- Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,524,002 - Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations; claims 10–26 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan does not teach limitations [10d]–[10f].
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). The Petition further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of delivering multimedia content. Resp. 18. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions. slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 11; Resp. 18–19; Reply 5. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence “must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “‘Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). Reasonable inferences of a POSITA may suffice to establish inherent disclosure in a prior art reference such as Farber. See Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–1075 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation is whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference that every claim element is disclosed in that reference.”). Here, however, we find the Petition’s argument and evidence insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Farber inherently discloses limitation [1b].” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,140,441 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,140,441 - Fca US LLC v. Signal IP, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 19, 2016 · IPR2015-01118 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 3 is unpatentable under § 103 over three instituted combinations; claims 1 and 2 were not shown unpatentable over Mock and Steele.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Signal. In particular, FCA cites Dr. Lall’s testimony on “experience in vehicle electronics” and “experience in the design of automobile components.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 17–19). In addition, Dr. Lall testified at his deposition that an ordinarily skilled artisan also would have had the general background tools provided by obtaining a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or electrical engineering, as defined by the standard curricula for those degrees. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 11:16–15:22. Dr. Lall also referenced his familiarity with these curricula based on his employment as a professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Auburn University. See id. at 12:19–13:5; Ex. 1009 ¶ 4. Accordingly, we do not agree with Signal that Dr. Lall’s testimony as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for the ’374 patent is conclusory and/or lacking a factual basis. As such, we decline to discount the weight given to Dr. Lall’s testimony on that issue.6 Importantly, Signal never proposed an alternative definition of the ordinary level of skill in the art. See Tr. 48:17–25. As such, we have no indication from Signal about what particular aspects of FCA’s definition Signal believes are incorrect, if any. FCA’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill comports with the qualifications a person would need to understand and implement the teachings of the ’374 patent and the prior art of record. Accordingly, we apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Signal. In particular, FCA cites Dr. Lall’s testimony on “experience in vehicle electronics” and “experience in the design of automobile components.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 17–19). In addition, Dr. Lall testified at his deposition that an ordinarily skilled artisan also would have had the general background tools provided by obtaining a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or electrical engineering, as defined by the standard curricula for those degrees. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 11:16–15:22. Dr. Lall also referenced his familiarity with these curricula based on his employment as a professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Auburn University. See id. at 12:19–13:5; Ex. 1009 ¶ 4. Accordingly, we do not agree with Signal that Dr. Lall’s testimony as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for the ’374 patent is conclusory and/or lacking a factual basis. As such, we decline to discount the weight given to Dr. Lall’s testimony on that issue.6” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We are persuaded by Signal’s arguments. “Distinctive” ordinarily means “characteristic of one person or thing, and so serving to distinguish it from others.” Distinctive, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1st ed. 2001) (Ex. 3001). Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the limitation “distinctive codes for tire transmitters and vehicle function transmitters” must reflect that the recited codes distinguish tire transmitters from vehicle function transmitters. This is consistent with the surrounding language of claim 1, which recites different actions taken depending on whether the transmitted data contains “a distinctive code for tire transmitters” or “a distinctive code for the vehicle function transmitters.” This usage within the claim is important because “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In particular, “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. We also note that FCA’s proposed interpretation would read out language from the claim. Under FCA’s theory, the claim does not require the codes to distinguish between tire