- Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2024-01498 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the Lesniak- and Native-based grounds; the Squatch and Sturgis ground fails because Squatch was not shown to be a printed publication.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Squatch is a printed publication. As described above, Petitioner relies on Squatch as a “website excerpt” placed on its site at the relevant time, but has not produced a screen shot of the website to show that it ever existed. See Ex. 1059. Petitioner provides internal documents that purport to describe what would have been on Dr. Squatch’s website at the relevant time, but falls short of establishing what was on the website for the interested consumer to view. Thus, we determine that this ground fails.” slip op. at 55
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications at this stage of the proceeding. PO Resp. 10. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art. See e.g., Exs. 1003, 1004.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a secondary wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that Lesniak teaches how to make stable compositions by including a secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Id. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Pet. Reply 6 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate deodorant stick within the parameters of claim 1.” slip op. at 25
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claims 1, 16, and 19 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting as it provides antecedent basis for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” for each independent claim. PO Resp. 7–10. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 6–9 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 9. We agree. Petitioner does not argue to the contrary. See, e.g., Pet. 19 (arguing that Lesniak discloses a deodorant stick in the form of an antiperspirant stick).” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 11,844,752 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,844,752 - Avation Medical, Inc. v. Emkinetics, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01378 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as anticipated by Svihra or obvious over the asserted combinations; the cited non-patent references qualify as printed publications.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Legal Standards Anticipation A claim is unpatentable as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only when “every element and limitation of the claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the invention.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, a reference may inherently anticipate if a claim limitation that is not expressly disclosed “is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The “very essence of inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a reference unavoidably teaches the property in question.” Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“(citing In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Of particular relevance to the case presently before us is the VidStream court’s holding that “[w]hen there is an established publisher there is a presumption of public accessibility as of the publication date.” VidStream, 981 F.3d at 1065. Hulu addressed, inter alia, whether certain asserted references were shown to be publicly available and could be considered as prior art. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 8. In Hulu, the Board held that, although testimonial evidence is one way to prove public accessibility, there are also various indicia of publication and other evidence that may be considered as a totality of the evidence to determine if an asserted reference was publicly accessible and prior art. Id. at 18. Facts to be considered in analyzing the issue, other than testimonial evidence, include, for example, whether there is an established publisher, a copyright date/notice, other publication-related dates (impression, printing, etc.), an ISBN number, citations to the reference before (and to a lesser degree, after) the priority date at issue corroborating its availability and/or that the publisher was established. Id. at 19–20 (see Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). Here, we find the totality of evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Svihra and Amarenco (as well as the other identified non-patent references) were printed publications, and publicly accessible, prior to the ’477 patent’s priority date. We note at the outset that Patent Owner does not allege that any contested reference is fabricated, or a counterfeit document, but only that Petitioner has not set forth sufficient facts establishing that such references were published and available. Resp. 4. Svihra bears sufficient indicia of publication to conclude it was a printed publication and publicly accessible as of 2002. Ex. 1004. First, it appears on its face to be a legitimate scientific journal article; it indicates it was included at pages 480–83 in volume 103 (No. 12) of Bratisl Lek Listy, the Bratislava Medical Journal, which was established in 1921. The article identifies that it was received for publication on May 30, 2002, and accepted for publication on December 9, 2002; and multiple means of contact for the author and publisher are provided. Id. at 480, 483. Each of these indicia supports the contention that Svihra was published and publicly available in 2002. There is no direct evidence that Svihra was publicly accessed as of this date, but the article is cited as a reference in each of Exhibits 1085–1087, which further supports that Svihra was, generally, publicly available to interested individuals of ordinary skill in the art, which further corroborates that it was a published and publicly accessible publication. Having an established publisher also creates a presumption of publication for Svihra, which has not been rebutted by Patent Owner. VidStream, 981 F.3d at 1065.