- Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00349 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not disclose the claimed sequence of screen captures used to assemble a media stream.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not dispute the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 22. No express finding is necessary. The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 14–15; PO Resp. 22. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“c. Analysis “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan does not anticipate claim 1 because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 26–29. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. Sur-reply 21. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 26–29; Sur-reply 21.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“All other challenged claims require the “generating” and “assembling” operations because they depend from claims 1, 12, or 17. Petitioner does not allege that the additional references—Durante, Ma, Suzuki, Wanamaker, Heikens, Matthews, or Wilsher—teach or suggest the “temporal sequence of screen captures” recited in claim 1. Rather, Petitioner’s reasoning in the challenges to the dependent claims pertaining to the screen captures mirror the rationale presented in the independent claim. See, e.g., Pet. 25 (arguing that Avellan’s screen captures correspond to the video content in the challenge to claim 2), 26–27 (arguing that Avellan obtains screen captures from a playback of a video on the webpage in the challenge to claim 4). Petitioner’s argument that Avellan teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depend on the reasoning and insufficiently supported characterizations of Avellan in the challenges based on 35 U.S.C. § 102, as discussed above. See Pet. 40–60. grounds based on anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that any challenged claim is unpatentable as anticipated by Avellan or obvious over any of the combinations of Avellan and the other cited references.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,123,074 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,123,074 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01119 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60-64, 67-79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199-204, 208-216, 223, 225, and 230 were not proven unpatentable over the asserted combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Given our determination of how Ahn consistently describes the “touch and drag” gesture and “dragged” to mean the movement of a finger (or other object external to the touch screen), and in the absence of persuasive evidence in the figures or in other portions of Ahn to support the movement or appearance of a menu during a user input gesture, we determine that the present record does not support a conclusion that Ahn teaches or suggests a menu sliding onto a display or appearing during an input gesture such as a touch and drag gesture, as opposed to being displayed after such a gesture is completed.” slip op. at 27
- Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,656,754 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01116 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, or 230 unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed blurring …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“(Ex. 1003), that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof,” and that “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice-versa).” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–30).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “even under [this] interpretation of Ahn, the only difference between Ahn and the claims is whether the animation occurs in direct correspondence with a user’s dragging gesture or after the dragging gesture is complete – a straightforward design choice if ever there was one.” Pet. Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1024, 99:16–108:20; Ex. 1023 ¶ 12). However, as Patent Owner argues (PO Sur-reply 7–8) this argument is presented in Reply and is an improper shift of theory from the Petition. Nevertheless, were we to consider it, we would not find it compelling; Dr. Terveen’s cited testimony repeats this bare statement and is not supported by any evidence or additional explanation. Ex. 1023 ¶ 12; see 37 CFR § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (assigning little weight to opinion testimony that “merely repeats” conclusory statements in a brief, without “cit[ing] any additional supporting evidence or provid[ing] any technical reasoning to support [the declarant’s] statement”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,656,754 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2024-01115 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Apple did not prove claims 1, 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 197, 199–204, 208–216, 223, 225, and 230 unpatentable over the asserted Ahn combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“In the Decision on Institution in each proceeding, we noted that Petitioner’s definition left it unclear whether the bachelor’s degree in the proposed definition would be considered by Petitioner to be “an advancedlevel degree,” and did not adopt the portion of the definition relating to the substitution of years of experience for a degree. Dec. on Inst. 15–16. Patent Owner “does not agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill” but did not propose an alternative definition. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, adopted Dr. Terveen’s definition for the purposes of his declaration. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 32–33. We again adopt the main portion of Dr. Terveen’s definition, and determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers.” This definition is commensurate with the problems and solutions in the ’754 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction In these proceedings, there is no controversy that would require us to decide any claim construction issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Obviousness of Claims 2, 27, 37, 58, 60–64, 67–79, 186, 187, 189, 191,” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obviousness of the menus in the Ahn-Chaudhri combination following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing 01119-Petition, 26–33, substantially identical to Pet. 32– 40). However, again, the Petition does not explain an alternative theory in which Chaudhri supplements Ahn’s menu functionality to move that menu onto the screen, as opposed to teaching visual cues provided by gradual changes of the display during a gesture or the visual cue that an unlock image may provide during the unlock gesture. See Pet. 14–18 (describing Chaudhri teaching “visual differentiation” or “transitioning an optical intensity” between a user-interface object and the background, based on, e.g., transparency), 35–40 (same). In Reply, Petitioner adds evidence to attempt to support its contention that the combination teaches a menu following a user’s finger during a dragging gesture, involving references to Chaudhri’s discussion of a visual cue, further discussing Chaudhri’s unlock image. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 54, 62, 74–79, Figs. 5A-5C (cited at Pet. Reply 4–5). With respect to these citations and arguments, even if they had been timely presented in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that they do not articulate a modification of Ahn with Chaudhri or a motivation to combine. PO Sur-reply 6. Additionally, we agree that these embodiments of Chaudhri are distinct from the cited portions of Chaudhri discussed with respect to this theory in the Petition, which relate not to the movement of displayed graphics, but to variations of optical intensity and visual cues. Id. at 6–7. We evaluate the Petition’s arguments in light of Petitioner’s statement in Reply that they require a teaching regarding “menus . . . following a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture.” Pet. Reply 2. To the extent that the Petition shows that the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri would show visual changes as the user performs a dragging gesture, these do not relate to the movement of a menu, but rather to other optical effects. Thus, as we do not find that the Petition supports an Ahn-Chaudhri combination in which a menu follows a user’s finger as the user performs the dragging gesture to open the menu, as Petitioner argues, we determine that Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d of claim 2 taught or suggested by the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri according to this theory.” slip op. at 31
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“(3) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not shown limitation 2.d to be taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered obvious by Ahn and Chaudhri. Thus, we determine that Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Ahn and Chaudhri.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,656,754 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,656,754 - Shure Incorporated v. Clearone, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 14, 2022 · PGR2020-00079 · APJ David C Mckone · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to prove the asserted §112 grounds and obviousness grounds by a preponderance of the evidence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As we stated in the Institution Decision (at 30), Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable in light of the descriptions in the ’653 patent and prior art, and is supported by expert testimony. We further find that Patent Owner’s proposed addition, that a skilled artisan would have had experience with digital signal processing, is consistent with the descriptions in the ’653 patent and prior art. Because the parties do not contend that their disagreement over “at least” has any bearing on this proceeding, we need not evaluate whether a skilled artisan might have had more than three years of work experience or whether that would lead to vagueness. Instead, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, with Patent Owner’s addition, and omit “at least”: A skilled artisan would have possessed: (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or acoustical engineering that included coursework on the design of acoustic and/or antenna arrays, phased arrays, and/or beamforming; or (ii) three years of work experience in the field of directional microphone arrays; and the skilled artisan would have had experience with digital signal processing.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner that the claim limitation at issue here specifies a single device that has multiple properties. Rather, claim 1 broadly recites “a ceiling tile combined with the beamforming microphone array.” We agree with Petitioner that the plain language of claim 1 does not require that the entire beamforming microphone array is physically integrated into a single ceiling tile, as combining a ceiling tile and a microphone array is broader than physically installing the microphone array in the ceiling tile. Nor can the language of claim 1 reasonably be read to exclude combining more than one ceiling tile with the microphone array. Where claim 1 assigns specific properties to a ceiling tile, it does so expressly, reciting “the ceiling tile being sized and shaped to be mountable in a drop ceiling in place of at least one of a plurality of ceiling tiles included in the drop ceiling.” Thus, the plain language of claim 1 requires at least one ceiling tile combined in some way with a beamforming microphone array, and each ceiling tile (if there is more than one) is a particular size and shape.