transmitters and vehicle function transmitters, and encompasses codes that are merely distinct from each other. In effect, FCA would have us read the limitation as “the remote transmitters all having the same data format but distinctive codes.” The claim does not stop there, however. The full limitation is “the remote transmitters all having the same data format but distinctive codes for tire transmitters and vehicle function transmitters” (emphasis added). Thus, the codes are distinctive “for” tire transmitters and vehicle function transmitters, and the processor performs different actions depending on whether the transmitted data contains “a distinctive code for tire transmitters” versus “a distinctive code for vehicle function transmitters.” FCA’s proposed interpretation would read out this important aspect of the claim. Interpreting the claim to require the codes to distinguish between the two types of transmitters also is consistent with the Specification. We agree with Signal that the usage of “distinctive codes” in claim 1 is supported by the Specification’s disclosure of an exemplary message format with a “header” that “identif[ies] the source as a tire sender or a keyless entry fob.” Ex. 1001, 4:51–55, Fig. 4. Importantly, the header is separate and distinct from the “unique transmitter identification code,” an identifier unique to each transmitter that corresponds to the “ID” block in Figure 4. Id. at 4:55– 56, Fig. 4. In other words, the Header distinguishes types of transmitters (i.e., a tire sender or keyless entry fob) by their function or category, whereas the ID uniquely identifies a particular transmitter and distinguishes it from the others. An exemplary use of the ID block is illustrated with respect to step 94 of Figure 7, and it serves to show the different uses of the Header and the ID: After a message is determined to be a tire pressure message via category identification at step 78, a low pressure warning may be displayed “for the particular tire position which sent the message as determined by the identification code incorporated in the transmission,” among other things. Id. at 5:20–23, 5:32–44, Fig. 7.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We are not persuaded by Signal’s arguments because we do not agree with Signal that Schuermann’s separate interrogation implies that a sign-up procedure is unnecessary. Rather, Schuermann is silent as to whether and how a sign-up procedure would be used, so FCA is correct that Schuermann “leaves it to persons of ordinary skill in the art to use known techniques for accomplishing transponder sign-up.” Pet. Reply 4. As such, we are persuaded by FCA’s rationale that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to incorporate Mock’s sign-up procedure to ensure reliable identification of tire transmitters. See Pet. 29–30; Ex. 1009 ¶ 35. We additionally agree with FCA that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have appreciated the benefits of adding Mock’s sign-up procedure based on the cost reductions Mock mentions that are associated with a changeable identification code at the tire transmitter. Ex. 1005, 4:47–51. Signal’s counsel conceded that Mock teaches this benefit at the oral hearing. Tr. 38:4–25.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 5,463,374 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 5,463,374 - Google, Inc. v. Personal Audio LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 9, 2016 · IPR2015-00846 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 9, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Chase and Loeb; claims 5–8, 14–17, 28, and 29 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (affirming that USPTO has statutory authority to construe claims according to Rule 42.100(b)). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification, and absent any special definition, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning. See In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In our Institution Decision, we preliminarily interpreted the “processor for . . .” elements of claims 1 and 4 Dec. 7–8. After our Institution Decision, neither party identified any issues relating to our preliminary interpretation of the “processor for . . .,” and we discern no other reason to modify our interpretation. Accordingly, we maintain our interpretation of the “processor for . . .” for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. Our interpretation is consistent with the findings of the District Court in the Apple Litigation, which interpreted the “processor for . . .” elements as recited in claims 1, 4, 5, 6, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Because the parties raise issues regarding the scope of terms introduced in claims 5, 6, and 14, we also adopt the District Court’s interpretation of those terms and the reasoning supporting those interpretations. The claim interpretations upon which we rely in resolving disputed issues are summarized in the table below.