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner also explains why a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the cited references, again citing specific disclosures from the references, and the supporting testimony of Dr. Wingeier. See Pet. at 27–28. Based on our review of Petitioner’s arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cited references teach or suggest all of the limitations of challenged claim 1, and that Petitioner has established why a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the references, as proposed, with a reasonable expectation of success, for the reasons advocated by Petitioner with respect to Ground 2.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“engineering, and at least two years of experience in the design and/or analysis of biomedical devices” and that “[a]dditional work experience could substitute for a formal degree and vice versa.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. See generally Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the challenged patent and the level of skill in the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition and additionally use the term “skilled artisans” to refer to people with such skill at the time the invention was filed.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 9,002,477 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,002,477 - Avation Medical, Inc. v. Emkinetics, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01375 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Svihra, Mann, and Ponsford, and independently over Amarenco, Mann, and Ponsford.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“Ex. 1001, claim 1. In other words, to effectuate “direct” stimulation of the PTN nerve branch, a practitioner of the ’742 patent must: (1) non-invasively position an electrical stimulator relative to a portion of a patient’s body, such that a branch of a posterior tibial nerve within the first portion of the body is directly targeted by the electrical stimulator; (2) passing a current through the electrical stimulator; and (3) delivering an electrical stimulus from the electrical stimulator to the branch of the posterior tibial nerve such that the branch directly receives the electrical stimulation. Merely “placing electrodes over branches of the PTN” cannot be said, in and of itself, to “directly” target and stimulate the branches, as Petitioner argues.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of filing “would have had an undergraduate degree in the field of biomedical engineering or a related discipline, such as electrical engineering, and at least two years of experience in the design and/or analysis of biomedical devices” and that “[a]dditional work experience could substitute for a formal degree and vice versa.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. See generally Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the challenged patent and prior art, we adopt this definition, and also use the term “skilled artisan” to refer to persons with such skill at the time the invention was filed.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“the evidence of record, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to modify the teachings of Svihra by non-invasively stimulating a nerve branch of the PTN, e.g., the medial or lateral plantar nerves, as taught by Ponsford, to treat OAB/urinary incontinence. A skilled artisan would have understood that the fibers of a given branch of the PTN necessarily constitute a subset of the PTN fibers, stimulation of which is known to be effective in the treatment of OAB/urinary incontinence. See Ex. 1004, 480–481. Just as it was known in the art that stimulation of the much larger sacral nerve, of which the fibers of the PTN form a part, could have beneficial effects in the treatment of incontinence, and that stimulation of the PTN itself could have a similar effect (see Ex. 1084, col. 12, ll. 33–52), so, a skilled artisan could reason, might electrical stimulation of a branch of the PTN exert a similar effect. We also agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to stimulate a smaller nerve branch of the PTN, rather than the entire PTN itself, so as to minimize undesirable side effects of stimulating the entire PTN, i.e., the recruitment of downstream muscular contraction, as taught by Mann. With respect as to whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in the treatment of OAB/incontinence via stimulation of a branch of the PTN, rather than the entire PTN itself, we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art, would understand from Mann that electrical stimulation of the larger, more central sacral nerve could be employed to treat OAB/urinary incontinence, and that a subset of those PTN fibers could be electrically stimulated to achieve a similar effect. See Ex. 1084, col. 12, ll. 33–52. Such a skilled artisan could similarly reason that a subset of those PTN fibers, i.e., a branch of the PTN, particularly major branches such as the plantar nerves, could also be similarly electrically stimulated to treat OAB/urinary incontinence. Although success in such an experiment would not be guaranteed, “only a reasonable expectation of success, not absolute predictability, is necessary for a conclusion of obviousness.” In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1985).” slip op. at 46
