- Delta T, LLC v. Macroair Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 12, 2022 · IPR2021-01214 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claim 15 unpatentable as obvious over Madsen, finding the mounting shaft could be detachably secured in the hub openings and have a constant cross section.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, nor do the parties assert that there exists any such difference. Although Petitioner’s definition includes specific knowledge of fans or other rotary machines, we understand Patent Owner’s broader definition to include such knowledge. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We also find Drs. Sheard and Paulus are qualified to opine on the perspective and understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, as they have at least ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–11; Ex. 1003; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 4–11; Ex. 2002; see also Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F. 4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case— like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.”).” slip op. at 7
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“2. District Court Constructions In the related district court proceeding, the district court construed certain claim terms of the ’588 patent. Ex. 1014. Petitioner proposes claim constructions that are consistent with the district court’s constructions. Pet. 10–17. Patent Owner states that it “adopts the district court’s claim constructions for the purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 1014). The district court has construed the following ’588 patent claim terms: Term Construction “hub assembly” “a hub with multiple parts that are assembled together” (Ex. 1014, 13– 14) “openings” “one or more locations where the arm members may be detachably secured” (Ex. 1014, 12–13) “detachably secured”” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Rather than rely on the definitions of “secure” from a general dictionary, we focus on the Specification as the “single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal citation omitted). The Specification describes the use of nuts and bolts that can be used to fix or attach the arms into the slots of the hub. Ex. 1001, 4:47–51 (stating “nuts 212 can then be used to secure the arms 144 in the slots 202”) (emphasis added). But that is not the only use of “secure” in the Specification. As Petitioner notes, the Specification also describes a “securing assembly 152 that inhibits the hub from falling when the motor shaft breaks or the hub otherwise disengages from the shaft.” Id. at 3:42–45 (emphasis added). We also credit Dr. Sheard’s explanation of the operation of the ’588 patent’s securing assembly as allowing for rotational movement while preventing loss: [T]he hub 110 of the ‘588 Patent is “secured” to the motor mount 106 by way of the “securing assembly 152.” This securing assembly prevents the hub from “falling away from the motor mount” (i.e., prevents the hub from becoming lost or coming loose), but the relative engagement between the first member 154 and the second member 170 of the securing assembly continues to allow for relative rotation between the hub 110 and the motor mount 106. This relative rotation between the hub 110 and the motor mount 106 of the ‘588 Patent is not only allowed, but is absolutely necessary if the hub is going to rotate so that the fan blades may turn. Ex. 1024 ¶ 67. Patent Owner argues that the securing assembly is irrelevant to the construction of “secured” because it does not refer specifically to the arm members being detachably secured in the openings. PO Sur-reply 13. We disagree. Claim terms must be read in light of the specification and must not import limitations from the specification into the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Moreover, we presume the specification uses a word consistently throughout the patent, even if describing a different embodiment. See Energy Transp. Grp., Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (relying on the specification’s use of the word “programmable” to describe a different embodiment to construe the same term in the claim, as “there is no reason to construe the term ‘programmable’ differently when used to describe [the embodiment of the claimed invention]”); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (noting “claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent”). Thus, we decline to limit the construction of “secured” to the preferred embodiment, as proposed by Patent Owner, and consider the Specification’s description of the “securing assembly” to inform the meaning of “secured” as encompassing rotational movement and preventing loss. Accordingly, we construe the term “secured” to mean the arm members are “fixed or attached (while allowing for rotational movement) so that the arm members cannot be lost.”” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“presented at trial, we find Petitioner has the better position. We are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art, seeing the unlabeled fasteners identified by Petitioner, would have found it obvious to use removable fasteners such as screws or bolts to detachably secure the mounting shafts in the openings formed by the bearing housings. See Ex. 1006, Figs. 3 and 5 (reproduced and annotated at Pet. 41). We credit the testimony of Dr. Sheard that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make the fan blade mounting shaft of Madsen detachably secured in the openings of the hub to “allow for the replacement of worn or broken parts, or for replacement of parts according to an ordinary course of maintenance.