• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
• Google LLC v. Brodti Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00472 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error, with Yasnovsky added for claims 7, 8, 16, 17, and 20.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art are substantially similar. In light of the record before us, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’898 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Patent Owner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’898 patent and the prior art, particularly experience pertaining to Internet/web interfaces and web-based media. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Neither party argues, nor do we determine, that the outcome of our Decision depends on which party’s definition is selected.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “includ[e] a server and one or more webpages that may be provided by the server for display in a web browser.” Pet. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 13–15). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that the Specification strongly supports this construction (requiring a server and webpage(s)) by describing a “website” as synonymous with a server computer system: “The WWW [(World Wide Web)] service allows a server computer system (i.e., Web server or Web site) to send graphical Web pages or screens of information such as the advertising materials to a remote client computer system 10.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:2 (emphases added); see id. at Fig. 1 (depicting a service engine and webpages as a web server, i.e., website), 3:15–18 (describing Figure 1 as showing “a server of the website” (emphasis added)); Pet. Reply 5; see Ex. 1026 ¶ 13. Petitioner also submits a supporting (and persuasive) contemporaneous technical dictionary definition of “website,” which highlights the distinction between a lay person’s understanding of the term versus that of the relevant artisan. Pet. Reply 5–6. This definition explains that the “common but technically inaccurate” usage of “website” is to mean “Web page,” but the technically correct usage of “website” is to mean “one or more computers that are associated with a fully qualified domain name and make content available on the Web.” Id. (citing Ex. 1028, 402). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, likewise testifies that “[a] website cannot exist without the server or computer that provides its webpages.” Ex. 1026 ¶ 15; see Ex. 1027, 36:8–20 (Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, agreeing that “it has to be some machine somewhere that’s providing the webpages for the website.”). The limitations of claim 1 also support Petitioner’s position that “website” includes a server and webpage(s). Reply 5. For example, claim 1 recites advertising material for “populat[ing] on one or more websites,” and selected “advertising buy options comprise at least one website of the respective websites.” Ex. 1001, 10:29–51 (emphases added). We find these limitations make the most technical sense where “website” implicates an Internet domain or domain name, such as brodti.com, which itself is a computer system (server) and associated webpage(s) reached via that domain name. This interpretation aligns with testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, in which he states that a “website” describes “a group of webpages at a particular domain (e.g., www.espn.com, www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl, www.espn.com/nhl).” Ex. 2009 ¶ 68 (emphasis in italics added). In other words, brodti.com and espn.com are two different websites, with each website having one or more webpages (e.g., www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl), and such websites include a server giving life to such webpage(s). slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proffers that placing advertising material “within” web property content means “inserting” an advertisement into particular content. PO Resp. 12. Petitioner responds that “placing . . . within” means what it says, and notes that “[t]he words ‘insert’ or ‘inserting’ appear nowhere in the [Specification].” Pet. Reply 7–8; see id. at 8 (Petitioner arguing that Patent Owner’s expert “admitted that the claim does not specify details regarding how advertising material needs to be placed within web property content.” (citing Ex. 1027, 29:18–24)). Patent Owner replies that the relevant artisan allegedly “would have understood ‘placing . . . within’ to mean ‘inserting into,’” but then submits that whether “placing . . . within” versus “inserting into” is used does not matter because Petitioner allegedly has not demonstrated the obviousness of either. PO Sur-reply 17. As Petitioner observes, “[i]t is unclear if Patent Owner intended any difference in meaning between these two terms.” Pet. Reply 8. Accordingly, based on the complete record before us, we determine that no further construction of this limitation is needed, and “placing A within B” means what it says—“placing A within B.”” slip op. at 20

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “determining” of impression validity feature of limitation 1[h] by disclosing “a ‘single-pixel’ image technique for determining that an impression is valid,” e.g., by using “cookies.” Pet. 42–45. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, testifies that this “single-pixel” impression tracking technique would have been a “well-known” technique to the relevant artisan, and as described by Error, operates as follows: [A] URL link for a single pixel (or transparent) image file is embedded onto a webpage that is delivered to a web browser. The image is not meant to be viewed and will likely not be visible to the user. After the user’s browser receives the webpage, it uses the embedded URL link to request the single-pixel image from a server. The receipt of that request by the server provides an indication that the user’s web browser actually received and presented the web page to the user. Ex. 1002 ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1007, 1:36–54, 2:6–21); see id. at ¶¶ 132–139. slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 11,416,898 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,416,898