Patent outcomesUS 11,224,742 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,224,742 - Beone Medicines USA, Inc. / Beigene, Ltd. v. Pharmacyclics LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 1, 2025 · PGR2024-00009 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 12, and 20 are unpatentable for lack of written description under § 112(a); the Board did not reach the enablement, anticipation, or obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Under that standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Moreover, “claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties agree that the preamble of the claims should be limiting and that the terms “optionally substituted fused heterocyclic ring system” and “irreversible” BTKIs should be construed consistent with the definitions provided in the Specification. Pet. 42–45; see also id. at 42 (citing Ex. 1001, 19:57–20:7 (defining “optionally substituted” or “substituted”), 14:51–52 (defining “fused”), 15:66–16:21 (defining “heterocycle”), 14:36–44 (defining “ring” and “ring system”), 26:23–25 (defining “irreversible Btk inhibitor”); PO Resp. 26.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Under that standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Moreover, “claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties agree that the preamble of the claims should be limiting” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateUnpatentable
“To satisfy written description for the claimed genus of iBTKIs, the Specification must describe either a representative number of members of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus with enough precision that a POSA can visualize or recognize the members of the genus. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. Patent Owner concedes that the Specification does not describe a representative number of members of the genus, stating “this is a common structural features case.” Tr. 65:25–66:3. We, therefore, focus our analysis on whether the Specification adequately describes common structural features of the genus. We find that it does not.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,672,803 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,672,803 - Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Atossa Therapeutics, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · PGR2023-00043 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 15, and 20–22 are anticipated by Ahmad; claims 3, 5–14, and 16–19 are obvious over the cited prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“As explained in our Institution Decision, we adopted Patent Owner’s definition because we do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art—both definitions provide for a highly skilled POSA with experience in formulating drugs. Dec. Inst. 8. Petitioner’s counsel confirmed during the hearing that there was no substantive difference between the parties’ definitions. Tr. 7:25–8:5. Accordingly, we find the parties’ respective definitions to be equivalent and consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). We, therefore, adopt Patent Owner’s definition of a POSA. Moreover, we find that Dr. McConville, Dr. Bihovsky, and Dr. Davies are all qualified to opine from the perspective of a skilled artisan as all are persons of at least ordinary skill in the art, based on either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“When read as a whole, however, we find compelling that the Specification consistently identifies (Z)-endoxifen salts as separate from (Z)- endoxifen. Throughout the Specification—including in the Abstract and the Summary of the Invention—the ’334 Patent refers to “(Z)-endoxifen and salts thereof,” suggesting that references to “(Z)-endoxifen” alone do not include the salt forms unless expressly identified as such. See, e.g., id. at Abstract (“The present disclosure provides . . . methods of making (Z)- endoxifen or a salt thereof”), 2:60–62 (Summary of the Invention stating same); 6:4–6 (Summary of the Invention stating “process for manufacturing (Z)-endoxifen or salts thereof”). Moreover, the Specification states that although endoxifen is available commercially as an (E)/(Z) isomer free base mixture, as well as ≥98% (Z)- endoxifen HCL and (Z)-endoxifen citrate salts, “[t]here remains a need for (Z)-endoxifen free base preparations that are sufficiently stable for preparation of pharmaceutical compositions.” Id. at 82:3–5, 82:37–39. Accordingly, the Specification states, “[p]rovided herein in the present disclosure are preparations of endoxifen free base that are . . . at least 90% (Z)-endoxifen free base.” Id. at 82:43–45. Taking the language of the claims and the Specification as a whole, we determine that the intrinsic evidence supports construing the limitation “the compound of Formula (III) is (Z)-endoxifen” to be limited to the (Z)- endoxifen free base form and excludes the salt and solvate forms.