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Second, Patent Owner argues that our construction “should reflect the fact the microphones of a [beamforming microphone array] are located in positions relative to each other, by design, to establish constructive interference in one or more preferred beam directions.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 31–37, 48). Petitioner responds that claim 1 recites “beamforming” broadly and that Patent Owner attempts to limit “beamforming” to one technique out of several, including techniques that determine time delay between microphones rather than knowing the distances between the microphones. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 11–21). The parties’ competing proposals here are directed to Petitioner’s allegations that CTG System and Levit render the challenged claims obvious. However, as explained below, Petitioner has not established whether CTG System performs beamforming under either proposed construction. Thus, we need not resolve the parties’ claim construction dispute. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017; Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 19
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable
“Despite an obligation to identify in the Petition the evidence that supports its indefiniteness allegations,5 Petitioner largely failed to discuss the Specification. Pet. 30; see also Dec. 41 (“Despite enumerating five techniques that it contends exemplify ‘adaptive acoustic processing,’ Petitioner does little to address the description of those techniques in the Specification.”). In one passage cited by Petitioner, the Specification states that an “embodiment of Array 116 may include adaptive acoustic processing that automatically adjusts to the room configuration for the best possible audio pickup.” Ex. 1001, 6:13–16. Petitioner argues that this description “lacks any disclosure providing objective boundaries of the claim’s scope, either through definitions or working examples.” Pet. 30. Petitioner also acknowledges that the Specification “discusses acoustic echo cancellation (in general) as an additional feature from adaptive acoustic processing,” and admits that a skilled artisan “would have recognized that echo cancellation processing occurring automatically in response to a room configuration would be a meaning of adaptive acoustic processing.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:5–22). However, Petitioner does not discuss the rest of the Specification in the Petition. Petitioner should have addressed in the Petition the express descriptions of Dr. Vipperman’s enumerated examples of adaptive acoustic processing in the Specification in order to support its 5 Our rules require Petitioner to make its case in the Petition, including identifying “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” “the specific part of the claim that fails to comply with the statutory grounds raised and . . . how the identified subject matter fails to comply with the statute,” and “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b). Indeed, “[t]he Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” Id. at § 42.204(b)(5). otherwise conclusory statement that “[n]one of these techniques are described in the specification,” Pet. 32. If it was Petitioner’s position that these express descriptions were nevertheless not examples of adaptive acoustic processing, Petitioner should have made those arguments in the Petition.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,728,653 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,728,653 - Apple Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KGNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 13, 2018 · IPR2016-01863 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 4, 6-8, 10, 11, 14, 20, 21, 23, 30, 34, and 35 not shown unpatentable under the asserted § 103 grounds for failure to establish a sufficient reason to combine …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We find the Zadok testimony in this regard persuasive as it presents more than just the educational level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s proposal is more helpful as it identifies the familiar objects of the technology used by a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention: operating systems (e.g., MS-DOS, Windows, Unix) and their associated file systems (e.g., a FAT file system), device drivers for computer components and peripherals (e.g., mass storage device drivers), and communication interfaces (e.g., SCSI and PCMCIA interfaces). Ex. 1003 ¶ 28. We, therefore, determine that Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art is appropriate.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“required to enable the transfer of files from the ION node to the workstation. In this case, we have testimony from Petitioner’s expert opining that the emulation of the ION node as a disk would lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand Pucci as accomplishing the file transfer using “existing SCSI hard disk drivers.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 133. On the other hand, we have testimony of Mr. Gafford that explains Pucci’s workstation program as being involved in the request of the A-to-D converted data by “implement[ing] specific functions by enabling the reading or writing of specific block addresses within the ION drive.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 65. That is, Dr. Zadok’s view of Pucci is that once the ION system is set up to emulate a hard disk, no other software is required to transfer data. In contrast, Mr. Gafford’s testimony does not negate Pucci’s use of the SCSI protocol, but ascribes to the workstation application control over the data read, such that the software is required to enable the transfer data. In this regard, we credit the testimony of Mr. Gafford over the testimony of Dr. Zadok, as it is more consistent with the disclosure of Pucci. Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that it is “within the discretion of the trier of fact to give each item of evidence such weight as it feels appropriate”); see also, In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). As we stated above with regard to the file system limitation, Pucci’s principle of operation” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“In view of Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Pucci and Kepley, as asserted by Petitioner, to achieve the challenged claims. Our determination is based on two findings: a) First, we determine that Pucci does not teach or suggest a reason for the use of a file system for storing digitized voice messages at the ION node; and b) Second, we determine that achieving computer-to-computer file transfer, as taught by Kepley, and the “traditional” nature of the substitution proffered by Petitioner, are not sufficient motivations to modify Pucci, in light of the changes to Pucci that would impermissibly alter Pucci’s principle of operation.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner also argues that the ’746 patent works the same way as Pucci in this regard, and, therefore, buffering in real time could be handled as a file even though there is no file at the acquisition time. Reply, 8; Tr. 7 Claim 1 of the ’746 patent, for instance, requires that the “digitized analog data is stored in a file system of the data storage memory as at least one file of digitized analog data,” and Petitioner has identified the “digitized analog data” as the data from the A-to-D converters. Pet. 2728 (emphasis omitted). 24:1221. This argument risks analyzing Pucci in hindsight, with the knowledge of what is disclosed in the ’746 patent. It would be improper, absent any other evidence, for us to rely on the ’746 patent disclosure regarding real-time input to ascertain whether Pucci suggests handling its raw data in the same way. See Nike, Inc. v. adidas AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1344 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We are troubled by the Board’s citation to the ’011 patent’s written description and the corresponding appearance of using the ’011 patent to find claim 49 unpatentable.”). Instead, as stated above, we rely on what Pucci teaches to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, without the benefit of the ’746 patent disclosure. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984) (“It is difficult but necessary that the decisionmaker forget what he or she has been taught . . . about the claimed invention and cast the mind back to the time the invention was made (often as here many years), to occupy the mind of one skilled in the art.”).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,504,746 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,504,746 - 3shape Medical A/S v. Sirona Dental Systems GmbHNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 21, 2017 · IPR2016-00481 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 were not shown unpatentable: Mushabac did not anticipate claims 1–5 and 9–10, and the asserted combinations did not render claims 1–8 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We determine that only the following claim phrase requires explicit construction for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (internal citation omitted)).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner provides evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) is someone with a D.M.D. (Doctor of Medicine in Dentistry or Doctor of Dental Medicine) or D.D.S. (Doctor of Dental Surgery) and at least several years of experience with 3-D technology used in dental implant treatment, planning, and surgery. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 63–66). Alternatively, such a person may have a computer engineering degree or be a trained dental laboratory technician having substantial experience with 3-D technology and software applications used in dental implant treatment, planning, and surgery. Id. Patent Owner has accepted Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this IPR. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s definition of a POSA in this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“2. Analysis of “optical measuring of the visible surfaces of the jaw” Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires “the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Ganz agreed under cross-examination that “Mushabac optically measures the teeth [a]nd then it uses … bone sounding to measure the surfaces of the jawbone.” Ex. 2026, 252:11–20. When directly asked where a three-dimensional optical measuring of visible surfaces of the jaw was “stipulated” in Mushabac, Dr. Ganz could not identify any passage to support that assertion made in paragraph 100 of his Declaration. Id. at 248:16–252:20. We find Dr. Ganz’s cross-examination testimony to be highly persuasive and consistent with the disclosures in Mushabac and the testimony of Dr. Erickson. For the reasons given above, we determine that Mushabac does not expressly disclose an “optical” (light-based) measurement of the “visible surfaces of the jaw” in three dimensions, as recited in claim 1 of the ’006 patent.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 6,319,006 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,319,006 - RPX Corporation v. Chanbond LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 25, 2017 · IPR2016-00234 · APJ Jacqueline T Harlow · IPR · Final written decision