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00117 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–9, 11–16, 18, and 19 as obvious over Kim; claims 10 and 17 as obvious over Kim and Fang, Park, and Park and Fang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 7. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed 4 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 103; PO Resp. the ’711 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that “on a surface” should be interpreted in line with the definition of “on” set forth in the ’711 patent. Ex. 1001, 4:1–6. We particularly note that the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ . . . should be interpreted in the broadest manner” and that “on” is not limited to “directly on.” Id. Instead, the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ also includes the meaning of ‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Id. Patent Owner agrees that this definition controls the “standalone ‘on’” term such that A may be on B even if there is an intervening layer between them. Tr. 55:8–11 (“The standalone ‘on,’ we agree in the context of the patent, you can have intervening layers. I think the patent is clear about that.”). Claim 14 recites that the etch-stop layer is “on” something; i.e., “on a side surface and a top surface of each step.” Ex. 1001, 16:20–22. Patent Owner agrees that a surface is a “something.” Tr. 56:5–8 (“surface obviously is a something”). Substituting the “a “‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween” results in claim 14 reading as, “on a surface with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Unlike “directly on,” which specifies the relation between two things, “a surface” may merely indicate the thing that something is “on,” particularly when “on” is “interpreted in the broadest manner” as expressly required by the ’711 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Although Dr. Campbell testified in his deposition in response to Petitioner’s counsel that “on the surface” requires direct contact with the surface, his interpretation was based on “embodiments of” the patent rather than a general understanding of a person skilled in the art confronted with that term. Ex. 1027, 122:6–25, 124:6–23 (“I’m not sure if there are other sources for that, but it was on the ’711, so I’ve taken it there.”). Dr. Campbell, upon questioning from Patent Owner’s counsel, later stated that “an expert in semiconductor fabrication” would understand “on the surface” to mean “contact between one layer and another . . . with nothing in between.” Id. at 146:25–147:6. However, Dr. Campbell did not explain why such an interpretation is particular to the semiconductor fabrication art, or provide other explanation or support for this statement, which is in tension with the definition of “on” in the ’711 patent. Accordingly, we significantly discount the weight accorded to that statement. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (stating, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court. Similarly, a court should discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and patent.’”). On balance, Dr. Campbell’s testimony is best understood as a description of certain Figures of the ’711 patent rather than a representation of an ordinarily skilled person’s understanding of the term “on the surface.” See Ex. 2009 ¶ 47 (describing Figs. 1, 3, and 4 as depicting layers in contact with the underlying layer or substrate). For example, Dr. Campbell describes Figure 9A as having a barrier layer “on and directly contacting the top and side surfaces of each step.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added) (citing inter alia Ex. 1001, 7:6–67). Dr. Campbell does not explain why, beyond the fact that many Figures show layers as adjacent and in contact, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would understand those Figures to limit the claim language rather than illustrating particular embodiments that fall within a broader scope of claims 14 and 15. See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specifications into the claims.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Kim’s first and second section are described as compatible, not mutually exclusive, embodiments. Kim’s second section builds further layers upon the structure of its first section, and states: In these embodiments, the same elements as in the embodiments previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B will be denoted by the same reference numbers therein, and for concise description, overlapping description of elements previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B may be omitted. Ex. 1005 ¶ 184 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that only the embodiments in Figures 17A–22B describe an etch-stop layer and a barrier layer (as claimed), and that the language cited for a gate-stack-on-top configuration (e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 90, 91, and 240) is “conspicuously absent from the description of Figures 17A–22B.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 36). However, Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4 through 15 embodiments. While Figures 17A–22B show a gate-stack-on-bottom configuration, this merely continues the gate-stack-on-bottom illustrations that were used in all of the previous Figures, even for those in which it is undisputed that a gate-stack-on-top configuration is a described alternative. The Figures exemplify rather than limit the description of the gate-stack-on-bottom view in Figures 4–15 and do not exclude the gate-stack on bottom description of the embodiments exemplified by those figures.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,672,711 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,672,711