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“presumption of enablement, and the patentee/applicant has the burden to prove nonenablement for such prior art”). As such, Apple instructs us that a petitioner need not provide evidence in its petition to show a prior art patent is enabling as part of its burden to prove anticipation. Id. at 449–50 (finding the Board erred in shifting the burden to the petitioner to provide evidence in its petition to show prior art patent publication was enabling). Thus, it is Patent Owner’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Ahmad is not enabling. Before we turn to the substantive grounds, we must first resolve the parties’ disputes over several legal issues regarding enablement. First, Patent Owner asserts that “[w]hile the claims of a prior art patent are presumed enabled, . . . [t]here is no presumption that every prophetic example in the specification is enabled, especially where that prophetic example is not explicitly claimed.” PO Resp. 32 (citations omitted). This is an incorrect statement of the law. The Federal Circuit has clearly stated that “a presumption arises that both the claimed and unclaimed disclosures in a prior art patent are enabled.” Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Patent Owner may rebut that presumption, but that presumption of enablement exists nonetheless for both the claimed and unclaimed disclosures.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We find Petitioner has the better position. Ahmad itself provides the reason to combine Ahmad’s formulation with Cole’s enteric coating, stating in the stomach” and to “prevent release of medication before it reaches the small intestine.” Ex. 1003, 18:19–24. It was known that endoxifen could be susceptible to degradation in the acidic conditions of the stomach, and a POSA would have been motivated to use an enteric capsule to avoid acidic degradation and improve bioavailability. Ex. 1031 ¶ 6 (citing Ex. 1019, 1353). We credit Dr. McConville’s testimony that applying enteric coatings would have been routine (Ex. 1020 ¶ 71; Ex. 1031 ¶ 5), which is consistent with Ahmad’s disclosure that the enteric coating “can be done as methods known in the art.” Ex. 1003, 18:27–29. Similarly, the ’334 Patent states that “enteric tablets, enteric caplets, or enteric capsules of the present disclosure may be prepared by techniques known in the art.” Ex. 1001, 39:28–30. Moreover, the fact that Cole uses paracetamol as a model drug and not endoxifen is of no concern to our obviousness analysis. We credit the formulation expertise of Dr. McConville, who explains that “[i]n the case of an enteric coated capsule, it is the degradation of the enteric coating and the capsule that will control the release of the drug, not the nature of the drug itself.” Ex. 1031 ¶ 7 (citing Ex. 1008, 84). Thus, a POSA would have understood that the capsule in Cole would have the same benefits for use with other drugs, such as endoxifen. Id. Patent Owner and Dr. Davies identify certain complications that may plague enteric-coated endoxifen formulations and HPMC capsules, such as “potential interactions between enteric coatings and pharmaceutical compositions” and “variations in release profiles.” PO Resp. 63–64; Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 164, 166. But we are not persuaded by that argument, because we agree with Dr. McConville that Patent Owner and Dr. Davies fail to cite any credible evidence of such complications between enteric coatings and interactions. Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 8, 10. Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we find that the combination of Ahmad and Cole teaches each limitation of claims 5–8, 16, and 17 and that a POSA would have had a reason to use the enteric coating and HPMC capsules of Cole with the (Z)- endoxifen formulation of Ahmad to reach the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 84–97; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 5–16.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 11,572,334 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,572,334 - Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc. v. Spruce Biosciences, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 27, 2024 · PGR2022-00025 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable because the ’201 patent lacks written description support for the claimed genus of CRF1 receptor antagonists under § 112(a).
RulingsFinal written decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“[A] sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the genus. Id. at 1350 (citing Regents, 119 F.3d at 1568–69). Moreover, “an adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials.” Id. (citing Regents, 119 F.3d at 1568 (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171)). Furthermore, “functional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function.” Id. (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001))). “[M]erely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species.” Id.” slip op. at 42
