to climate control with engine on). There does not appear to be any dispute that Hibi operates its climate” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,819,135 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,819,135
• Dynaenergetics Europe GmbH / Dynaenergetics US, Inc. v. Qinetiq LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2024 · PGR2023-00003 · APJ William A Capp · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–5 not unpatentable; Petitioner failed to prove its asserted §101, §102, §103, and §112 grounds, including indefiniteness and written-description challenges.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “prevail, Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Serra testifies that he is familiar with the” slip op. at 45

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “process of claim 1. The first principal decision is the selection of a known liner design from a library that is made at the beginning of the design process. The second principal decision is made at the conclusion of the design process where a “final liner design” emerges after hole shapes produced by modified liners converge toward the desired hole shape. A person of ordinary skill in the art, having read claim 1 in context, would understand that the term “optimized” in the claim refers to the hole shape of the known liner design that is selected from among the known liner designs in the library during the selection step of the claim. A person of ordinary skill in the art would similarly understand that the design that is chosen in the initial selection process is “optimized” with respect to the population of known liner designs in the library as opposed to being “optimized” relative to liner designs produced during the later varying and modelling steps of the design process.” slip op. at 26

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that claims 1–5 of the ’039” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,215,039 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Bilski · Phillips · Markman · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,215,039
• Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 17, 2024 · IPR2022-01217 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–10 not shown unpatentable as obvious over Kato, the Tesla Roadster Manual, and Eberhard because the asserted combination did not teach the claimed scheduled charging times and processor-controlled charging.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Wilson, testifies that one skilled in the art during the relevant time frame “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or physics (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including vehicle information systems, vehicle sensors, and vehicle controllers (ECUs),” but “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 27). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill in the art. See PO Resp. 16 (“Because the proposed level of ordinary skill does not affect the ultimate analysis, Patent Owner takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.”). We analyze the asserted prior art with respect to the level of skill set forth by Petitioner because it is consistent with the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “According to Petitioner, “all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 10. Similarly, “for all claim terms, Patent the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 14. And after institution, Petition made clear that “[t]he Parties agree the Challenged Claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning for purposes of this IPR.” Pet. Reply 1. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “reliance on the time period that can be spent at a charging location corresponding to the recited calculated scheduled start time. Petitioner’s testimony from Dr. Wilson does little to help, as it simply parrots the contentions laid out in the Petition. And, like the contentions in the Petition, that testimony does not offer persuasive explanation as to why one skilled in teaching “computing . . . a charging schedule . . . comprising a scheduled start time and an indication of a scheduled stop time” as required by the claims. Contrary to Petitioner’s representations, we see nothing in paragraphs 53–55 of Kato teaching a specific time that is computed as a scheduled start time. Absent persuasive explanation and evidence from Petitioner, the preponderance of the evidence before us does not support Petitioner’s assertion that the beginning of an available time window for charging is a scheduled start time or that the end of that window is a scheduled stop time for charging. We note, again, that Petitioner relies on the express teachings of Kato. The Petition does not assert that it would have been obvious to employ a scheduled start time based on any modification to Kato’s teachings. Our decision is limited to the particular basis for the challenge advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 10,998,753 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,998,753

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.