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00038 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 10–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Chin; the Board did not find them anticipated by Chin or Whitehorn.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . (‘POSITA’) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field plus at least two years of work or post-graduate experience in image capture, image processing, image display, user interfaces, or a related field. Additional education could offset a lesser amount of experience and vice versa. Pet. 16. Patent Owner accepts Petitioner’s definition. See PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’842 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Petitioner that claim construction is unnecessary. As demonstrated in the analysis provided below addressing this claim limitation in view of the prior art, we need not explicitly construe “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Similarly, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy between the parties.” slip op. at 9

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments relying on Kennametal are belated. A “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)6 at II.I. Thus, we need not consider Petitioner’s belated argument raised for the first time in the Reply. In any event, we agree that Kenneametal is inapplicable for the purpose of supplying a claim limitation missing from Chin’s disclosure. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Kennametal does not stand for the proposition that a reference missing a limitation can anticipate a claim if a skilled artisan viewing the reference would ‘at once envisage’ the missing limitation.”). Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not 6 Available at www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trial-practice-guide. displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See generally Ex. 1004.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the theory of inherency was not raised in the Petition and is therefore waived. Compare Pet. 29–33, with Pet. Reply 11–15. In any event, we also agree that Petitioner’s speculation regarding the disclosure of Chin is insufficient to support a theory of inherency. See Pet. Reply 11–15. As explained above, Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See Ex. 1004. Speculation regarding the possibilities and probabilities of what is displayed on first display 51 in self-photographing mode, and what is displayed on second display 52 in outward-facing mode are insufficient to establish inherency. See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d at 745. For the forgoing reasons and based on the entire record developed during trial, the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin discloses “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” Accordingly, based on the entire record developed during trial the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,836,842 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,836,842
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00040 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6–9 as anticipated or obvious over the asserted references, and claim 5 as obvious over Yook or Yook in view of Purcell.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because the Petition presents argument and evidence that substantively demonstrates, with clarity and particularity, how and why each reference discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the displaying element recited in limitation 1[B]. We agree with Petitioner that “Patent Owner neglects to address the actual substance of the Petition, which clearly addresses this limitation with respect to each reference.” Reply 1–2. The Petition addresses in detail how each asserted reference discloses displaying two applications on two separate displays in accordance with the displaying element, by presenting multiple annotated figures from Yook, Lee, Aguilar, and Purcell. Pet. 27–30, 47–50, 62–63, 77–78. The Petition also cites and quotes the accompanying descriptions for the annotated figures from each prior art reference as well as explanatory expert opinion testimony from Dr. Rodriguez. Id. (citing Rodriguez Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–74, 119–122, 149–150, 182–183; Yook Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47, 51, 58, 96–101, Figs. 4b, 4d, 5; Lee Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 48–53, Figs. 4, 6, 9, 10; Aguilar Ex. 1006, 7:1–7, Figs. 5–5d; Purcell Ex. 1007 ¶ 16, Fig. 2). We provide detailed examples below of how the Petition maps Yook and Lee onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Although we do not provide detailed examples directed to Aguilar and Purcell, we find the Petition maps Aguilar and Purcell onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4).” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “Instead, Patent Owner chose to raise an entirely new theory of patentability. Sur-Reply 3–13; Tr. 28:8–20. Patent Owner’s new theory is based on a claim construction that construes claim 1 of the ’756 patent as “recit[ing] a specific order of steps that must be performed in the order written.” Id. at 3–4. “Because of this order, the [displaying element] must occur after both (two) ‘selecting’ steps,” and Patent Owner contends none of the prior art references asserted in the Petition “meets the order required by claim 1.” Id. at 4. We will not consider Patent Owner’s new theory of patentability raised for the first time in its Sur-Reply. See Apple Inc. v. e-Watch, Inc., IPR2015-00412, Paper 50, 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach”); see also Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl’ns S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (argument raised for the first time in the reply brief, which could have been raised in the opening brief, is waived). Patent Owner should have raised its “specific order of steps” argument in the Response. By failing to do so, Patent Owner has waived the argument. Id.” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Third, we are further persuaded by Dr. Surati’s testimony that the wave shape visual indicator depicted in Figures 10A–C of the ’756 patent indicates that a user can do something, but not necessarily what that something is (e.g., minimizing or maximizing). Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1012, 200:1–6). It is telling that Dr. Surati testified that only through repeated use and exposure would a user recognize a relationship between a wave shape and the functions of maximizing or minimizing an application. Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 197:13–199:22). We are also persuaded by Dr. Rodriguez’s testimony regarding the teachings of Yook: Yook therefore teaches giving users the ability to transition a split-screen application back into full screen mode. Further, a POSITA would have understood that this ability would undoubtedly be implemented in the form of a visual indicator, which, from the 2000s to today, is the industry’s universal method of alerting a user to an accessible function. . . . Ex. 1003 ¶ 107 (emphasis added); For claim 5, Yook discloses many different types of “icons” that are used to receive user gesture inputs. See, e.g., Figs. 1, 4e, 5a, 5c, 5d, 6, 7a, 7b, 7c, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Examples of these icons are displayed below: Id. ¶ 108; and A POSITA would have understood that Yook’s icons can have a wave shape because the shape taken by a visual indicator, or icon, is merely a matter of common and routine design choice. Indeed, the shape of an icon does not affect its function or how a gesture input is received. Id. ¶ 109 (emphasis added). In short, we are persuaded Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that a displayed visual indicator that “has a wave shape” is a design choice not affecting the function of the visual indicator, and a visual indicator that “has a wave shape” would have been an obvious design choice to a POSITA in view of Yook.” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the parties’ agreed level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’756 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 9,134,756 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,134,756
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00911 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 10 was not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Toyama because the challenge did not remedy the deficiencies in its nonobvious base claim 8.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’806 patent, and we adopt it for purposes definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In our Decision on Institution, we noted that the parties disputed construction of “each local contact” found in dependent claim 10, and “dielectric structure” recited in independent claim 8. Inst. Dec. 8–9. We determine that no express construction of “each local contact” recited in claim 10, or any other claim term, is required to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “independent claim 8 would have been obvious for the reasons set forth in its petition in the 791-IPR. See id. at 1 (stating the present Petition maintains the same grounds set forth in IPR2024-00791). As explained in our Final Written Decision (Ex. 3001) in the 791-IPR issued concurrently, Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 8 would have been obvious over Toyama under any of Petitioner’s three alternative arguments. None of Petitioner’s arguments set forth in the present Petition, including the arguments directed to claim 10, remedy the deficiencies regarding its base claim 8. See Pet. 53–31, 98–101, 124–125; see also Reply. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Final Written Decision in the 791-IPR issued concurrently, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 8, and therefore dependent claim 10, would have been obvious over Toyama. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Dependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”); Ex. 3001.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyNot reached

    “Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Jack C. Lee, Ph. D. (Ex. 1003) and the Reply Declaration of Jack C. Lee, Ph.D. (Ex. 1043) in support of its 2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), revised 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’806 patent has an effective filing date after March 16, 2013 (Ex. 1001, codes (22), (63)), we refer to the AIA version of Sections 102 and 103. 3 Toyama, US Pub. No. 2017/0179026 A1, published June 22, 2017 (Ex. 1005). 4 Petitioner characterizes its alternative arguments of unpatentability of claim 10 as based on three “grounds.” See Pet. 15. Because each of Petitioner’s arguments are based on the same reference, albeit different embodiments, we characterize Petitioner’s challenges as three alternative arguments based on a single ground because each argument relies on the same reference. Ph.D. (Ex. 2005). Transcripts of the depositions of Dr. Lee (Exs. 2006, 2010) and of Dr. Yang (Ex. 1044) have also been submitted into the record.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,937,806 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,937,806