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art (“POSA”) “would have a medical degree or a Ph.D. in a field related to endocrinology, and would have knowledge of hormone regulation and disorders, as well as knowledge of the treatment regimens employed to treat such disorders . . . [and] would also have at least three years of experience conducting research concerning endocrine disorders, including CAH or other adrenal disorders.” Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 34 (Dr. Carey Declaration)). Patent Owner does not expressly contest this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. Because Petitioner’s definition of a person of skill in the art appears commensurate with the level of skill reflected in the asserted art in this case as well as the ’201 patent itself, see, e.g., Exs. 1024, 1025, 2003, 2004, 2005, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). C.” slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“For these reasons, we do not find persuasive the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Dobs, that: By describing adjustments of dosing protocols to achieve an A4 reduction from baseline, and describing this use of tildacerfont as just one embodiment of the claimed use of the entire well-known, well-characterized, and discrete class, the specification reasonably conveyed to a POSA that the invention extended to the particularly claimed use of the entire recited class. Ex. 2014 ¶ 82. On the contrary, far from being a “well-known, well-characterized, and discrete class” the prior art teaches a heterogeneous assembly of different classes of small molecule CRF1 receptor antagonists (Type I, Type II, and “atypical”) displaying a very considerable variety of structures, both in terms of the core pharmacophore (e.g., monocyclic, bicyclic, tricyclic, phenolic, cyclohexyl amide, etc.) as well as in the various side groups. Moreover, the challenged claims recite only “a CRF1 receptor antagonist or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof,” the scope of which also encompasses the much larger (and, according to Williams) much more effective large-molecule (peptide) CRF1 receptor antagonists, about which the Specification is entirely silent. See Ex. 1029, Abstr., 1065. Furthermore, despite Dr. Dobs’ testimony that “[t]he [prior art] references explain the typical CRF1 antagonist consists of a core nitrogen heterocycle with an aryl substituent adjacent to the core nitrogen atom and a branched alkyl group attached at the opposite end of the core,” Dr. Dobs also acknowledged that the “atypical CRF1 receptors depicted in Figures 11 and 12 of Williams had different structures, and lacked the nitrogen heterocyclic core.” Ex. 1042, 127:9–14, 130:13–131:16; see also Ex. 2014 ¶ 83. Additionally, Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Cutler, testified, by way of example, in his Reply Declaration that two of the ‘“first-generation CRF1 antagonists’ identified in Figure 1 of the Williams article do not fall within the Figure 2 structure Dr. Dobs relies upon.” Ex. 1047 ¶ 93. Indeed, with respect to the alleged core pharmacophore that Dr. Dobs” slip op. at 54
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“with chemical terminology”; “could not answer questions regarding the chemical structures in the prior art articles”; “did not know whether CRF1 receptor antagonists contained the structural features she deemed ‘essential’ in her Declaration”; and “agreed that tildacerfont has structurally unique features” (see Ex. 1042, 52–53, 125–126, 126–128, 128–130) goes to the weight that we assign to such testimony, but we do not find that such testimony, in light of Dr. Dobs’ extensive qualifications as an endocrinologist set forth above, deems Dr. Dobs unqualified to testify concerning the written description issue in this proceeding. For these reasons explained above, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Dobs’ written description opinions in paragraphs 20 and 75–87 of Exhibit 2014 is denied.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 11,007,201 unpatentable§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,007,201 - Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc. v. Spruce Biosciences, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · PGR2021-00088 · APJ John G New · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–25 are unpatentable because the ’908 patent lacks written description support under § 112(a); the Board did not reach Grounds 1–3 or 5.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“To the extent that Dr. Dobs has admitted that she is “not comfortable with chemical terminology”; “could not answer questions regarding the chemical structures in the prior art articles”; “did not know whether CRF1 receptor antagonists contained the structural features she deemed ‘essential’ in her Declaration”; and “agreed that tildacerfont has structurally unique features” (see Ex. 1038, 52–53, 125–126, 126–128, 128–130), we will weigh her testimony regarding those matters accordingly. However, for the reasons explained above, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Dobs’ written description opinions in paragraphs 19 and 80–91 of Exhibit 2014 is denied.” slip op. at 10
- Strike new argumentOther
“Analysis Patent Owner’s Exhibits 2020–2026 play no part in our reasoning and were not relied upon by the Board in reaching our Decision. Petitioner’s Motion to strike Exhibits 2020–2026 is therefore dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“typically possess a medical degree or a Ph.D. in a field related to endocrinology, and would have knowledge of hormone regulation and disorders, as well as knowledge of the treatment regimens employed to treat such disorders. Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 34). Petitioner argues that such a person of ordinary skill would also have at least three years of experience conducting research concerning endocrine disorders, including CAH or other adrenal disorders. Id. Patent Owner does not expressly contest this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in its Response. Because we find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the demonstrable level of skill in the art (see, e.g., Exs. 1009, 1025, 2003, 2004, 2005), and in the absence of a different proposed definition of the level of skill in the art by Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 26