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we preliminarily interpreted the “processor for . . .” elements of claims 1 and 4 Dec. 7–8. After our Institution Decision, neither party identified any issues relating to our preliminary interpretation of the “processor for . . .,” and we discern no other reason to modify our interpretation. Accordingly, we maintain our interpretation of the “processor for . . .” for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. Our interpretation is consistent with the findings of the District Court in the Apple Litigation, which interpreted the “processor for . . .” elements as recited in claims 1, 4, 5, 6, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Because the parties raise issues regarding the scope of terms introduced in claims 5, 6, and 14, we also adopt the District Court’s interpretation of those terms and the reasoning supporting those interpretations. The claim interpretations upon which we rely in resolving disputed issues are summarized in the table below.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“As stated by the Federal Circuit, “a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “Rather, the test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. Petitioner does not seek to combine the devices of Chase and Loeb physically. Rather, Petitioner argues that Loeb describes an example of a conventional interface used for controlling a device that plays music and contends that features of that interface would have been recognized as advantageous for Chase’s affiliate terminal. We are persuaded that a skilled artisan would have sought out examples of admittedly conventional interfaces to improve the functionality of Chase’s affiliate terminal. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”).” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded that Chase teaches away from discontinuing a currently playing song to advance to a next segment. According to Chase, “[t]he jock box is a physical representation of a DAC cart located in a studio. It provides 8 pushbuttons each with an LED and a small LCD display. Conceptually the jock box is a CD player with an automated changer.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 219. As explained above, and shown in Chase’s Figure 4, DAC 52 is a component separate from remote control terminal 54. The jock box is a “physical representation of a DAC cart.” Id. We read this to be a typographical error and view the jock box as a physical representation of a DAC card, e.g., DAC card 52. If “cart” is not a typographical error, it could refer to a “cart machine,” id. ¶ 36, which also is a component separate from remote control terminal 54 (Figure 4 shows line 56 communicating with a cart, not shown). In either case, Chase’s description of a jock box does not refer to the behavior of remote control terminal 54, which is described elsewhere as follows: The DJ may also request, through the remote control terminal, that the DAC 52 start play of the next segment queued in the DAC 52, stop play of the current segment, fast forward/rewind through the current segment or to a next/previous segment. The DJ may use up/down arrows on the remote control terminal to scroll through a play list displayed to the DJ and select, out of turn, a segment from the play list. Id. ¶ 186. This description is consistent with a device that can discontinue play of a current segment and skip to the next. Thus, Chase does not teach away from a player with that behavior.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 7,509,178 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,509,178 - Daifuku Co., Ltd. / Daifuku America Corp. v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · May 3, 2016 · IPR2015-00083 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, 9, 11–15, 17, and 20 are unpatentable as anticipated by JPAP ’213; claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over JPAP ’213 and JPAP ’237.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we construed the “translating stage is configured to vertically move the gripper portion” limitation as follows: Claim 1 merely requires a translating stage configured to vertically move the gripper to a position near (“proximate”) one of two locations, a load port and a storage location. The translating stage need not be configured to move the gripper to a location proximate both because the claim uses the phrase “at least one of” those two locations. Dec. on Inst. 12. After further development of the record and consideration of the arguments presented and evidence relied upon by both parties, we determine that the above construction is appropriate with respect to this Final Written Decision. Accordingly, we construe “at least one of [a] and [b]” to mean “at least one of the listed items but not necessarily both.”” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“construction for the “at least one of” phrase, “there is no anticipation because JPAP ’213 cannot move the gripper proximate to the claimed positions.” PO Resp. 22. This argument is not persuasive because, for the reasons set forth above, the properly construed claims are not as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. See Section II.A. Even were we to conclude that Patent Owner’s proposed construction, where “at least one of” modifies both “[a]” and “[b],” Patent Owner’s arguments are not on point. Claim 1, for example, recites “the translating stage is configured to vertically move the gripper portion . . . to at least one of a second position proximate to a load port [beneath the rail] and a third position proximate to a storage location [disposed lateral to the rail].” There is no dispute that the system of JPAP ’213 is capable of moving to a location proximate a location under the rail. As to the storage location, it is not readily apparent how the above-quoted claim language requires, as Patent Owner argues, a vehicle “capable