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00909 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Toyama, based on the First Exemplary Structure and, for some limitations, the Second Modification.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND 2 We apply AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 to the ’378 patent because it was filed after, and never claimed the benefit of an effective filing date before, March 16, 2013. Petitioner also applies AIA §§ 102 and 103. See Pet. 2, 24–26. 3 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 104; PO Resp. experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about semiconductor manufacturing and 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not object to such a definition. PO Resp. 13. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the Specification of the ’378 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner asserts that only the term “a staircase structure in the alternating layer” should be construed, and that the term should be construed as “a staircase structure in the alternating layer stack.” Pet. 32–33. Patent Owner does not dispute this construction, and our determination would be unaffected by Petitioner’s proposed construction. Therefore, we need not provide an express construction of this term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Petitioner asserted that all other terms should receive their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 33.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither the language of claim 15 nor the Specification indicates a narrower meaning, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning. Patent Owner argues that the plain meaning of “with” is “having” or “inclusive of.” PO Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1038, 8). Citing the same dictionary, Petitioner argues that the plain meaning of “with” includes objects that are separate. Pet. Reply 3 (stating, “In the sentence ‘Alice went to school with Bob,’ it would be nonsensical to interpret that to mean that Bob is part of Alice.”) (citing Ex. 1038, 7). The cited definition of “with” states that it may indicate “accompaniment,” such as “went there [with] her,” as well as combination (“milk [with] honey”). Ex. 1038, 7. Based on the evidence and arguments presented, we determine that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning, which includes accompaniment (A is accompanied by B) as well as combination (A is part of B, or A and B are a part of C).4” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the lower volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the isolation structure and the upper volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the dielectric structure. First, the structure may be the same material; i.e., SiO2. Ex. 1001, 10:37–40 (isolation structure 233 filled with SiO2), 10:46–47 (dielectric structure can include SiO2, and can include the same material as dielectric layer 230), 10:12–14 (dielectric layer 230 is formed of SiO2). Second, the ’378 patent indicates that the dielectric structure may be “aligned to” and “in contact with” the isolation structure. Id. at 10:30–36. Thus, the two structures of the ’378 patent may appear as two aligned and contacting structures; e.g., a single column of the same material. Third, the ’378 patent specification describes that the dielectric structure and a top portion of the isolation structure may be formed in the same deposition step. When etching the opening 600 that is to be filled with dielectric structure 232, “opening 600 may extend partially into STI structure 233;” i.e., “the etch process used to form opening 600 may also remove (recess) portion of the top surface of STI structure 233.” Id. at 15:12–20; Fig. 6. Then, “opening 600 can be filled with a dielectric layer 702,” which may be the same SiO2 material as the isolation structure, and “[a]s a result, dielectric structure 232 is formed.” Id. at 15:42–54. Thus, the ’378 patent describes a dielectric structure that partially replaces or re-forms, with the same material, its isolation structure. The ’378 patent does not mention whether this results in a dielectric structure that extends into the isolation structure or an isolation structure re-filled to its original height, and it would not appear to matter because both structures may be composed of the same material. The ’378 patent’s indifference to the exact boundary between dielectric structure 232 and isolation structure 233 during formation from the same material indicates that these structures need not be taught by distinct elements. applicable only if the ’378 patent describes that the isolation region and dielectric structure were formed as a single unitary structure. PO Resp. 51; PO Sur-reply 16–18. Retractable Techs. focuses on whether the two elements at issue “could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance,” not whether they were formed integrally. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304 (“The specifications further disclose a method to couple the two structures . . . to allow some diffusion or insipient melting to occur where they touch . . . . This passage suggests that [the structures] could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance”). Retractable Techs. looks to whether the specification suggests that the claim terms require separate structures. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Patent Owner’s focus on whether the claimed structures were disclosed as being separately formed disregards the issue of whether the separately claimed structures require specific methods of forming those structures. Here, as in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the Specification does not indicate any particular structure or function for the structures that results from their separate steps of deposition. Thus, as held in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the two portions of Toyama “need not be two separate parts” to teach two separate claim limitations. Retractable Techs., 635 F.3d at 1303–04. Consequently, we determine that the claim language does not support a requirement that these structures be separate and distinct. Patent Owner’s further arguments are not availing. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, in our “Third” point, supra, we do not state that the isolation structure and the dielectric structure are formed in the same deposition step. PO Resp. 52–53; PO Sur-reply 18; Supra at 34. We only” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,658,378 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,658,378
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00788 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Toyama, Mushiga, and Mushiga with Makala.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further asserts March 16, 2013. Petitioner also applies AIA §§ 102 and 103. See Pet. 2, 24–26. 3 Neither party presented evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness during trial. knowledgeable about semiconductor manufacturing and 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not object to this assessment. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’378 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s construction, asserting that its grounds render obvious this limitation under Patent Owner’s construction propose construction of the term “through array contact,” which was at issue in the Preliminary Response and in the parallel district court proceeding. Id. Nor have the parties indicated, in response to Board inquiry, that any relevant construction has occurred. See Paper 34. with Petitioner that Patent Owner does not dispute this aspect of the “a dielectric structure on the isolation structure” limitation in Petitioner’s assertions based on Toyama. PO Sur-reply 20–21. Patent Owner does dispute that Mushiga’s insulating spacer 586 is “on” the isolation structure. PO Resp. 70–72. However, because Petitioner relies upon a dielectric structure that includes other portions of Mushiga that Patent Owner does not dispute to be on the asserted isolation structure, the dispute is whether Petitioner is correct to include multiple components as part of a single dielectric structure, and not whether spacer 586 is on an isolation structure. Id. Because Petitioner’s assertions and our determination would be unaffected by its proposed construction, we need not construe this term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s citations to the Specification do not support its proposed construction. Patent Owner relies on multiple embodiments, only one of which describes a substrate “with” an isolation structure. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 22:27–28). For example, one of Patent Owner’s cited embodiments recites “on” an isolation region, but Patent Owner specifically argues that the “on” embodiment does not apply to the claimed “with” embodiment. Id. at 22 (denying that “the ‘with’ relationship encompasse[s] the ‘on’ relationship”). Only one of the embodiments cited is clearly within the scope of the “with” claim language, and that embodiment describes no more than the claim language itself. Ex. 1001, 22:27–28. Moreover, Figure 2, cited by Patent Owner, is an illustration “according to some embodiments,” but is not described as depicting all embodiments. Ex. 1001, 3:35–36. These other embodiments need not be included in claim 15’s “with” language because other claims (not at issue in this proceeding) specifically recite language from other embodiments. Ex. 1001, 23:20–21 (“a dielectric structure on an isolation region of the substrate”), 23:58 (“forming an isolation structure on a substrate”). Thus, the specification of the ’378 patent does not limit “a substrate with an isolation structure” in claim 15 to “part of” an isolation structure, such as in a shallow region or other partial-depth portion of the substrate. Because neither the language of claim 15 nor the Specification indicates a narrower meaning, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “a Patent Owner argues that the plain meaning of “with” is “having” or “inclusive of.” PO Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1038, 7). Citing the same dictionary, Petitioner argues that the plain meaning of “with” includes objects that are separate. Pet. Reply 3 (stating, “In the sentence ‘Alice went to school with Bob,’ it would be nonsensical to interpret that to mean that Bob is part of Alice.”) (citing Ex. 1038, 7). The cited definition of “with” states that it may indicate “accompaniment,” such as “went there [with] her,” as well as combination (“milk [with] honey”). Ex. 1038, 7. Based on the evidence and arguments presented, we determine that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning, which includes accompaniment (A is accompanied by B) as well as combination (A is part of B, or A and B are a part of C).