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“For these reasons, we do not find persuasive the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Dobs, that: By describing adjustments of dosing protocols to achieve at least a 10% reduction from baseline, and describing this use of tildacerfont as just one embodiment of the claimed use of the entire well-known, well-characterized, and discrete class, the specification reasonably conveyed to a POSA that the invention extended to the particularly claimed use of the entire recited class. Ex. 2014 ¶ 87. On the contrary, far from being a “well-known, well-characterized, and discrete class” the prior art teaches a heterogeneous assembly of different classes of small molecule CRF1 receptor antagonists (Type I, Type II, and “atypical”) displaying a very considerable variety of structures, both in terms of the core pharmacophore (e.g., monocyclic, bicyclic, tricyclic, phenolic, cyclohexyl amide, etc.) as well as in the various side groups. Moreover, the challenged claims recite only “a CRF1 receptor antagonist or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof,” the scope of which also encompasses the much larger (and, according to Williams) much more effective large-molecule (peptide) CRF1 receptor antagonists, about which the Specification is entirely silent. See Ex. 1029, Abstr., 1065.” slip op. at 56
Patent outcomesUS 10,849,908 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,849,908 - Symrise AG / Symrise Inc. v. Inolex Investment CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 1, 2024 · IPR2023-01035 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claims 1–6, 8–10, and 22–28, and denied substitute claims 29–44 because Wright ’451 rendered them obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSA” or “POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree and two or more years of experience or a master’s degree in organic synthesis or chemical engineering, with education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 16). Patent Owner took no position on the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8. In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition. Dec. Inst. 6–7. In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner states that it accepts the Board’s definition for purposes of this proceeding. MTA 24. We, therefore, see no reason to disturb our definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears to be consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Although neither party expressly proposes a construction for the term “conversion,” the parties appear to differ in their interpretations of that term. Petitioner interprets “conversion” to mean the percent conversion of the 1- alcohol. See Pet. Opp. RMTA 6–7 (interpreting “conversion” as percentage of remaining 1-alcohol); Ex. 1040, 109:2–11. Patent Owner, on the other hand, interprets “conversion” to mean the total percentage of alkenes that have been produced. Ex. 2010 ¶ 123 (interpreting “conversion” as percentage of total alkenes). During oral argument, counsel for Patent Owner conceded that “conversion can mean either.” Tr. 27:18–28:13. Without the benefit of briefing by the parties, we decline to expressly construe the term “conversion,” as our Decision would be the same under either interpretation, as discussed further below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). Moreover, we do not find it necessary to expressly construe any other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. Id.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Analysis A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said claimed invention pertains. See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Objective evidence of nonobviousness may include” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded. “[A]ny superior property must be unexpected to be considered as evidence of non-obviousness.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We must, therefore, first consider what results were expected to determine what a POSA would have considered to be unexpected. Id. As seen by the table below, Wright ’451’s disclosure fully encompasses the temperature ranges and purported unexpected results recited by substitute claim 29 and shown in Table 2 of the ’048 Patent: Reference Reaction Calcination Conversion Regioselectivity Rate13 Temperature Temperature Wright ’451 about 220 °C about 200 °C greater than about 90% to to about to 600 °C about 95% about 99% 440 °C Substitute 240 °C to about 420 °C at least 95% to about Claim 29” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 10,995,048 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,995,048 - Shanghai Hongene Biotech Corp. v. Chemgenes Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00875 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable because the ’696 patent anticipates each claim.