RPX did not prove claims 1–31 unpatentable under § 103: the record lacked an adequate reason to combine the cited references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“The broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim terms “digital stream” and “digital information stream” includes no requirement, however, that the packets of the recited stream must be differentiated from other packets by more than destination address. As explained above, independent claims 1 and 19 of the ’822 patent describe the “digital stream” as the product of the combiner combining demodulated channels identified as having information addressed to an addressable device. Ex. 1001, 12:29–40, 15:11–23. Claims 1 and 19 additionally state that the digital stream is output to the addressable device. Id. Neither claim 1 nor claim 19 recites further detail concerning the characteristics of the packets of the “digital stream.” Id. Moreover, the dependent claims of the ’822 patent suggest that a “stream” may include unrelated content from different sources that is 9 addressed to different destinations. For example, claims 14 and 28, which depend indirectly from claims 1 and 19, respectively, recite that the “combiner is configured to combine the digital information demodulated by the wireless demodulator unit with digital information received from at least one addressable device, and output the combined digital information as the outgoing digital information stream to the wideband distribution unit.” Ex. 1001, 14:14–19, 16:49–54. Thus, by their plain language, these claims contemplate that the digital information to be combined may be received from more than one addressable device, and remain agnostic regarding the relationship between the packets in a stream, or the ultimate destination of those packets. See Ex. 1020, 96:11–97:8 (testimony by Dr. Nettles that claims 13 and 14 of the ’822 patent refer to a “digital information stream” that may include packets from different devices, relating to different content, going to different destinations). The specification of the ’822 patent is likewise consistent with an understanding of the claim terms “digital stream” and “digital information stream” as being free from any requirement that the packets of the recited stream be differentiated from other packets by more than destination address. Aside from the claims themselves, the specification of the ’822 patent uses the term “digital stream” in only a single instance, to describe signal throughput (the specification nowhere uses the term “digital information stream”). Ex. 1001, 10:10–14. The specification explains that “the channel width can, for example, be increased from 6 MHz per channel to 12 MHz per channel in order to accommodate, for example, the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther
“2. Other Claim Terms In the Decision on Institution, we concluded that the claim terms “when,” “detector,” “additive signal,” and “channel identification information,” for which RPX proffered constructions in its Petition (Pet. 7– 9), did not require express construction, and should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Dec. 6. Neither RPX nor ChanBond challenges our determination that the plain and ordinary meaning of each of these terms applies in the instant proceedings. Pet. Reply 1 (“RPX agrees with the Board that affording those terms their ordinary and customary meaning is appropriate for the purposes of these proceedings.”); PO Resp. 21 (“[T]he term ‘when’ requires only its ‘ordinary and customary meaning.’ . . . [T]he term ‘detector’ is used in accordance with its regular and customary meaning[.]”), 25 (“Insofar as this construction is consistent with the ‘ordinary and customary meaning’ of this term, Patent Owner agrees, however, it should not be limited unnecessarily by the cited examples from the specification referenced by Petitioner.”), 26 (“[T]he claim is plain in meaning as written, no further construction is necessary.”). Accordingly, we conclude that none of the claim terms “when,” “detector,” “additive signal,” and “channel identification information,” requires express construction, and afford each term its plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 12
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We find that the preponderance of the evidence does not support a conclusion that an artisan of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the network gateway of Rakib with the protocols and formatting disclosed in DOCSIS 1.1.4. We are mindful that obviousness inquiry requires “an expansive and flexible approach.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. Such analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418. It is axiomatic, however, that a determination of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“RPX does not offer adequate explanation as to why a relevant skilled artisan would have sought to combine Rakib with DOCSIS 1.1.4, when Rakib is addressed to DOCSIS 1.2, and makes no mention of DOCSIS 1.1.4. Nor does RPX explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Rakib’s references to “DOCSIS 1.2 compatible,” “DOCSIS modem,” or “DOCSIS data” as suggesting combination with DOCSIS 1.1.4. In this regard, we highlight that RPX does not present evidence sufficient to establish any relationship between the cited portions of DOCSIS 1.1.4 and DOCSIS 1.2, or otherwise demonstrate a rationale for combining Rakib with 20 DOCSIS 1.1.4. Rather, RPX relies solely on Mr. Koperda’s unsupported, conclusory testimony (in a footnote) that any differences between DOCSIS 1.1.4 and DOCSIS 1.2 are “not relevant to the downstream/upstream RF channel management” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 104 n.3); testimony to which we give little weight (37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,941,822 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,941,822 - Daifuku Co., Ltd. / Daifuku America Corp. v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 3, 2016 · IPR2015-00088 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 11–16, 19, 20, and 25–36 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over JPAP ’213 and JPAP ’237 because Petitioner failed to establish a reasoned motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). No issue in this Decision requires explicit construction of any claim term. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we do not provide explicit construction for any claim terms.