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the lower volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the isolation structure and the upper volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the dielectric structure. First, the ’378 patent indicates that both the dielectric structure and the isolation structure may be the same material; i.e., SiO2. Ex. 1001, 10:37–40 (isolation structure 233 filled with SiO2), 10:46–47 (dielectric structure can include SiO2, and can include the same material as dielectric layer 230), 10:12–14 (dielectric layer 230 is formed of SiO2). Second, the ’378 patent indicates that the dielectric structure may be “aligned to” and “in contact with” the isolation structure. Id. at 10:30–36. Thus, the two structures of the ’378 patent may appear as two aligned and contacting structures; e.g., a single column, of the same material. Third, the ’378 patent specification describes that the dielectric structure and a top portion of the isolation structure may be formed in the same deposition step. When etching the opening 600 that is to be filled with dielectric structure 232, “opening 600 may extend partially into STI structure 233;” i.e., “the etch process used to form opening 600 may also remove (recess) portion of the top surface of STI structure 233.” Id. at 15:12–20. Then, “opening 600 can be filled with a dielectric layer 702,” which may be the same SiO2 material as the isolation structure, and “[a]s a result, dielectric structure 232 is formed.” Id. at 15:42–54. Thus, the ’378 patent describes a dielectric structure that partially replaces or re-forms, with the same material, its isolation structure. The ’378 patent does not mention whether this results in a dielectric structure that extends into the isolation structure or an isolation structure re-filled to its original height, and it would material. The ’378 patent’s indifference to the exact boundary between dielectric structure 232 and isolation structure 233 during formation from the same material indicates that these need not be taught by distinct elements. We do not agree with Patent Owner that Retractable Techs. is applicable only if the ’378 patent describes that the isolation region and dielectric structure were formed as a single unitary structure. PO Resp. 50; PO Sur-reply 9. Retractable Techs. focuses on whether the two elements at issue “could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance,” not whether they were formed integrally. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304. (“The specifications further disclose a method to couple the two structures . . . to allow some diffusion or insipient melting to occur where they touch . . . . This passage suggests that [the structures] could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance”). Retractable Techs. looks to whether the specification suggests that the claim terms require separate structures. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Patent Owner’s focus on whether the claimed structures were disclosed as being separately formed disregards the issue of whether the separately claimed structures require specific methods of forming those structures. Here, as in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the Specification does not indicate any particular structure or function for the structures that results from their separate steps of deposition. Thus, as held in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the two portions of Toyama “need not be two separate parts” to teach two separate claim limitations. Retractable Techs., 635 F.3d at 1303– 04. Consequently, we determine that the claim language does not support a requirement that these structures be separate and distinct.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,658,378 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,658,378
• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01165 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Zhou does not teach the claimed low-light high-pass or stickiness parameter limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “4. Conclusion for the Prior Art Analysis In sum, we find that Zhou does not disclose the low-light high-pass parameter or the stickiness parameter. Petitioner’s grounds for both independent claims 1 and 16 rely on Zhou for teaching a low-light high-pass parameter or a stickiness parameter. Pet. 23–28, 64. Because we find Zhou does not teach these limitations, all of Petitioner’s grounds fall for this reason. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any claim of the ’840 patent would have been obvious in view of the prior art cited.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) in the field of the ’840 patent would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. Alternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. An advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner applies the same standard. PO Resp. 26–27. We use this agreed-upon standard for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We review this testimony based on the strength of the underlying factual basis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value . . ..”). Here, the underlying factual basis is not very strong for either witness. That said, we find that Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more logically sound and consistent with the ’840 patent disclosure. Based on our reading of the specification, we find a clear indication that “stickiness” has to do with the past. In order to control “the extent by which preceding portion(s) . . . impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory” (emphasis added), one must control the degree by which the past frames impact determination. And to control the degree of the past’s influence, one must, as a consequence, favor the past over the future. That is, the frame of reference of the stickiness parameter is the past. The specification could have used a time-agnostic term, like a “nearness” or “adjacency” parameter, but it did not. Thus, the fact that “stickiness” is used in conjunction with “preceding” indicates that it deals with a preference for preceding frames. On this basis, we find Dr. Katsaggelos’s testimony less persuasive than Dr. Foroosh’s.