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill, although different facially, are similar substantively. For example, both parties argue that a POSA would have high levels of skill, with advanced degrees and/or extensive work experience in organic chemistry.3 See Pet. 16; PO Resp. 21. In addition, Petitioner contends that a POSA would have had experience in the development of oligonucleotide building blocks. Pet. 16. Similarly, Patent Owner asserts that a POSA would have had education” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“have significant background in P(III) chemistry. Id. at 19; Sur-reply 12–13. According to Patent Owner, Dr. Baran published only about a dozen papers that relate to oligonucleotide synthesis, and the focus of those papers appears to be on P(V) chemistry, which is fundamentally different from P(III) chemistry. PO Resp. 19–20; Sur-reply 12–13. Although it does not challenge Dr. Baran’s qualification to provide opinion in this proceeding, Patent Owner asserts that “Dr. Baran’s lack of experience in P(III) synthesis[] should be strongly considered” in our evaluation of the weight of Dr. Baran’s testimony. Sur-reply 13. Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Baran is principally experienced in P(V) chemistry presupposes that experience indicates an ignorance of P(III) chemistry. We do not find this position consistent with the breadth of Dr. Baran’s experience as indicated by his Curriculum Vitae. See Ex. 1003, 50–105. We weigh the testimonies of both Dr. Baran and Dr. Hrdlicka, against the cumulative weight of the evidence of record in assessing their credibility and probative value.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every claim element, arranged as in the claim, must be disclosed in a single piece of prior art. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For a claim directed to a genus, if a prior art reference discloses a species falling within the claimed genus, the species anticipates the genus. In re Slayter, 276 F.2d 408, 411 (CCPA 1960); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that when a claim 2 US Patent No. 5,869,696, issued Feb. 9, 1999 (Ex. 1014, “the ’696 patent”). element is written in Markush form, “the entire element is disclosed by the prior art if one alternative in the Markush group is in the prior art”).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther
“Resp.”) and a Motion to Amend Claims (Paper 11, “MTA”). In the MTA, Patent Owner proposed to replace claims 1 and 2 with substitute claims 4 and 5. MTA 1–2. Petitioner filed an Opposition to Patent Owner’s MTA (Paper 13) and a Reply to Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 14, “Reply”). After we entered Preliminary Guidance on Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend (Paper 15), Patent Owner requested authorization to withdraw its MTA (Ex. 3003). We granted that request. Paper 17. Thereafter, Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply to Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 20, “Sur-reply”).1” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 8,309,707 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,309,707 - Shanghai Hongene Biotech Corp. v. Chemgenes Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00862 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable because Aerschot anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Baran is principally experienced in P(V) chemistry presupposes that experience indicates an ignorance of P(III) chemistry. We do not find this position consistent with the breadth of Dr. Baran’s experience as indicated by his Curriculum Vitae. See Ex. 1003, 47–102. We weigh the testimonies of both Dr. Baran and Dr. Hrdlicka, against the cumulative weight of the evidence of record in assessing their credibility and probative value.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“The parties’ proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill, although different facially, are similar substantively. For example, both parties argue that a POSA would have high levels of skill, with advanced degrees and/or extensive work experience in organic chemistry.3 See Pet. 12; PO Resp. 20–21. In addition, Petitioner contends that a POSA would have had experience in the development of oligonucleotide building blocks. Pet. 16. Similarly, Patent Owner asserts that a POSA would have had education and/or experience in “the development and syntheses of nucleosides, nucleotides, and nucleic acids.” PO Resp. 20–21. After considering the parties’ arguments and the prior art, we determine that a POSA would have had a Ph.D. (or equivalent degree) in organic chemistry or medicinal chemistry, with at least two to three years of post-graduate work experience in the development and syntheses of nucleosides, nucleotides, and nucleic acids, including, but not limited to, the syntheses of oligonucleotides through solid phase oligonucleotide synthesis. In addition, an individual with a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree and at least five years of work experience in these fields also would qualify as a POSA.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to address the construction of any claim term.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every claim element, arranged as in the claim, must be disclosed in a single piece of prior art. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For a claim directed to a genus, if a prior art reference discloses a species falling within the claimed genus, the species anticipates the genus. In re Slayter, 276 F.2d 408, 411 (CCPA 1960); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that when a claim element is written in Markush form, “the entire element is disclosed by the prior art if one alternative in the Markush group is in the prior art”).” slip op. at 5
Patent outcomesUS 8,541,569 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,541,569
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.