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“3 Although the parties argue for certain differences in the level of skill in the art, the differences are not material to our decision. Therefore, we apply Petitioner’s proffered skill level of one having at least an undergraduate degree in industrial or systems engineering and 3–5 years of experience designing systems and processes using automated material handling systems. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶ 38); PO Resp. 8–9 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 15).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“paragraph 7 as providing the motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to add the lateral transfer device from the conveyance truck of JPAP ’237 to moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. Dr. Sturges, moreover, does not provide a reasoned analysis based on the disclosures and embodiments of JPAP ’213 and JPAP ’237, in the context of the knowledge and skill level of a degreed engineer with 3–5 years of experience developing automated material handling systems. Dr. Sturges does not explain why and how one of ordinary skill would have selected the lateral transfer device from the conveyance truck of JPAP ’237 for use with moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 222–226. For example, there is no explanation of why one of ordinary skill would use the lateral transfer device from JPAP ’237, given that mechanically moveable storage tables already are used to effect lateral transfer of articles B on both sides of moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. See id. Even if the proposed modification were to be made, Dr. Sturges does not account for counterweight 51 in JPAP ’237, which extends laterally to the opposite side of extendable arm 42, or explain why the counterweight would not interfere with the articles and storage tables located on the opposite side of moving body 3 in JPAP ’213 Figure 1. Id.; Mot. Observ. 2–3 (quoting Ex. 2039, 70:22–71:15 (“Q. [Y]ou did not provide any testimony that the hoist vehicle of the JPAP ’213 reference can utilize the robotic arm on one side while maintaining the swinging shelves on the other side; correct? A. That’s correct.”)). To the extent Petitioner argues that Dr. Sturges has provided evidence on this point (Tr. 83:9–13), such evidence has not been cited in the Petition or the Reply, nor have we located such evidence. Pet. 36–49 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 218–272); Reply 11– 12 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 222–26); Mot. Observ., 1–2 (quoting Ex. 2039, 71:23–72:9 (“Q. [Y]ou did not address whether it would have been necessary to change the functional relationship between the swinging shelf and the hoist vehicle of the JPAP ’213 reference; correct? A. That’s accurate.”)).7” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We also credit the Declaration testimony of Dr. Bottoms and Patent Owner’s translator, Mr. Yazaki, and the deposition testimony of Petitioner’s translator, Mr. Chu. Mr. Chu testifies that JPAP ’213 paragraph 7 does not “say anything about the transfer means moving an article laterally.” Ex. 1035, 30:23–31:5. Mr. Yazaki’s Declaration states that paragraph 7 expresses only that “the transfer means is on the moving body side, as opposed to being on the article retaining unit side” of the conveyance system and “not [] that the transfer means is on a lateral surface of the moving body facing the article retaining unit.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 5. Dr. Bottoms testifies that a person of ordinary skill would have understood the translated phrase “on the side of the moving body” in paragraph 7 to refer to the transfer means (the hoist) being located on the moving body side of the system rather than the storage side of the system, not physically positioning the transfer means on the lateral side of moving body 3. Ex. 2013 ¶ 114. Dr. Bottoms also explains how JPAP ’213 distinguishes between vertical movement of the retaining unit transfer means and lateral movement of the article movement means MS. Id. ¶ 116 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 22). Dr. Sturges’ Declaration testimony, relied upon by Petitioner to rebut Patent Owner’s argument and evidence (Reply 8–9, citing Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 142–44), provides no analysis of paragraph 7, claim 4, or the relevant description in JPAP ’213. Rather, it mimics the error of the Petition in asserting that JPAP ’213 “teaches a system where the vehicle does the work of transferring the pods B laterally to and from the tables 11.” Ex. 1028 ¶ 142.5 Therefore, for the reasons given above, we find that JPAP ’213” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 7,165,927 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,165,927 - Daifuku Co., Ltd. / Daifuku America Corp. v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 3, 2016 · IPR2015-00085 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 6–11 and 14 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over JPAP 213 and JPAP 237 because the petitioner did not establish a reasoned motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“A conclusion of obviousness requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Rather, obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined the prior art elements in the normal course of their work to yield the claimed invention. Id. We have rejected Petitioner’s interpretation of JPAP Paragraph 7 that underpins its motivation to combine argument and Dr. Sturges’ corresponding testimony. See Section II.B.3–4 above. Although Petitioner and Dr. Sturges do provide evidence of known alternatives for laterally transferring semiconductor cassette pods in overhead rail conveyance systems (Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶ 162)), their analysis of a reason or motivation to combine the systems in the manner claimed in the ’153 patent is lacking. The insufficiency of the evidence and analysis is particularly acute when the assertion that JPAP 213 paragraph 7 “expressly contemplates” such a combination is removed from the analysis. Petitioner’s remaining argument, that it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill to make the asserted modification because it was one of a “finite number of identified, predictable solutions” and “an arrangement of old elements . . . yielding no more than one would expect from such an arrangement,” is little more than a conclusory summary of KSR without the incumbent analysis based on the facts and evidence of the present case. Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶ 164); Reply 6–7, 11–13 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 162–165). For example, Petitioner argues that “any mechanical engineer would have understood that the number of moving mechanisms should always be reduced when possible” in support of its motivation to combine argument. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 7; Ex. 1028 ¶ 165). Petitioner’s cited evidence does not support the statement; rather it relies on an incorrect interpretation of JPAP 213 paragraph 7. Dr. Sturges also acknowledges in his deposition that paragraph 165 of his Declaration relies only on Petitioner’s incorrect interpretation of JPAP 213 paragraph 7. Ex. 1034, 165:9–17 (“Q. [L]ooking at paragraph 165, I don’t see any reference to anything besides paragraph 7 of the ’213 reference. Right? A. No. 165 doesn’t have any other cite.”). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Sturges, moreover, provides a meaningful mechanical analysis or explanation beyond citing JPAP 213 paragraph 7 in support of Petitioner’s motivation to combine argument. In short, Petitioner’s conclusory paraphrasing of KSR is insufficient to satisfy its burden, particularly without the support of Petitioner’s interpretation of JPAP 213 paragraph 7. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”) (quoted with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Therefore, for the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has not satisfied its burden of proving the asserted obviousness of claims 6–11 and 14 over JPAP 213 and JPAP 237 by a preponderance of the evidence.14” slip op. at 28
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We also credit the Declaration testimony of Dr. Bottoms and Patent Owner’s translator, Mr. Yazaki, and the deposition testimony of Petitioner’s translator, Mr. Chu. Mr. Chu testifies that JPAP 213 paragraph 7 does not “say anything about the transfer means moving an article laterally.” Ex. 1035, 30:23–31:5. Mr. Yazaki’s Declaration states that paragraph 7 expresses only that “the transfer means is on the moving body side, as opposed to being on the article retaining unit side” of the conveyance system and “not . . . that the transfer means is on a lateral surface of the moving body facing the article retaining unit.” Ex. 2019 ¶ 5. Dr. Bottoms testifies that a person of ordinary skill would have understood the translated phrase “on the side of the moving body” in paragraph 7 to refer to the transfer means (the hoist) being located on the moving body side of the system rather than the storage side of the system, not physically positioning the transfer means on the lateral side of moving body 3. Ex. 2013 ¶ 114. Dr. Bottoms also explains how JPAP 213 distinguishes between vertical movement of the retaining unit transfer means and lateral movement of the article movement means MS. Id. ¶ 116 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 22). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, Dr. Bottoms’ deposition testimony is not inconsistent with his declaration testimony clarifying the interpretation of JPAP 213 paragraph 7, as discussed above. Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1043, 109:7–14). His deposition testimony is consistent with the disclosure of the retaining unit transfer means as a vertical hoist, not a lateral transfer mechanism. Dr. Sturges’ Declaration testimony, relied upon by Petitioner to rebut Patent Owner’s argument and evidence (Reply 9), provides no analysis of paragraph 7, claim 4, or the relevant description in JPAP 213. Rather, it mimics the error of the Petition in asserting that JPAP 213 “already contemplates modifying the Fig. 1 system . . . to do the work of moving [articles] B to and from the overhead locations BS, 11.” Ex. 1028 ¶ 165.11 Therefore, for the reasons given above, we find that JPAP 213” slip op. at 19
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“14 In view of our determination, we need not consider Patent Owner’s objective evidence of nonobviousness. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“objective evidence of nonobviousness . . . may be sufficient to disprove or rebut a prima facie case of obviousness”). PO Resp. 30–45; Reply 17–24. of Exhibit 1038. Petitioner relies on Exhibit 1038 and paragraphs 3–4 of Exhibit 1040 to rebut Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner copied Patent Owner’s invention claimed in the ’153 patent. Reply 18–19, 21, 23. Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1038 and paragraphs 3–4 of Exhibit 1040 as irrelevant (Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402), inadmissible hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)), and unauthenticated (Fed. R. Evid. 901). Mot. Excl. 2–8. We do not rely on or address Patent Owner’s asserted objective evidence of nonobviousness or Petitioner’s rebuttal evidence in our Decision. Therefore, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibits 1038 and paragraphs 3–4 of Exhibit 1040 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 30
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
Patent outcomesUS 7,771,153 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,771,153
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.