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 119. Dr. Sheard explains that the bearings of Madsen facilitate the rotation of the fan blade mounting arms within the bearing housing and are subject to wear and tear by the nature of the friction to which they are exposed during normal use. Id. ¶ 120. Thus, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the bearings of Madsen may need to be repaired, replaced, or maintained over time, which would require a user to access the inside of the bearing housing. Id. According to Dr. Sheard, “the [person of ordinary skill in the art’s] general knowledge of the need to repair, replace, or maintain fan parts such as bearings would motivate the [ordinary artisan] to combine this knowledge with Madsen in order to make the bearing housing 54 detachable from the hub.” Id. Moreover, as Dr. Sheard further explains, we find that the ordinary artisan “would be motivated to make the unlabeled fasteners illustrated in Figure 3 of Madsen . . . to be removable fasteners (e.g. screws, bolts, or other threaded fasteners). This use of removable fasteners provides a well known and easy manner for the user to access these parts in need of replacement.” Id. Dr. Sheard opines that because fans of different sizes may require blades of different lengths and fan blade mounting shafts of different designs, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make a single hub that accommodates different mounting shafts and blade lengths using a detachably secured mounting shaft. Id. ¶ 123. In doing so, manufacturers could avoid the cost of making multiple different hubs for different sized mounting shafts and would allow the end user the advantage of choosing different blades lengths and types for a given hub. Id. Thus, we are persuaded that these known problems in the art would have motivated a person of ordinary skill to modify Madsen to use a detachably secured mounting shaft. See ABT Sys., LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 797 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“It is well settled that, even where references do not explicitly convey a motivation to combine, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Finally, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s assertion that because detachably secured connections between an intermediate arm member and hub were well known to a person of ordinary skill in the art, it would have been obvious to combine those known connections with the design of Madsen “as an art equivalent type of connection, yielding the predictable result of restraining movement of the intermediate arm member with respect to the hub.” Id. ¶ 124; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,579,588 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,579,588 - Nichia Corporation v. Document Security Systems, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 18, 2022 · IPR2018-01165 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 16–19 after their statutory disclaimer and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Moreover, under 37 § C.F.R. 42.73(b), a “party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” The only claims before us on remand have been disclaimed. Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer to be a request for adverse judgment as to those claims which remain before us, which we now grant.” slip op. at 3
- RemandOther
“Written Decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 31, 32. The court issued its decision affirming our findings as to all claims except claims 15–19. Nichia Corp. v. Document Sec. Sys., Inc., Nos. 2020-2261, 2020-2287, 2022 WL 1218036, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2022). Specifically, the court reversed our determination that Petitioner had not shown independent claim 15 to be unpatentable and remanded for further proceedings regarding dependent claims 16–19. Id. On June 14, 2022, the court issued the formal mandate. Paper 33. On June 23, 2022, Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed claims 16–19 of the ’087 patent. Thus, claims 16–19 are no longer part of this proceeding and no issues remain for us to consider on remand. See Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (noting that disclaiming claims effectively eliminates those claims from the patent as though the disclaimed claims had never existed (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Asetek Danmark A/S v. CoolIT Sys., Inc., IPR2020-00747, Paper 42 at 6 (PTAB Sept. 30, 2021) (determining that a proceeding); cf. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,524,087 - Ford Motor Company v. Safe Driving Technologies LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 14, 2022 · IPR2021-01353 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner after it disclaimed claims 1–7 and 14–16, the only claims at issue, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Actions constituting a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Patent Owner has disclaimed, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), claims 1–7 and 14–16 of the ’709 patent, and has requested that the Board enter adverse judgment against it with respect to these claims, the only claims at issue in this proceeding. Ex. 3002; Paper 14. Having reviewed Patent Owner’s disclaimer and request, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–7 and 14–16 of the ’709 patent is appropriate.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,532,709 - Exactech, Inc. v. Zimmer, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 9, 2022 · IPR2022-00840 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 18–21 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that DeOrio and Stulberg rendered the claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“press-fit or screwed to the tibia. Pet. 33. Petitioner and its declarant, Mr. Drewry, rely on column six, lines 28–33 and Figure 4 to support the contention that “DeOrio discloses an intramedullary rod 28 that is secured to the tibia by being press-fit or screwed into a bore drilled into the intramedullary canal of the tibia.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1004, 6:28–33, Fig. 4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50, 73); Ex. 1003 ¶ 73 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:28–33, Fig. 4). However, DeOrio makes no such disclosure of a press-fit or screwed connection between the intermedullary rod and the tibia. The relevant portion of column six discloses only that “a bore is drilled into the intramedullary canal of a patient’s tibia.” Ex. 1004, 6:30–31. Figure 4 illustrates shaft 30 of intermedullary rod 28 extending into the tibia, presumably in the bore drilled therein. DeOrio does not provide details regarding how the intermedullary rod is positioned within the bore, and certainly makes no disclosure of a press-fit or screwed connection as asserted by Petitioner. Thus, DeOrio does not support Petitioner’s contentions.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“For at least the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that DeOrio discloses or teaches a fastener as recited in claim 18. Petitioner’s reliance on Stulberg to teach a computer-assisted tracking system does not correct this deficiency. See Pet. 38–41. Therefore, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claim 18 or its dependent claims 19–21 would have been obvious in view of DeOrio and Stulberg.” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,029,477 - PTAB · Sep 21, 2022 · IPR2022-00707 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–17, 19, and 20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Smith renders at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“from Mr. Crevelt. Based largely on this testimony, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Smith discloses a “method of electronic fund transfer between a stored value account and a gaming account” as recited in limitation [1.0].” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“based on Sommer. Pet. 49–84. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner meets the threshold for institution by demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Smith, we need not decide whether Petitioner’s other challenges demonstrate the same. The challenges based on Sommer, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record. Because “[e]qual treatment of claims and grounds for institution purposes has pervasive support in SAS,” we institute review of all the challenges as raised in the Petition. See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,785,926 - PTAB · Sep 21, 2022 · IPR2022-00706 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–17, 19, and 20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Smith renders at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“§ 314, the Office may not institute review of fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). For the reasons expressed below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing that at least claim 1 is unpatentable. In accordance with the SAS decision and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a), we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’176 patent on all grounds alleged by Petitioner. D. THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Here, neither party proposes an interpretation of the claim terms beyond their ordinary and customary meaning. See Pet. 10. Thus, at this stage, we see no reason to depart from that approach. B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage, Patent Owner does not contest Mr. Crevelt’s testimony, and we discern no reason to question Mr. Crevelt’s credibility. Thus, for purposes of institution, we adopt the level of skill in the art proffered by Petitioner. C. LEGAL STANDARDS” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner challenges claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–17, 19, and 20 as obvious based on Sommer. Pet. 49–84. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner meets the threshold for institution by demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Smith, we need not decide whether Petitioner’s other challenges demonstrate the same. The challenges based on Sommer, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record. Because “[e]qual treatment of claims and grounds for institution purposes has pervasive support in SAS,” we institute review of all the challenges as raised in the Petition. See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,466,176 - PTAB · Aug 31, 2022 · IPR2022-00696 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 6, 8–12, and 15–20 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Smith.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Preamble—“computer-based method of transferring funds between a stored value account and a gaming account” (Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 36, 39, 43, 45, 92, Figs. 1, 3, 6;; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 99–102)); Method Step 1—“receiving, by one or more computing devices, a player identifier of a player, wherein the player identifier is associated with a gaming account having a balance maintained by a casino computing system” (Pet. 15–19 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9–19, 34–36, 39, 41–46, 47, 49, 59, 73, 76–78, 85–86, Figs. 1, 3, 6; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 104– 113)); Method Step 2—“identifying, by any of the one or more computing devices, a stored value account based at least partially on the player identifier, wherein the stored value account is associated with a stored value payment vehicle issued to the player, and wherein a balance of the stored value account is maintained by an issuer processor computing system” (Pet. 19–23 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, ¶¶ 17, 33– 35, 41, 43–44, 49, 56, 58, 75, 77–78, 84, 91, 93–94, Figs. 1, 3, 5, 6; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 114–124)); and Method Steps 3 and 4—“instructing, by any of the one or more computing devices, the issuer processor computing system to decrease the balance of the stored value account; and instructing, by any of the one or more computing devices, the casino computing system to increase the balance of the gaming account.” (Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 44–45, 77–79, 85, Figs. 3, 6; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 125–130)). At this stage, Sightline does not respond to Everi’s showing. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Everi’s contentions, the cited portions of Smith, and the testimony of Everi’s declarant), we are persuaded that Everi demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Smith.” slip op. at 5
Nonecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,998,708 - PTAB · Aug 31, 2022 · IPR2022-00614 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, 6–11, 14–20, and 22–26 based on a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Smith.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner’s arguments (id. at 10–24) and the supporting testimony of Dwight Crevelt (Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 99–131) demonstrate, in a manner that is sufficiently persuasive at this stage of the proceeding, that Smith teaches or suggests each limitation of claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its argument that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We, therefore, institute an inter partes review as to all grounds and all challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60; AC Techs., 912 F.3d at 1364.” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“during the relevant time frame “would have a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Engineering or Computer Science, or an equivalent degree, with at least two years of experience in casino or gaming transaction facilitation, or related technologies.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 37). Patent Owner does not presently challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. We also find that Petitioner’s formulation is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes construction for any of the claim terms. Pet. 9–10. Accordingly, we decline to construe any claim terms at this time. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner’s arguments (id. at 10–24) and the supporting testimony of Dwight Crevelt (Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 99–131) demonstrate, in a manner that is sufficiently persuasive at this stage of the proceeding, that Smith teaches or suggests each limitation of claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its argument that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We, therefore, institute an inter partes review as to all grounds and all challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60; AC Techs., 912 F.3d at 1364.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,708,809 - PTAB · Aug 31, 2022 · IPR2022-00663 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
Review instituted for claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11–17, 19, and 20; Everi showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Smith.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“6. Conclusion We have fully considered Everi’s showing with respect to how Smith discloses or renders obvious each of the steps of method claim 1. See Pet. 14–27. In doing so, we conclude that Everi demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that the method of challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Smith.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“over Smith. See Pet. 10–47. In challenging claim 1, Everi provides a detailed mapping of how Smith satisfies each of the recited steps. See id. at 17–27. Although Sightline does not respond to Everi’s challenge at this stage, we nonetheless consider Everi’s showing with respect to each of the recited steps of method claim 1.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). That is, “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning’ . . . that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13. Here, neither party proposes an express construction of the claim terms beyond their ordinary and customary meaning. See Pet. 10. Thus, at this stage, we see no reason to further construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Everi’s declarant, Mr. Crevelt, testifies that one skilled in the art during the relevant time frame “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Engineering or Computer Science, or an equivalent degree, with at least two years of experience in casino or gaming transaction facilitation, or related technologies.” Ex. 1001 ¶ 37. At this stage, Everi’s formulation of the relevant skill in the art appears reasonable. Hence, we adopt it for purposes of institution. We also note that Everi’s formulation appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,196,123 - PTAB · Jul 14, 2022 · IPR2022-00411 · APJ Paul J Korniczky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11, or 13 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and other evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11, and 13 of the ’690 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“2 The substantive discussion in Petitioner’s three declarations are essentially identical to each other and to the Petition. For example, pages 40–74 of the Petition are essentially identical to a single paragraph in each of the declarations –– Hopkins Decl. ¶ 88 on pages 54–92, Keough Decl. ¶ 88 on pages 63–97, and Denton Decl. ¶ 65 on pages 46–81. Thus, we question whether the declarations provide independent analysis and we give the declarations little, if any, weight. See Intex Recreation Corp. et al. v. Team Worldwide Corp., IPR2018-00875, Paper 129 at 40, n. 15 (PTAB Sept. 11, 2019) (“We further note that Dr. Stevick’s testimony is nearly identical to the language appearing in the Patent Owner Response, down to the case citation. This identity in language causes us to attribute less weight to a declarant’s testimony.” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s definition is unclear. Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition includes unclear and subjective requirements such as that the person of ordinary skill in the art have (a) worked “long enough to be aware of” certain items, including unexplained “primary existing RV features,” (b) familiarity with unexplained “common terminology,” (c) “good mechanical aptitude,” (d) “good spatial perception,” (e) “significant experience” with a wide variety of roles, and (f) “sufficient awareness of the various governmental regulations applicable to RVs.” Id. (citing Pet. 18–20). Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’690 patent. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“While we generally agree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a truss and beam, as used in the ’690 patent, are two different structures, serve different purposes, and provide different benefits to the overall design of a chassis, Patent Owner identifies the function, but not the structure, of a truss and beam. After considering the extrinsic and intrinsic evidence, we construe: (1) a beam to be a “body, with one dimension large compared with the other dimensions, configured to carry lateral loads (perpendicular to the large and bending dimension) and bending movements;” and (2) a truss to be a “frame built from members in tension and compression.” These definitions are consistent with the support structures shown in Figures 7 and 9 and discussed in column 3, lines 21–48 of the Specification. Referring to Figures 7 and 9, for example, truss 93C is a frame built from members in tension and compression and beam 93D has one large dimension and supports loads applied to its perpendicular axis. In addition, third section 93 of chassis 90 has beams, not trusses. Ex. 1001, 3:26–28.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,046,690
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.