of moving the gripper/hoist mechanism laterally.” PO Resp. 23; see also Ex. 2016 ¶ 102 (Dr. Bottom’s offering the conclusory opinion that “[A] vehicle capable of moving the gripper to a position proximate to the storage location/conveyer lateral to the overhead rail must be capable of moving the gripper/hoist mechanism laterally.”). A vertically-moving system would be configured to move a gripper proximate (near, next to) an adjacent storage location even if lacking the ability to move laterally so as to place a unit on a storage shelf. Cf. Dec. on Inst. 12 (indicating our understanding of “proximate” as meaning “near”); see, e.g., Ex. 1003, col. 8, ll. 12–16 (“[The overhead hoist transport vehicle is moved along a track, as depicted in step 904, to a position adjacent the selected storage bin.”), and Figs. 3, 5b. Accordingly, we find the system of JPAP ’213 has the capability of moving to a position proximate a laterally disposed storage location as well as a positon beneath the rail. Ex. 1005, 20 (Fig. 1). Based on the argument and evidence presented in the Petition, and the insufficiency of the responsive argument and evidence presented in the Patent Owner Response, as discussed above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 3, 4, 9, 11–15, 17 and 20 are anticipated by JPAP ’213.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“paragraph 7 as providing the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to add the lateral transfer device from the conveyance truck of JPAP ’237 to moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. Dr. Sturges, moreover, does not provide a reasoned analysis based on the disclosures and embodiments of JPAP ’213 and JPAP ’237, in the context of the knowledge and skill level of a degreed engineer with 3–5 years of experience developing automated material handling systems. Dr. Sturges does not explain why and how one of ordinary skill would have selected the lateral transfer device from the conveyance truck of JPAP ’237 for use with moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 162–165. For example, there is no explanation of why one of ordinary skill would use the lateral transfer device from JPAP ’237, given that mechanically moveable storage tables already are used to effect lateral transfer of articles B on both sides of moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. See id. Even if the proposed modification were to be made, Dr. Sturges does not account for counterweight 51 in JPAP ’237, which extends laterally to the opposite side of extendable arm 42, or explain why the counterweight would not interfere with the articles and storage tables located on the opposite side of moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. Id.; see also Mot. Observ. 4–5 (quoting Ex. 2041, 70:22–71:15 (“Q. [Y]ou did not provide any testimony that the hoist vehicle of the JPAP ’213 reference can utilize the robotic arm on one side while maintaining the swinging shelves on the other side; correct? A. That’s correct.”)). To the extent Petitioner argues that Dr. Sturges has provided evidence on this point (Tr. 83:9–13), such evidence has not been cited in the Petition or the Reply, nor have we located such evidence. Pet. 48–58 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 57, 157– 196); Reply 12–13 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 162–65, and 169); Mot. Observ., 2–3 (quoting Ex. 2041, 71:23–72:9 (“Q. [Y]ou did not address whether it would have been necessary to change the functional relationship between the swinging shelf and the hoist vehicle of the JPAP ’213 reference; correct? A. That’s accurate.”)).10” slip op. at 32
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“D. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1038 and ¶¶ 3–4 of Exhibit 1040 filed by Petitioner with Petitioner’s Reply. Mot. Excl. 1 (Paper 47). Petitioner opposes the motion to exclude. Pet. Excl. Opp. 4–14 (Paper 56). Exhibit 1038 is a confidential product development plan dated September 25, 2002, and produced by Petitioner in this proceeding. Exhibit 1040 is a Second Declaration of Dr. Sturges, and paragraphs 3–4 contain his testimony explaining aspects of the confidential product development plan of Exhibit 1038. Petitioner relies on Exhibit 1038 and paragraphs 3–4 of Exhibit 1040 to rebut Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner copied Patent Owner’s invention claimed in the ’172 patent. Reply 20, 22, and 25. Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1038 and paragraphs 3–4 of Exhibit 1040 as irrelevant (Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402), inadmissible hearsay (Fed. R. 11 In view of our determination, we need not consider Patent Owner’s objective evidence of nonobviousness. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“objective evidence of nonobviousness . . . may be sufficient to disprove or rebut a prima facie case of obviousness”). PO Resp. 46–60; see also Reply 18–25. Evid. 801(c)), and unauthenticated (Fed. R. Evid. 901). Mot. Excl. 1–8. We do not rely on or address Patent Owner’s asserted objective evidence of nonobviousness or Petitioner’s rebuttal evidence in our Decision. Therefore, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibits 1038 and paragraphs 3–4 of Exhibit 1040 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 8,197,172 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,197,172
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.