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “That said, we do not construe a stickiness parameter as prohibiting consideration of future frames. Instead, we determine that the stickiness parameter’s value determines the impact of the preceding portions, versus the following portions. The ’840 patent recognizes this, when it says that a stickiness parameter value of “1,” representing a “lazy” stabilizer that maximally favors the past, would not override a violation of the margin constraint based on the look-ahead (i.e., would not allow the viewing window to fall out of bounds in the event of large future motion). See Ex. 1001, 22:26–30; see also id. at 12:61–13:29 (acknowledging that favoring the past may lead to a conflict with the viewing window determination), 15:39–60 (adjusting the viewing window to ensure it does not violate a margin constraint). Thus, while a past-favoring parameter by necessity favors the past over the future, it does not prohibit consideration of the future. In view of the above, we construe the claimed “stickiness parameter” as a parameter that controls the extent by which preceding portions of the trajectory impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory, with an understanding that in order to favor preceding portions, to some extent, the parameter must relatively disfavor following portions.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,958,840
• Intel Corporation / Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 are obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17– 18 (1966). A party who petitions the Board for a determination of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). We assess Petitioner’s evidence and argument according to the above- referenced obviousness standard. We determine that the Petition satisfies the reasonable likelihood of prevailing standard under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We begin our analysis with a discussion of the Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref references. slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claims 1 and 30 of the ’034 patent, a limitation we need not construe to decide the institution question. Id. at 13; Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner contends that “no claim construction is required” to address the Petition’s asserted deficiencies. Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner also contends, however, that the Petition relies on a “novel claim construction” of limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1]—“second [third] hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores”—to support Petitioner’s obviousness argument. Id. at 11–12.8 Patent Owner challenges the Petition’s reliance on “single core processors on different chips,” such as the Power3 single-core processors of the Symmetric Multi- Processor (“SMP”) configuration disclosed in the RS6000 reference, as a disclosure of limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1]. Id. Patent Owner contends that such single-core processors on different chips do not satisfy limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1] because the ’034 patent “claims only multicore processors.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–27). Petitioner responds in part as follows: To the extent PO is implicitly arguing that RS6000’s “four, eight, twelve, or sixteen 375 MHz 630FP 64-bit processors” do not teach the recited “cores,” Patent Owner’s argument excludes embodiments described in the ’034 patent’s specification. The ’034 patent describes “[p]rocessor cores [as] generally independent microprocessors.” Ex.1001, 5:14–15. Patent Owner’s attempt to exclude RS6000 from the scope of the claims 8 Pursuant to the Board’s Order on Related Matter Updates (Paper 14), the parties filed the September 26, 2025 Claim Construction Order entered in the co-pending District Court litigation in this proceeding. Ex. 1085. The District Court Claim Construction Order did not construe the claim phrase “hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores.” Id. patent where the processor has independent microprocessors. Patent Owner’s attempt to distinguish RS6000’s Symmetric MultiProcessor as a “configuration” (Paper 8, 24) also fails because a “Symmetric MultiProcessor configuration” is no different than the ’034 patent’s description of a configuration of independent microprocessors. Id. Paper 9, 30.9 It is apparent there is a dispute over the plain meaning of Limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1], “a second [third] hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores,” recited in the independent claims.10 The parties are ordered to propose and support a particularized plain meaning or other construction of Limitations [1.4.1], [1.5.1], and [30.1.2] in their briefs. The parties are ordered to analyze the relevant claim language and cite to the specification and prosecution history in support of their claim construction, where applicable, with particular attention to the description of a hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores in the ’034 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:11–37, 7:14–36, 9:50–10:3.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artInstituted

    “Motivation to Combine and Analogous Art The Petition offers several motivations to combine Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref in the manner claimed in the ’034 patent with a reasonable expectation of success, which we find sufficient on the present record. The Petition first asserts that Menon and Trefethen are analogous prior art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex.1001, 1:14–15; Ex.1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition points out that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition also contends that: Accordingly, Menon and Trefethen together represent a combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex.1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,570,034

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.